Image provided by: University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries, Lincoln, NE
About Hesperian student / (Lincoln [Neb.]) 1872-1885 | View Entire Issue (Nov. 15, 1888)
2 THE HESPERIAN, But it may be urged that this continuous exodus will leave the acres without occupants. In a country that offers so many inducements to agriculture, there need be no cause for fear. Do we ever hear the farmers say that there should be more of them? And are we not yearly exporting ship-load after ship-load of farm products? Europe is sending us men to fill the places left vacant. And if theenei getic American sons and grandsons of those for eigners choose to leave the farms, the land will not be idle. Brainy farmers, and brainy men in general, be lieve and are advocating a policy quite different from that of the conservative journalists, and yet the words of the latter are not wasted. For the sup posed evil the remedy commonly proposed is to beautify the farms and farm homes, and to give the boys the mind-food they require, in the best books This ought to be advocated and practiced. Boys so nourished mentally will become the better citizens, on the farm or in the city. WHO WAS THE GREATEST UNION GENERAL OF THE WAR? The Civil war was a great biographical educator, but its teachings of the lives of men must be accepted with cau tion, for pepple arc prone to regard actions as justified by sue cess, and condemned by failure. In war, where success, quick and certain, is the prime requisite, caution is seldom consid ered the better part of valor; and the stratigest, who eschews battles and moves with consummate skill on the military chess board is often sacrificed to the warrior who seeks only battle and "never maneuvers." Most lamentably was this true in the Civil war, which, from the beginning, was characterized by the inefficiency and timidity of the authorities. The ad ministration, composed almost entirely of new military men, hung like a mill stone about the neck of the commanding gen eral. Unable from the nature of their training to understand the sound .military reasons which he gave for his actions, and hampered by an unreasonable concern, for the safety of the capital, they refused sanction to his plans of campaign or granted it only with embarrassing restrictions, which made success out of the question, and defeat well nigh certain. The popular cry was success, "On to Richmond," and success in generalship was made the price of continuance in power. General after general was placed in command, only to carry out his single restricted campaign, and then to follow his predecessor into oblivion. Yet so fickle was the administra tion that, after it had once dismissed General McClellan for in competency, it hesitated not to reinstate him at a time when the first great crisis was at hand, and the first great battle was to be fought on northern soil. Was it any wonder, then, that the the strategist was oftimes sacrificed to the warrior? Mere succcess must not be considered the criterion of genius; but rather, success viewed by the side of the difficulties over come. A genius may often be unsuccessful, and the proverb ially successful man is seldom a genius, but more often a child of fortune. General Grant is popularly considered the greatest north rrn (general of the war. Those who are responsible for this sentiment areon the.onehand, the old soldiers, whose love foi him exceeds their judgment, and, on the other, the enthu siastic historian, who is a mere annalist and not a critic. General Grant was essentially a favorite of fortune; and, al though moralists would have us believe that "good luck" and "bad luck" are mere terms used to cover laziness or lack of dispatch, still history and experience show that there is some thing beyond a man's will, which often shapes his career. It was Grant's luck at Fort Donclsun that Buckner, the only man who possessed any kind of a military training, was third in command. It was Grant's luck that General C. F. Smith, by far the greatest general in that region, died soon after It was his luck at Shiloh that brought Bucll's soldiers on the field in the evening of the fateful April 6. General Grant, in his memoirs, maintains that Bucll's soldiers did not arrive until the morning of April 7; but the contrary evidence of historians, who were not personally connected with the battle, must be considered overpowering. At Vicksburg it was luck, and luck only, which made Grant's project of cut ting loose from his base successful. In later days, when the success of such maneuvers has been demonstrated by Sher man's great march, it is natural for us to consider Grant's movement to the rear of Vicksburg a stroke of genius; but, in those days, when such a movement was untried and un certain, it could be considered only hazardous, if not fooj hardy. It was contrary to sound military reason. The chances of failure far exceeded the chances of success; and none but a Napoleon would have dared take those chances. Had Grant failed his military career would have ended theie; and the fact that he did not fail is attributable more to his wonderful luck than to his genius. Success", that most unfair criterion, caused his movement to be ended as the woik of genius; but never in all history has genius appeared in one solitary flash, proceeded and followed by mediocrity. It was fortunate for Grant that Johnston was powerful without, and Pcmberton conceited within. At Chattanooga, it is com monly thought, his genius begins to appear; and his method of opening a "cracker line," and the capture of Lookout Mountain certainly seem to indicate such. Yet, he had to reinforce himself with Sherman's entire army and part of the army of the Potomac. It is true that Longstreet, with his powerful corps, was practically on the scene at Knoxville; and yet the fact that he helped Bragg defeat Rosccranz at Chickamauga is entirely iorgotten in our condemnation of the latter general. Yet in spite of this, does the popular ad miration center in Grant? No, few people even know that he was present; but it centers in the army of the Cumberland, Rosecranz's old command, and in its immortal charge up Mis sionary Ridge. It was Grant's fortune that he began his military career in obscurity, free from the criticising eye of the administration. McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and Burnside all fulfilled their work in emancipating the administration from General Hal leek; and in educating it up to a knowledge of its military ig norance, and to the necessity of placing full confidence in the commanding general. It was Grant's fortune that he achieved his success at the time when all vigor had been ex hausted in that education, and when, finally, after three long years, an army had been formed, and the unqualified freedom given to use that army. Grant was the only general of any re nown thac they could choose ;and they chose him because he had succeeded in small achievements, while the others had failed in achieving the impossible. McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and Burnside by their failures made it possible tor Grant to suc ceed. They were the rounds in the ladder up which Grant mounted. They prepared the sword giving it a wonderfully keen edgewith which Grant struck. Ki
