2
THE HESPERIAN,
But it may be urged that this continuous exodus
will leave the acres without occupants. In a country
that offers so many inducements to agriculture,
there need be no cause for fear. Do we ever hear
the farmers say that there should be more of them?
And are we not yearly exporting ship-load after
ship-load of farm products? Europe is sending us
men to fill the places left vacant. And if theenei
getic American sons and grandsons of those for
eigners choose to leave the farms, the land will not
be idle.
Brainy farmers, and brainy men in general, be
lieve and are advocating a policy quite different
from that of the conservative journalists, and yet
the words of the latter are not wasted. For the sup
posed evil the remedy commonly proposed is to
beautify the farms and farm homes, and to give the
boys the mind-food they require, in the best books
This ought to be advocated and practiced. Boys so
nourished mentally will become the better citizens,
on the farm or in the city.
WHO WAS THE GREATEST UNION GENERAL OF
THE WAR?
The Civil war was a great biographical educator, but
its teachings of the lives of men must be accepted with cau
tion, for pepple arc prone to regard actions as justified by sue
cess, and condemned by failure. In war, where success, quick
and certain, is the prime requisite, caution is seldom consid
ered the better part of valor; and the stratigest, who eschews
battles and moves with consummate skill on the military chess
board is often sacrificed to the warrior who seeks only battle
and "never maneuvers." Most lamentably was this true in
the Civil war, which, from the beginning, was characterized
by the inefficiency and timidity of the authorities. The ad
ministration, composed almost entirely of new military men,
hung like a mill stone about the neck of the commanding gen
eral. Unable from the nature of their training to understand
the sound .military reasons which he gave for his actions,
and hampered by an unreasonable concern, for the safety of
the capital, they refused sanction to his plans of campaign
or granted it only with embarrassing restrictions, which made
success out of the question, and defeat well nigh certain. The
popular cry was success, "On to Richmond," and success in
generalship was made the price of continuance in power.
General after general was placed in command, only to carry
out his single restricted campaign, and then to follow his
predecessor into oblivion. Yet so fickle was the administra
tion that, after it had once dismissed General McClellan for in
competency, it hesitated not to reinstate him at a time when
the first great crisis was at hand, and the first great battle
was to be fought on northern soil. Was it any wonder, then,
that the the strategist was oftimes sacrificed to the warrior?
Mere succcess must not be considered the criterion of genius;
but rather, success viewed by the side of the difficulties over
come. A genius may often be unsuccessful, and the proverb
ially successful man is seldom a genius, but more often a
child of fortune.
General Grant is popularly considered the greatest north
rrn (general of the war. Those who are responsible for this
sentiment areon the.onehand, the old soldiers, whose love
foi him exceeds their judgment, and, on the other, the enthu
siastic historian, who is a mere annalist and not a critic.
General Grant was essentially a favorite of fortune; and, al
though moralists would have us believe that "good luck" and
"bad luck" are mere terms used to cover laziness or lack of
dispatch, still history and experience show that there is some
thing beyond a man's will, which often shapes his career.
It was Grant's luck at Fort Donclsun that Buckner, the only
man who possessed any kind of a military training, was third
in command. It was Grant's luck that General C. F. Smith,
by far the greatest general in that region, died soon after
It was his luck at Shiloh that brought Bucll's soldiers on the
field in the evening of the fateful April 6. General Grant,
in his memoirs, maintains that Bucll's soldiers did not arrive
until the morning of April 7; but the contrary evidence of
historians, who were not personally connected with the
battle, must be considered overpowering. At Vicksburg it
was luck, and luck only, which made Grant's project of cut
ting loose from his base successful. In later days, when the
success of such maneuvers has been demonstrated by Sher
man's great march, it is natural for us to consider Grant's
movement to the rear of Vicksburg a stroke of genius; but,
in those days, when such a movement was untried and un
certain, it could be considered only hazardous, if not fooj
hardy. It was contrary to sound military reason. The
chances of failure far exceeded the chances of success; and
none but a Napoleon would have dared take those chances.
Had Grant failed his military career would have ended theie;
and the fact that he did not fail is attributable more to his
wonderful luck than to his genius. Success", that most unfair
criterion, caused his movement to be ended as the woik of
genius; but never in all history has genius appeared in one
solitary flash, proceeded and followed by mediocrity. It was
fortunate for Grant that Johnston was powerful without, and
Pcmberton conceited within. At Chattanooga, it is com
monly thought, his genius begins to appear; and his method
of opening a "cracker line," and the capture of Lookout
Mountain certainly seem to indicate such. Yet, he had to
reinforce himself with Sherman's entire army and part of the
army of the Potomac. It is true that Longstreet, with his
powerful corps, was practically on the scene at Knoxville;
and yet the fact that he helped Bragg defeat Rosccranz at
Chickamauga is entirely iorgotten in our condemnation of
the latter general. Yet in spite of this, does the popular ad
miration center in Grant? No, few people even know that he
was present; but it centers in the army of the Cumberland,
Rosecranz's old command, and in its immortal charge up Mis
sionary Ridge.
It was Grant's fortune that he began his military career in
obscurity, free from the criticising eye of the administration.
McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and Burnside all fulfilled their
work in emancipating the administration from General Hal
leek; and in educating it up to a knowledge of its military ig
norance, and to the necessity of placing full confidence in
the commanding general. It was Grant's fortune that he
achieved his success at the time when all vigor had been ex
hausted in that education, and when, finally, after three long
years, an army had been formed, and the unqualified freedom
given to use that army. Grant was the only general of any re
nown thac they could choose ;and they chose him because he had
succeeded in small achievements, while the others had failed
in achieving the impossible. McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and
Burnside by their failures made it possible tor Grant to suc
ceed. They were the rounds in the ladder up which Grant
mounted. They prepared the sword giving it a wonderfully
keen edgewith which Grant struck.
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