

But it may be urged that this continuous exodus will leave the acres without occupants. In a country that offers so many inducements to agriculture, there need be no cause for fear. Do we ever hear the farmers say that there should be more of them? And are we not yearly exporting ship-load after ship-load of farm products? Europe is sending us men to fill the places left vacant. And if the energetic American sons and grandsons of those foreigners choose to leave the farms, the land will not be idle.

Brainy farmers, and brainy men in general, believe and are advocating a policy quite different from that of the conservative journalists, and yet the words of the latter are not wasted. For the supposed evil the remedy commonly proposed is to beautify the farms and farm homes, and to give the boys the mind-food they require, in the best books. This ought to be advocated and practiced. Boys so nourished mentally will become the better citizens, on the farm or in the city.

WHO WAS THE GREATEST UNION GENERAL OF THE WAR?

The Civil war was a great biographical educator, but its teachings of the lives of men must be accepted with caution, for people are prone to regard actions as justified by success, and condemned by failure. In war, where success, quick and certain, is the prime requisite, caution is seldom considered the better part of valor; and the strategist, who eschews battles and moves with consummate skill on the military chess-board is often sacrificed to the warrior who seeks only battle and "never maneuvers." Most lamentably was this true in the Civil war, which, from the beginning, was characterized by the inefficiency and timidity of the authorities. The administration, composed almost entirely of new military men, hung like a mill stone about the neck of the commanding general. Unable from the nature of their training to understand the sound military reasons which he gave for his actions, and hampered by an unreasonable concern, for the safety of the Capital, they refused sanction to his plans of campaign or granted it only with embarrassing restrictions, which made success out of the question, and defeat well nigh certain. The popular cry was success, "On to Richmond," and success in generalship was made the price of continuance in power. General after general was placed in command, only to carry out his single restricted campaign, and then to follow his predecessor into oblivion. Yet so fickle was the administration that, after it had once dismissed General McClellan for incompetency, it hesitated not to reinstate him at a time when the first great crisis was at hand, and the first great battle was to be fought on northern soil. Was it any wonder, then, that the the strategist was oftentimes sacrificed to the warrior? Mere success must not be considered the criterion of genius; but rather, success viewed by the side of the difficulties overcome. A genius may often be unsuccessful, and the proverbially successful man is seldom a genius, but more often a child of fortune.

General Grant is popularly considered the greatest northern general of the war. Those who are responsible for this sentiment are, on the one hand, the old soldiers, whose love

for him exceeds their judgment, and, on the other, the enthusiastic historian, who is a mere annalist and not a critic. General Grant was essentially a favorite of fortune; and, although moralists would have us believe that "good luck" and "bad luck" are mere terms used to cover laziness or lack of dispatch, still history and experience show that there is something beyond a man's will, which often shapes his career. It was Grant's luck at Fort Donelson that Buckner, the only man who possessed any kind of a military training, was third in command. It was Grant's luck that General C. F. Smith, by far the greatest general in that region, died soon after. It was his luck at Shiloh that brought Buell's soldiers on the field in the evening of the fateful April 6. General Grant, in his memoirs, maintains that Buell's soldiers did not arrive until the morning of April 7; but the contrary evidence of historians, who were not personally connected with the battle, must be considered overpowering. At Vicksburg it was luck, and luck only, which made Grant's project of cutting loose from his base successful. In later days, when the success of such maneuvers has been demonstrated by Sherman's great march, it is natural for us to consider Grant's movement to the rear of Vicksburg a stroke of genius; but, in those days, when such a movement was untried and uncertain, it could be considered only hazardous, if not foolhardy. It was contrary to sound military reason. The chances of failure far exceeded the chances of success; and none but a Napoleon would have dared take those chances. Had Grant failed his military career would have ended there; and the fact that he did not fail is attributable more to his wonderful luck than to his genius. Success, that most unfair criterion, caused his movement to be ended as the work of genius; but never in all history has genius appeared in one solitary flash, preceded and followed by mediocrity. It was fortunate for Grant that Johnston was powerful without, and Pemberton conceited within. At Chattanooga, it is commonly thought, his genius begins to appear; and his method of opening a "cracker line," and the capture of Lookout Mountain certainly seem to indicate such. Yet, he had to reinforce himself with Sherman's entire army and part of the army of the Potomac. It is true that Longstreet, with his powerful corps, was practically on the scene at Knoxville; and yet the fact that he helped Bragg defeat Rosecranz at Chickamauga is entirely forgotten in our condemnation of the latter general. Yet in spite of this, does the popular admiration center in Grant? No, few people even know that he was present; but it centers in the army of the Cumberland, Rosecranz's old command, and in its immortal charge up Missionary Ridge.

It was Grant's fortune that he began his military career in obscurity, free from the criticising eye of the administration. McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and Burnside all fulfilled their work in emancipating the administration from General Halleck; and in educating it up to a knowledge of its military ignorance, and to the necessity of placing full confidence in the commanding general. It was Grant's fortune that he achieved his success at the time when all vigor had been exhausted in that education, and when, finally, after three long years, an army had been formed, and the unqualified freedom given to use that army. Grant was the only general of any renown that they could choose; and they chose him because he had succeeded in small achievements, while the others had failed in achieving the impossible. McClellan, Hooker, Pope, and Burnside by their failures made it possible for Grant to succeed. They were the rounds in the ladder up which Grant mounted. They prepared the sword—giving it a wonderfully keen edge—with which Grant struck.