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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (May 17, 1901)
""wpfwif nMvpvfX'ir TWWw9nwfT " "W -r- Ratify the Treaty. Declare the Nation's Policy. I gladly avail myself of the columns of the Journal to suggest a few reasons why the op ponents of a colonial policy should make their light in support of a resolution declaring the na tion's purpose rather than against the ratification o the treaty. The conflict between the doctrine of self-government and the doctrine of. alien government supported by external force has been thrust upon the American people as a result of the war. It is so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided, and, since it deals with a question now before congress, it must be considered immediately. It Is useless to ask what effect this new issue will have upon other issues. Issues must be met as they arise; they cannot be moved about at will like pawns upon a chess board. The opponents of imperialism have an oppor tunity to choose the ground upon which the battle is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification of the treaty? First, because a victory won against the treaty would prove only temporary if the people really favor a colonial policy. That a victory won against the treaty would depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct action for a time, but a minority, so long as it re mains a minority, cart only delay action and en force reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a policy. ."When there seemed some probability of the rejection of the treaty the friends of the admin istration began to suggest the propriety of with holding the treaty until the new senate could be convened in extra session. As the new senate will have a considerable republican majority it would be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an ef fort to prevent the ratification of the treaty -would be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us suppose it possible to defeat ratification in both the present and the next senate what would be the result? Would the imperialists aftafa'don the hope of annexing the Philippines so long as they could claim the support of- the president-land a majority of both houses? Could a minority of the senate prevent the annexation of Hawaii? .As -e are now in possession of the Philippine islands the advo cates of a colonial policy iu jht secure an ap propriation sufficient to pay the twenty millions agreed upon and leave ue rest of the treaty for future consideration. In other words, if the op ponents of imperialism have a majority In both houses they can declare the nation's policy; if the Imperialists have a majority in both houses they cannot be permanently thwarted by a minority In the senate. A resolution declaring the nation's policy recognizes that the destiny of the United States is In the hands of all the people and seeks to ascer tain at once the sentiment of the people as re flected by their representatives. If that decision is in harmony with the policy which has prevailed in the past the question will be settled and the people will return to the con sideration of domestic problems. If, however, the advocates of imperialism eitner postpone consid eration or control the action of . mgress an ap peal will be taken to the voters at the next elec tion. So great a change in cur national policy cannot be made unless the authority therefor comes directly and unequivocally from that source of all power iu a republic the people. In answer to those who fear that the question of imperialism, if discussed, will draw attention away from other quest!ons,It is sufficient to say that the people cannot be prevented from consid ering a question which reaches down to the foun dation principles of the republic. Instead of avoid ing the issue it is the part of wisdom ito deal wiui it at once and dispose of it permanently. The Commoner. ' Second, tho rejection of the treaty would bo unwise because the opponents of the treaty would bo compelled to assume responsibility for the con tinuance of war conditions and for the risks which always attend negotiations with a hostile nation. The rejection of (ho treaty would give tho ad ministration an excuse for military expenditures which could not bo justified after tho conclusion of peace, and tho opponents of tho treaty would bo charged with making sucn appropriations nec essary. It must be remembered that in caso tho treaty is rejected negotiations must be renewed with an enemy whose ill-will is not concealed. Who is able to guarantee the nation against new dangers and new complications? In order to form an estimate of the risks which would thus bo in curred, one has only to recall the unexpected things which have happened since war was de clared. Is it wise to so make the attack as to as sume all the risks when the same end can bo gained by a plan which throws the risks upon our opponents? If the imperialists vote down a reso lution declaring the nation's policy or postpone its consideration,they becomo-responsible for any loss of life or expenditure of money which may follow as a result of such action. I suggest below a few reasons in support of a resolution declaring it to be the nation's purpose to establish a stable government In Cuba and the Philippines and then to give the inhabitants inde pendence under an American protectorate which will guard them against molestation from with out. First, such a course is consistent with national honor. Our nation owes it to the nations, with which we haye dealings, as well)fas to. the, inhabitants of., Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, 'to announce l immediately what it intends to do respecting tho territory surrendered by Spain. The president has said that the only purpose our nation has in. taking possession of Cuba is to assist the inhabitants to establish a stable and In dependent government. , It can do no harm for congress to reaffirm this purpose, and it may do much good. The Cubans, having fought for inde pendence for many years and against great odds, are naturally jealous of tho liberty which they have won and no doubt should be left as to the sincerity and good faith of our government in its dealings with them. Such a declaration would not only be harmless, but it is almost made necessary by the flippant, if not contemptuous, tone in which some United States officials speak of the intelli gence and patriotism of the Cubans and of their right to independence. The duty of declaring our national policy in regard to the Philippines Is even more imperative. The Filipinos were fighting for independence when the United States declared war against Spain. In the formal protest filed with the peace commissioners in Paris the representatives of Aguinaldo assert that they received friendly as surances from United States ofifcials, and acted upon those assurances in co-operating against the Spaniards. Whether or not such assurances were given, frankness and honesty should characterize our dealings with them. If, we announce to the world that we hold tho Philippine jsjands, not for pecuniary profit, but in trust for the inhabitants; if we declare that our only purpose is to assist the Filipinos to establish a stable and independent government, friendly re lations will be maintained and there will be little need of troops. . If, on tho other hand, the Fili pinos are not to have independence, but merely a changeof masters we should break the news to them at once and "send over a large army to in struct them in the principles of a government which, in one hemisphere, derives its just powers from the consent of the governed and In the other derives Its authority from superior force. While our nation Is not prepared to draft a complete code of laws suited to the peculiar needa of the Filipinos wo ought to bo. able to decide at onco whether wo intond to deal with them accord ing to tho principles of our own government or ac cording to tho custom's prevailing among Europ ean monarchies. Even a republican congress ought to bo ablo to choose without hesitation bo tweon a policy which establishes a republic in thq Orient and a policy which sows tho seeds of mili tarism in tho United States. Tho trade relations possible under a protector atd would be of more value to tho United States than any which could como as tho result of forclblo annexation. Tho people of Porto Rico have not manifested a'ny desire for political independence and would in all probability favor annexation, yet it is only right that they should have an opportunity to choose. Tho resolution authorizing intervention recognized the right of tho Cubans to indepen dence. To bo consistent we must also respect tho wishes of tho inhabitants- of i'orto Rico. The res olution could, without impropriety, offer annexa tion to Porto Rico. In a recent interview I suggested that "tho United States should retain a harbor and coaling station in tho Philippines and in Porto Rico in re turn for services rendered and added that Cuba should bo asked to mako a similar concession on the same ground. Second, a resolution declaring tho nation's pur pose presents a plain and clear-cut issue between the theory of self-government and the colonial pol icy. It presents a positive, affirmative method of dealing with the question. In opposing the treaty we would be on the defensive; in outlining a policy wo shall be aggressive. Tho strongest arguments which could be used in support of tho treaty will lose1 their force entirely when Spain is eliminated and the American people are able to' dispose of tho question according to their own ideas and in terests. Third, It. secures, by easier means, every end that can be secured by a rejection of the treaty. If an officer of the law arrests a person in possession of stolen goods he can either compel tho return of the goods to the owner or he can first rescue them and then return them himself. Wo find Spain in tho-possession of a t.tle to a part of tho Philippines. She has not yet conquered all tho native tribes, but the title which she has was acquired by force and-has-been held by force. Wo can either compel her to surrender her title to tho Filipinos, as we compelled her to surrender Cuba to the Cubans, or we can ac -t possession and then of our own accord turn over the islands to tho inhabitants. The peace commissioners might have demanded independence for the Filipinos as they did for the Cubans; if they did not properly interpret the wishes of the people of the United States tho blame must fall upon them and not upon the people. Certainly seventy millions of citizens are under no pbligations to abate their de votion to the ideals which they have cherished for a century in order to indorse the work of a peaco commission or to approve of the instructions of an executive. . If it is urged that the ratification of the treaty imposes upon us an obligation to pay twenty mil lions of dollars to Spain, I answer, first, that this amount can probably bo secured from the Fili pinos in return for independenqe, and, second, that, if it cannot be secured from them, It is better to loso tho amount entirely than to expend a larger sum in securing a modification of the treaty. It is better to -regard the amount paid as a contribution to liberty than to consider it the mar ket price of lana, improvements or people. To terminate the war upon the same high plane upon which it was Inaugurated is worthy of a great republic; to descena from a sublime beginning to the purchase of sovereignty (for our own profit) from a nation whose title we disputed in Cuba would lay us open to tho charge of Punic faith. M i