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Ratify the Treaty.
Declare the Nation's Policy.
I gladly avail myself of the columns of the
Journal to suggest a few reasons why the op
ponents of a colonial policy should make their
light in support of a resolution declaring the na
tion's purpose rather than against the ratification
o the treaty.
The conflict between the doctrine of self-government
and the doctrine of. alien government
supported by external force has been thrust upon
the American people as a result of the war. It is
so important a conflict that it cannot be avoided,
and, since it deals with a question now before
congress, it must be considered immediately. It Is
useless to ask what effect this new issue will have
upon other issues. Issues must be met as they
arise; they cannot be moved about at will like
pawns upon a chess board.
The opponents of imperialism have an oppor
tunity to choose the ground upon which the battle
is to be fought. Why not oppose the ratification
of the treaty?
First, because a victory won against the treaty
would prove only temporary if the people really
favor a colonial policy.
That a victory won against the treaty would
depend for its value entirely upon the sentiment
of the people is evident. A minority can obstruct
action for a time, but a minority, so long as it re
mains a minority, cart only delay action and en
force reflection; it cannot commit the nation to a
policy.
."When there seemed some probability of the
rejection of the treaty the friends of the admin
istration began to suggest the propriety of with
holding the treaty until the new senate could be
convened in extra session. As the new senate will
have a considerable republican majority it would
be quite certain to ratify the treaty. Thus an ef
fort to prevent the ratification of the treaty -would
be likely to fail in the very beginning. But let us
suppose it possible to defeat ratification in both the
present and the next senate what would be the
result? Would the imperialists aftafa'don the hope
of annexing the Philippines so long as they could
claim the support of- the president-land a majority
of both houses? Could a minority of the senate
prevent the annexation of Hawaii? .As -e are now
in possession of the Philippine islands the advo
cates of a colonial policy iu jht secure an ap
propriation sufficient to pay the twenty millions
agreed upon and leave ue rest of the treaty for
future consideration. In other words, if the op
ponents of imperialism have a majority In both
houses they can declare the nation's policy; if the
Imperialists have a majority in both houses they
cannot be permanently thwarted by a minority
In the senate.
A resolution declaring the nation's policy
recognizes that the destiny of the United States is
In the hands of all the people and seeks to ascer
tain at once the sentiment of the people as re
flected by their representatives.
If that decision is in harmony with the policy
which has prevailed in the past the question will
be settled and the people will return to the con
sideration of domestic problems. If, however, the
advocates of imperialism eitner postpone consid
eration or control the action of . mgress an ap
peal will be taken to the voters at the next elec
tion. So great a change in cur national policy
cannot be made unless the authority therefor
comes directly and unequivocally from that source
of all power iu a republic the people.
In answer to those who fear that the question
of imperialism, if discussed, will draw attention
away from other quest!ons,It is sufficient to say
that the people cannot be prevented from consid
ering a question which reaches down to the foun
dation principles of the republic. Instead of avoid
ing the issue it is the part of wisdom ito deal wiui
it at once and dispose of it permanently.
The Commoner. '
Second, tho rejection of the treaty would bo
unwise because the opponents of the treaty would
bo compelled to assume responsibility for the con
tinuance of war conditions and for the risks which
always attend negotiations with a hostile nation.
The rejection of (ho treaty would give tho ad
ministration an excuse for military expenditures
which could not bo justified after tho conclusion
of peace, and tho opponents of tho treaty would
bo charged with making sucn appropriations nec
essary. It must be remembered that in caso tho
treaty is rejected negotiations must be renewed
with an enemy whose ill-will is not concealed.
Who is able to guarantee the nation against new
dangers and new complications? In order to form
an estimate of the risks which would thus bo in
curred, one has only to recall the unexpected
things which have happened since war was de
clared. Is it wise to so make the attack as to as
sume all the risks when the same end can bo
gained by a plan which throws the risks upon our
opponents? If the imperialists vote down a reso
lution declaring the nation's policy or postpone its
consideration,they becomo-responsible for any loss
of life or expenditure of money which may follow
as a result of such action.
I suggest below a few reasons in support of a
resolution declaring it to be the nation's purpose
to establish a stable government In Cuba and the
Philippines and then to give the inhabitants inde
pendence under an American protectorate which
will guard them against molestation from with
out. First, such a course is consistent with national
honor.
Our nation owes it to the nations, with which
we haye dealings, as well)fas to. the, inhabitants of.,
Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, 'to announce l
immediately what it intends to do respecting tho
territory surrendered by Spain.
The president has said that the only purpose
our nation has in. taking possession of Cuba is to
assist the inhabitants to establish a stable and In
dependent government. , It can do no harm for
congress to reaffirm this purpose, and it may do
much good. The Cubans, having fought for inde
pendence for many years and against great odds,
are naturally jealous of tho liberty which they
have won and no doubt should be left as to the
sincerity and good faith of our government in its
dealings with them. Such a declaration would not
only be harmless, but it is almost made necessary
by the flippant, if not contemptuous, tone in which
some United States officials speak of the intelli
gence and patriotism of the Cubans and of their
right to independence.
The duty of declaring our national policy in
regard to the Philippines Is even more imperative.
The Filipinos were fighting for independence
when the United States declared war against
Spain. In the formal protest filed with the peace
commissioners in Paris the representatives of
Aguinaldo assert that they received friendly as
surances from United States ofifcials, and acted
upon those assurances in co-operating against the
Spaniards. Whether or not such assurances were
given, frankness and honesty should characterize
our dealings with them.
If, we announce to the world that we hold tho
Philippine jsjands, not for pecuniary profit, but
in trust for the inhabitants; if we declare that our
only purpose is to assist the Filipinos to establish
a stable and independent government, friendly re
lations will be maintained and there will be little
need of troops. . If, on tho other hand, the Fili
pinos are not to have independence, but merely
a changeof masters we should break the news to
them at once and "send over a large army to in
struct them in the principles of a government
which, in one hemisphere, derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed and In the other
derives Its authority from superior force.
While our nation Is not prepared to draft a
complete code of laws suited to the peculiar needa
of the Filipinos wo ought to bo. able to decide at
onco whether wo intond to deal with them accord
ing to tho principles of our own government or ac
cording to tho custom's prevailing among Europ
ean monarchies. Even a republican congress
ought to bo ablo to choose without hesitation bo
tweon a policy which establishes a republic in thq
Orient and a policy which sows tho seeds of mili
tarism in tho United States.
Tho trade relations possible under a protector
atd would be of more value to tho United States
than any which could como as tho result of forclblo
annexation.
Tho people of Porto Rico have not manifested
a'ny desire for political independence and would
in all probability favor annexation, yet it is only
right that they should have an opportunity to
choose. Tho resolution authorizing intervention
recognized the right of tho Cubans to indepen
dence. To bo consistent we must also respect tho
wishes of tho inhabitants- of i'orto Rico. The res
olution could, without impropriety, offer annexa
tion to Porto Rico.
In a recent interview I suggested that "tho
United States should retain a harbor and coaling
station in tho Philippines and in Porto Rico in re
turn for services rendered and added that Cuba
should bo asked to mako a similar concession on
the same ground.
Second, a resolution declaring tho nation's pur
pose presents a plain and clear-cut issue between
the theory of self-government and the colonial pol
icy. It presents a positive, affirmative method of
dealing with the question. In opposing the treaty
we would be on the defensive; in outlining a policy
wo shall be aggressive. Tho strongest arguments
which could be used in support of tho treaty will
lose1 their force entirely when Spain is eliminated
and the American people are able to' dispose of
tho question according to their own ideas and in
terests. Third, It. secures, by easier means, every end
that can be secured by a rejection of the treaty.
If an officer of the law arrests a person in
possession of stolen goods he can either compel tho
return of the goods to the owner or he can first
rescue them and then return them himself. Wo
find Spain in tho-possession of a t.tle to a part of
tho Philippines. She has not yet conquered all
tho native tribes, but the title which she has was
acquired by force and-has-been held by force. Wo
can either compel her to surrender her title to tho
Filipinos, as we compelled her to surrender Cuba
to the Cubans, or we can ac -t possession and
then of our own accord turn over the islands to
tho inhabitants. The peace commissioners might
have demanded independence for the Filipinos as
they did for the Cubans; if they did not properly
interpret the wishes of the people of the United
States tho blame must fall upon them and not
upon the people. Certainly seventy millions of
citizens are under no pbligations to abate their de
votion to the ideals which they have cherished for
a century in order to indorse the work of a peaco
commission or to approve of the instructions of
an executive. .
If it is urged that the ratification of the treaty
imposes upon us an obligation to pay twenty mil
lions of dollars to Spain, I answer, first, that this
amount can probably bo secured from the Fili
pinos in return for independenqe, and, second, that,
if it cannot be secured from them, It is better to
loso tho amount entirely than to expend a larger
sum in securing a modification of the treaty.
It is better to -regard the amount paid as a
contribution to liberty than to consider it the mar
ket price of lana, improvements or people.
To terminate the war upon the same high
plane upon which it was Inaugurated is worthy
of a great republic; to descena from a sublime
beginning to the purchase of sovereignty (for our
own profit) from a nation whose title we disputed
in Cuba would lay us open to tho charge of Punic
faith.
M
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