Image provided by: University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries, Lincoln, NE
About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (May 17, 1901)
NJjTjv - -tys uelcotcd as . Nebraska's representatives in the United States Senate. The advocates of the single gold standard have insisted that their financial policy was for the best interest of the people. They have de nied any favoritism towards corporationi or monopolies. And if dependence could be placed upon these declaimers, then the ad vocate of the single gold standard must be as radically opposed to corporation domination in political affairs as the advocate of bimetal lism could possibly be. But hero wo have perhaps a leading exponent, among the periodicals, of the single gold standard boast ing of the election of two corporation men as indicative of "a progress in education and exceedingly gratifying." Unquestionably the election of such men should be "a progress in education" to people who have refused to be lieve that little by little the corporations of the country are seeking to install themselves in power. Undoubtedly the election of such men is "exceedingly gratifying" to the class inter ests which they are expected to serve, and it is not in the least surprising that the representa tives of the money trust, the greatest of' all trusts, should express particular gratification at such selections. W Deceiving the Cubans. When the Cuban Commissioners recently visited Washington, we are told that they were informed by the President and Secretary Root that the Piatt amendment, which assumed to lay dbwn rules for the guidance of the Cuban people, is an established law and one whose provisions the administration cannot avoid. In the Neeley case the United States Su: preme Court held: "Cuba is foreign territory. It cannot be re garded in any constitutional, legal or interna tional sense as a part of the territory of the United States. That island is territory held in trust for. the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it rightfully belongs and to whom exclusive control . will be surrendered." Now if Cuba is in fact foreign territory, if it cannot be regarded in any constitutional, legal or international sense as a part of the ter ritory of the United States, if that territory belongs rightfully to the inhabitants of Cuba, if those inhabitants are entitled to the exclu sive control of that territory by what right- constitutional, legal, international or moral do the United States assume to provide funda mental laws for the organization of the Cuban government and for the guidance of that gov ernment after it shall have been organized? The imperialist claims that the United States have title to the Philippines, the island of Guam, and the island of Porto Rico because those islands were ceded to us in the treaty with Spain. But in that same treaty, Spain merely relinquished title to Cuba. Turning back to our own ante-war declara tions we find that the United States declared that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent; that it was not the purpose of the United States to exercise sov ereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and The Commoner. that when that was accomplished it was the in tention to leave the control of that island to its people. So far as concerns Cuba we do not possess even what is called "color of title;" and the highest court in our land has formally de clared that wo arc without any authority other than that of trustee whose duty it is simply to deliver that territory to the inhabitants of Cuba, to whom it "rightfully belongs," and to whom "exclusive control" should be surren dered. . And yet in the face of these facts the Presi dent and his Secretary of War calmly announce to the Cuban Commissioners that the Piatt amendment is the law of the land and that the people of Cuba are bound thereby When men seek to do wrong, enter upon a schomo of injustice and assume powers to which they arc not entitled, they are very apt to ex pose their own inconsistency not to call it hypocricy and in this instance the inconsis tensy is visible to the naked eye. w The Ratification of the Treaty. A reader of The Commoner has called at tention to the fact that republicans try to shirk responsibility for an imperial policy by saying that I advised the ratification of the treaty. He asks that I state the reasons which led riib to favor ratification. ' ' ' ' In a speech delivered at Indianapolis, Aug ust 8, 1900, accepting the democratic nomina tion, I took occasion to discuss this matter, the following being an extract from that speech: ' When the president finally laid before the senate a treaty which recognized the indepen dence of Cuba', but provided for the cession of the Philippine islands to the United States, the menace of imperialism became so apparent that many preferred to reject the treaty and risk the ills that might follow rather than take the chance of correcting the errors of the treaty by the in dependent action of this country. I was among the number of those who believed it better to ratify the treaty and end the war, re lease the volunteers, remove the excuse for war expenditures and then give the Filipinos the in dependence which might be forced from Spain by a new treaty. In view of the criticism which my action aroused in some quarters, I take this occasion to restate the reasons given at that time. I thought it safer to trust the American people to give inde pendence to the Filipinos than to trust the accom plishment of that purpose to diplomacy with an unfriendly nation. Lincoln embodied an argument in the question when he asked, "Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?" I believe that we are now In a better position to wage a successful contest against imperialism than we would have been had the treaty been rejected. With the treaty ratified a clean-cut issue is presented be tween a government by consent and a government by force, and imperialists must bear the responsi bility for all that happens until the question is settled. If the treaty had been rejected the opponents ' of imperialism would have been held responsible for any international complications which might have arisen before the ratification of another treaty. But whatever difference of opinion may have existed as to the best method of opposing a colonial policy, there never was any difference aa to the great importance of the question md there fs no difference now as to the. course to ho pur sued. The titlo of Spain being extinguished we were at liberty to deal with the Filipinos according to American principles. The Bacon resolution, Intro duced a month before hostilities broko out at Ma nila, promised indopendonco to tho Filipinos on tho samo torms that It was promised to tho Cu bans. I supported this resolution and believe that its adoption prior to the breaking out of hostilities would have prevented bloodshed, and that Its adop tion at any subsequent time would have ended hostilities. If the treaty had been rejected considerable timo would have necessarily elapsed before a new treaty could have been agreed upon and ratified, and during that timo the question would have been agitating tho public mind. If the Bacon resolution had been adopted by tho senate and carried out by the president, either at the time of the ratification of tho treaty or at any timo afterwards, it would have taken the question of imperialism out of politics and left the American people free to deal with their domestic problems. J3ut the resolution was defeated by tho vote of the republican vico president, and from that time to this a republican congress has refused to take any action whatever in tho matter. While the treaty was pending in the sen ate, and about two months before the vote was taken upon it, I wrote an article for the New York Journal, giving reasons in support of tho proposition to ratify the treaty and declare the policy of tho government by resolution. This article will be found on another page of this issue. The ratification of the treaty in no way committed this nation to an imperial policy. It simply terminated Spanish authority and left the United States free to deal with the islands according to American principles. The Bacon resolution, which declared it to be the purpose of the United States to establish a stable gov ernment, which, when established, was to be turned over to the inhabitants of the Philip pine islands, was a tic vote in the senate, and was only defeated by tho vote of the vice-president. As the treaty required a two-thirds vote for its ratification, it is evident that one fourth of those who voted to ratify did so with the understanding that the question remained an open one. Senator Wellington of Maryland voted for the ratification of the treaty, and in a speech delivered last fall he stated that he so voted because the president promised him that the Philippine Islands would not be held perma nently. If the ratification of the treaty had necessarily committed this country to an im perialistic policy, then all who opposed im perialism would have been justified in oppos ing, aye, even compelled to oppose, the treaty. But as ratification did not commit the nation to an imperialistic policy, the only question the senate had to consider was how best to cor rect the errors in the treaty. The payment of twenty millions of dollars to Spain did not obligate this country to enter upon a colonial policy. It could have been re covered from the Filipinos in return for inde pendence, and if not recovered, it was a small contribution to the extension of liberty. We had by one act of congress appropriated fifty millions of dollars to secure independence for the Cubans who numbered less than two mil-