

selected as Nebraska's representatives in the United States Senate.

The advocates of the single gold standard have insisted that their financial policy was for the best interest of the people. They have denied any favoritism towards corporations or monopolies. And if dependence could be placed upon these declaimers, then the advocate of the single gold standard must be as radically opposed to corporation domination in political affairs as the advocate of bimetallism could possibly be. But here we have perhaps a leading exponent, among the periodicals, of the single gold standard boasting of the election of two corporation men as indicative of "a progress in education and exceedingly gratifying." Unquestionably the election of such men should be "a progress in education" to people who have refused to believe that little by little the corporations of the country are seeking to install themselves in power. Undoubtedly the election of such men is "exceedingly gratifying" to the class interests which they are expected to serve, and it is not in the least surprising that the representatives of the money trust, the greatest of all trusts, should express particular gratification at such selections.

Deceiving the Cubans.

When the Cuban Commissioners recently visited Washington, we are told that they were informed by the President and Secretary Root that the Platt amendment, which assumed to lay down rules for the guidance of the Cuban people, is an established law and one whose provisions the administration cannot avoid.

In the Neeley case the United States Supreme Court held:

"Cuba is foreign territory. It cannot be regarded in any constitutional, legal or international sense as a part of the territory of the United States. That island is territory held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it rightfully belongs and to whom exclusive control will be surrendered."

Now if Cuba is in fact foreign territory, if it cannot be regarded in any constitutional, legal or international sense as a part of the territory of the United States, if that territory belongs rightfully to the inhabitants of Cuba, if those inhabitants are entitled to the exclusive control of that territory—by what right—constitutional, legal, international or moral—do the United States assume to provide fundamental laws for the organization of the Cuban government and for the guidance of that government after it shall have been organized?

The imperialist claims that the United States have title to the Philippines, the island of Guam, and the island of Porto Rico because those islands were ceded to us in the treaty with Spain. But in that same treaty, Spain merely relinquished title to Cuba.

Turning back to our own ante-war declarations we find that the United States declared that the people of Cuba are and of right ought to be free and independent; that it was not the purpose of the United States to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and

that when that was accomplished it was the intention to leave the control of that island to its people.

So far as concerns Cuba we do not possess even what is called "color of title;" and the highest court in our land has formally declared that we are without any authority other than that of trustee whose duty it is simply to deliver that territory to the inhabitants of Cuba, to whom it "rightfully belongs," and to whom "exclusive control" should be surrendered.

And yet in the face of these facts the President and his Secretary of War calmly announce to the Cuban Commissioners that the Platt amendment is the law of the land and that the people of Cuba are bound thereby.

When men seek to do wrong, enter upon a scheme of injustice and assume powers to which they are not entitled, they are very apt to expose their own inconsistency—not to call it hypocrisy—and in this instance the inconsistency is visible to the naked eye.

The Ratification of the Treaty.

A reader of THE COMMONER has called attention to the fact that republicans try to shirk responsibility for an imperial policy by saying that I advised the ratification of the treaty. He asks that I state the reasons which led me to favor ratification.

In a speech delivered at Indianapolis, August 8, 1900, accepting the democratic nomination, I took occasion to discuss this matter, the following being an extract from that speech:

When the president finally laid before the senate a treaty which recognized the independence of Cuba, but provided for the cession of the Philippine islands to the United States, the menace of imperialism became so apparent that many preferred to reject the treaty and risk the ills that might follow rather than take the chance of correcting the errors of the treaty by the independent action of this country.

I was among the number of those who believed it better to ratify the treaty and end the war, release the volunteers, remove the excuse for war expenditures and then give the Filipinos the independence which might be forced from Spain by a new treaty.

In view of the criticism which my action aroused in some quarters, I take this occasion to restate the reasons given at that time. I thought it safer to trust the American people to give independence to the Filipinos than to trust the accomplishment of that purpose to diplomacy with an unfriendly nation.

Lincoln embodied an argument in the question when he asked, "Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws?" I believe that we are now in a better position to wage a successful contest against imperialism than we would have been had the treaty been rejected. With the treaty ratified a clean-cut issue is presented between a government by consent and a government by force, and imperialists must bear the responsibility for all that happens until the question is settled.

If the treaty had been rejected the opponents of imperialism would have been held responsible for any international complications which might have arisen before the ratification of another treaty. But whatever difference of opinion may have existed as to the best method of opposing a colonial policy, there never was any difference as to the great importance of the question and there

is no difference now as to the course to be pursued.

The title of Spain being extinguished we were at liberty to deal with the Filipinos according to American principles. The Bacon resolution, introduced a month before hostilities broke out at Manila, promised independence to the Filipinos on the same terms that it was promised to the Cubans. I supported this resolution and believe that its adoption prior to the breaking out of hostilities would have prevented bloodshed, and that its adoption at any subsequent time would have ended hostilities.

If the treaty had been rejected considerable time would have necessarily elapsed before a new treaty could have been agreed upon and ratified, and during that time the question would have been agitating the public mind. If the Bacon resolution had been adopted by the senate and carried out by the president, either at the time of the ratification of the treaty or at any time afterwards, it would have taken the question of imperialism out of politics and left the American people free to deal with their domestic problems. But the resolution was defeated by the vote of the republican vice president, and from that time to this a republican congress has refused to take any action whatever in the matter.

While the treaty was pending in the senate, and about two months before the vote was taken upon it, I wrote an article for the New York Journal, giving reasons in support of the proposition to ratify the treaty and declare the policy of the government by resolution. This article will be found on another page of this issue.

The ratification of the treaty in no way committed this nation to an imperial policy. It simply terminated Spanish authority and left the United States free to deal with the islands according to American principles. The Bacon resolution, which declared it to be the purpose of the United States to establish a stable government, which, when established, was to be turned over to the inhabitants of the Philippine islands, was a tie vote in the senate, and was only defeated by the vote of the vice-president. As the treaty required a two-thirds vote for its ratification, it is evident that one-fourth of those who voted to ratify did so with the understanding that the question remained an open one.

Senator Wellington of Maryland voted for the ratification of the treaty, and in a speech delivered last fall he stated that he so voted because the president promised him that the Philippine Islands would not be held permanently. If the ratification of the treaty had necessarily committed this country to an imperialistic policy, then all who opposed imperialism would have been justified in opposing, aye, even compelled to oppose, the treaty. But as ratification did not commit the nation to an imperialistic policy, the only question the senate had to consider was how best to correct the errors in the treaty.

The payment of twenty millions of dollars to Spain did not obligate this country to enter upon a colonial policy. It could have been recovered from the Filipinos in return for independence, and if not recovered, it was a small contribution to the extension of liberty. We had by one act of congress appropriated fifty millions of dollars to secure independence for the Cubans who numbered less than two mil-