AMERICAN OCCUPATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Historical Record from the Time of the Ca=
pitulation of Manila to Admiral Dewey
and the United States Navy.
War with the Filipinos Has Been Fostered 1>y the Democratic
Allies of Aguinaldo—How the Enemies of Our Country
Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan.
riie “Fire In the Rear” Prevent* a Peaceful Administration of the
Affairs of the Islands—Lawton’s Letter and
Dewey’s Denial.
ANTI/A capitulated to the
United States forces, command
ed by Adtniral Dewey, ou May
1, 1898.
In order to become Informed ttjton
the condition of affairs in the Philip
pines, President McKinley, on .Ian, 20,
1899, appointed a commission com
posed of President J. G. Scliurtnan, of
Cornell University; Professor Dean.
Worcester; Charles Denby, late Min
ister to China; Admiral Dewey and
General Otis. The commission minded
Its report to President McKinley Nov.
2, 1899, and the same was transmitted
to Cougress by the President, Feb. 2,
1900. It reads in part as follow*:
“The undersigned commissioners ap
pointed by you to investigate affairs in
the Philippine Islands and to report the
result of their investigations, together
with such recommendations ns might in
their judgment be called for by the con
ditions which should be found to exist
in these islands, have the honor to sub
mit the following preliminary statement
in compliance with your request.*’
Tlie commission next tells briefly how
It conducted the task intrusted to it.
bearing statements from all classes of
people in Manila as to the capabilities of
the Filipinos for self-government, the
habits and customs of the people, and
also the establishment of municipal gov
ernments in many towns.
History nf Islands.
Turning to the history of the islands,
the commission attaches little importance
to the divers rebellions which hjul [ire
ceiled thiit of 18!HI. As to this move
ment the commissioners declare that it
was in no sense an attempt to win inde
pendence, tint solely to obtain relief from
intolerable abuses.
To sustain this statement they quote
from an insurgent proclamation, show
ing that what was demanded was the ex
pulsion of the friars and the restitution
to the people of their lands, with a di
vision of the episcopal sees between
Spanish and native priests. It was also
demanded that the Filipinos have parlia
mentary representation, freedom of the
press, religious toleration, economic au
tonomy, and laws similar to those of
Spain. The abolition of the power of
banishment was demanded, with a legal
equality for all persons in law and equal
ity in [iay between Spanish and native
civil servants.
Treaty with Spanish,
The commission declares that these de
mands had good ground; that on paper
the Spanish system of government was
tolerable, but in practice every Spanish
governor did what he saw tit. and the
evil deeds of men in the government were
hidden from Spain by strict press censor
ship. Allusion is made to the powerful
Katipunan Society, patterned on the Ma
sonic order, and mainly made tip of Ta
galos. as a powerful revolutionary force.
The war begun in lSftti was terminated
by the treaty of Blac-na-Hnte. The Fili
pinos were numerous, but possessed only
about 800 small arms. The Spanish felt
that it would require 100,000 men to cap
ture their stronghold, and concluded to
resort to the use of money. Certain con
cessions were also decided upon, includ
ing representation of the Filipinos in the
Cortes, the deportation of the friars,
which was the principal question; the
grant of the right of association and of a
free press.
Promises Not Kept.
Governor General Rivera was willing
to pay mn» in Mexican money
when Aguiuuldo and his cabinet and lead
iug officers arrived in Hong Kong. It up
pears, however, that I'aterno offered the
latter only $4<«U>00. Jitsiisst to Im> paid
when Aguinahlo arrived at llrmg Kong
and the balance when the Filipinos had
delivered up their arms. The arrange
ment was not acceptable to the people.
The promises were never earned out.
Spanish abuses began afresh, in Manila
• lone nmre than 5iO0 men being execut
ed. Hence sporadic risings occurred,
though they possessed nothing like the
strength of the original movement ’Hie
insurgents lacked arms, ammunition and
leaders.
The treaty had ended the war, which,
with the exception of an unimportant
outbreak in Cebu, had twi n routined tp
I.utoit, Kpain'i sovereignty in the other
islands never having been questioned, and
the thought of independence never has
lag been entertained
■ aim Anitiiiai'ia,
Th* r*p®rl ttirn |rlt* bow ••»<» Atttftia
IIb« ram* to Manila a* i*>»*rtt«c g,itrral
al Ikli i«RdiFf Uni war l*r»ki- out hr
twrrn *i am ai-l ih* l M«air> Am
(MliM Bought It wrat* t hr nf
ilk* FUlpiaua to ilrfrn.l M|<*iu again*!
Ammm. ikrM auloaomj, but
lb* b lll|>ia >« did a *1 Iruai h>«t
Thro cant* lb* 1*1 mt Mar amt ik* <•
•IraCIIM at IM M|>*ltaill •**! by l»r»*|
with tk* fraulliH* lo*a *t |W**ltg* M
•pain Tk*a I* )>i«* Af».a«l«tu ram*
Ut (ku fatal Ik* »•>•»!•**"• »a»a
Tk# foil** tag nt*#iwfaaJuia *• Ikla
subject bn* been furnished the commis
sion by Admiral Dewey:
"‘On April ‘J4, 1H1IH, the following ci
pher dispatch was received at Hong
Kong from E. Spencer Pratt, I'nited
States consul general at Singapore:
“ ‘Aguinuldo. insurgent leader, here.
Will come Hong Kong, arrange with
commodore for general co-operation in
ilirgeut* Manila if desired. Telegraph.’
"On the same day Commodore Dewey
telegraphist Mr. I’ratt, 'Tell Aguiualdo
come soon ns possible,’ the necessity for
haste being due to the fact that the
squadron had been notified by the Hong
Kong tiovernment to leave those waters
by the following day. The squadron left
Hone Kong on the morning of the 'J.lth,
and Mira Hay on the UTtb. Agulnaldo
diil not leave Singapore until the -Htb,
and so did not arrive in Hong Kong
in time to have a conference with the
admiral.
“It had been reported to the comrno
dore ns early as March 1, by the United
States consul at Manila and others that
! tiie Filipinos had broken out into insur
1 rection against the Spanish authority in
j the vicinity of Manila, and on March SO
Mr. Williams had telegraphed: 'Five
thousand rebels armed in camp near city.
Loyal to us in case of war.’
•>o Alliance .’lime.
”I’pon llit* arrival of the squadron at |
Manila it was found that there was no
insurrection to apeak of, ami it was ac
cordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to
coine to Cavite on hoard the McCulloch.
He arrived with thirteen of his staff on
May 10, ami immediately came on board
i the Olympia to call on tin* commander
in-chief. after which he was allowed to
land at Cavite and organize an army.
“This was done with the purpose of
strengthening the I'uited States forces
and weakening those of the enemy. No
alliance of any kind was entered into
with Aguitialdo, nor was any promise of
I independence made to him, then or at
any other time.”
The commission’s report then rapidly
sketches events now historical, it tells
in substance how the Filipinos attacked
the Spanish and how <Icn. Anderson ar
rived, and Aguinaldo, at bis request, re
moved from Cavite to Bucoor. Says the
commission:
“Now for the first time rose the idea of
national independence. Aguinaldo issued
n proclamation in which he took the re
sponsibility of promising it to his people
on behalf of the American Government,
although he admitted freely in private
conversation w ith members of his cabinet
that neither Admiral Idewey nor any oth
er American bad made him any such
promise.”
Growth at friction.
The report states that Aguinaldo
wished to attack the Americans when
they landed at l'aranaque. but was de
ferred by lack of arms and ammunition.
I' roin that point on there was a growing
friction Iictween the Filipinos and the
American troops.
“There were no conferences,” says the
report, “between the officers of the Fili
pinos god our officers with u view to
operating against the Spaniards, nor was
there co-operation of any kind. • • •
There never was any preconcert»d opera
tion or any combined movement by the
1 nited States and Filipinos against the
Spaniards.”
Reference is made to Aguinaldo's de
mand that lie Is* allowed to loot Manila
and take the arms of the Spaniards. The
lutter demand is said to confirm the state
inent that he intended to get possession
of the arms to attack the Americans.
Wuitliitf for rreteit.
Further evidence of the hostile inten
tioos of lhe Filipinos nan found in the
organisation of "popular clubs," which
later on furnished u |.m-#] unlit.a to at
t»' k the American*. The decrees of the
Filipino congress are also cited, as well
as the making of bolos tknivesi in every
shop in Manila.
r» i* shown that a considerable element
In the Filipino congress wished to address
to president McKinley a re.) Host not to
abandon the Filipinos I At this stage the
Falls conference was discussing the fn
litre of the Philippines i The President
was also to tie asked Ills desiie as to the
form of government he wished to estah
li»h Hot all this tune Agu.naldo was
preparing for war and delaying these
messages, and it »a< understood that the
attack would eotne upon the llrst a« t In
the Am*, lean for..* which would afford
a pretest
» lllplsos llegin M ur.
A brief chapter then tells of the lack
of success attending the effort made at
this time l.j t Jett Merritt, through t r o.
»«•••■• " to *' " at i Ii.j'oal .1 ter
standing's 't. Aguiaalto >
tisttu, purpmsea sad dr.i.-rs ' ' . I
people This brings the story up to the
outbreak on the evening <*f the 4th of
Fehruary. with the attach upon the
iiuei.caa troops t » .« the action »f
the Nrbraahaa sentinel The enmuiin
•ten. in r» deluding this chapter says
"After the landtag nf eur (reap# Agu
naldo made up his mind that it would he
necessary to fight the Americans and
after the making of the treaty of peace
at .l'aris this determination was Ftrcngtta
ened. He did not o|*enly declare that he
intended to tight the Americans but he
excited everybody, and esiiroially the mil
itary men, by cluiming independence, and
it is doubtful whether he had the power
to cheek or control the army at the time
hostilities broke out.
No Alternative I^efU
“Deplorable as war is the one in which
we are now engaged was unavoidable
by u*. We were at tacks >4 by a bold, ad
venturous anti enthusiastic army. No
alternative was left to us except igno
minious retreat. It is But to lie conceived
of that any American would have sanc
tioned tiie surrender of Manila to the
insurgents. Our obligations to other na
tions, to the friendly Filipinos and to
ourselves and our ting demanded that
force should be met by force.
"Whatever the future of the Philip
pines may be. there is no course open to
us now except the prosecution of the war
until tiie insurgents are reduced to sub
mission. The commission is of the opin
ion that there bus been no time since the
destruction of the Spanish sipiadron by
Admiral Dewey when it was possible to
withdraw our forces from the islands
either with honor to ourselves or with
safety to the inhabitants.”
Reign of Terror.
The commissioners then take up the
condition of the country at the time of
their arrival, comparing it with condi
tions existing when they left a shart time
ago. A vivid picture is given of the an
nrehy existing among the inhabitants in
and about Manila during the early
spring.
“The situation in the city,” says the
commission, “was bad. Incendiary fires
occurred daily. The streets were almost
deserted. Half of the native popnlution
hail fled and most of the remainder were
shut in their houses. Business was at a
standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere
faced our lines, and the sound of rifle fire
was frequently audible in our house. A
reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who
had favored Americans feared assassina
tion, and few had the courage to come
out openly for us. Fortunately there
were among this number some of the best
men of the eity.”
Restoring Pnhlic Confidence.
'Hie report then speaks of the issu
anee of the commission’s proclamation
and the good effects it had ou public sen
timent. The natives, accustomed to Span
ish promises, urged upon the commission
that acts instead of promises should be
given them. As a result native law courts
were established and this greatly aided
in the restoration of public confidence.
The flow of population soon began to set
toward the city. Natives who had fled
from their homes returned.
As showing the limited scope of the
rebellion the commission states:
“We learned that the strong anti-Amer
ican feeling was confined to the Tagalo
provinces, namely, Manila. Cavite, Lu
guna, Batangas, Morong, Bulacan,
Nueva Ecija. I’rincipe, Infanta and Z a in
hales. It was strongest in the first six
named, and hardly existed in the last I
four. I
Revolt Not Popular.
“The population of these provinces is
estimated to be about 1.500,000, but it
should not be supposed that even in the j
six provinces immediately adjacent to !
Manila the people were united in their
opposition to us. Kven here there was
a strong conservative element, consisting
of people of wealth and intelligence, op
posed to the war."
I'nder the head, "The Rebellion not a
National Movement,” the report treats
of the rebellion outside of the provinces
of Luzon, where, it is stated, the upris
ing was viewed at hist with indifference
and later with fear. Throughout the
archipelago at large there was trouble
only at those points to which armed Ta
galos had been sent in considerable num
bers.
Ask American Help.
The machinery of insurgent “govern
ment” served only for plundering the
people under the pretest of levying “war
contributions, while many of the insur
gent ofllcials were rapidly accumulating
wealth.” It is stated that the insurgent
administration throughout the interior
was worse than in the days of Spanish
misrule. In many provinces there was
absolute anarchy, ami from ail sides came
Iietitions for protection and help.
In speaking of Hen. MacArthnr’s
movement northward the report tells of
the insurgent method of intimidating the
natives by telling them fearful tales con
cerning the American soldiers. This
method of procedure, eminently success
ful at first, in the end recoiled on its au
thors.
Troop* Bring Peace.
At* to the state of afTaira when the 1
commission left the report says:
“Before the eointnission left the Philip
pines nearly all the inhabitants had re
turned to those ruined villages. Many
of the houses had been rebuilt. Fields i
that had lain fallow for three years were j
green with growing crop*. Municipal !
governments were established, and the ,
people, protected by otir troops, were en |
joying peace, security and u degree of j
participation in their own government j
previously unknown in the history of the
Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents
to raise reeruits and money in the prov- !
inee of Hulaean were pio\iug abortive,
escept w hen backed by bayonets and bul
lets, and even in such cases the native* 1
were applying to us for help to resist 1
t hem."
The chapter devoted to "Kntabliihment '
of Municipal tjovcrnmetits" give* in de
tail the effort* in that direction There
were many diffb ulties encountered The
condition of the |ieople »»* found to tie .
inu*t pitiable They bad been plundered ]
by the itiMirgent troops, who had robbed
them of jewels, money, rlothing and even
food. *u that they were literally *tar*lng
Peaceful citrons had l«e» n hred on Worn
en had been maltreated
Plan of Oovernment.
There was general satisfaction that the
%n»eri■ ml t. • i i me at la«t an t iihoIi
, t t*» »e#med favorable for an Atneman
i propaganda The town* of Itji .r amt
< lion* were selected for the purpose ,.f
I ctprfiinent. and after talk* with the
I loc*| “h*ad men ' a boa I form of govern
. meal was established Km uirnged by
I the result the work w ts continued at
I l**ranai)ue and I .a* l‘ina*, with similar
g>*<d results
I At the request «f lien Is * tea ska
had keen assigned tn thia «<>rh hy lien
Otis, the mnoo t on pi j a * I a «
s* kerne of mnniripnl * *#rno>e»t, titular
! »s« ugk la ike o'.I «»t'.o
wwarnhassikis m Uka sal.tea, kut g ytng
them liberties which they h». never be
fore enjoyed. This scheme was adopted
and gave general satisfaction.
In every instance enthusiasm ran high
before the commissioners took their de
parture. and cheers were raised for Gen.
Lawton and for the country which he
represented.
Secure Good Results.
With a single exception the officials
elected proved worthy of the trust impos
ed in them, and conditions very rapidly
improved in the newly organized towns.
Governments were organized with more
satisfactory results in Pandncan, Santa
Ana. San Felipe. Meri, San I’edro and
Machei, while a slightly different system
was put into effect in Malabon, Polo,
Obnudo, Meycauya, Yung und Mnlolos.
The commission states that a large
nniount of supervision over the affairs of
our new municipalities proved necessary,
as the officials were timid and slow to
comprehend their new duties. At many
of the elections the voters went about
"asking who they were expected to vote
for,” and it was only with great diffi
culty that they were persuaded to exer
cise the right of free suffrage.
Sellouts for Manila.
The commissioners stun up the situa
tion at the time of their departure as
follow s:
"When we left Manila a large volume
of business was being done, and the
streets were so crowded as to he hardly
safe. The native population was guiet
and orderly and all fear of an uprising
had long sinee passed. An efficient corps
of native policemen was on duty. A
system of public schools in which Knglish
was taught had been advocated by the
commission and established by Gen. Otis.
Some tl.000 scholars were in attendance.
•To the Taenlo provinces of Luzon,
where the anti-American fceling.had been
strongest, public sentiment had greatly
changed, as evidenced by the fact that
the military governor of Batangas had
offered to surrender his troops nnd his
province if we would only send a small
force there. The Bicols, in southern Lu
zon, had risen against their Tagalo inns
ters. The Macaliebes were clamoring for
an opportunity to light in our ranks, and
native soldiers and scouts were already
serving under Gen. Lawton.
Rebellion Dying Out.
“Stories of the corruption of insurgent
officers were becoming daily more com
mon, nnd the disintegration of the ene
my’s forces was steadily progressing. The
hope of assistance from outside sources
seemed to be all that held them togeth
er.”
Haring given so murh attention to the
Island of Luzon, the commission then
takes up in detail the conditions in the
other islands. On this point it is stated
that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo,
and when it ends in Luzon it must end
throughout the archipelago. The situa
tion elsewhere than in Luzon is summed
up as follows:
"The only island, apart from Luzon,
where serious trouble threatens, is Fa
nny, to which a considerable force of Ta
galo soldiers was sent before the out
break of hostilities. Many of the Visay
ans of this island are opposed to the Tn
gains, however, nnd it is not believed
that the latter can make a formidable
resistance.
(Ippone trie inurolo*.
“In Samar. Leyte and Masbate the Ta
calo invaders are numerically few ami
are disliked by the natives of these isl
ands, whom they have oppressed. We
were assured that 2<M) men would suffice
to restore order in Mindoro. Bohol was
asking for troops. The Calnmianes isl
anders had sent word that they would
welcome us. There can be no resistance
in Palawan. Satisfactory relations had
already been established with the war
like Moros. whose sultan had previously
been conciliated by a member of the com
mission. and in Mindanao this tribe hail
even taken up our cause and attacked
the insurgents, of whom there are very
few in the island.
"In Cebu we have only to reckon with
the lawless element, which has never
been very formidable there.’*
Special attention is given to the Island
of Negros, as this scented a field well
adapted to the extension of an American
system. Here the natives have adopted
a local form of government, including a
congress, and had raised the American
flag. They believed themselves capable
of managing their own affairs and asked
for a battalion of troops to hold in check
a mountainous hand of fanatics. The
battalion was furnished, but the people
proved unable to carry out their program
owing to ill feeling among their own offi
cials. The Americans remained popular.
Nf«l American Rule.
At the request of (Jeri. Otis a new and
simplified scheme of government for the
island, giving the people a large voice in
their affairs, hut placing an American in
full control, was put into operation. It
brought about satisfaction, and public or
der is better in the island to-day than at
any time during the last twenty years.
Summarizing the failure of the native
form of government and the success of
the American control, the commission
says:
"The flat failure of this attempt to es
tahlish an independent native government
in Negros, conducted as it was under the
most favorable circumstances, makes it
apparent that here, as well a* in the leaa
favored provinces, a large amount of
American control is at present absolutely
essential to a successful administration
of public affairs."
Kfforls for l*ea« e.
The eff orts at conciliation with Agut
naldo and his various commissions are
set forth in detail. These commissioners
Were assured of the hcuefhent purposes
of the I’nited States and the ('resident's
readiness to grant the I'iltpino people a«
large s measure of home rule and as
ample lit>erty as consistent with the end
of government, "subject only t« the rer
ogt.ition of the sovereignty of the I'ailed
States a point which, being established,
the commission invariably refused even to
discuss "
The romnossion adds that nothing came
<<f negotiations a* Aguinablo'a emissaries
were without powers, and merely cattle,
ami came again, f .r Information t'euMe
tots reception was accorded to the insur
gent c " hi in <»»11 h s and earnest appeals
mail# tit slop further bloodshed, all wit
i.es« og "the spirit i f patt -nt com dialo.ti"
eth Intel by the Aim can commissi n in
endeavoring to re*. b an imu able adjust
n • M with the ihsurg* its a- wed as thn
obdurm » of Ag i ntid
On salt UsKtsMtsi.
The report sums «p the tea tit af these
fruti esa eitbsuges as lulisst
"Ns better prwof raul4 t*e furnished
that the primary abject #f to struggle u
not, m ta pretended the bbei'y sf the
Filipino peoples, but the continuance if
his own arbitrary and despotic power.
In any event, the American people may
feel confident that no effort was omitted
by the commission to secure a peaceful
end of the struggle, but the opportuni
ties they offered and urged were ail neg
lected, if not, indeed, spurned.”
The chapter devoted to “Capacity for
Self-Government” is the result, tlie re
port states, of diligent inquiry for sev
eral months, in the course of which a
great number of witnesses were exam
ined, of all shades of political thought
and varieties of occupation, tribe and lo
cality.
Tribes, Not a Nation.
The most striking and perhaps the most
significant fact in the entire situation is
the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the
archipelago, the diversity of their lan
guages (which are mutually unintelligi
ble) and the multifarious phases of civ
ilization-ranging all the way from the
highest to the lowest. As to this the
report says:
"The Filipinos are not a nation, but
a variegated assemblage of different
tribes and peoples, nnd their loyalty is
still of the tribal type.”
Concerning their intellectual capacities
the commission says:
“As to the general intellectual capaci
ties of the Filipinos the commission is dis
posed to rate them high. But excepting
in a limited number of persons these ca
pacities have not been developed by edu
cation or experience. The masses of the
people are uneducated.
Need of Education.
“That intelligent public opinion on
w-hich popular government rests does not
exist in the Philippines. And it cannot
exist until education bus elevated the
masses, broadened their intellectual hori
zon and disciplined their faculty of judg
ment. And even then the power of self
government cannot be assumed without
considerable previous training and experi
ence under the guidance nnd tutelage of
an enlightened and liberal foreign power.
For the bald fact is that the Filipinos
have never had any experience in govern
ing themselves.”
The report shows that this inability for
self-government is due to the old Span
ish regime, which gave the Filipinos lit
tle or no part in governing themselves.
After reviewing this Spanish system the
commission sums up on this point:
“This is all the training in self-govern
ment which the inhabitants of the Phil
ippine Islands have enjoyed. Their lack
of education and political experience,
combined with their racial anil linguistic
diversities, disqualify them, in spite of
their mental gifts nnd domestic virtues,
to undertake the task of governing the
archipelago at the present time. The
most that can he expected of them is to
co-operate with tlit* Americans in the
administration of general affairs, from
Manila as a center, and to undertake,
subject to American control or guidance
(as may he found necessary), the admin
istration of provincial and municipal af
fairs.
Must Retain Rule.
“Fortunately, there are educated Fili
pinos, though they do not constitute a
large proportion of the entire population,
and their support and services will be of
incalculable value in inaugurating and
maintaining the new government. As ed
ucation advances and experience ripens,
the natives may he intrusted with a larg
er and more independent share of govern
ment, self-government, as the American
ideal, being constantly kept in view us
the goal. In this way American sover
eignty over the archipelago will prove a
great political boon to the people.
"Should our power by any fatality be
withdrawn the commission believe* that
the government of the Philippines would
speedily lapse into anarchy, which would
excuse, if it did not necessitate, the in
tervention of other powers and the even
tual division of the islands among them.
"Only through American occupation,
therefore, is thp idea of a free, self-gov
erning and united Philippine common
wealth at all conceivable. And the in
dispensable need from the Filipino point
of view of maintaining American sover
eignty over the archipelago is recognized
by all intelligent Filipinos and even by
those insurgents who desire an American
protectorate. The latter, it is true, would
take the revenues and leave us the re
sponsibilities. Nevertheless they reeog
ni/.o the indubitable fact that the Fili
pinos cannot stand alone.
“Thus the welfare of the Filipinos co
incides with the dictates of national hon
or in forbidding our abandonment of the
archipelago. We cannot from any point
of view escape the responsibilities of gov
ernment which our sovereignty entails,
and the commission is strongly persuaded
that the performance of onr national duty
will prove the greatest blessing to the
peoples of the Philippine Islands.’’
Praise for Troop*.
One of Iho closing chapter* of the re
port is devoted to a tribute to "our sol
diers and sailors in the war," The com
mission says that the presence of Admiral
Iiewey as a tnenilier of this body makes
it unfitting to dwell on his personal
achievements, but he joins in the eulogy
of his comrades. The commissioners vv it
nessed some of the many brave deeds of
our soldiers, ami they declare that all that
skill, courage and a patient endurance
can do has been done in the Philippines.
They dismiss the reports of the dese
crating of churches, the murdering of
prisoners and the coniiiiitting of unnien
tionable crimes and suy they are glad to
express the belief that a sir was never
more humanely conducted, adding:
"If churches were occupied it was only
as a military necessity, and frequently
their use a« forts by the insurgents had
made it necessary to train our artillery
upon them.
llrigtH Trad* Cat are.
"Prisoners were taken whenever upper
tumly offered, often only to tie set at
liberty after taring disarmed and fed I p
to the lime of our departure, although
numerous spies had been captured, not a
single Filipino had teen executed Such
wrongs as were carnally cuniniitted
against the natives ware likely to t>e
brought to our attention, and >n every
case that we investigated we found a
willingness on the part of those its author
it? t« administer prompt justice *
The >"Utn.isaioncrs give n general view
of the value of the tsitaiis. their rh huesa
in agrtrwiturn> and forest products, their
mineral wraith and the<r roiuiuandiug
ge •graphical p»*e ten* 1 hey state that
I' ;l ,'c .«■ I da • iniib! • • n I.
■ .me one of the gnat trade venters of
the Fast Mamin is already rsvannd
hr net* steamship buss with Austral#
India and Japan ami she will herons#
the mutual terminus of many ether Ones
whan a ah-p canal rounevta the Atlanta* ,
with the Pacific. It cannot be doubted
that commerce will greatly Increaae, and
the United States will obtain a large
share in this treatment.
Benefit to Islands.
Manila, with the immunity which it has
thus far enjoyed from that terrible pest,
the bubonic plague, should become a dis
tributing center for China, Siam, the
Straits Settlements, Tonquin, Anuarn and
Australia.
The report concludes:
“Our eontrol means to the inhabitant*
of the Philippines internal peace and or
der, a guarantee against foreign aggres
sion and against the dismemberment of
their country, commercial and industrial
prosperity and as large a share of the
affairs of government us they shall prove
fit to take. When peace and prosperity
shall have been established throughout
the archipelago, when education shall
have become general, then, in the lan
guage of a leading Filipino, his people
will, under our guidance, ‘become more
American than the Americana them
selves.’ ”
Dewey Heard Prom.
On May 110, 18!>8, Admiral Dewey ca
bled to the Navy Department:
"Aguiuahlo, the rebel cominander-ln
chief, was brought down by the McCul
loch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and
may render assistance which will be val
uable.”
On May 20 the Secretary of the Navy
telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as fol
lows:
“It is desirable, as far as possible, and
consistent for your success and safety,
not to have political alliances with the
insurgents or any faction in the islands
that would incur liability to maintain
their cause in the future.”
To this telegram Dewey replied:
“Its-ceipt of telegram of May 20 is ac
knowledged, and 1 tlnink tlie deportment
for the expression of confidence.. Have
acted according to the spirit of depart
ment’s instructions therein from the be
ginning. and I have entered into no alli
ance with the insurgents or with any fac
tion, This squadron can reduce the de
fenses of Manila at any moment, hut it
is considered useless until the arrival of
sufficient United States forces to retain
possession.”
Aguinuldo Conaplres.
As soon ns A ku in a Ido discovered he
was to have no assistance from the Unit
id States he commenced to < i nspire
against our forces there, intei, ng to
overthrow the authority of this Lovern
lueut iu tile islands.
Dewey’* Strong: Denial.
In a pamphlet afterwards published
by Agttiualdo, entitled "The True Version
of the Philippine Revolution,” he charged
that Admiral Dewey had assured him
that the United States would recognize
the independence of the Filipinos. When
this was published, the admiral wrote the
following letter to Senator Lodge:
"Dear Senator Lodge: The statement of
Mini I io Aguinnldo, recently published in
the Springfield Republican, so far as it
relates to me is a tissue of falsehood. I
never promised him, directly or indirect
ly. independence for tlie Filipinos. I
never treated him us an ally, except so
far us to make use of him and his sol
diers to assist me in my operations
against the Spaniards. lie never uttered
the word ‘independence’ in any conver
sation with rite or my officers. The state
ment that 1 received him with military
honors, or sainted the Filipino flag, is ab
solutely false. Sincerely yours,
‘‘(JEORUE DEWEY.”
Aguinnldo Organizes Revolution.
On May lit Aguinaldo issued three
proclamations, one containing decrees as
to the treatment of the Spanish enemy,
another announcing the establishment of
a dictatorial government witli himself as
dictator, and the third containing further
decrees concerning military operations.
In the following July he organized a
revolutionary government with himself
as President. During that month the
several detachments of the United Stutes
army arrived at Manila, and on July 25
ticn. Merritt took command, and Ad
miral Dewey sent the following dispatch:
"Merritt arrived yesterday in the New
port. Tbp remainder of the expedition Is
expected within the next few days. Sit
uation is most critical at Manila. The
Spanish may surrender at any moment.
Merritt's most difficult problem will be
how to deal with insurgents under Agui
naldo, who has become aggressive aud
even threatening toward our army.”
Hostilities Begun by Aguinaldo,
On Aug. 13 Manila was captured, and
• f this and subsequent events the Philip
pine ciimniisslnn, composed of Admiral
I n*wey. <ien. Otis, President Sehuruian,
Prof. \\ oreester and (Jen. Denby, says:
"When the city of Manila was taken on
Auk 13, the Filipinos took no part in the
attack, but catne following in with a view
of looting the city and were only prevent
ed from doing bo by our forces preventing
them from entering. Aguinaldo claimed
that lie had the right to occupy the city;
he demanded of (Jen Merritt the paluce
of Mulncanun for himself and the cession
of all the churches of Manila, also that
a part of the money taken from the Span
iards as spoils of war should be given up,
and altove all that he should be given the
arms of the Spanish prisoners. This con
firms the statement already made that
la* intended to get possession of these
arms for the purpose of stturking u« All
these demands were refused. After the
taking of Manila the feeling between the
Americans and the insurgents grew worse
day by day. • • • Aguinaldo removed
his seat of government to Mslolos, where
the so-called Filipino congress assembled.
Filipinos Prepared for War,
On the lilad of September a significant
decree passed the Filipino congress ini
posing a military service on every male
ovt-r l.H > mis of age. es>rpt those holding
governUM ul positions In eiery rarriags
factuiy and hla<k«mith shop in Manila
• s s
llllp r s goals non multiplied Ago!
ns Ido endeavored to gel the war making
!*■ wer transferred from congress to him
•elf, and also urged a heavy bond <hiii
to secure one million dollars for I he pgr
• • •
It is now known tli.it elaborate plans had
been perfected for a simultaneous a I lark
t.» the fone w.Hcm and wiili .it Manila
* * * Persistent altaika were made ta
provoke •#» soldiers to are The tnaur
grata were ia-oiesl la out guards sad
made persistent sol Atidsssi edarts
to push them bs< k and nlnsrs ig» ,
surgeut lines further Into the eity sf Ma
min.
Te Altai h isireliass.
l-srly is Jso ,a'» IMki Aguinnidn had
h»s plana perfected «s* as t« he ready l«
*oiamenre hostilities against the Auaert
can fnrees
The twctun.ag eeder, whisk has aaiaa
