AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Historical Record from the Time of the Ca= pitulation of Manila to Admiral Dewey and the United States Navy. War with the Filipinos Has Been Fostered 1>y the Democratic Allies of Aguinaldo—How the Enemies of Our Country Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan. riie “Fire In the Rear” Prevent* a Peaceful Administration of the Affairs of the Islands—Lawton’s Letter and Dewey’s Denial. ANTI/A capitulated to the United States forces, command ed by Adtniral Dewey, ou May 1, 1898. In order to become Informed ttjton the condition of affairs in the Philip pines, President McKinley, on .Ian, 20, 1899, appointed a commission com posed of President J. G. Scliurtnan, of Cornell University; Professor Dean. Worcester; Charles Denby, late Min ister to China; Admiral Dewey and General Otis. The commission minded Its report to President McKinley Nov. 2, 1899, and the same was transmitted to Cougress by the President, Feb. 2, 1900. It reads in part as follow*: “The undersigned commissioners ap pointed by you to investigate affairs in the Philippine Islands and to report the result of their investigations, together with such recommendations ns might in their judgment be called for by the con ditions which should be found to exist in these islands, have the honor to sub mit the following preliminary statement in compliance with your request.*’ Tlie commission next tells briefly how It conducted the task intrusted to it. bearing statements from all classes of people in Manila as to the capabilities of the Filipinos for self-government, the habits and customs of the people, and also the establishment of municipal gov ernments in many towns. History nf Islands. Turning to the history of the islands, the commission attaches little importance to the divers rebellions which hjul [ire ceiled thiit of 18!HI. As to this move ment the commissioners declare that it was in no sense an attempt to win inde pendence, tint solely to obtain relief from intolerable abuses. To sustain this statement they quote from an insurgent proclamation, show ing that what was demanded was the ex pulsion of the friars and the restitution to the people of their lands, with a di vision of the episcopal sees between Spanish and native priests. It was also demanded that the Filipinos have parlia mentary representation, freedom of the press, religious toleration, economic au tonomy, and laws similar to those of Spain. The abolition of the power of banishment was demanded, with a legal equality for all persons in law and equal ity in [iay between Spanish and native civil servants. Treaty with Spanish, The commission declares that these de mands had good ground; that on paper the Spanish system of government was tolerable, but in practice every Spanish governor did what he saw tit. and the evil deeds of men in the government were hidden from Spain by strict press censor ship. Allusion is made to the powerful Katipunan Society, patterned on the Ma sonic order, and mainly made tip of Ta galos. as a powerful revolutionary force. The war begun in lSftti was terminated by the treaty of Blac-na-Hnte. The Fili pinos were numerous, but possessed only about 800 small arms. The Spanish felt that it would require 100,000 men to cap ture their stronghold, and concluded to resort to the use of money. Certain con cessions were also decided upon, includ ing representation of the Filipinos in the Cortes, the deportation of the friars, which was the principal question; the grant of the right of association and of a free press. Promises Not Kept. Governor General Rivera was willing to pay mn» in Mexican money when Aguiuuldo and his cabinet and lead iug officers arrived in Hong Kong. It up pears, however, that I'aterno offered the latter only $4<«U>00. Jitsiisst to Im> paid when Aguinahlo arrived at llrmg Kong and the balance when the Filipinos had delivered up their arms. The arrange ment was not acceptable to the people. The promises were never earned out. Spanish abuses began afresh, in Manila • lone nmre than 5iO0 men being execut ed. Hence sporadic risings occurred, though they possessed nothing like the strength of the original movement ’Hie insurgents lacked arms, ammunition and leaders. The treaty had ended the war, which, with the exception of an unimportant outbreak in Cebu, had twi n routined tp I.utoit, Kpain'i sovereignty in the other islands never having been questioned, and the thought of independence never has lag been entertained ■ aim Anitiiiai'ia, Th* r*p®rl ttirn |rlt* bow ••»<» Atttftia IIb« ram* to Manila a* i*>»*rtt«c g,itrral al Ikli i«RdiFf Uni war l*r»ki- out hr twrrn *i am ai-l ih* l M«air> Am (MliM Bought It wrat* t hr nf ilk* FUlpiaua to ilrfrn.l M|<*iu again*! Ammm. ikrM auloaomj, but lb* b lll|>ia >« did a *1 Iruai h>«t Thro cant* lb* 1*1 mt Mar amt ik* <• •IraCIIM at IM M|>*ltaill •**! by l»r»*| with tk* fraulliH* lo*a *t |W**ltg* M •pain Tk*a I* )>i«* Af».a«l«tu ram* Ut (ku fatal Ik* »•>•»!•**"• »a»a Tk# foil** tag nt*#iwfaaJuia *• Ikla subject bn* been furnished the commis sion by Admiral Dewey: "‘On April ‘J4, 1H1IH, the following ci pher dispatch was received at Hong Kong from E. Spencer Pratt, I'nited States consul general at Singapore: “ ‘Aguinuldo. insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong, arrange with commodore for general co-operation in ilirgeut* Manila if desired. Telegraph.’ "On the same day Commodore Dewey telegraphist Mr. I’ratt, 'Tell Aguiualdo come soon ns possible,’ the necessity for haste being due to the fact that the squadron had been notified by the Hong Kong tiovernment to leave those waters by the following day. The squadron left Hone Kong on the morning of the 'J.lth, and Mira Hay on the UTtb. Agulnaldo diil not leave Singapore until the -Htb, and so did not arrive in Hong Kong in time to have a conference with the admiral. “It had been reported to the comrno dore ns early as March 1, by the United States consul at Manila and others that ! tiie Filipinos had broken out into insur 1 rection against the Spanish authority in j the vicinity of Manila, and on March SO Mr. Williams had telegraphed: 'Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal to us in case of war.’ •>o Alliance .’lime. ”I’pon llit* arrival of the squadron at | Manila it was found that there was no insurrection to apeak of, ami it was ac cordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to coine to Cavite on hoard the McCulloch. He arrived with thirteen of his staff on May 10, ami immediately came on board i the Olympia to call on tin* commander in-chief. after which he was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army. “This was done with the purpose of strengthening the I'uited States forces and weakening those of the enemy. No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguitialdo, nor was any promise of I independence made to him, then or at any other time.” The commission’s report then rapidly sketches events now historical, it tells in substance how the Filipinos attacked the Spanish and how tisttu, purpmsea sad dr.i.-rs ' ' . I people This brings the story up to the outbreak on the evening <*f the 4th of Fehruary. with the attach upon the iiuei.caa troops t » .« the action »f the Nrbraahaa sentinel The enmuiin •ten. in r» deluding this chapter says "After the landtag nf eur (reap# Agu naldo made up his mind that it would he necessary to fight the Americans and after the making of the treaty of peace at .l'aris this determination was Ftrcngtta ened. He did not o|*enly declare that he intended to tight the Americans but he excited everybody, and esiiroially the mil itary men, by cluiming independence, and it is doubtful whether he had the power to cheek or control the army at the time hostilities broke out. No Alternative I^efU “Deplorable as war is the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by u*. We were at tacks >4 by a bold, ad venturous anti enthusiastic army. No alternative was left to us except igno minious retreat. It is But to lie conceived of that any American would have sanc tioned tiie surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other na tions, to the friendly Filipinos and to ourselves and our ting demanded that force should be met by force. "Whatever the future of the Philip pines may be. there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until tiie insurgents are reduced to sub mission. The commission is of the opin ion that there bus been no time since the destruction of the Spanish sipiadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants.” Reign of Terror. The commissioners then take up the condition of the country at the time of their arrival, comparing it with condi tions existing when they left a shart time ago. A vivid picture is given of the an nrehy existing among the inhabitants in and about Manila during the early spring. “The situation in the city,” says the commission, “was bad. Incendiary fires occurred daily. The streets were almost deserted. Half of the native popnlution hail fled and most of the remainder were shut in their houses. Business was at a standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere faced our lines, and the sound of rifle fire was frequently audible in our house. A reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who had favored Americans feared assassina tion, and few had the courage to come out openly for us. Fortunately there were among this number some of the best men of the eity.” Restoring Pnhlic Confidence. 'Hie report then speaks of the issu anee of the commission’s proclamation and the good effects it had ou public sen timent. The natives, accustomed to Span ish promises, urged upon the commission that acts instead of promises should be given them. As a result native law courts were established and this greatly aided in the restoration of public confidence. The flow of population soon began to set toward the city. Natives who had fled from their homes returned. As showing the limited scope of the rebellion the commission states: “We learned that the strong anti-Amer ican feeling was confined to the Tagalo provinces, namely, Manila. Cavite, Lu guna, Batangas, Morong, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija. I’rincipe, Infanta and Z a in hales. It was strongest in the first six named, and hardly existed in the last I four. I Revolt Not Popular. “The population of these provinces is estimated to be about 1.500,000, but it should not be supposed that even in the j six provinces immediately adjacent to ! Manila the people were united in their opposition to us. Kven here there was a strong conservative element, consisting of people of wealth and intelligence, op posed to the war." I'nder the head, "The Rebellion not a National Movement,” the report treats of the rebellion outside of the provinces of Luzon, where, it is stated, the upris ing was viewed at hist with indifference and later with fear. Throughout the archipelago at large there was trouble only at those points to which armed Ta galos had been sent in considerable num bers. Ask American Help. The machinery of insurgent “govern ment” served only for plundering the people under the pretest of levying “war contributions, while many of the insur gent ofllcials were rapidly accumulating wealth.” It is stated that the insurgent administration throughout the interior was worse than in the days of Spanish misrule. In many provinces there was absolute anarchy, ami from ail sides came Iietitions for protection and help. In speaking of Hen. MacArthnr’s movement northward the report tells of the insurgent method of intimidating the natives by telling them fearful tales con cerning the American soldiers. This method of procedure, eminently success ful at first, in the end recoiled on its au thors. Troop* Bring Peace. At* to the state of afTaira when the 1 commission left the report says: “Before the eointnission left the Philip pines nearly all the inhabitants had re turned to those ruined villages. Many of the houses had been rebuilt. Fields i that had lain fallow for three years were j green with growing crop*. Municipal ! governments were established, and the , people, protected by otir troops, were en | joying peace, security and u degree of j participation in their own government j previously unknown in the history of the Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents to raise reeruits and money in the prov- ! inee of Hulaean were pio\iug abortive, escept w hen backed by bayonets and bul lets, and even in such cases the native* 1 were applying to us for help to resist 1 t hem." The chapter devoted to "Kntabliihment ' of Municipal tjovcrnmetits" give* in de tail the effort* in that direction There were many diffb ulties encountered The condition of the |ieople »»* found to tie . inu*t pitiable They bad been plundered ] by the itiMirgent troops, who had robbed them of jewels, money, rlothing and even food. *u that they were literally *tar*lng Peaceful citrons had l«e» n hred on Worn en had been maltreated Plan of Oovernment. There was general satisfaction that the %n»eri■ ml t. • i i me at la«t an t iihoIi , t t*» »e#med favorable for an Atneman i propaganda The town* of Itji .r amt < lion* were selected for the purpose ,.f I ctprfiinent. and after talk* with the I loc*| “h*ad men ' a boa I form of govern . meal was established Km uirnged by I the result the work w ts continued at I l**ranai)ue and I .a* l‘ina*, with similar g>*rh hy lien Otis, the mnoo t on pi j a * I a « s* kerne of mnniripnl * *#rno>e»t, titular ! »s« ugk la ike o'.I «»t'.o wwarnhassikis m Uka sal.tea, kut g ytng them liberties which they h». never be fore enjoyed. This scheme was adopted and gave general satisfaction. In every instance enthusiasm ran high before the commissioners took their de parture. and cheers were raised for Gen. Lawton and for the country which he represented. Secure Good Results. With a single exception the officials elected proved worthy of the trust impos ed in them, and conditions very rapidly improved in the newly organized towns. Governments were organized with more satisfactory results in Pandncan, Santa Ana. San Felipe. Meri, San I’edro and Machei, while a slightly different system was put into effect in Malabon, Polo, Obnudo, Meycauya, Yung und Mnlolos. The commission states that a large nniount of supervision over the affairs of our new municipalities proved necessary, as the officials were timid and slow to comprehend their new duties. At many of the elections the voters went about "asking who they were expected to vote for,” and it was only with great diffi culty that they were persuaded to exer cise the right of free suffrage. Sellouts for Manila. The commissioners stun up the situa tion at the time of their departure as follow s: "When we left Manila a large volume of business was being done, and the streets were so crowded as to he hardly safe. The native population was guiet and orderly and all fear of an uprising had long sinee passed. An efficient corps of native policemen was on duty. A system of public schools in which Knglish was taught had been advocated by the commission and established by Gen. Otis. Some tl.000 scholars were in attendance. •To the Taenlo provinces of Luzon, where the anti-American fceling.had been strongest, public sentiment had greatly changed, as evidenced by the fact that the military governor of Batangas had offered to surrender his troops nnd his province if we would only send a small force there. The Bicols, in southern Lu zon, had risen against their Tagalo inns ters. The Macaliebes were clamoring for an opportunity to light in our ranks, and native soldiers and scouts were already serving under Gen. Lawton. Rebellion Dying Out. “Stories of the corruption of insurgent officers were becoming daily more com mon, nnd the disintegration of the ene my’s forces was steadily progressing. The hope of assistance from outside sources seemed to be all that held them togeth er.” Haring given so murh attention to the Island of Luzon, the commission then takes up in detail the conditions in the other islands. On this point it is stated that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo, and when it ends in Luzon it must end throughout the archipelago. The situa tion elsewhere than in Luzon is summed up as follows: "The only island, apart from Luzon, where serious trouble threatens, is Fa nny, to which a considerable force of Ta galo soldiers was sent before the out break of hostilities. Many of the Visay ans of this island are opposed to the Tn gains, however, nnd it is not believed that the latter can make a formidable resistance. (Ippone trie inurolo*. “In Samar. Leyte and Masbate the Ta calo invaders are numerically few ami are disliked by the natives of these isl ands, whom they have oppressed. We were assured that 2erty as consistent with the end of government, "subject only t« the rer ogt.ition of the sovereignty of the I'ailed States a point which, being established, the commission invariably refused even to discuss " The romnossion adds that nothing came <e brought to our attention, and >n every case that we investigated we found a willingness on the part of those its author it? t« administer prompt justice * The >"Utn.isaioncrs give n general view of the value of the tsitaiis. their rh huesa in agrtrwiturn> and forest products, their mineral wraith and the8, Admiral Dewey ca bled to the Navy Department: "Aguiuahlo, the rebel cominander-ln chief, was brought down by the McCul loch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance which will be val uable.” On May 20 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as fol lows: “It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.” To this telegram Dewey replied: “Its-ceipt of telegram of May 20 is ac knowledged, and 1 tlnink tlie deportment for the expression of confidence.. Have acted according to the spirit of depart ment’s instructions therein from the be ginning. and I have entered into no alli ance with the insurgents or with any fac tion, This squadron can reduce the de fenses of Manila at any moment, hut it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.” Aguinuldo Conaplres. As soon ns A ku in a Ido discovered he was to have no assistance from the Unit id States he commenced to < i nspire against our forces there, intei, ng to overthrow the authority of this Lovern lueut iu tile islands. Dewey’* Strong: Denial. In a pamphlet afterwards published by Agttiualdo, entitled "The True Version of the Philippine Revolution,” he charged that Admiral Dewey had assured him that the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipinos. When this was published, the admiral wrote the following letter to Senator Lodge: "Dear Senator Lodge: The statement of Mini I io Aguinnldo, recently published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to me is a tissue of falsehood. I never promised him, directly or indirect ly. independence for tlie Filipinos. I never treated him us an ally, except so far us to make use of him and his sol diers to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. lie never uttered the word ‘independence’ in any conver sation with rite or my officers. The state ment that 1 received him with military honors, or sainted the Filipino flag, is ab solutely false. Sincerely yours, ‘‘(JEORUE DEWEY.” Aguinnldo Organizes Revolution. On May lit Aguinaldo issued three proclamations, one containing decrees as to the treatment of the Spanish enemy, another announcing the establishment of a dictatorial government witli himself as dictator, and the third containing further decrees concerning military operations. In the following July he organized a revolutionary government with himself as President. During that month the several detachments of the United Stutes army arrived at Manila, and on July 25 ticn. Merritt took command, and Ad miral Dewey sent the following dispatch: "Merritt arrived yesterday in the New port. Tbp remainder of the expedition Is expected within the next few days. Sit uation is most critical at Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Agui naldo, who has become aggressive aud even threatening toward our army.” Hostilities Begun by Aguinaldo, On Aug. 13 Manila was captured, and • f this and subsequent events the Philip pine ciimniisslnn, composed of Admiral I n*wey. mis of age. es>rpt those holding governUM ul positions In eiery rarriags factuiy and hla