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About The Loup City northwestern. (Loup City, Neb.) 189?-1917 | View Entire Issue (Aug. 17, 1900)
AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Historical Record from the Time of the Ca= pitulation of Manila to Admiral Dewey and the United States Navy. War with the Filipinos Has Been Fostered 1>y the Democratic Allies of Aguinaldo—How the Enemies of Our Country Have Toasted William Jennings Bryan. riie “Fire In the Rear” Prevent* a Peaceful Administration of the Affairs of the Islands—Lawton’s Letter and Dewey’s Denial. ANTI/A capitulated to the United States forces, command ed by Adtniral Dewey, ou May 1, 1898. In order to become Informed ttjton the condition of affairs in the Philip pines, President McKinley, on .Ian, 20, 1899, appointed a commission com posed of President J. G. Scliurtnan, of Cornell University; Professor Dean. Worcester; Charles Denby, late Min ister to China; Admiral Dewey and General Otis. The commission minded Its report to President McKinley Nov. 2, 1899, and the same was transmitted to Cougress by the President, Feb. 2, 1900. It reads in part as follow*: “The undersigned commissioners ap pointed by you to investigate affairs in the Philippine Islands and to report the result of their investigations, together with such recommendations ns might in their judgment be called for by the con ditions which should be found to exist in these islands, have the honor to sub mit the following preliminary statement in compliance with your request.*’ Tlie commission next tells briefly how It conducted the task intrusted to it. bearing statements from all classes of people in Manila as to the capabilities of the Filipinos for self-government, the habits and customs of the people, and also the establishment of municipal gov ernments in many towns. History nf Islands. Turning to the history of the islands, the commission attaches little importance to the divers rebellions which hjul [ire ceiled thiit of 18!HI. As to this move ment the commissioners declare that it was in no sense an attempt to win inde pendence, tint solely to obtain relief from intolerable abuses. To sustain this statement they quote from an insurgent proclamation, show ing that what was demanded was the ex pulsion of the friars and the restitution to the people of their lands, with a di vision of the episcopal sees between Spanish and native priests. It was also demanded that the Filipinos have parlia mentary representation, freedom of the press, religious toleration, economic au tonomy, and laws similar to those of Spain. The abolition of the power of banishment was demanded, with a legal equality for all persons in law and equal ity in [iay between Spanish and native civil servants. Treaty with Spanish, The commission declares that these de mands had good ground; that on paper the Spanish system of government was tolerable, but in practice every Spanish governor did what he saw tit. and the evil deeds of men in the government were hidden from Spain by strict press censor ship. Allusion is made to the powerful Katipunan Society, patterned on the Ma sonic order, and mainly made tip of Ta galos. as a powerful revolutionary force. The war begun in lSftti was terminated by the treaty of Blac-na-Hnte. The Fili pinos were numerous, but possessed only about 800 small arms. The Spanish felt that it would require 100,000 men to cap ture their stronghold, and concluded to resort to the use of money. Certain con cessions were also decided upon, includ ing representation of the Filipinos in the Cortes, the deportation of the friars, which was the principal question; the grant of the right of association and of a free press. Promises Not Kept. Governor General Rivera was willing to pay mn» in Mexican money when Aguiuuldo and his cabinet and lead iug officers arrived in Hong Kong. It up pears, however, that I'aterno offered the latter only $4<«U>00. Jitsiisst to Im> paid when Aguinahlo arrived at llrmg Kong and the balance when the Filipinos had delivered up their arms. The arrange ment was not acceptable to the people. The promises were never earned out. Spanish abuses began afresh, in Manila • lone nmre than 5iO0 men being execut ed. Hence sporadic risings occurred, though they possessed nothing like the strength of the original movement ’Hie insurgents lacked arms, ammunition and leaders. The treaty had ended the war, which, with the exception of an unimportant outbreak in Cebu, had twi n routined tp I.utoit, Kpain'i sovereignty in the other islands never having been questioned, and the thought of independence never has lag been entertained ■ aim Anitiiiai'ia, Th* r*p®rl ttirn |rlt* bow ••»<» Atttftia IIb« ram* to Manila a* i*>»*rtt«c g,itrral al Ikli i«RdiFf Uni war l*r»ki- out hr twrrn *i am ai-l ih* l M«air> Am (MliM Bought It wrat* t hr nf ilk* FUlpiaua to ilrfrn.l M|<*iu again*! Ammm. ikrM auloaomj, but lb* b lll|>ia >« did a *1 Iruai h>«t Thro cant* lb* 1*1 mt Mar amt ik* <• •IraCIIM at IM M|>*ltaill •**! by l»r»*| with tk* fraulliH* lo*a *t |W**ltg* M •pain Tk*a I* )>i«* Af».a«l«tu ram* Ut (ku fatal Ik* »•>•»!•**"• »a»a Tk# foil** tag nt*#iwfaaJuia *• Ikla subject bn* been furnished the commis sion by Admiral Dewey: "‘On April ‘J4, 1H1IH, the following ci pher dispatch was received at Hong Kong from E. Spencer Pratt, I'nited States consul general at Singapore: “ ‘Aguinuldo. insurgent leader, here. Will come Hong Kong, arrange with commodore for general co-operation in ilirgeut* Manila if desired. Telegraph.’ "On the same day Commodore Dewey telegraphist Mr. I’ratt, 'Tell Aguiualdo come soon ns possible,’ the necessity for haste being due to the fact that the squadron had been notified by the Hong Kong tiovernment to leave those waters by the following day. The squadron left Hone Kong on the morning of the 'J.lth, and Mira Hay on the UTtb. Agulnaldo diil not leave Singapore until the -Htb, and so did not arrive in Hong Kong in time to have a conference with the admiral. “It had been reported to the comrno dore ns early as March 1, by the United States consul at Manila and others that ! tiie Filipinos had broken out into insur 1 rection against the Spanish authority in j the vicinity of Manila, and on March SO Mr. Williams had telegraphed: 'Five thousand rebels armed in camp near city. Loyal to us in case of war.’ •>o Alliance .’lime. ”I’pon llit* arrival of the squadron at | Manila it was found that there was no insurrection to apeak of, ami it was ac cordingly decided to allow Aguinaldo to coine to Cavite on hoard the McCulloch. He arrived with thirteen of his staff on May 10, ami immediately came on board i the Olympia to call on tin* commander in-chief. after which he was allowed to land at Cavite and organize an army. “This was done with the purpose of strengthening the I'uited States forces and weakening those of the enemy. No alliance of any kind was entered into with Aguitialdo, nor was any promise of I independence made to him, then or at any other time.” The commission’s report then rapidly sketches events now historical, it tells in substance how the Filipinos attacked the Spanish and how <Icn. Anderson ar rived, and Aguinaldo, at bis request, re moved from Cavite to Bucoor. Says the commission: “Now for the first time rose the idea of national independence. Aguinaldo issued n proclamation in which he took the re sponsibility of promising it to his people on behalf of the American Government, although he admitted freely in private conversation w ith members of his cabinet that neither Admiral Idewey nor any oth er American bad made him any such promise.” Growth at friction. The report states that Aguinaldo wished to attack the Americans when they landed at l'aranaque. but was de ferred by lack of arms and ammunition. I' roin that point on there was a growing friction Iictween the Filipinos and the American troops. “There were no conferences,” says the report, “between the officers of the Fili pinos god our officers with u view to operating against the Spaniards, nor was there co-operation of any kind. • • • There never was any preconcert»d opera tion or any combined movement by the 1 nited States and Filipinos against the Spaniards.” Reference is made to Aguinaldo's de mand that lie Is* allowed to loot Manila and take the arms of the Spaniards. The lutter demand is said to confirm the state inent that he intended to get possession of the arms to attack the Americans. Wuitliitf for rreteit. Further evidence of the hostile inten tioos of lhe Filipinos nan found in the organisation of "popular clubs," which later on furnished u |.m-#] unlit.a to at t»' k the American*. The decrees of the Filipino congress are also cited, as well as the making of bolos tknivesi in every shop in Manila. r» i* shown that a considerable element In the Filipino congress wished to address to president McKinley a re.) Host not to abandon the Filipinos I At this stage the Falls conference was discussing the fn litre of the Philippines i The President was also to tie asked Ills desiie as to the form of government he wished to estah li»h Hot all this tune Agu.naldo was preparing for war and delaying these messages, and it »a< understood that the attack would eotne upon the llrst a« t In the Am*, lean for..* which would afford a pretest » lllplsos llegin M ur. A brief chapter then tells of the lack of success attending the effort made at this time l.j t Jett Merritt, through t r o. »«•••■• " to *' " at i Ii.j'oal .1 ter standing's 't. Aguiaalto > tisttu, purpmsea sad dr.i.-rs ' ' . I people This brings the story up to the outbreak on the evening <*f the 4th of Fehruary. with the attach upon the iiuei.caa troops t » .« the action »f the Nrbraahaa sentinel The enmuiin •ten. in r» deluding this chapter says "After the landtag nf eur (reap# Agu naldo made up his mind that it would he necessary to fight the Americans and after the making of the treaty of peace at .l'aris this determination was Ftrcngtta ened. He did not o|*enly declare that he intended to tight the Americans but he excited everybody, and esiiroially the mil itary men, by cluiming independence, and it is doubtful whether he had the power to cheek or control the army at the time hostilities broke out. No Alternative I^efU “Deplorable as war is the one in which we are now engaged was unavoidable by u*. We were at tacks >4 by a bold, ad venturous anti enthusiastic army. No alternative was left to us except igno minious retreat. It is But to lie conceived of that any American would have sanc tioned tiie surrender of Manila to the insurgents. Our obligations to other na tions, to the friendly Filipinos and to ourselves and our ting demanded that force should be met by force. "Whatever the future of the Philip pines may be. there is no course open to us now except the prosecution of the war until tiie insurgents are reduced to sub mission. The commission is of the opin ion that there bus been no time since the destruction of the Spanish sipiadron by Admiral Dewey when it was possible to withdraw our forces from the islands either with honor to ourselves or with safety to the inhabitants.” Reign of Terror. The commissioners then take up the condition of the country at the time of their arrival, comparing it with condi tions existing when they left a shart time ago. A vivid picture is given of the an nrehy existing among the inhabitants in and about Manila during the early spring. “The situation in the city,” says the commission, “was bad. Incendiary fires occurred daily. The streets were almost deserted. Half of the native popnlution hail fled and most of the remainder were shut in their houses. Business was at a standstill. Insurgent troops everywhere faced our lines, and the sound of rifle fire was frequently audible in our house. A reign of terror prevailed. Filipinos who had favored Americans feared assassina tion, and few had the courage to come out openly for us. Fortunately there were among this number some of the best men of the eity.” Restoring Pnhlic Confidence. 'Hie report then speaks of the issu anee of the commission’s proclamation and the good effects it had ou public sen timent. The natives, accustomed to Span ish promises, urged upon the commission that acts instead of promises should be given them. As a result native law courts were established and this greatly aided in the restoration of public confidence. The flow of population soon began to set toward the city. Natives who had fled from their homes returned. As showing the limited scope of the rebellion the commission states: “We learned that the strong anti-Amer ican feeling was confined to the Tagalo provinces, namely, Manila. Cavite, Lu guna, Batangas, Morong, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija. I’rincipe, Infanta and Z a in hales. It was strongest in the first six named, and hardly existed in the last I four. I Revolt Not Popular. “The population of these provinces is estimated to be about 1.500,000, but it should not be supposed that even in the j six provinces immediately adjacent to ! Manila the people were united in their opposition to us. Kven here there was a strong conservative element, consisting of people of wealth and intelligence, op posed to the war." I'nder the head, "The Rebellion not a National Movement,” the report treats of the rebellion outside of the provinces of Luzon, where, it is stated, the upris ing was viewed at hist with indifference and later with fear. Throughout the archipelago at large there was trouble only at those points to which armed Ta galos had been sent in considerable num bers. Ask American Help. The machinery of insurgent “govern ment” served only for plundering the people under the pretest of levying “war contributions, while many of the insur gent ofllcials were rapidly accumulating wealth.” It is stated that the insurgent administration throughout the interior was worse than in the days of Spanish misrule. In many provinces there was absolute anarchy, ami from ail sides came Iietitions for protection and help. In speaking of Hen. MacArthnr’s movement northward the report tells of the insurgent method of intimidating the natives by telling them fearful tales con cerning the American soldiers. This method of procedure, eminently success ful at first, in the end recoiled on its au thors. Troop* Bring Peace. At* to the state of afTaira when the 1 commission left the report says: “Before the eointnission left the Philip pines nearly all the inhabitants had re turned to those ruined villages. Many of the houses had been rebuilt. Fields i that had lain fallow for three years were j green with growing crop*. Municipal ! governments were established, and the , people, protected by otir troops, were en | joying peace, security and u degree of j participation in their own government j previously unknown in the history of the Philippines. Attempts of the insurgents to raise reeruits and money in the prov- ! inee of Hulaean were pio\iug abortive, escept w hen backed by bayonets and bul lets, and even in such cases the native* 1 were applying to us for help to resist 1 t hem." The chapter devoted to "Kntabliihment ' of Municipal tjovcrnmetits" give* in de tail the effort* in that direction There were many diffb ulties encountered The condition of the |ieople »»* found to tie . inu*t pitiable They bad been plundered ] by the itiMirgent troops, who had robbed them of jewels, money, rlothing and even food. *u that they were literally *tar*lng Peaceful citrons had l«e» n hred on Worn en had been maltreated Plan of Oovernment. There was general satisfaction that the %n»eri■ ml t. • i i me at la«t an t iihoIi , t t*» »e#med favorable for an Atneman i propaganda The town* of Itji .r amt < lion* were selected for the purpose ,.f I ctprfiinent. and after talk* with the I loc*| “h*ad men ' a boa I form of govern . meal was established Km uirnged by I the result the work w ts continued at I l**ranai)ue and I .a* l‘ina*, with similar g>*<d results I At the request «f lien Is * tea ska had keen assigned tn thia «<>rh hy lien Otis, the mnoo t on pi j a * I a « s* kerne of mnniripnl * *#rno>e»t, titular ! »s« ugk la ike o'.I «»t'.o wwarnhassikis m Uka sal.tea, kut g ytng them liberties which they h». never be fore enjoyed. This scheme was adopted and gave general satisfaction. In every instance enthusiasm ran high before the commissioners took their de parture. and cheers were raised for Gen. Lawton and for the country which he represented. Secure Good Results. With a single exception the officials elected proved worthy of the trust impos ed in them, and conditions very rapidly improved in the newly organized towns. Governments were organized with more satisfactory results in Pandncan, Santa Ana. San Felipe. Meri, San I’edro and Machei, while a slightly different system was put into effect in Malabon, Polo, Obnudo, Meycauya, Yung und Mnlolos. The commission states that a large nniount of supervision over the affairs of our new municipalities proved necessary, as the officials were timid and slow to comprehend their new duties. At many of the elections the voters went about "asking who they were expected to vote for,” and it was only with great diffi culty that they were persuaded to exer cise the right of free suffrage. Sellouts for Manila. The commissioners stun up the situa tion at the time of their departure as follow s: "When we left Manila a large volume of business was being done, and the streets were so crowded as to he hardly safe. The native population was guiet and orderly and all fear of an uprising had long sinee passed. An efficient corps of native policemen was on duty. A system of public schools in which Knglish was taught had been advocated by the commission and established by Gen. Otis. Some tl.000 scholars were in attendance. •To the Taenlo provinces of Luzon, where the anti-American fceling.had been strongest, public sentiment had greatly changed, as evidenced by the fact that the military governor of Batangas had offered to surrender his troops nnd his province if we would only send a small force there. The Bicols, in southern Lu zon, had risen against their Tagalo inns ters. The Macaliebes were clamoring for an opportunity to light in our ranks, and native soldiers and scouts were already serving under Gen. Lawton. Rebellion Dying Out. “Stories of the corruption of insurgent officers were becoming daily more com mon, nnd the disintegration of the ene my’s forces was steadily progressing. The hope of assistance from outside sources seemed to be all that held them togeth er.” Haring given so murh attention to the Island of Luzon, the commission then takes up in detail the conditions in the other islands. On this point it is stated that the rebellion is essentially Tagalo, and when it ends in Luzon it must end throughout the archipelago. The situa tion elsewhere than in Luzon is summed up as follows: "The only island, apart from Luzon, where serious trouble threatens, is Fa nny, to which a considerable force of Ta galo soldiers was sent before the out break of hostilities. Many of the Visay ans of this island are opposed to the Tn gains, however, nnd it is not believed that the latter can make a formidable resistance. (Ippone trie inurolo*. “In Samar. Leyte and Masbate the Ta calo invaders are numerically few ami are disliked by the natives of these isl ands, whom they have oppressed. We were assured that 2<M) men would suffice to restore order in Mindoro. Bohol was asking for troops. The Calnmianes isl anders had sent word that they would welcome us. There can be no resistance in Palawan. Satisfactory relations had already been established with the war like Moros. whose sultan had previously been conciliated by a member of the com mission. and in Mindanao this tribe hail even taken up our cause and attacked the insurgents, of whom there are very few in the island. "In Cebu we have only to reckon with the lawless element, which has never been very formidable there.’* Special attention is given to the Island of Negros, as this scented a field well adapted to the extension of an American system. Here the natives have adopted a local form of government, including a congress, and had raised the American flag. They believed themselves capable of managing their own affairs and asked for a battalion of troops to hold in check a mountainous hand of fanatics. The battalion was furnished, but the people proved unable to carry out their program owing to ill feeling among their own offi cials. The Americans remained popular. Nf«l American Rule. At the request of (Jeri. Otis a new and simplified scheme of government for the island, giving the people a large voice in their affairs, hut placing an American in full control, was put into operation. It brought about satisfaction, and public or der is better in the island to-day than at any time during the last twenty years. Summarizing the failure of the native form of government and the success of the American control, the commission says: "The flat failure of this attempt to es tahlish an independent native government in Negros, conducted as it was under the most favorable circumstances, makes it apparent that here, as well a* in the leaa favored provinces, a large amount of American control is at present absolutely essential to a successful administration of public affairs." Kfforls for l*ea« e. The eff orts at conciliation with Agut naldo and his various commissions are set forth in detail. These commissioners Were assured of the hcuefhent purposes of the I’nited States and the ('resident's readiness to grant the I'iltpino people a« large s measure of home rule and as ample lit>erty as consistent with the end of government, "subject only t« the rer ogt.ition of the sovereignty of the I'ailed States a point which, being established, the commission invariably refused even to discuss " The romnossion adds that nothing came <<f negotiations a* Aguinablo'a emissaries were without powers, and merely cattle, ami came again, f .r Information t'euMe tots reception was accorded to the insur gent c " hi in <»»11 h s and earnest appeals mail# tit slop further bloodshed, all wit i.es« og "the spirit i f patt -nt com dialo.ti" eth Intel by the Aim can commissi n in endeavoring to re*. b an imu able adjust n • M with the ihsurg* its a- wed as thn obdurm » of Ag i ntid On salt UsKtsMtsi. The report sums «p the tea tit af these fruti esa eitbsuges as lulisst "Ns better prwof raul4 t*e furnished that the primary abject #f to struggle u not, m ta pretended the bbei'y sf the Filipino peoples, but the continuance if his own arbitrary and despotic power. In any event, the American people may feel confident that no effort was omitted by the commission to secure a peaceful end of the struggle, but the opportuni ties they offered and urged were ail neg lected, if not, indeed, spurned.” The chapter devoted to “Capacity for Self-Government” is the result, tlie re port states, of diligent inquiry for sev eral months, in the course of which a great number of witnesses were exam ined, of all shades of political thought and varieties of occupation, tribe and lo cality. Tribes, Not a Nation. The most striking and perhaps the most significant fact in the entire situation is the multiplicity of tribes inhabiting the archipelago, the diversity of their lan guages (which are mutually unintelligi ble) and the multifarious phases of civ ilization-ranging all the way from the highest to the lowest. As to this the report says: "The Filipinos are not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, nnd their loyalty is still of the tribal type.” Concerning their intellectual capacities the commission says: “As to the general intellectual capaci ties of the Filipinos the commission is dis posed to rate them high. But excepting in a limited number of persons these ca pacities have not been developed by edu cation or experience. The masses of the people are uneducated. Need of Education. “That intelligent public opinion on w-hich popular government rests does not exist in the Philippines. And it cannot exist until education bus elevated the masses, broadened their intellectual hori zon and disciplined their faculty of judg ment. And even then the power of self government cannot be assumed without considerable previous training and experi ence under the guidance nnd tutelage of an enlightened and liberal foreign power. For the bald fact is that the Filipinos have never had any experience in govern ing themselves.” The report shows that this inability for self-government is due to the old Span ish regime, which gave the Filipinos lit tle or no part in governing themselves. After reviewing this Spanish system the commission sums up on this point: “This is all the training in self-govern ment which the inhabitants of the Phil ippine Islands have enjoyed. Their lack of education and political experience, combined with their racial anil linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts nnd domestic virtues, to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. The most that can he expected of them is to co-operate with tlit* Americans in the administration of general affairs, from Manila as a center, and to undertake, subject to American control or guidance (as may he found necessary), the admin istration of provincial and municipal af fairs. Must Retain Rule. “Fortunately, there are educated Fili pinos, though they do not constitute a large proportion of the entire population, and their support and services will be of incalculable value in inaugurating and maintaining the new government. As ed ucation advances and experience ripens, the natives may he intrusted with a larg er and more independent share of govern ment, self-government, as the American ideal, being constantly kept in view us the goal. In this way American sover eignty over the archipelago will prove a great political boon to the people. "Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn the commission believe* that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the in tervention of other powers and the even tual division of the islands among them. "Only through American occupation, therefore, is thp idea of a free, self-gov erning and united Philippine common wealth at all conceivable. And the in dispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sover eignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the re sponsibilities. Nevertheless they reeog ni/.o the indubitable fact that the Fili pinos cannot stand alone. “Thus the welfare of the Filipinos co incides with the dictates of national hon or in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of gov ernment which our sovereignty entails, and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of onr national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands.’’ Praise for Troop*. One of Iho closing chapter* of the re port is devoted to a tribute to "our sol diers and sailors in the war," The com mission says that the presence of Admiral Iiewey as a tnenilier of this body makes it unfitting to dwell on his personal achievements, but he joins in the eulogy of his comrades. The commissioners vv it nessed some of the many brave deeds of our soldiers, ami they declare that all that skill, courage and a patient endurance can do has been done in the Philippines. They dismiss the reports of the dese crating of churches, the murdering of prisoners and the coniiiiitting of unnien tionable crimes and suy they are glad to express the belief that a sir was never more humanely conducted, adding: "If churches were occupied it was only as a military necessity, and frequently their use a« forts by the insurgents had made it necessary to train our artillery upon them. llrigtH Trad* Cat are. "Prisoners were taken whenever upper tumly offered, often only to tie set at liberty after taring disarmed and fed I p to the lime of our departure, although numerous spies had been captured, not a single Filipino had teen executed Such wrongs as were carnally cuniniitted against the natives ware likely to t>e brought to our attention, and >n every case that we investigated we found a willingness on the part of those its author it? t« administer prompt justice * The >"Utn.isaioncrs give n general view of the value of the tsitaiis. their rh huesa in agrtrwiturn> and forest products, their mineral wraith and the<r roiuiuandiug ge •graphical p»*e ten* 1 hey state that I' ;l ,'c .«■ I da • iniib! • • n I. ■ .me one of the gnat trade venters of the Fast Mamin is already rsvannd hr net* steamship buss with Austral# India and Japan ami she will herons# the mutual terminus of many ether Ones whan a ah-p canal rounevta the Atlanta* , with the Pacific. It cannot be doubted that commerce will greatly Increaae, and the United States will obtain a large share in this treatment. Benefit to Islands. Manila, with the immunity which it has thus far enjoyed from that terrible pest, the bubonic plague, should become a dis tributing center for China, Siam, the Straits Settlements, Tonquin, Anuarn and Australia. The report concludes: “Our eontrol means to the inhabitant* of the Philippines internal peace and or der, a guarantee against foreign aggres sion and against the dismemberment of their country, commercial and industrial prosperity and as large a share of the affairs of government us they shall prove fit to take. When peace and prosperity shall have been established throughout the archipelago, when education shall have become general, then, in the lan guage of a leading Filipino, his people will, under our guidance, ‘become more American than the Americana them selves.’ ” Dewey Heard Prom. On May 110, 18!>8, Admiral Dewey ca bled to the Navy Department: "Aguiuahlo, the rebel cominander-ln chief, was brought down by the McCul loch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance which will be val uable.” On May 20 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed to Admiral Dewey as fol lows: “It is desirable, as far as possible, and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future.” To this telegram Dewey replied: “Its-ceipt of telegram of May 20 is ac knowledged, and 1 tlnink tlie deportment for the expression of confidence.. Have acted according to the spirit of depart ment’s instructions therein from the be ginning. and I have entered into no alli ance with the insurgents or with any fac tion, This squadron can reduce the de fenses of Manila at any moment, hut it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession.” Aguinuldo Conaplres. As soon ns A ku in a Ido discovered he was to have no assistance from the Unit id States he commenced to < i nspire against our forces there, intei, ng to overthrow the authority of this Lovern lueut iu tile islands. Dewey’* Strong: Denial. In a pamphlet afterwards published by Agttiualdo, entitled "The True Version of the Philippine Revolution,” he charged that Admiral Dewey had assured him that the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipinos. When this was published, the admiral wrote the following letter to Senator Lodge: "Dear Senator Lodge: The statement of Mini I io Aguinnldo, recently published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to me is a tissue of falsehood. I never promised him, directly or indirect ly. independence for tlie Filipinos. I never treated him us an ally, except so far us to make use of him and his sol diers to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards. lie never uttered the word ‘independence’ in any conver sation with rite or my officers. The state ment that 1 received him with military honors, or sainted the Filipino flag, is ab solutely false. Sincerely yours, ‘‘(JEORUE DEWEY.” Aguinnldo Organizes Revolution. On May lit Aguinaldo issued three proclamations, one containing decrees as to the treatment of the Spanish enemy, another announcing the establishment of a dictatorial government witli himself as dictator, and the third containing further decrees concerning military operations. In the following July he organized a revolutionary government with himself as President. During that month the several detachments of the United Stutes army arrived at Manila, and on July 25 ticn. Merritt took command, and Ad miral Dewey sent the following dispatch: "Merritt arrived yesterday in the New port. Tbp remainder of the expedition Is expected within the next few days. Sit uation is most critical at Manila. The Spanish may surrender at any moment. Merritt's most difficult problem will be how to deal with insurgents under Agui naldo, who has become aggressive aud even threatening toward our army.” Hostilities Begun by Aguinaldo, On Aug. 13 Manila was captured, and • f this and subsequent events the Philip pine ciimniisslnn, composed of Admiral I n*wey. <ien. Otis, President Sehuruian, Prof. \\ oreester and (Jen. Denby, says: "When the city of Manila was taken on Auk 13, the Filipinos took no part in the attack, but catne following in with a view of looting the city and were only prevent ed from doing bo by our forces preventing them from entering. Aguinaldo claimed that lie had the right to occupy the city; he demanded of (Jen Merritt the paluce of Mulncanun for himself and the cession of all the churches of Manila, also that a part of the money taken from the Span iards as spoils of war should be given up, and altove all that he should be given the arms of the Spanish prisoners. This con firms the statement already made that la* intended to get possession of these arms for the purpose of stturking u« All these demands were refused. After the taking of Manila the feeling between the Americans and the insurgents grew worse day by day. • • • Aguinaldo removed his seat of government to Mslolos, where the so-called Filipino congress assembled. Filipinos Prepared for War, On the lilad of September a significant decree passed the Filipino congress ini posing a military service on every male ovt-r l.H > mis of age. es>rpt those holding governUM ul positions In eiery rarriags factuiy and hla<k«mith shop in Manila • s s llllp r s goals non multiplied Ago! ns Ido endeavored to gel the war making !*■ wer transferred from congress to him •elf, and also urged a heavy bond <hiii to secure one million dollars for I he pgr • • • It is now known tli.it elaborate plans had been perfected for a simultaneous a I lark t.» the fone w.Hcm and wiili .it Manila * * * Persistent altaika were made ta provoke •#» soldiers to are The tnaur grata were ia-oiesl la out guards sad made persistent sol Atidsssi edarts to push them bs< k and nlnsrs ig» , surgeut lines further Into the eity sf Ma min. Te Altai h isireliass. l-srly is Jso ,a'» IMki Aguinnidn had h»s plana perfected «s* as t« he ready l« *oiamenre hostilities against the Auaert can fnrees The twctun.ag eeder, whisk has aaiaa
