

Eastern Roads Urge Sweeping Wage Reduction

Labor Board With Three Members Absent Hear Appeals of 93 Railroads—Unskilled Men Affected.

Chicago, April 18.—Eastern railroads appearing before the railroad board opened their drive today for sweeping wage reductions for all unskilled labor and in some instances, for shop and train service employees. Over the protest of the labor organizations the board decided to proceed with the consolidated wage hearing of disputes certified by 93 railroads. The board decided to proceed, although there are three vacancies, due to the fact that congress has not yet confirmed President Harding's appointees and that one member is absent.

Five members, a quorum, remain, however. Many Exhibits Filed. Scores of exhibits, most of them dealing with the cost of living and wages for similar labor in other industries, were filed as carrier after carrier laid its evidence before the board. Nearly two score roads had finished their presentation when the session adjourned. Following a protest earlier in the day by the employees, the board had extended the time limit for each side's testimony to five days of five hours each.

Special representatives of the New York Central, Erie and the New England roads presented their own cases. Other eastern roads were represented by J. G. Walber of the Bureau of Information of Eastern Railroads.

In opening their plea for wage reductions, the carriers declared there had been a widespread reduction of wages from 10 to 20 per cent and that the cost of living had receded steadily for several months.

Living Costs Lower.

"The latest Department of Labor figures, for the period ending December, 1920," said Mr. Walber, "show a decline in the cost of living of 7.4 per cent from the peak in July, 1920, when present wages were established. The national industrial conference board figures show a decline of 17 per cent in 1921." Numerous exhibits were filed to show that the cost of living in July, 1920, was 104.5 per cent more than in 1914, while in March of this year it was 67 per cent greater. Additional eastern roads will appear tomorrow, after which western roads will have their turn. Today's crowd was so large that the small committee room was inadequate and the board will move into larger quarters tomorrow.

Fashionable Garb of Paris Society Women Ruined by Blizzard

Paris, April 18.—Approximately \$80,000 worth of Tagale Leghorn and fine rice straw summer hats was ruined at Longchamps Sunday.

Worn after the fashion which decreases straws in winter and felt and fur-trimmed hats for the Grand Prix in June, the handsome millinery displays was utterly spoiled when a sudden blizzard descended, causing a wild stampede of beautiful women for shelter.

Society women sporting advance summer styles stood shivering under trees and hotting hoods with automobile rugs thrown grotesquely over their shoulders, while an extraordinary effect was produced by the snow-covered ground and the prevailing fashion of bare feet in sandals, which were soon smothered in mud.

Cleo De Merode led a rush for the limousines, her two purple beauty spots, moistened by snow running into streaks resembling an Indian on the warpath.

Fort Morgan Post To Send to Harding Set of Golf Sticks

Fort Morgan, Colo., April 18.—(Special.)—Miss Pauline Trumbo will leave here April 19 for Washington, D. C., to present President Harding a set of golf sticks, the gift of the American Legion post of this city. Miss Trumbo will stop at all principal cities on her way to the capital, including Lincoln on April 20 and Omaha, April 21, and will get governors and mayors to write their signatures on golf balls she will carry and the collection to be kept by the post of this city as relics.

When she reaches Washington she will ask President Harding to write his signature on one of the collection as a climax to the trip. Besides a set of six golf sticks, she will present him a specially made golf ball, four inches in diameter, on which is inscribed, "If you can't hit the little ones, use this one." She will invite President Harding to visit the big roundup here, July 4-7, to which Marshal Foch of France and General Pershing have accepted invitations.

County Schools Hold Art Exhibit at Beaver City

Beaver City, Neb., April 18.—(Special.)—The grade and rural schools of Furnas county held an exhibit here of their art work, drawings and maps. Nearly all the districts of the county were represented and a large crowd attended the exhibition. A county spelling contest for grade pupils was won by Miss Lois Larson of Beaver City.

Glee Club of Hastings College Gives Concert

Fairmont, Neb., April 18.—(Special.)—The Hastings College Glee club, which is on its annual tour of the state, gave a concert here. Thirty-three young men and women compose the company, which is directed by Hayes M. Fuhr.

The government now collects nearly \$300,000,000 a year in luxury taxes on articles purchased mainly by or for women.

Capitulation of Germany Following Sinking of Sussex Staved Off War For Just One Year Says Daniels

Cabinet forestalled war in April, 1916—Navy was ready and under mobilization orders—Details of preparations for hostilities a year before war came, and how it was staved off—President's Bureau made ultimatum—Germany declined to abandon ruthless policy, president was determined to sever relations—Daniels confident in crisis because of navy plans made to have fleet ready for any emergency—Promises story about construction of Mr. Daniels.

By JOSEPH DANIELS. Former Secretary of the Navy.

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ARTICLE 5. The navy prepared for action in April, 1916, for war seemed almost as imminent then as it did the next year. When President Wilson sent his Sussex note to Germany, declaring that relations would be broken if ruthless submarine warfare was not stopped, we made all plans to mobilize the fleet. Nothing could show more clearly the critical situation than the steps the navy took to meet it.

My mobilization order of April 27, 1916, shows that 29 of 32 battleships were ready for immediate action, and that one of the remaining three would be ready in three weeks' time.

The corresponding table for the destroyer force showed that of 49 destroyers, 42 were immediately available, and that three of the remaining seven would be available within 30 days.

The sinking of the Sussex was the biggest jolt which had come to the peaceful hopes of Washington since the sinking of the Lusitania. It so plainly disregarded the American position as defined in the president's Lusitania note that it could not be ignored. Either Germany must repudiate the Sussex incident as typical of a policy, or continued relations would be impossible.

It was about this time, I think, although I do not recall the exact date, when the president, after dwelling upon the extreme gravity of the situation, said to us solemnly: "I hope that those of us who believe in prayer, will ask divine guidance." Those who know him best (and most people know him best) and there were some of optimistic temperament, who hoped that this firm threat of American action would result in a complete abandonment of Germany's warfare on merchant shipping; but there were others who held no such hope. The latter were greatly upon her U-boat weapon to allow it to be restricted in striking power for any great length of time.

The end of the submarine as the decisive weapon Germany regarded it at that time I shall narrate later. Some temporary concession it might make, but where separate need or tempting opportunity appealed to it, there seemed no reason to doubt that Von Tirpitz would forget all pledges and undertakings and strike wherever he could do most damage.

There were those, indeed, who doubted if Germany would make any temporary concession, and I think all felt that the possibility of war brooded over us with darkening shadows when we left the White House with the knowledge that America's ultimatum was on its way to Berlin.

Order for Mobilization. My own apprehensions that relations might be broken off induced me to take immediate steps to have the fleet in readiness. The Navy department made complete plans for mobilization, and on April 27 I approved the order, and it was forthwith sent to every ship. It was accompanied by the mobilization sheets, showing when each battleship and destroyer would be available for service. The test of the mobilization order follows:

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"2. Plans will be developed by all the officers concerned for execution upon the receipt of the order to mobilize.

"3. The order to mobilize when received will be construed as an order to take all necessary action for the rapid assembly of ships at the rendezvous in all respects ready for war service.

"4. The rendezvous is designed as Chesapeake bay. 2. Copies of mobilization sheets are forwarded herewith.

Ready for Emergency. This, as the order itself indicates, was a strictly confidential communication. Congress alone has power to declare war, and no war order may be issued until it has given authority. But when war threatens it is the navy's duty to get ready for emergency. As the first line of defense it must not be caught napping. Mobilization is the next step to actual hostilities, and is justifiable only when conditions are extremely threatening. That was the case in the spring of 1916.

As it happened, Germany yielded. She replied to our ultimatum with a declaration that her government was prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents." She further promised that merchant vessels should no longer be sunk without warning or without saving human lives except in cases where they attempted to escape or to offer resistance.

Note the phrase "for the rest of its duration." This made the pledge binding until the war ended. Within eight months Germany was laying her plans to shatter this solemn promise, and within nine she had repudiated it. For the time, however, it averted the rupture between the two countries, and postponed for nearly a year what many of us now had come to regard it as inevitable.

But this I want to emphasize—if Germany had declined to abandon the sort of warfare the Sussex sinking represented, President Wilson would have seen Berthoff home in the spring of 1916, and we would have been at war in all human probability, before midsummer. We were set for this program when Berlin backed down.

Early in 1915 I asked the general board to make a study and submit recommendations concerning "the preparation necessary to be made by the bureaus and offices of the department to insure a state of preparedness for war."

On March 13, 1915, the board, then headed by Admiral Dewey, furnished the desired plan, and I sent them to each bureau chief with instructions to comply with their requirements.

War plans had been made already, and corrected up-to-date, for the fleet.

In July of 1915 I invited Mr. Edison and 20 other eminent engineers, scientists and inventors to devote their genius to naval efficiency. I urged them to attempt to discover some effective means for combating submarines.

On October 7 I directed the general board to prepare a five-year building program for the navy, on an estimate of \$100,000,000 each year for new construction. About the same time Admiral Blue, with my approval, made plans to increase the number of enlisted men from 54,000 to practically 100,000.

For two years before war did come we were working to get the whole navy ready, and when the mysterious S. W. Davidson sailed for London in March, 1917, I knew from Admiral Mayo, commander-in-chief, that the fleet was in such good condition that only a word would be required to mobilize it for war.

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