

## GERMANS LONG FED UPON LIES BY VON TIRPITZ

(Continued From Page One.)

high seas fleet would fight a second Skagerrak battle and that thereby the doom of British domination of the seas would be sealed, just as it was almost universally believed that our U-boats would in a short time force England "to her knees."

All these hopeful ones were blinded by the lie—the lie which was one of the chief weapons of our warfare on land and sea. Lie and bluff celebrated veritable orgies, particularly under Tirpitz and Capelle.

### People in Ignorance.

The innocent people did not know that for a year we could speak of our "high seas fleet" only in a limited way; they did not know that actually the U-boat squadrons were equal to the task that was set them only in the mouths of the leaders of our fleet, never in reality; they did not know that the "Prussian system" had been long since sentenced to death and damnation.

They did not know that the soldiers and engineers, this magnificent human material, infinitely good natured and devoted, must finally be driven to despair by the wrong kind of treatment and other factors. All these things can be only briefly alluded to in the frame of this article.

### Lips Were Sealed.

Those who know the truth had their lips sealed by the censorship. Those who were honest and upright and whom the ardent love of their country and their people commanded to give warning against underestimating the enemy and overestimating our own power, were muzzled in every way.

Despite all the obstacles and the sharp restrictions this writer has unwaveringly endeavored to tell the truth. Naturally, this was possible the most of the time only "between the lines" and thus much remained hidden to the eyes of those whose perspective was not properly set to look for the many tricks of deception.

### Facts as to Shipping.

What are the facts? In November, 1914, we had a little over a million tons of naval shipping against the British 2,200,000 tons. The German material was inferior to the British, thanks to the mistakes of Von Tirpitz. Our ships of the line, battleships and cruisers, were of smaller displacement than their British; they were less powerful and possessed less speed.

If one compares the strength of the two fleets and remembers that the Russian Baltic fleet of 200,000 tons, was up to Russia's collapse, to be counted on the enemy's side—the French naval forces were for the greater part arrested in the Mediterranean by the Austro-Hungarian fleet—it is clear that our fleet had slight chances.

In spite of this the personnel of our navy has, as far as was possible with the deficient material and in the circumstances, made an extraordinary record. With very few exceptions, the officers and men stood the trying test brilliantly.

### Von Tirpitz to Blame.

On nearly every occasion our defeats were traceable to the Von Tirpitz wrong building policy. Think, for instance, of the duel between the Emden and the Sydney on November 9, 1914, when the glorious raiding cruiser of Captain von Mueller came to an end. Both vessels had been built in the same year. The Sydney had 15.2-centimeter guns, the Emden only 10.5-centimeter guns. The Sydney, with its one-third larger caliber guns, naturally could fight the Emden down easily without even coming within the Emden's range. Similar conditions prevailed in the fight off the Falkland islands.

### Saved from Disaster.

In the Skagerrak battle our fleet was saved from disaster by three things:

- 1—The clever leadership of Admiral Scheer.
- 2—The clumsy handling of the

## Famous Phrases Created By Colonel Roosevelt

Speak softly and carry a big stick. My hat is in the ring. I'm for the square deal. We fought at Armageddon. De-lighted! Mollycoddle. The Ananias club. The River of Doubt. Nature fakirs.

Terms Applied to Colonel Roosevelt by His Friends and Admirers.

The Rough Rider (Spanish-American war). The Bull Moose (Bull Moose party). The American Warwick (at the time when he made Taft president). The Great Advertiser (at the time he sent the American fleet around the world). Bwana Tumbo (of South African lion hunting fame). T. R. The Colonel.

English fleet by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe.

3—The low visibility.

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At last, on October 1, 1917, Reichstag deputies like Struwwel and Gothein succeeded in gaining the ear of the army command—and those of the marine ministry. The result was an order to discontinue construction of dreadnaughts and battle cruisers.

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