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WANTED—TO BUY
WANTED—TO RENT
WANTED—SITUATIONS

Supreme Court Syllabi

1815. White against State. Error from Boone, Affirmed. Reese, C. J.
1816. In a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor in violation of law, it was charged in the information that the accused did on a date named, unlawfully sell to a person designated, an intoxicating and spirituous liquor, the driver the name or quality of the liquor alleged to have been sold. The proof showed the sale, that though labeled and branded by another name, which was for the purpose of deception, the liquor contained to a large degree the kind and quality alleged in the information, and that it was intoxicating. Held, that the evidence sufficiently sustained the averments of the information under the provisions of section 14, chapter 90, Compiled Statutes.

1817. Hoyt against Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company. Appeal from Douglas. Affirmed. Reese, C. J.
1818. Vestover against Hoover. Appeal from Lancaster. Reversed. Letton, J.
1819. County of Hamilton against Aurora National Bank. Appeal from Hamilton. Reversed and remanded. Fawcett, J., Rose, J., not sitting. Barnes and Root, J., dissenting.

1820. In an action against a city for injuries from a defective sidewalk, proof of defendant's actual notice of the defects is not essential to the recovery unless made by statute, where the proof justifies a finding that the unsafe condition had existed for a year or more, and the length of time sufficient to charge the city with notice.
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CALL Webster 636 for repairing, plastering, brick and cement work.
COMPETENT nurse immediately. Webster 1114.
STENOGRAPHER—Young man with experience in law office would like position as stenographer and secretary. Address M. G. L. 1103 W. 11th, Bellevue, Kan.

RAILWAY TIME CARD
UNION STATION—Tenth and Mason. Union Pacific—
San Fran Overland L. 8:15 am 4:15 pm
Chicago Local Express 8:25 am 4:25 pm
Chicago Special 8:30 am 4:30 pm

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LEGAL NOTICES
SEALED BIDS WILL BE RECEIVED
For the construction of a new bridge over the Missouri river, between Trip county, South Dakota, to Winthrop county, South Dakota. Distance about 10 miles. Bids will be opened April 10, 1911. Contract will be let to whom the board considers the lowest responsible bidder. For further particulars and information address J. T. TRIZONA, Clerk of School District No. 2, Winner, South Dakota.

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