unday Bee.
PAST THBXE
HALF-TONE
PAGES I TO
FOR" ALL THE KZWS THE
OMAHA DEE
BEST IN THE WEST
J
VOL. XXXLX-NO. 3.
OMAIIA, SUNDAY MORNING, JULY 4, 1909.
SINGLE COrY FIVE CENTS.
POSSIBILITY OF MAKING THE ARMY EFFICIENT DEFENSE
Method Suggested by Which the Present Establishment Can' Be Made a Training School in Which Young Men May Gain a Working Knowledge of the Science of Modern Warfare
The- Omaha
THE total strength of tba army at the outbreak of war, under
the preaent organization, would be represented by about
100,000 men, and aa this force Is more than likely to be
Insufficient for the conduct of subsequent operations It
will be necessary to increase It by large additions. These
additional men may be had in part by drawing on the National
Guard; but, should the exigencies be great, they must, for the most
part, be obtained as volunteers from the population in geenraL Vol
unteers from the population in general would no doubt present them
selves up to the number called for, and more too for that matter, but
their fitness for immediate use in the army would leave much to be,
desired. These men would enter the army without any previous
military instruction whatever. They would have to be equipped and
drilled, operations which require many months of valuable time. The
immediate value of the volunteers who join the army will depend
upon the amount of military Instruction they have already had.
Those who have been trained In the National Guard and other mili
tary bodies will be sooner available than the men who volunteer
from outside such organizations.
Now, the number of volunteers that may become necessary in a
given drcurastance may be many times greater than the regular
an.iy and the National Guard combined, and these volunteers, under
('.Myitis conditions, will require many months of Instruction and
bec? they will be fitted to enter the field against an army
ci)ii!oy' Of trained regular troops.
iVuc-ii'Vlme will be required in order to equip, drill and generally
to iiKtiarc the volunteer for use In war; and It Is evident that If the
voiunttrrs are to be equipped and drilled after war Is declared this
unilon will ! at great disadvantage In coping with one, the poten
tial military forces of which have been previously trained, and are,
on tli- outlircnV of hostilities, prepared to enter the army as regular
tsoliltarg.
In nrvei nl of the European nations all men capable of entering
tiic piiny, HMit ns volunteers or as conscripts, have already been
tr -lined and IhHr equipments are In store. It has been the boast of
one of tliesf that It could put a million of trained men on each of its
fo principal frontiers as quickly as the men could be marched or
t ran '.ported to the posts assigned to them.
The ijiiPHttn of training a large number of men In time of peace"
U duo which heretofore has occupied the public mind but very little,
in f;i t, ropu'?r spntlment has always taken It for granted that there
would be an abundance of time In which to equip and drill the forces
nwssary fir war after war has been declared. The same notion
prevails in rcpnrd to the procuring of guns, munitions and supplies.
Mta of this kind have been brought about by a variety of causes,
hut chk-fly by the fnct thnt the Atlantic ocean has heretofore consti
tuted n sort of bnrrler between this country and the formidable mil
itary nations of Ktirope. Had the country been situated In closer
proximity to Ktirope popular notions on these subjects would be
tie quite different.
Feeling of Security
The difficulty and the time heretofore required In order to trans
port large armies with their supplies across the ocean has been in
the greatest measure responsible for a feeling of security and has
led the public into false notions regarding the best policy In provid
ing for the national defense. Then, too, may be added to this the
fact that our neighbors north and south have never kept up threaten
ing military establishments. Isolated in the center of a vast conti
nent on which there exists no possible enemy formidable enough to
threaten its existence, and separated by the two great oceans from
the other powers of the globe, this nation imagined itself to be In the
enviable position of .being able to provide for defense with scarcely
the nucleus of a standing army. Lured by a feeling of security due
to the special situation of the country in respect to foreign military
powers, the public mina lauea, in spue ox me mamiesi warn 01 co
hesion between the states politically, to conceive of the possibility
of an enemy at home; and, when this unforeseen enemy did appear,
the time occupied by-the government in forming an army to meet
the requirements of the situation was just as useful In enabling the
confederacy to raise and equip a force to resist It The sacrifices
that followed in men and money show plainly that the policy was
not one of economy. When summed up, in money alone, they con
stitute a sum, up to the present time, sufficient to maintain an army
of 100,000 men for a century. Had the government possessed half
such a force at the outbreak of war the occasion for these sacrifices
would not have taken place.
The enormous sacrifices made in the great conflict at home,
caused mainly by the want of foresight in regard to military prepa
ration, had but little effect on the feeling of security against a for
eign attack, and the notion that the ocean constitutes an efficient
barrier between this country and European powers still prevails to
an extent sufficient to hamper preparations for defense. The publio
mind falls to see the changes in clrcumstancea which have dimin
ished the value of the ocean as a barrier between us and possible
foreign enemies. In the times of sailing ships, which had relatively
very small carrying capacity, four weeks were required in transport
between an European shore and our own; whereas at the present
day a week would more than suffice for a modern steamship, carry
ing, say, six times as many men, to reach almost any point on our
coast. This increase of carrying power and speed practically re
duces the distance which separates us from Europe, measured in
terms of transportation, to one-twenty-fourth of what it was a cen
tury ago, when our present military policy had its origin. Under
such conditions the ocean, instead of acting as a barrier, really be
comes a facility for the enemy, as was fully demonstrated in the ease
of the confederacy, in which the immense ocean front proved Its
principal weakness, enabling the union army to choose its own point
of attack.
Invulnerable to Invasion
Failure to provide trained men wherewith to increase the army
may still prove to be aa costly in the case of a foreign enemy as it
did in the case of the confederacy. To the ordinary man this coun
try, with its 90,000.000 inhabitants, situated as it is between two
oceans, with no formidable enemy on our continent, seems invul
nerable to Invasion from any source whatever. On this subject,
however, much might be Bald; but would an extensive Invasion be
necessary in order to Impose upon the country a humiliating peace?
Our urban population now numbers more than one-third of the
whole, and its maintenance depends on commerce and the manufac
turing Industries, which, in turn, depend to a very large extent on'
our foreign trade. Were our foreign trade to be atopped by the
aelzure of three or four ports vast numbers of our urban population
would be without employment, aud were such a state of alege to
continue for a long time the population would have to be redis
tributed. The cost to the country of such a measure aa this might
be so much greater than the demands of the enemy that public opin
ion as to the feasibility of continuing the war would be likely to be
come ao much divided as to make a renewal of effort undesirable.
Moreover, a numerous population and distance from an enemy do
not in this age in themselves constitute military force. Twenty
thousand men embarked in Europe, proceeded to China a distance
twice aa great aa separatea us from Europe landed, marched to the
capital, took it and dictated terms of peace to a country containing
400,000,000 Inhabitants; as did 3,600 invaders burn our own capital
when we had 7,000,000 people.
Having achieved our independence through the aid of continental
Europe and entering the family ot nationa as an offset to the grow
ing colonjal power of England, our existence as a nation for the time
was secured by the aame influences that brought us Into being. Our
earliest expansion was not a result of military achievement, but
mostly by purchase of unexplored territory with indefinite bounda
ries. The acquisition of this territory in no way affected the bal
ance of power in Europe; In fact, both the purchaser and the ven
dors had but meager ideas of the value or political importance of the
territory ceded. The Indians conbtltuted a menace to the progress
of our development and compelled tho government to establish a
"""" -unwrmx
a
. :: y
W. 'A'. GLASSFORD, U. S. A'.,
Lieutenant Colonel Signal Corps, Commanding Fort Omaha.
national military force, which has continued to the present time.
Later acquisitions of territory brought about war, but with a weak
and contiguous power and the achievements of the Improvised army
during this war were unfortunately well calculated to confirm the
prevailing notion concerning the practicability of providing soldiers
for the army after war is declared.
Our development by expansion up to the termination of the Mex
ican war caused no jealousy among the great powers of Europe, and
as a consequence did not suggest to our people the necessity of in
creased armaments. Our latest territorial acquisitions came to us
as the result of a war with another weak power and as the opera
tions of this war were mainly conducted on the sea they produced
no Influence In regard to the prevailing system of raising men for
the army.
Watched by Europe
In extending our possessions from our Atlantic border westward
to the Asiatic continent we excited very little interest abroad until
the last atep, on account of the undeveloped nature of the territories
acquired and their small value to the general commerce of the world.
But for the first time in the progress of our acquisitions the events
connected with the most recent were watched by the governments of
Europe with Intense interest, and it cannot be said that public opin
ion in continental Europe waa specially favorable to this country in
regard to them. Our advent aa a colonial power in the east had not
yet been fully established when European discontent began to be
manifested in an unmistakable manner. We had entered the Asiatic
contest aa a colonial power in the midst of the complicated colonial
Interests of Europe. As a result our army has been nearly quadru
pled in alse and our navy expanded in relatively a still greater
degree.
The sentiment of the people has always been opposed to a stand
ing army in time of peace, but in spite of this events and surround
ings have usually dictated the course pursued. The people In general
have little knowledge of military affaire and they look for guidance
to those whose special training has fitted them to judge of such mat
ters. None of the modern changes In the military establishment
has been brought about as a result of public Initiative. Even great
political changes which have had their effect on the military estab
lishment, such as the abolition of slavery, the acquisition of Hawaii,
Porto Rico and the Philippines, were not the result of popular initia
tive. Unfortunately, great changes in the military policy of the
country, if left to publio opinion, would never he brought about ex
cept by disaster and defeat It would require the stress of catas
trophy in order to make clear to the people in general the necessity
In time of peace -of a general training of soldiers to be held in re
serve for war. The people of corntries that have been Invaded by
an enemy and have been compelled to pay large indemnities to get
rid of him have alone really understood It
Balance of Power in Europe
The military policy of the United Statea has been one of expedi
ency based on the balance of power In Europe rather than upon sen
timent at home. As a small, weak power the position of this coun
try in respect to the great powers of Europe was in many ways simi
lar to Holland, Belgium and Swltst-rland, and differing mainly from
them by the distance which separated it from Europe. As long aa
the balance of power remained practically the same as at the begin
ning of our Independence, and also on account of the time required
to assemble and embark troops and of the difficulties of transporta
tion, large military preparation la time of peace was not aa essential
as at present in order to protect ns from foreign aggression. As the
country grew, so did Europe likewise, the balance of power shifting
with the general development, and this, together with the enor
mously increased facilities of transportation, places the United States
in a very different position relative to the other powers than at the
beginning of its history.
Calculations have been made which show that the Germans could
embark at the shortest notice, using ships which happened to be in.
port at any one time, from 70,000 to 100,000 men, who could be'
transported to our coast in about a week's time. This is a force!
which is equal to our entire regular army. In the British transport
service from two to three tons' space Is allowed for each man, and
this rule Is found to agree very closely with our own service in trans
porting troops to the Philippines. Thus the "Sherman," having a
gross tonnage of 6,780 tons, sailed from New York with a passenger
list of 2,017. The "Lusltania," according to these measurements,
could transport at a single trip 11,410 men, and ships now building
will carry 20,000 men. The German Transatlantic liners sailing
between New York and European ports have a total capacity for
transportation of about 160,000 troops, while the four British lines
could carry 160,000. The entire foreign fleet of regular Transatlan
tic passenger steamers trading at the port of New York alone have
a capacity for transporting about 414,000 troops at a single trip, j
To be more precise, it is customary for short voyages of a week
or less to allow 2.25 tons per man and 6.25 tons per horse, while for
longer voyages 2.75 tons per man and 8 tons per horse are found to
be necessary. The total gross tonnage of English vessels available
on short notice for the transportation of troops is 1,050,000 tons, or
sufficient to carry on a short voyage 466,000 men. Germany's gross
tonnage of 1,100,000 tons available at short notice would accommo
date 488,000 men, while the tonnage of French vessels, aggregating
800,000 tons, has a capacity of 355,000 men. The gross tonnage of
Japanese vessels available for this purpose amounts to 700,000 tons,
which could carry, according to the rule for long voyages, 254,000
men.
Our Ship-Building Plants
It will be readily seen by the roregoing that there Is no lack oi
facilities by which an almost unlimited number of European or for
eign troops could be rapidly transported to our shores. Of course,
no landings of a considerable number of men could ever take place
on our coast as long as our navy is free to act in the neighborhood
of such attempted landings. Landings, if they take place at all,
would take place after naval engagements on the sea, In which our
vessels might be obliged temporarily or otherwise to seek refuge in
our ports. Should our navy fail from any cause to prevent a land
ing, then the task of protecting the coast devolves entirely upon the
army. In such a situation it is clear that the ports,, the navy yards
and the shlp-bulldlng plants should be defended at all hazards. By
doing this we would confine the operations of the enemy to the sea.
The effect of a blockade under such circumstances would be quite
different from that caused by the occupation of our ports by the
enemy.
But It Is not only for defense of this kind that we need a power
ful army. It would not be difficult to conceive of a situation in which
our forces would have to be emplojed beyond our shores in order to
bring to an acceptable termination a war In which our navy from the
very nature of its operations would be powerless. With Alaska,
Hawaii, the Philippines and the Canal Zone we can no longer figure
on a military force strictly for home defense. An aggression against
any one of these outlying possessions on the part of a foreign power
would Immediately bring about a war, which, In such a case, would
have to be carried on beyond our home shores. Modern naval move
ments take place quickly, so the necessity for defense either at home
or in our colonies is a matter which requires an immediate force, and
the strength of this force might be much greater than we can pro
duce at short notice, considering our lack of reserves.
Strategically we stand as a power In relation to the other powers
of the globe somewhat In the position of an island. Ninety per cent
of our vast foreign commerce passes over the seas. All but about
& per cent of this is carried on through the ports of our Atlantic sea
board. Our land frontiers would be of little use to us as commer
cial outleta In case of war. We differ from England as an island in
being able to produce on our own soil a sufficiency of food and other
necessities for the use of our population. A blockade of the ports
of England would mean starvation to the inhabitants. A blockade
of our own ports would not amount to quite that, but to many of us
something very akin to it Our great urtfan population would Im
mediately feel the strain which would follow such a condition and
Its effects would not by any means stop there.
The effects of a blockade of the ports of a country will depend
on its situation in respect to other countries, and also very much on
the occupation and modo of life of the inhabitants. ' All countries
will be far from being affected in a like manner. A blockade of the
Atlantic ports alone of the United States would throw this country
almost entirely upon its own resources, while a blockade of the ports
of Germany would, of course, produce Inconvenience, but Its general
effect on the country would be quite dlffeient from the effect of a
blockade of pur own ports, as outlets to its commerce would be
found through neutral ports and over its land frontiers, through
which a very large portion of it la carried on at all times.
Our Agricultural Population
An exclusively ' agricultural population evenly distributed over
a country might hold out longer under the stress of a blockade than
one In which great masses of people are collected into cities. But
under the most favorable circumstances there would be a limit If
much of the agriculture in such a case were of a special kind, such
as cotton, tobacco, etc., it might have to be abandoned altogether
and replaced by productions more aulted to temporary requirements.
Such a change would bring about great hardship on the people. Take
for instance the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Were the agriculture
of these islands shaped for the purpose it would no doubt produce
a sufficiency of food for the sustenance of the population. But it
does not do this habitually. Flour, fish and other foodstuffs are im
ported, while the land is turned to account in cultivating sugar, to
bacco and coffee. One of the first lesults of war was general hunger
throughout the islands, which would have been much more destruc
tive to the population than bullets by the time a change in crops
could have been brought about
t A sudden change In the occupations and mode of life of an urban
population would be much more serious in its effects than in the
case of a rural one.
i We have a coast line of 3,500 miles altogether, 2, 00 miles on
the Atlantic, Including the gulf coast, and 900 miles on the PaclQc.
Nine-tenths of our foreign commerce on the Atlantic side Is carried
on through only six ports, and half of this through only one port. A
power or combination of powers, with a navy strong enough to drive
our warships from the seas, could well afford in case of war to leave
the Pacific coast entirely out of consideration, as being in no way
calculated to effect the result The enemy's attention would bt
turned exclusively to the few ports through which our foreign com
merce Is mainly carried on, with the object of seising them and de
stroying our naval aresnals and ship-building plants. Once this
were effected, with a foothold on Long Island, he could carry on the
war Indefinitely at comparatively little expense to himself, while we
might go on exhausting ourselves in military preparation which
would be of no possible use under the circumstances, as however
numerous our armies got to be, they could not reach the enemy.
The similarity of conditions and general development in this
country and in Europe force the adoption of similar military estab
lishments. Hence the plan of creating reserves in this country can
not differ very much from that of those countries. Germany has a
standing army of over 600,000 men apd a reserve force of trained
men. of twice that number. France has a somewhat smaller number
in both the standing armyand the reserve, while the other nations
of continental Europe maintain forces of almost equal proportional
(strength. Some system of universal military training will have to
be adopted in this country sooner or later. Our system of raising
armies by untrained volunteers after war is declared will no longer
be safe In view of the great number of trained men which could im
mediately be hurled against them. At the outbreak of war every
able-bodied man is supposed to respond to a call in defense of the
, country; then why should he not respond in a similar way for train
ing in anticipation of war? The question of war or peace does not
necessarily depend upon the will of a single nation, therefore In
than. 1v.ab n.9 amaa1 .11 1 1 , . . . . .
these times of general armament all men ahould have military train
ing as far as compatible with the ordinary vocations of life.
We Need Reserves
We need reserves of trained men wherewith to Increase our army
in case of war, and we need a number of them several times greater
than our present regular forces. How this reserve force may be
Created under our volunteer system of recruiting is a question that
is much easier to ask than to answer. The author has been long of
'.the opinion that much can be accomplished in this direction by a
short term of service without re-enlistment, and by making the army
a school for the training of reserves. By single term enlistments for
three years in an army of 100,000 men about one-third of this num
ber of trained men would be discharged each year, 60 per cent of
iwhom, or say 20,000, would be fit for active service during ten years.
This would produce a permanent reserve force in ten years of 200,-.
ooo men. As the number of reserves that can be so trained depends
upon the size of the army and the duration of enlistment, it is evi
dent that by increasing the army to 200,000 and reducing the en
listment to two years 100,000 would pass into this reserve each year,
which would in ten years produce a permanent reserve force of 600,
000 men. The latter figure comes nearer to our present needs. The
size of the regular army will then evidently depend upon the number
of reserves required and the time necessary in training them,
j The main difficulty in carrying out this single term service with
lout re-enlistment lies in obtaining volunteers. In order to obtain
Fthese in sufficient numbers for the purpose of creating a reserve
force special Inducements will have to be offered. Our army even
fatVhe present time offers inducements which are as advantageous
'as many civil employments. At first sight civil employments seem
to bring higher pay, but when It Is considered that the soldier re
ceives his board, lodging and clothes, in addition to his pay, the net
salary in the army is greater than in most employments outside it.
There Is no institution that offers such encouragement to saving and
thrift as the army. The soldier's savings can be deposited with the
government with an assured repayment and with interest The pos
sible accumulations of a term of service would give a modest start
. in life to the young man upon his leaving the army. But in view of
the fact that the system of recruitlrg implies to a great extent con
currence In the labor market, further Inducements will have to be
offered. These do uot necessarily -mean Increased pay.
By making the military service accomplish the double purpose of
training the young soldier and educating blm at the same time in
order that he may at the conclusion of his service leave with acqui
sitions useful in civil life an Inducement would be created that
would no doubt cause the requisite number of young men to enlist.
Ordinarily the spare time of the soldier Is sufficient, If properly
utilized, for the study of various branches which will not only be
useful to him In the array Itself, but alxo later in civil life. At in
tervals during the day the soldier could be given much time for
study, while the entire evening, with few exceptions, could be de
voted to such a, purpose, but in order to do this some general system
must prevail. The soldier's efforts must be directed. In order to
(Continued on Page Four.
prlie and first honorable mention nmv on '"Volunteer Annlea,"
Journal Military Servlro Inxtltute. Vol X1I, i ae 171. 1SD8.
EnllMed pay of the army per n ontli.
115 Privates, cavalry. Infantry, artillery, signal ' corpa; a-eond-cUsi pri
vates, eiixlneera und ordnance.
IIS Private, hospital corps.
118 Klrat-cla-is privates, hoHpltal jjorps. engineers, ordnance, signal corps
$21 'orporal of cavalry, artillery, Infantry.
124 Corporal of hospital corps, engineer, ordnance, signal corpa.
130 Serjeants, hoxpltal corpa. cavulry. arilllery. infantry.
13 Sertteanta, signal corpa, engineers, ordnance.
40 Staff Ht-rKeantH.
115 First sergeants, cavalry. Infantry, artillery, etKlneera; first-class
sergeants, signal corpa. etc
150 Servants, f Irxt-class. hospital corps.
!& KngTneers of coast artillery.
(75 tler.trlciana
bervlce at colonial and Alaskan stations brings an lneraae ef it per