

# POSSIBILITY OF MAKING THE ARMY EFFICIENT DEFENSE

Method Suggested by Which the Present Establishment Can Be Made a Training School in Which Young Men May Gain a Working Knowledge of the Science of Modern Warfare

**T**HE total strength of the army at the outbreak of war, under the present organization, would be represented by about 100,000 men, and as this force is more than likely to be insufficient for the conduct of subsequent operations it will be necessary to increase it by large additions. These additional men may be had in part by drawing on the National Guard; but, should the exigencies be great, they must, for the most part, be obtained as volunteers from the population in general. Volunteers from the population in general would no doubt present themselves up to the number called for, and more too for that matter, but their fitness for immediate use in the army would leave much to be desired. These men would enter the army without any previous military instruction whatever. They would have to be equipped and drilled, operations which require many months of valuable time. The immediate value of the volunteers who join the army will depend upon the amount of military instruction they have already had. Those who have been trained in the National Guard and other military bodies will be sooner available than the men who volunteer from outside such organizations.

Now, the number of volunteers that may become necessary in a given circumstance may be many times greater than the regular army and the National Guard combined, and these volunteers, under existing conditions, will require many months of instruction and drill before they will be fitted to enter the field against an army composed of trained regular troops.

Much time will be required in order to equip, drill and generally to prepare the volunteer for use in war; and it is evident that if the volunteers are to be equipped and drilled after war is declared this nation will be at great disadvantage in coping with one, the potential military forces of which have been previously trained, and are, on the outbreak of hostilities, prepared to enter the army as regular soldiers.

In several of the European nations all men capable of entering the army, either as volunteers or as conscripts, have already been trained and their equipments are in store. It has been the boast of one of these that it could put a million of trained men on each of its two principal frontiers as quickly as the men could be marched or transported to the posts assigned to them.

The question of training a large number of men in time of peace is one which heretofore has occupied the public mind but very little. In fact, popular sentiment has always taken it for granted that there would be an abundance of time in which to equip and drill the forces necessary for war after war has been declared. The same notion prevails in regard to the procuring of guns, munitions and supplies. Ideas of this kind have been brought about by a variety of causes, but chiefly by the fact that the Atlantic ocean has heretofore constituted a sort of barrier between this country and the formidable military nations of Europe. Had the country been situated in closer proximity to Europe popular notions on these subjects would be quite different.

## Feeling of Security

The difficulty and the time heretofore required in order to transport large armies with their supplies across the ocean has been in the greatest measure responsible for a feeling of security and has led the public into false notions regarding the best policy in providing for the national defense. Then, too, may be added to this the fact that our neighbors north and south have never kept up threatening military establishments. Isolated in the center of a vast continent on which there exists no possible enemy formidable enough to threaten its existence, and separated by the two great oceans from the other powers of the globe, this nation imagined itself to be in the enviable position of being able to provide for defense with scarcely the nucleus of a standing army. Lured by a feeling of security due to the special situation of the country in respect to foreign military powers, the public mind failed, in spite of the manifest want of cohesion between the states politically, to conceive of the possibility of an enemy at home; and, when this unforeseen enemy did appear, the time occupied by the government in forming an army to meet the requirements of the situation was just as useful in enabling the confederacy to raise and equip a force to resist it. The sacrifices that followed in men and money show plainly that the policy was not one of economy. When summed up, in money alone, they constitute a sum, up to the present time, sufficient to maintain an army of 100,000 men for a century. Had the government possessed half such a force at the outbreak of war the occasion for these sacrifices would not have taken place.

The enormous sacrifices made in the great conflict at home, caused mainly by the want of foresight in regard to military preparation, had but little effect on the feeling of security against a foreign attack, and the notion that the ocean constitutes an efficient barrier between this country and European powers still prevails to an extent sufficient to hamper preparations for defense. The public mind fails to see the changes in circumstances which have diminished the value of the ocean as a barrier between us and possible foreign enemies. In the times of sailing ships, which had relatively very small carrying capacity, four weeks were required in transport between an European shore and our own; whereas at the present day a week would more than suffice for a modern steamship, carrying, say, six times as many men, to reach almost any point on our coast. This increase of carrying power and speed practically reduces the distance which separates us from Europe, measured in terms of transportation, to one-twenty-fourth of what it was a century ago, when our present military policy had its origin. Under such conditions the ocean, instead of acting as a barrier, really becomes a facility for the enemy, as was fully demonstrated in the case of the confederacy, in which the immense ocean front proved its principal weakness, enabling the union army to choose its own point of attack.

## Invulnerable to Invasion

Failure to provide trained men wherewith to increase the army may still prove to be as costly in the case of a foreign enemy as it did in the case of the confederacy. To the ordinary man this country, with its 90,000,000 inhabitants, situated as it is between two oceans, with no formidable enemy on our continent, seems invulnerable to invasion from any source whatever. On this subject, however, much might be said; but would an extensive invasion be necessary in order to impose upon the country a humiliating peace? Our urban population now numbers more than one-third of the whole, and its maintenance depends on commerce and the manufacturing industries, which, in turn, depend to a very large extent on our foreign trade. Were our foreign trade to be stopped by the seizure of three or four ports vast numbers of our urban population would be without employment, and were such a state of siege to continue for a long time the population would have to be redistributed. The cost to the country of such a measure as this might be so much greater than the demands of the enemy that public opinion as to the feasibility of continuing the war would be likely to become so much divided as to make a renewal of effort undesirable. Moreover, a numerous population and distance from an enemy do not in this age in themselves constitute military force. Twenty thousand men embarked in Europe, proceeded to China—a distance twice as great as separates us from Europe—landed, marched to the capital, took it and dictated terms of peace to a country containing 400,000,000 inhabitants; as did 3,500 invaders burn our own capital when we had 7,000,000 people.

Having achieved our independence through the aid of continental Europe and entering the family of nations as an offset to the growing colonial power of England, our existence as a nation for the time was secured by the same influences that brought us into being. Our earliest expansion was not a result of military achievement, but mostly by purchase of unexplored territory with indefinite boundaries. The acquisition of this territory in no way affected the balance of power in Europe; in fact, both the purchaser and the vendors had but meager ideas of the value or political importance of the territory ceded. The Indians constituted a menace to the progress of our development and compelled the government to establish a



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national military force, which has continued to the present time. Later acquisitions of territory brought about war, but with a weak and contiguous power and the achievements of the improvised army during this war were unfortunately well calculated to confirm the prevailing notion concerning the practicability of providing soldiers for the army after war is declared.

Our development by expansion up to the termination of the Mexican war caused no jealousy among the great powers of Europe, and as a consequence did not suggest to our people the necessity of increased armaments. Our latest territorial acquisitions came to us as the result of a war with another weak power and as the operations of this war were mainly conducted on the sea they produced no influence in regard to the prevailing system of raising men for the army.

## Watched by Europe

In extending our possessions from our Atlantic border westward to the Asiatic continent we excited very little interest abroad until the last step, on account of the undeveloped nature of the territories acquired and their small value to the general commerce of the world. But for the first time in the progress of our acquisitions the events connected with the most recent were watched by the governments of Europe with intense interest, and it cannot be said that public opinion in continental Europe was specially favorable to this country in regard to them. Our advent as a colonial power in the east had not yet been fully established when European discontent began to be manifested in an unmistakable manner. We had entered the Asiatic contest as a colonial power in the midst of the complicated colonial interests of Europe. As a result our army has been nearly quadrupled in size and our navy expanded in relatively a still greater degree.

The sentiment of the people has always been opposed to a standing army in time of peace, but in spite of this events and surroundings have usually dictated the course pursued. The people in general have little knowledge of military affairs and they look for guidance to those whose special training has fitted them to judge of such matters. None of the modern changes in the military establishment has been brought about as a result of public initiative. Even great political changes which have had their effect on the military establishment, such as the abolition of slavery, the acquisition of Hawaii, Porto Rico and the Philippines, were not the result of popular initiative. Unfortunately, great changes in the military policy of the country, if left to public opinion, would never be brought about except by disaster and defeat. It would require the stress of catastrophe in order to make clear to the people in general the necessity in time of peace of a general training of soldiers to be held in reserve for war. The people of countries that have been invaded by an enemy and have been compelled to pay large indemnities to get rid of him have alone really understood it.

## Balance of Power in Europe

The military policy of the United States has been one of expediency based on the balance of power in Europe rather than upon sentiment at home. As a small, weak power the position of this country in respect to the great powers of Europe was in many ways similar to Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, and differing mainly from them by the distance which separated it from Europe. As long as the balance of power remained practically the same as at the beginning of our independence, and also on account of the time required to assemble and embark troops and of the difficulties of transportation, large military preparation in time of peace was not as essential as at present in order to protect us from foreign aggression. As the country grew, so did Europe likewise, the balance of power shifting with the general development, and this, together with the enormously increased facilities of transportation, places the United States in a very different position relative to the other powers than at the beginning of its history.

Calculations have been made which show that the Germans could

embark at the shortest notice, using ships which happened to be in port at any one time, from 70,000 to 100,000 men, who could be transported to our coast in about a week's time. This is a force which is equal to our entire regular army. In the British transport service from two to three tons' space is allowed for each man, and this rule is found to agree very closely with our own service in transporting troops to the Philippines. Thus the "Sherman," having a gross tonnage of 5,780 tons, sailed from New York with a passenger list of 2,017. The "Lusitania," according to these measurements, could transport at a single trip 11,410 men, and ships now building will carry 20,000 men. The German Transatlantic liners sailing between New York and European ports have a total capacity for transportation of about 160,000 troops, while the four British lines could carry 150,000. The entire foreign fleet of regular Transatlantic passenger steamers trading at the port of New York alone have a capacity for transporting about 414,000 troops at a single trip.

To be more precise, it is customary for short voyages of a week or less to allow 2.25 tons per man and 6.25 tons per horse, while for longer voyages 2.75 tons per man and 8 tons per horse are found to be necessary. The total gross tonnage of English vessels available on short notice for the transportation of troops is 1,050,000 tons, or sufficient to carry on a short voyage 466,000 men. Germany's gross tonnage of 1,100,000 tons available at short notice would accommodate 488,000 men, while the tonnage of French vessels, aggregating 800,000 tons, has a capacity of 355,000 men. The gross tonnage of Japanese vessels available for this purpose amounts to 700,000 tons, which could carry, according to the rule for long voyages, 254,000 men.

## Our Ship-Building Plants

It will be readily seen by the foregoing that there is no lack of facilities by which an almost unlimited number of European or foreign troops could be rapidly transported to our shores. Of course, no landings of a considerable number of men could ever take place on our coast as long as our navy is free to act in the neighborhood of such attempted landings. Landings, if they take place at all, would take place after naval engagements on the sea, in which our vessels might be obliged temporarily or otherwise to seek refuge in our ports. Should our navy fail from any cause to prevent a landing, then the task of protecting the coast devolves entirely upon the army. In such a situation it is clear that the ports, the navy yards and the ship-building plants should be defended at all hazards. By doing this we would confine the operations of the enemy to the sea. The effect of a blockade under such circumstances would be quite different from that caused by the occupation of our ports by the enemy.

But it is not only for defense of this kind that we need a powerful army. It would not be difficult to conceive of a situation in which our forces would have to be employed beyond our shores in order to bring to an acceptable termination a war in which our navy for the very nature of its operations would be powerless. With Alaska, Hawaii, the Philippines and the Canal Zone we can no longer figure on a military force strictly for home defense. An aggression against any one of these outlying possessions on the part of a foreign power would immediately bring about a war, which, in such a case, would have to be carried on beyond our home shores. Modern naval movements take place quickly, so the necessity for defense either at home or in our colonies is a matter which requires an immediate force, and the strength of this force might be much greater than we can produce at short notice, considering our lack of reserves.

Strategically we stand as a power in relation to the other powers of the globe somewhat in the position of an island. Ninety per cent of our vast foreign commerce passes over the seas. All but about 5 per cent of this is carried on through the ports of our Atlantic seaboard. Our land frontiers would be of little use to us as commercial outlets in case of war. We differ from England as an island in being able to produce on our own soil a sufficiency of food and other necessities for the use of our population. A blockade of the ports

of England would mean starvation to the inhabitants. A blockade of our own ports would not amount to quite that, but to many of us something very akin to it. Our great urban population would immediately feel the strain which would follow such a condition and its effects would not by any means stop there.

The effects of a blockade of the ports of a country will depend on its situation in respect to other countries, and also very much on the occupation and mode of life of the inhabitants. All countries will be far from being affected in a like manner. A blockade of the Atlantic ports alone of the United States would throw this country almost entirely upon its own resources, while a blockade of the ports of Germany would, of course, produce inconvenience, but its general effect on the country would be quite different from the effect of a blockade of our own ports, as outlets to its commerce would be found through neutral ports and over its land frontiers, through which a very large portion of it is carried on at all times.

## Our Agricultural Population

An exclusively agricultural population evenly distributed over a country might hold out longer under the stress of a blockade than one in which great masses of people are collected into cities. But under the most favorable circumstances there would be a limit. If much of the agriculture in such a case were of a special kind, such as cotton, tobacco, etc., it might have to be abandoned altogether and replaced by productions more suited to temporary requirements. Such a change would bring about great hardship on the people. Take for instance the case of Cuba and Porto Rico. Were the agriculture of these islands shaped for the purpose it would no doubt produce a sufficiency of food for the sustenance of the population. But it does not do this habitually. Flour, fish and other foodstuffs are imported, while the land is turned to account in cultivating sugar, tobacco and coffee. One of the first results of war was general hunger throughout the islands, which would have been much more destructive to the population than bullets by the time a change in crops could have been brought about.

A sudden change in the occupations and mode of life of an urban population would be much more serious in its effects than in the case of a rural one.

We have a coast line of 3,500 miles altogether, 2,600 miles on the Atlantic, including the gulf coast, and 900 miles on the Pacific. Nine-tenths of our foreign commerce on the Atlantic side is carried on through only six ports, and half of this through only one port. A power or combination of powers, with a navy strong enough to drive our warships from the seas, could well afford in case of war to leave the Pacific coast entirely out of consideration, as being in no way calculated to affect the result. The enemy's attention would be turned exclusively to the few ports through which our foreign commerce is mainly carried on, with the object of seizing them and destroying our naval arsenals and ship-building plants. Once this were effected, with a foothold on Long Island, he could carry on the war indefinitely at comparatively little expense to himself, while we might go on exhausting ourselves in military preparation which would be of no possible use under the circumstances, as however numerous our armies got to be, they could not reach the enemy.

The similarity of conditions and general development in this country and in Europe force the adoption of similar military establishments. Hence the plan of creating reserves in this country cannot differ very much from that of those countries. Germany has a standing army of over 600,000 men and a reserve force of trained men of twice that number. France has a somewhat smaller number in both the standing army and the reserve, while the other nations of continental Europe maintain forces of almost equal proportional strength. Some system of universal military training will have to be adopted in this country sooner or later. Our system of raising armies by untrained volunteers after war is declared will no longer be safe in view of the great number of trained men which could immediately be hurled against them. At the outbreak of war every able-bodied man is supposed to respond to a call in defense of the country; then why should he not respond in a similar way for training in anticipation of war? The question of war or peace does not necessarily depend upon the will of a single nation, therefore in these times of general armament all men should have military training as far as compatible with the ordinary vocations of life.

## We Need Reserves

We need reserves of trained men wherewith to increase our army in case of war, and we need a number of them several times greater than our present regular forces. How this reserve force may be created under our volunteer system of recruiting is a question that is much easier to ask than to answer. The author has been long of the opinion that much can be accomplished in this direction by a short term of service without re-enlistment, and by making the army a school for the training of reserves.\* By single term enlistments for three years in an army of 100,000 men about one-third of this number of trained men would be discharged each year, 60 per cent of whom, or say 20,000, would be fit for active service during ten years. This would produce a permanent reserve force in ten years of 200,000 men. As the number of reserves that can be so trained depends upon the size of the army and the duration of enlistment, it is evident that by increasing the army to 200,000 and reducing the enlistment to two years 100,000 would pass into the reserve each year, which would in ten years produce a permanent reserve force of 600,000 men. The latter figure comes nearer to our present needs. The size of the regular army will then evidently depend upon the number of reserves required and the time necessary in training them.

The main difficulty in carrying out this single term service without re-enlistment lies in obtaining volunteers. In order to obtain these sufficient numbers for the purpose of creating a reserve force special inducements will have to be offered. Our army even at the present time offers inducements which are as advantageous as many civil employments. At first sight civil employments seem to bring higher pay, but when it is considered that the soldier receives his board, lodging and clothes, in addition to his pay, the net salary in the army is greater than in most employments outside it.\*\* There is no institution that offers such encouragement to saving and thrift as the army. The soldier's savings can be deposited with the government with an assured repayment and with interest. The possible accumulations of a term of service would give a modest start in life to the young man upon his leaving the army. But in view of the fact that the system of recruiting implies to a great extent concurrence in the labor market, further inducements will have to be offered. These do not necessarily mean increased pay.

By making the military service accomplish the double purpose of training the young soldier and educating him at the same time in order that he may at the conclusion of his service leave with acquisitions useful in civil life an inducement would be created that would no doubt cause the requisite number of young men to enlist. Ordinarily the spare time of the soldier is sufficient, if properly utilized, for the study of various branches which will not only be useful to him in the army itself, but also later in civil life. At intervals during the day the soldier could be given much time for study, while the entire evening, with few exceptions, could be devoted to such a purpose, but in order to do this some general system must prevail. The soldier's efforts must be directed. In order to

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\*See prize and first honorable mention essay on "Volunteer Armies," Journal Military Service Institute, Vol. XXII, page 471, 1898.  
\*\*Enlisted pay of the army per month.  
\$15—Privates, cavalry, infantry, artillery, signal corps; second-class privates, engineers and ordnance.  
\$16—Private, hospital corps.  
\$18—First-class private, hospital corps, engineers, ordnance, signal corps.  
\$21—Corporal of cavalry, artillery, infantry.  
\$24—Corporal of hospital corps, engineers, ordnance, signal corps.  
\$26—Sergeants, hospital corps, cavalry, artillery, infantry.  
\$28—Sergeants, signal corps, engineers, ordnance.  
\$40—Staff sergeants.  
\$45—First sergeants, cavalry, infantry, artillery, engineers; first-class sergeants, signal corps, etc.  
\$50—Sergeants, first-class, hospital corps.  
\$65—Engineers of coast artillery.  
\$75—Electricians.  
Service at colonial and Alaskan stations brings an increase of 30 per cent.