AVAIL
AH
Me
MOT
Uric Rmoiv dL
Pearson
trw
D.S.N.
LATE
irs g - v. kf 3v "I - fin - t 'lit I j -a.. ii
m i m i a v -a ." ivi i .n. - jt 4 . . . 'i i m i i ii i ii
7pe$ of pxyoeH
houId tva ma fo localize the Inflow of
water from seams and rivet holes and bolt
holes. I believe the beet ablution would
be to place light armor outside of the
heavy armor and have two armored water
tight hulls In the region of the water line;
that la. to set the heavy armor hark about
jfour feet, no that the outer liirht armor
and the structure, behind It could b
crumpled up against the heavy armor, th
jinner armor being; somewhat analngoua to
the Inner bottom. I appreciate the atruot
.Ural difficulties Involved In thJa arrange
ment, but they ar not Insuperable. Prov
ing ground teats hould be made to deter
mine the necessary total thickness and the
rHntlve thickness of the outer and Inner
armor, and the necessary distance between
tthem, together with the beat form of
structure.
Therefore the light armor, aa found In
Istlng btUe ahlpa. ahould be abandoned
and ita weight assigned to heavy armor
worked In two thlckneaaAs. A irimil&r
structure should he de-1sed for trtrret
armor, though of courae water tl;htnaa
would not hava to be considered. Onlr
the main battery should have nrranr pro
tection. The d.cJt armor should be worked
a multiple decks. Splinter deck, or second
armor deck, should be thicker than at pres
ent over the machinery and ma-an
spaces and the steering gear; the oonnlrw
towers and system of communication
shmild have twenty-flvs pr cent hotter
protecttlon. The structure, of coutm
should be as caretully designed as that of
a cnilser to preserve stability In damaged
.condition.
In the case of the armored cnilser addi
jtlonal weight Should be added to the
splinter deck protection over vitals. Tbe
Inh.v K h"Id b' i' consider,
ably In thickness, and the entent reduced
j forward and the height above water low
ered somewhat.
'beFrZt,!ci,,"!t,"U' Jh tUrn,t arm- h1
be reduce.1 somewhat, no side armor should
be -attempted, but doubt, a. Z
v. . vver ine
should be kept as low as
water.
vitals, which
possible below
HE Russo-japanese war la full
of Instructive lessons. New light
has been thrown upon the meth
T
I on land and on era.
of power In E
turbed. The
Orient has been changed by
ods of conducting modern warfare
The balance
to ear products sa transit, but to demand
for Utem fair and Just opportunities In
the markets beyond the seas. Strong for
eln policies, hawed on a great navy, are
thus an American necessity. Therefore,
the supreme lesnon of the day for the
for insur
pcaoa, for
possible, and
v, k i Amertoen people Is this. that,
urope. has been ,, our prWerlty 1m Ume of
whole face of the prvenung war as long as pr
Axnerloa. the situation Is) crttlcsO. Our navvy
Is utterly 'Inadequate and w. have no
bases beyond our shores. The great obsta
cle In the way of prooeedlng to make ade-
I qua.te provision Is the lack of public Inter
est, constituting an inherent weanneas m
our country. To overcome this weakness
we should bend every patriotic energy.
employing the proceedings of the naval in
should be fitted with powerful outriggers,
with which, with reduced speed, they could
drive ahead a sweep or drag capable of
clearing a channel through which the mid
ship section of the vessel could pass.
Each battle shin should also carry a
ny the pnenom- nrniuMirim nf war if it 1 - .w. .a,.. r th nw Umiu
nal rise of Japan. A spirit of unrest is mU8t oom. we are driven by Inexorable fn'rm a board under the Navy Depart-
treat ment to utilise to the utmost the putoilo
press, the same board to course the cen
sorship In time of war.
Along with lessons In policy, the war
in'ht, vR.lux.hle lessons for America In
passing over China, witn indications or . conditions to secure and maintain
aeep Keaiexi movement on loot ior ine rmwr upon the sea.
nuiuury organizittiun 01 ine ninese, en-1 PmnfJsm Vmt
dangerlng the future peace and welfare 1 w ..
of the world. America has begun to play I For Pwer. "P" th tf Ruo-JaP-
1 nnAaa rae ha tris-tttrn rha 1 mnnirtn ruu n
iTonS." Pacemaker among the na- strategy and tactics. The foremost tr a tegl-
These lessons have value for other na- nval stations or base, of operations. All ! re oolUt Te
tlons hut their r.-ate.st value is for methods of coaling ships at see, have tae of aggressive operations, ine japan
Am'.c,bU.1. rr r, r,V U cV'os.' Proved Inadequate. Coai. which has be- from the start took the aggre-Uv. on
Bwtft and
o . t..J .-4 1n Iks DllflsUnS mi fa
h. threshold nf it ereat International ca- come as vital I or a neec as looa IS tor auu.u ojiu . -
reer. While a general Interest attaches ' man. can be put on board with aewurance defence until the war was over.
to the war operations on land, our chief of success oniy insio a ns-TDor. Arier
concern li with the development of warlwar has begun It can only be safely up
operatluns on the sea, for America's whole plied to a fleet from nrby stations ade
conuct with the world. In war and peace, Iquately stored before war Is declared.
Is over tho ocean. 1" most of the waters of the earth the
The first and last lesson taught by this bottoms of ships foul rapidly and require
war is the paramount Importance of con- frequent dockings under penalty of serious
trolling the sea within the sorve of war' loss of speed. Efforts at cleaning ships'
operations. Had Russia held undisputed bottoms at sea are as fruitless as efforts at
control of the sea In the Far East at the coaling 'at sea. With so much machinery
outset Japan, unable to reach the main
land and ner own kingdom open to In
vasion, would have acquiesced in the Rus
sian occupation of Manchuria and predom
inance In Core wvthout a resort to war.
A few hundred millions put Into ships In
advance would have saved to Russia the
domination of the Orient and changed the
eiurse of the world. When JApan gained
undisputed control of the sea Russia came
to terms.
No one would deny the Importance of the ! Lrnpertanoe,
operations 01 me
churla. but ewry
p?ace negotiations In the Spanish war
began alter the battle of Bajitlago. ao
on board, modern vessels, to remain nil
dent, must have periodical overhauling, re.
quiring tools and equipment that c&nnot
be carried on board. Furthermore, vessels
Injured In bottle and in accidents, Inevit
able in the operations of a flet, must look
to a nearby station for repairs. Since the
vigorous offence ie indeed the besjt method
of defence. The Romans failed utterly to
drive Hannibal from Italy until they In
vaded Africa. WJiererupon Hannibal was
Immediately summoned home to defend
Carthage. The coasts of Japan and the
lines of communications to Manchuria,
were never menaced because the Japanese
kept the Russian fleets on the defensive.
Had the Japanese fleets stayed at home to
protect their coasts, these coasts would
have been In danger and the line of com
munication broken and decisive operations
lmpoable.
The Buttle Ship.
Beekle leseons In snrategy and tactics
the war teaches valuable lessons In ques
tions of material and personnel. For the
unitea states naa a wvi inrean and mn.i
lug commerce over the ocean, th. mm nf .uestlon of type. It clearly shows that t
operations In time of war will extend farday, as of old, the brunt of battle must be
away from our shores. It Is of the utmost bo by ships of the greatest offensive
therefore, that wa huM and defensive power, as ine war cloud
Japanese armies In Man- hasten lha establishment of strorw naval "ae. In the Orient we see the battle ship
one must not. that, aslbaaaa 1- th, AirtHnt w.t.r. nf h. ..rth standing out as the only sale foundation
This nation's umnuru mA ,,,Hf a,. I "mtu iu uu.m --
kthmim ..i . armored
to build up sea power. The
cruiser has been conspicuous.
though more In scouting and In fighting
each other than In general engagements,
.S": , Ji k- . der American ownership and American
aftrr the battle of Mukden, but after the! ,..
battle of the Sea of Japan. I w. .', ,hr., . . jand torpe.lo craft have rendered valuable
Furthermore, tne benenu of mrrolMngiy,"othrV but these must be placed with
the seas are not confined to the advan-i1"?'"- Pow,r ,f llroPf ; establish and tha weaker types In th. category of the
tare In war. but are felt throughout the1 maintain a naval bass in the waters olitullt,nel. vvnen all is said and done
th. txrtboean te or th Oiilf of Mexico. I the fact remains that, however Imnonant
As Japanese diplomacy, following the Use operations In the attack and defence of
of Japan, Is causing the British to eva- coast lines and of commerce mav he under
power on the sea. No nation can ne great'"""" wonuuia iu iciai cunumuua. me wniroi 01 ine sea
In modern tlnvs without worldwide com'
long years of peace. Not only a nation's
Influence, hut Its opportusjtMee for com
merce are meaeurvd more and more by Its
torpedo boats, ten destroyers and five sub-1 placements. A properly designed vessel of
marines. ; twenty thousand tons displacement should
During the war scouting played a prom-, have a concentrated military power equal
inent part, particularly during the stages to that of six vessels of rive thousand tons
preceding the battle of the Sea or Japan. leach. The la-iger displacement gives a
whan tha flaota mar. innmuphini! The steadier tun nlatform and superior sea
mall inhmAHna Rrv' !il V enulnned 1or!lanan,y, tn o.. Ant 'n tr 1 n ualit lea with lejia loss of SDeed in a Sea-
Clearing th waters and channels of har- work, the Russians m-eak. consequently ths way, while the conditions of health and
bora of minea .nd torpedoes. In addition battle found the Japanese thoroughly pre-'comfort are better.
the wing and bottom structure of battle) pared, while the Russians were taken by The chief disadvantages are greater
ships should bo mors developed, with ad- surprise. Wireless telegraphy has wonder-, draft of water and larger turning circle,
dittonai Inner bottoms and wing bulkheads fully expanded the scope and usefulness but these Increase In similar designs only
to cushion and locallz. better a torpedo of scouting, especially with Improvements with the cube root of displacement, and
blow. (now being developed to prevent lnterfer-i with altered designs can both be held with-
The war brought out another line of ence. A fleet should be kept In constant In reasonable limits. Of course, ths total
weakness In sinking battleships, the wantltouch with the enemy, no matter how far, cost of this ship is greater, but for each
of stability under damaged conditions.! away. This service Is especially valuable military unit It Is really less, and the na
The remedy would lie not only In further for the United States, particularly during tlon with large resources like ours should
development of subdivision and Improve- the process of upbuilding our navy, when take advantage of this principle like a firm
ment of watertight work on bulkheads our enemy's fleet Is liable to take the ag-j with large capital. There Is no cheap road
and around the armor shelf but also in gresalve. Our scouts should be oft tha en-1 and short cut to naval power. The resort
arrangements for quickly flooding com-'emy's coasts before war is declared, and of Impoverished nations to special types
partments on the opposite sides and op-'should keep every fleet located, communl-' an(j small dlKplacements will be found to
poslte end of the ship, together with lm- eating with America through signal ships be an utter delusion. Naval power is ex
proved arrangements for quickly drawing stationed at Intervals across the ocean. We' pensive but the more expensive the better,
swash water from decks Into the bilge,. should follow then the movements of all the'siae of fleets Is relative and the
where It could be reached by bilge and fleets, and know well In advance their nations wltn tho greatest resources avall-wt-ecklng
pumps. In the case of large: strength and objectives. ai,ie for navies are th. Industrial and com-
wlng compartments the flooding of coun- Fttat pp-tea cruisers and converted I mercial nations that wish peace, while the
.fJ.ih?M imi? Tl" h onP"lte;ocean greyhounds can be utilised for this' armaments of military powers are a handl
w.tT . . 1 automatic service, especially for transmitting mes-!uap in the race for tea power. This Is a.
With careful and adequate nrenaration! - v.... ,. ,.. ...n ..ii i,l.. ,. -1,1,1, ! arg .n.n.
mrA with nna, r k.llr. h. V "ul 11 """". '""'1irtl uimn ij i- " '"T". : '.
I. v. T : "" -"'fiare built, armored cruisers must be the
ftn,l , P. galn;t ,udd,n di-aiter chlef rellance, espcclallv when the enemy
f,!nt n . ? I?1? 0 '.e8, ",d. mUi' himself has armored cruisers, but In weak
5?i iJ. Jh PU"1 I!"len" " numbers. The best results, however.
hZ th- i h-Vn "P?" wh,leh tO!cft fnr ves.wla .specially built, with vitals
it ,1 "7 "'"v. t"d the. fale of below water with fair deck protec-
UokM f?t Is fo her-a tlinri nBtlon to tlon and reduced batteries, with great coal
Wtlto thL LtT5 L T?hthMa' , -"durance and capable of escaping from
wrf.nhw.-tS,..?J!..u? th m.S ?-the fastest armored cruisers-vessels -f
tha tvn- for AmariXa a , .1 Y about thirteen thousand tons and twenty
On Harhor Defences.
For the harbor defence vessels the turr-r
armor should not be reduced Th, JJ.
armor shouM b. k,n w..I,e. .TV0
and triple armor decks shou"d be worked
over the vitals, the thlcknes,
tbi ior the lowest deck Ita,.i
paratlvely light draught, the upper ar
mored deck would have to be about Ave
JonVh'aTt Wt'r mM,,hP. "I'.plng to the
armor deck would he Knn .1- 1 .... t.
. . . . " 1 indues Uf
low the water line amldshlp, sloping to the
uunum ui m. oeit armor at sides. The
lowest deck should be worked about four
feet below the second deck amldshlp, and
sloping to twelve feet below water at the
"Ides, from which point a thick inner
bottom should be worked around the ship
fore and aft I estimate that with special
design this vessel could be kept down to
twenty-one feet draught of water.
In question of Bpeed, the war brought
out the essential advantage of higher speed
for tactics and strategy alike for all types
of vessels. Our navy from th. olden days
has adopted with advantage the policy of
outclassing similar ships abroad In speed,
as In weight of armament Bine our
sphere of action most cover long dJvtmnaas.
and since w. are weak In naval base.,
our ships should be considerably superior
to foreign ships In speed and should have
much greater coal endurance. It Is this
jreat weight of machinery and coal cotn
. ?, 1tn heavier battery, that en
talls ths large displacement. The adap
tation of the steam turbtn to marin. ew
Igatlon will permit of a great advanc In
power and speed with the sams weight of
machinery. Therefore I believe the speed
aimed at should be aa follows:
The M.ono ton battle ships should havs
21 knots of speed.
The 30 000 ton armored cruiser, should
have 25 knots of speed.
The 1S.00O ton scout cruisers should have
27 knots of frpeed.
ls"w ton harbor offence
should have 15 knots of speed.
Russo-Japanese war teaches that the bat-
l!i. " ti" Myp r "I which
America and all other nations must build
their naval strength; that after the battle
ship comes the armored cruiser a type
more important for America than for other
nations; that we must build at once a
special type of scout cruiser and should
build a limited number of special type of
harbor ffence vessels; that we should de
velop the use of the torpedo boat, not only
as an agent of Independent attack, but as
a consort of battle ships, for mutual pro
tection, and should utilize speclul sub
marines not only for attack, but for clear
ing ohannels. it teaches that the heavy
gun Is the king of weapons and the bas s
for offensive power In the shock of battle;
that other guns play the minor role of
Irotectlon agiln't torpedo vessels, for
which the light rapid firing gun Is bent
suited, so that the medium calibre battery
should be omitted from vessels of the tlrst
class; that a greater percentage of weight
should be given to armament than is found
in ships abroad, principally at the expense
of armor.
It teaches that the weight per cent of
armor should give way somewhat to of
fensive features of armament and speed
and should recede from the wide distribu
tion that has followed the development of
the rapid fire gun and be concentrated
mors upon the vitals, omitting the light
armor altogether; that turret armor la
over developed as compared with deck end
side armor; that armor Is most effective
when distributed on multiple decks; that
the armor of conning towers and tubes
for apparatus of communication should be
increased. It teaches that speed, like
armament, should be generally Increased,
particularly now that the steam turbine
vessels
or later, to give the dominion of the seas
;..to the hands of commercial and Indus
trial nations and bring about the reign of Kreater possibilities.
pe-e- , t These chan
For me race wun otner rower. 1 u-eral lessona of the war. call for Increas-
nia.te um-i Ainrrn;ai-
demvl to the level
ma.11tal.1ed a navy greater inn me com- i.,Pn i- th, u,.,ri,i
These changes, combined with the fn-
"A.1 lesSatna rif tha wir 11 tnm
would not be bur-)lns displacement of all types, especially
of Europeans if we(ffr AmmfaJl wnlcn shouW b, ,h.
bmed navies of the world.
for purpint'S of policy and
Furthermore,
strategy cov
leeven knots sustained speed. These are ering offenoe operations at great distances.
m-rce. ani no commerce cm survive wherv
the tlir ranno: give protection.
We h.ive mstchleaa natural resources
snd the largest populatl,n of high Indus
trial aptitude. Our oountry. consequent"
lv. has become by far the greatest pro-
evacuats Kiao-Chao. bases near the Jap- has always been settled at last, and must
aneae coasts, so should American dlplo- always be settled tn great decisive bat
macy follow up the rise of America
&-uiuiMn mcir men. Dm ) conspicuous iiu uwiui parts. They are
irom in. i inaies. lies me viciory 111101 or ran with ta nni ml an Inexpensive whid- trw a
.kl.i that sata mtm A . . ...
erfun weapon, oui tney serve a useful part
raT.M po"ve ano aggresslve. and ex-lth. wlae,. , i,,,aD ,h1 a,,uaj vl-ul,i con-l: .. f v....iu f. ,,J
iufort WWle toe batU.hnV. .!tact wlth 'he enemy, and should supplant must be larger by far than those of any
fhaV. tw? ?JrA . ,V . tJ' th"B the so-called protected crult-rs. sure to be!0thcr nation.
the . qeen encumbranc. to a nirnUn, fleM. I Tak,n, u :n int ration,
a contemporary battle ship, the arWrtd1 America Is. unfortunately, weak in the therefore. I believe w. should jump at
cruiser can nevertheless carry " it. Tower lmennhant rlne. from which to draw the once to battle ships of twenty-five thou
furtrer and faster Its service, ar. lr.rtll'ofnv,rtf', ,uts- Rn1 her armored cruisers eand tons displacement, and armored cru s
pensatol. for the' swift agras.lperal!are liable to be far away on Independent trs of twenty thousand tons,
tlon. so advantageous In the earlv ataes,lu,y- Ve mu,t u,refu,r build more of The war seems not to have been proliflo
of a war. For the United States whers the8 "cout h!P8- There should be at leaet ln lessons in the question of armor.
1 . - . . ttvA Ti w h 1 1111 r-itj 1 it 1 111 it mi iir?i ui . i lie i ill rfini bi 1 tf Bavjii id.uit in. iwwrvfr. M
oprauuiis iini-i exterwl so far, " ... : .-... u ,u Yr . V- ....v.i- ,.,. k. . . . -.' -.
BllCIIiy tVMU V " ' v" ' 1 J - -' ' vw. vito . 1 , v . ..... . v, . . i ' 1 ' ' ' ' - L ocniu-
prlnclpal fleets. We ought to build four of stability, buoyancy and vltala; the wording, commercial people hold a deolded ad
vantage 01 miinary ana lniann people, and
oonsiuently the dom'nlon of the sea will
ultlmartely ret with the commercial na
tion, the nation of peace; that to be a see
the rone 1
away from
valuaMa. I
one cruiser
ships.
While the burden of the fighting rented
upon trie tug snipe. cannot re denied that
While the above lessons In material are
Important the most Important lessons are
those In personnel.
In the Japanese victories It was not so
much a question of dlfferenealn eip. for
the Russians had good ship., but a differ
ence in men, not difference In courage, but
a difference in training. A general Infer
ence to be drawn Is that these victories,
like most of the victories of old, were
carried off by seafaring people.
The war teaches that the man behind the
gun is more important than the gun; that
tms type Is eaoeclallv
oeueve mat we should build ;
for every three n.w battle,
the, vessels at once and then build a new vitals Includes stability and buoyancy
one for each three battle ships laid down. Since the advent of rapid fire guns atten-
The special tyre ot naroor onenc. ves-, tlon has Den too much diverted to pro.
! previously mentioned, hullt to force lectin life. In naval warfare life la the
h. ti.M. wh.r. wh -Id.. nth .ha ' "r: JC w. t -a ,. Tluw",a. ,nV fortified harbors after the removal of last thing to be considered, except that
an their fighting strength, and In the- h.t-l-.,. and useful t-r. tkT. mines and torpedoes aa far a. practicable. l:fe associated
as orderlies and bodyguards to large ves
sels. Torpedo vessois can only be regarded
i unperauve iaai w. snouia lose no ruggea snip moi i na up and en-
more time In building up oor fleet and es- dure punishment and strike the heaw
th , .,rl.l atanla. n 1 IWUilaulina Ultae II vu wau.. i ne- vlt 1 1 Ul'IWa.
clothing and manufactured articles. ' We tartor ot defence cannot be improvised It muat be borna In mind, however, that M auaillarie. but they are very val
produce fsr more or tneue great staples i aaes a long " v ' 'iTitw sa xlllartea me japanesw were
t.'uin we can consu-ne, and our natlon.il ,,me " buo a oattis snip four years on In an unguaroea murarai oy i rorjieji) t)lollvlded rh Russians were wofullv laokkur
pr.iBoerfy depends u;Kn access to f relgn 'he average and a long Ume to establish ' from the weasew cran or irom a noatlng ; Untll we can build our fleets of large vee
mukes In the past a policy of Isola'lon a "aval station. While war operations. ! mm. Both sl,1s sustained serious dam- i Bt,u that riutre a long time, we shoiid
was wis. for young America but the time particularly on the sea, may come almost ' in this way. and "ore careful pro- bullll laJV numbers of torpedo veasels
has now come when mch policy la lm-! Instantaneously upon th. declaration of vision nvistb. made to guard against such quk kly constructed, as a .wnd line of de-'
ps'ble. Our proaucts must a-o to all war. ana war can com. at any tlm.. with' iijan- --.. -v CMTr!rTn;e for our vast coast line,
with the vital functions of
by submarines or other small craft, should the ship. The ship is the tiling and the
be able to sustain great punishment from vitals make the ship. In contemporaneous
heavy guns and torpeaoea, having closely war ahips the gurus are over protected. In
subdivided structures, uniuaially heavy no case was a ahlp captured or de-troy-d
a pmr over vitals, moderats aoeed. fair n... th- destruction of life or tbe silencing
uable ai .nnnlv. light draught, reoulrlna-about nt mini. Thev Invariably sank or turned
well pro-,, vi -teen thousand tons dlsplscement. We ovr .-ht1e tlie bulk of the crew wera Lll!
Should build four vessels of this special alive and most of the batteries still Intact
clasn thre for tlie Atlantic find one f ar 'urlheriiutre. Inadequate armor Is worse
the Far Etut. than no armor at Mil. Light armor cannot
For tlie qiwftlon of tonnuge the war keep out armor pl-roing projectiles, and ii.
brought out the advantage if large sizes to. impa.-t explos!on-of pro)ex-tll. with
for all clauses, irom ine uauie snip down lurge charges trie unsung eriect upon th
. Ini'llltf n mw
.. wm ..-,. ....... . . . . 1 ... 1 m. a i,k, a t . - i in atlirii nui y ii uvutu vi vuinii. a iaar . ,...... ....
p.uis "'" wun -u. ...... -- - " -car i,,, laura-hes aknuk, . i xmmm '"'" iLV ",4J to the torpedo boat. Tne military advan- arm..r plata rocks and teara the siruoture
the product of .he g-eit nat.on. of Eu- Wy. it is now a nundred time, more lm-: " V" "' w'nAtoroeJo tt.seU ,h "a"0" f rmarksble f Urg, diaplacwnen's I. essential of course, this effect Is felt upon the
r..p-. The world ha, c ,,e t, recgnlre Portant than It was In the day. of Wash-: 'n J" ' aZl"lrZW,irT i"'Mni waten. .! canals to permit the inh,.rent. Not only Is the encentsa- heavy armor plates, but In a less decree on
ha, where peace prevails. ad ,n eoual , Ington to prepare for war In time of s.f. X TJi 1 till f a","raa' "P and 1rn , power In scc.ord with principle, -f account of th. greater mass of the plate
..pportunl'y 1 given to all. the rnlted Yet America allows the matter to dr'ft or,"n ,A.U mj7n t!I fITv down the coVt. Nor sh-xild we lose ,-ght rategi and tact.es. but. since the dead. The structure behind and below the
tte.. with he, matchless advan-ages. canwlth woful negl'genc, , ' f 'BUnf,. '.'v- .hlnV e.,l..,.W of fhe submarine vease.1 and the mine and weight of structure varies with the squar, armor plaus wa. inadequate on th. Rus-
unicr-ell a'.l other nations. , Tn, wr .mphasised the fa-t that the Vy1 , "u- I'l "h, proIelon floatln torpedoed for harbor operations. I of a linear dmens on. while the military alan ships. This matter should hav. the
If r. ouM hiv rernuiiMt rmsp-rltr binding of shlp nd th Mtihl'uhment of,"11 J1' mou" offer.flve and defensive. Each year'v ap I varies with the cube, the proportion of use. closest attention. Not only should the
w. must. therXore, not only give security , bases must he done la Ume of peace, i ori 10 amnion, in batu .o-p inem.lves prtIru.tlon bU should provide for fifteen ful weight la greater with the larger dls- structure be reinforoed, but arrangement!
man a man must live at sea; that conse
quently a mercantile marine Is the chief
foundation for naval personnel; that
America, so wofully lacking, should pro
ceed wtthout delay In the rehabilitation of
our decayed merchant marine and shouid
develop a naval reaerve In every State;
that we should Increase at once th - number
of officers and enlloted men in the regular
navy and keep our ships in commission
and at sea; that a habit .if har.1 work 1.
ahsoiutHly neceniry In mode-m tlmea; that
tlie standard should be kept high at the
Naval Academy snd a post graduate
course established there; that the Induce
inerts In pay and advancement should be
increased for enl1stel men; the standard
jf recruiting s-hoiild be high, and th
methods of Instruction and training a-lutuld
I Improved and developed; that, above
all, a liberal ellowanc. fur ammunition
thou8d be made for target practice; that
our matchlee. naval traditions should b
"herlahed and th. loftleat Ideals kcjil taa
f9T th OfQoers; snd msss, ,
