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About Omaha daily bee. (Omaha [Neb.]) 187?-1922 | View Entire Issue (March 20, 1904)
How X . y-N . ' hijM anil' a'i,WM.i.. i-' ' -- A JAPANESE "WAGON" TRAIN (Coryri&M. 1904, by T. C. McCIure.) f 13M EM BERING NapoTeons famous I M 3 I wiyinp, that "un army cruwls on I Its stomach," the Russian und J"Panese leaders are devoting tho IiTtU greater part of their time and thought to the great problem of how they are to feed their forces as they move them over an immense and comparatively barren terrain. Theoretically, the transport and commla surlat arrangements of both the Russian and the Japanese armies are well nigh per fect. They have won the enthusiastic ad miration of military experts of many na tionalities, and none have admired them more than United States officers. But tho theory of peace time is vastly different from the stern practice of war. Theoreti cally, tho Greek transport and commissariat were all that they should have been In the Thcssaly campaign, while the Turkish ser vices were all that they should not havo been. But the world knows how the Greek organization broke down miserably, and how the Turkish commanders managed Bomehow to feed their men and move them across the country from one victorious field to another. The present war will test con clusively the value of the Russian and Ja panese theories, but some light is thrown upon them by previous campaigns in which their armies have engaged. The vast extent of the Russian emplro nnd the comparative scarcity of large towns and villages In Asiatic Russia make it nec essary for the general staff to assume that, in a campaign, the troops will usually have to bivouac, and will rarely be billetted upon the civil imputation. Accordingly, the baggage trains attached to Russian forces are larger than In most armies. An army corps of 45,900 men Is officially supposed to bo accompanied by 2,400 wagons; but the number varies, of course, with the iocal conditions and the exigencies of the situa tion. It is usually more, for It Is t'jfncult to reduce It if each unit of the force is to bo properly supplied. The unit of transport la the "polkovye obory," or regimental baggugc train. Each regiment has two nucli trains, called the first and the second echelons. The first train, which keeps up with tho regiment or goes ahead of it, carries ammunition, med ical supplies, food, the indispensable part of the officers' baggage and other necessary articles likely to be Immediately required. The second echelon carries supplies not so Immediately necessary, which can be left behind well la the rear whenever the tac tics of the commanding officer require. These supplies include harness, reserves of food, technical material, movable kitchens, religious emblems, ete. The regimental trains are supplemented by a divisional train, attached to each di vision of cavalry or infantry. Its business Is to replace the regimental stores as they are lost or consumed and to transport ar ticles of secondary Importance not likely to be often or urgently required. Ijirgf num bers of spare horses are attached to this divisional train, ns Is also a hospital sec tion, which is pubdivided Into a divisional ambulance and two field hospitals. When campaigning the Russian soldier is the Two Armies Are Moved ;a . - -Mir. i - i - ' " ON THE MARCH. A JAP PONT CARRIES ITS OW?f FORAGE. supposed to carry two days' rations on Ms person. The regimental trains carry rations for each man for two days longer, and the divisional trains for from two to four days, according to the arm of the service to which they arc attached, less being cjirrled for tho artillery and infantry than for the cavalry. It Is reckoned that fresh supplies should always be obtainable from the sur rounding country or along tho line of com munications within the six or eight days allowed. The system Is a good one, but It is im possible to forget that the transport and commissariat broke down miserably In every Important war waged by Russia dur ing the last century. The experience of the past indicates that the Cossacks are the only body of Russian soldiers who are mobile and well fed on a campaign. They are mobile because they always have large numbers of spare horses often two for each man; they are well fed because of their skill in foraging. Russian officers spend freely out of their private funds during a campaign in order to remedy the defects of the official trans port and commissariat. They have been obliged to do so even during maneuvers. The example was set by Skobeleff, Rus sia's greatest general of modern times, during the Russo-Turkixh war. He was a rich man and every rouble he owned was at the disposal of his beloved soldiers when they needed it. All tho official ar rangements for feeding the men and caring fur the sick and wounded broke down ut terly, and Skobeleff was always putting his hand in his pocket through that cam paign. On one occasion he spent 15,Oj0 roubles to charter a steamer to take a number of wounded men to Odessa for treatment. He never recovered from the government the large sums he expended. When Skobeleff was prutted to his face for his generosity towards his troops, he replied unaffectedly: "I owe everything to these men, and the least I can do la to spend a few thou- ; Ji p( s . . . i t r if i L. I'. !" I THE JAP ARMT MULE aN l) ,.,",! ' ' JAPS' COMMISSARY WAGON USUALLY DRAWN- BY COOLIES. sand roubles to help them In their need." That spirit animates most officers In tho Russian army today. General Kouropat kln, General Grodekoff and other famous officers trained under Skobeleff, followed his example. Now it Is regarded as the regular thing In the Russian army for un officer to havo to spend money on his men to remedy official Hhorlcimlngs. It Is to be feared that "graft" In- a great deal to do with those tshortco ei J. Military experts siy that only a small proportion of Russian offi'-ers possess the ability to cope with emergencies and muko orderly and efficient arrangenien ' fur tlj welfare of un army. The military attache at the American legation at St. Peters burg served with the Russian forces In the Turkish war. He formed a very poor opinion of tho RiiKsiun officers' capacity In those respects, for he wrote at the time: "If 4'(K) prisoners uro suddenly thrown on their hanus, as at the surrender of I'levna, no better expedient presents Itself than to herd them out In the snow In great flocks like sheep, and let three days pass before they get anything to eat; and twelve days before measures are perfected for marching them to the Danube, only twenty miles off the prisoners meanwhile perishing by hundreds every night. "If a bridge forming part of the main line of communication of a great army Is constructed across a large river, one end of It leading Into a miserable llttlo town with streets so narrow that two vehicles cannot pass, you do not find the lines of opposing travel so clearly marked that there can be no divergence from them, and men stationed at every corner to compel vehicles to take a certain direc tion, but you see two long lines of small supply wagons gradually approaching each other until they become Jammed and blocked In the middle of the town. Several hours, or even a day or more are occupied in unloading a half a mile of wagons and dragging them out backwards In order to reopen the communication. These are K-vTil ':J "I : " X n 1 a AMERICAN IMPORTATION. things which do not occur only during the first days or weeks, but throughout a whole compalgn of months." These defects are, however, largely off set by tho patient endurance of the Rus sian soldier, born of his dogllko loyalty to tho czar. The American military attache at I'levna was impressed by that quility. "When his battles result in defeats, when his biscuits are full of miiKKts, when his clothes ure shabby, when his boots drop to pieces, tho Russian soldier," he said, "reamins it all out slowly and can only come to the conclusion, so pathetic In its pimple faith, 'Ah, if the czir only knew!' Hvery one within his reach he freely dls russes, criticises und blames; he half sus pects that his generals may be fools, and he Is pure that his commissaries are ras cals; but no thought of censure ever crosses tils mind against the czar." It Is lini illy necessary to point out the Value of this mental attitude as a military lisset. The Russian soldiers appear, ns a gen rrnl rule, to luck the ability to "shift for tlumselves" in matters of transiort and commissariat. If their elaborate system of baggae trains breaks down, us It may well do under tho strain of a hard campaign, they aro utterly at a loss unless they are Cossufks, Kalmucks or Turcomans, accus tomed from boyhood to picking up their meals wherever and whenever they ciui find thein. The Japanese, on the contrary, showed during their war with China a remarkable ability to create their transiort und com missariat apparently out of nothing as they went along. They did not trouble much about buggtige trains; they had thein, to be sure, well supplied and well organized; but the troops moved so quickly that they were out of touch with their wagons half tho time. They traveled In the lightest pos sible order, and picked up any old native carts or mules or coolies they chanced to meet, making them serve the necessities of the moment, and then letting them go anil getting others further on. The only drawback of this system was that, as the campaign advancod, the armies became clogged by large numbers of coolies and other camp followers, who created a great deal of trouble and committed ex cesses which were wrongfully charged to the regular troops. Some of the Japanese commanders adopted a short way with these obnoxious persons, driving thein out of the army on pain of death as soon as tholr services were over. After the war, it was pretty generally agreed that no Blmllar nuisance should be tolerated in an other campaign. Purlng the advance to the relief of the besieged legations at Peking, the Japanese commissary was, by common agreement of the foreign officers, better than that of any Of the Euroeon troops; and tho Japanese soldiers showed a genius for foraging und accommodating their appetites to tho food available in thi country. Instesd of using heavy wagons liable to be bogged or to tire out the horafs. the Japanese had a great number of light hand carts much like the push carts of the (Continued on Page Sixteen.)