TIIE OMAHA DAILY BEE: TUESDAY. JANUARY 5. 1904.
r.
SPECUL MESS1CE ON CANAL
Prti'idtnt Ojinmaiiottee, with Coagrei
Cciicern.tj Npw Treaty.
POSITION OF IMTLD STATES IN BATTER
Krelles History ml Isibsnlaa (oaarrrt
ad Keiseaslfclllty f This
Ctiirail far lia
(Continued from First rage)
over It. The treaty Is thla rerpect simply
i.roceued on tiie m.e.-i on wtucn ail nego
tiations leading op to the prexrnt Miuaiion
Lave been toi.u u ied. In I note urgoistlon
the er-lae hy me V'nlted iawk, suuje.t
tu the paramount rigni i t lite local mv
trel:n, it suIh-Iij.iiImI conlioi over the
canal and (he Immediately adjacent terri
tory, has buro treated as a muUumeuUl
part of ' arrangement that tnlglit te
made. It has formd au esentlnl itatui
of all our plana, and iu necessity ta tuily
recognized in trie lia -Pa uncelui treat .
1 he congress, In providing Unit auch con
trol should be st-cured, adopted no new
trlncsple, hut only Incoi poi alJ in lis !egia
iilnti a con dltiou the Importance and pro
priety of which were universally rrcog
bized. During all the year tf negotiation
and discussion that preceded the oonclu
slon of the ilay-Htrran treety, Colombia
never Intimated that the requirement by
the United State of control over the canal
atrip would render unattainable the con
struction of a canal by way of the ialhmua
of I'anama; nor were we advised, during
the months when legislation of lM we
pending before the congress, that the term
which it embodied would render -negotiations
with Colombia Ira practicable. Jt 1
plain that no nation could construct and
guarantee the neutrality of the canal wtih
a leaa degree of control than was stipu
lated for In the Hay-Herran treaty. A re
fusal to grant such degree of control was
necessarily a refusal to mke any practical
treaty at all. 8uch refusal. therelore,
eguarely raised the question whether Co
1'MuL.U was entitled to bar the transit of
the world's truffle across the Isthmus.
That the canal Itself was eagerly de
manded by the people of the locality
through whlrh It was to pass, and thst the
people of thla locality no leas eagerly
longed for Its construction under American
control, are shown by the unanimity of
action In the new Panama republic. Fur
thermore, Colombia, after having rejected
the treaty In spite of our protests and
Warnings, when ft was In her power to ac
cept It, has since shown the utmost eager
ness to accept the -same treaty If only the
status quo could be restored. One of the
men standing highest In the official circles
of Colombia, on November addressed the
American minister at Bogota, saying thst
If the government of the United Ptates
would land troops to preserve Colombian
sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian
government would "declare martial law;
'4d, by virtue of vested constitutional
fcuihorlty. when rubllo order la disturbed,
(would) approve by, decree the ratification
of the canal treaty as signed; or. If the
government of the United Btstes prefers,
would) call extra sension of the congress
with new and friendly members neat May
to approve the treaty." Having thee
facts In view, there Is no shadow of ques
tion that the government of the United
Slates proposed a treaty whlrh wee not
merely Just, but generous to Colombia,
which our people regarded as erring, tf st
II, on the side of overgeneroslty ; whlrh
was hailed with delight by the people of
the Immediate locality through which the
canal was to pass, who were most con
cerned as to the new order of things, and
whloh the Colombian authorities now recog
nise aa being so good that they ere willing
to promise Its unoonflltlonsl ratification If
only wa will desert those who have shown
themselves our frleftds and restore to thoe
who hsve shown themselves unfriendly
the Tmwer ti undo what they did. I pass
ty the question to what assurance we
would have thst thev would now keen their
f ledge and not sgnln refuse to ratify the
reaty If they had ths power: for. of
coarse. I will not for one moment discuss
the possibility of the United Btstes com
mitting an act of such bsseress as to
abandon the new Republic of Panama.
Lweattoa Is Settle.
Third Finally, ' the congress definitely
pel lied where tiie canal waa to be buliL
It was provided Uiat a treaty should be
made.. fur .building taaciinal. at-ru the
tattUBua of huuunO. and if, after reason
able time. It proved impossible to secure
such treaty, that then wa should go to
Nicaragua. The treaty has bean made, for
It needs no argument to show that the In
tent of tbe courrss was to insure a canal
across Panama, atid that whether the re
pubilo granting tu title waa called New
tirantt da., Colombia or Panama nattered
not one whit. As event turned out, the
question cf "ret-KUiiable Urns" did not en
ter Into tne matter w an. Aimougn, aa
the months went by, It became Increasingly
improbable that the Colombian congress
would ra'lfy the treaty or teas steps
which would b equivalent thereto, yet all
chance for such action on their part did
not vanish until the congress closed at the
end of October; and wiih.lt three days
thereafter the revolution In Panama had
broken out. Panama became an Independ
ent state, and the control of tbe territory
necessary for building the canal then be
came obtainable. The condition under
which alone we oouid have rune to Nica
ragua thereby became Impossible of ful
fillment. Jf the pangliuj treaty with Pan
ama should not be ratified by the senate,
this would not alter the fact that we could
pot go to Nicaragua. The congress has de
cided tbe route, and there is no alternative
under existing legislation.
N"he in August it began to appear prob
able that the Colombian legislature would
not ratify the treaty, It became incumbent
tipon tne to ronalder well what the situa
tion was, and to be ready to advise the
congress aa to what were the various al
ternatives of action open to ua. Thar
were several possibilities. One was that
atnmbta would at the last moment see
the unwisdom or ner position, i nai inert
might be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay,
through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly
wamea ninrani iu.i i - t.'nuTTiiiva
might follow from her rejection of the
treatv. Although It was a constantly di
minishing rhanoe, yet the possibility of
ratification did not wholly pass away until
the oktee of the session of the Colombia
congress
A second alternative waa that by the
close of the session on the last day of Oc
tober, without the rat'ftoation of the treaty
by Colombia, and without any step taken
by Panama, the American eongreea, on
assembling early in jiovemnar, wouia ne
confronted with a situation In which there
bed been a failure to come to terms as to
building the canal along the Panama route,
and yet there had not been a lapse of a
reasonable time using the word reasonable
In any proper sense such aa would Justify
the administration going to the Nicaragua
route. Thla situation seemed on the whole
the moat likely, and aa a matter of fact
CARTER'S!
.. ... ', JL.-nJ
Ick Baadacae and relieve all the troubles teak
eWl to s buiees state of the swan, sack es lls
sin, Kaaaaa, Itrewatcee, litem aftar estiag.
Paia Bilae giea, eVe. Walls their sos tsauufc.
aWs sacrsss hat beta stows ht earing
Headache, jm Cartw'.Liul Ur Pulsate eqaaSy
vaieaoj la looM.panoa, certsf ssa nesrsBtaag
me a&Bovuig cueiUal wan the c
1 eiee m
ail SisaMar of ta sioaMca, st in uiat th liw
e4 regalai Lut bowels, Jtea If tury oaly caret
Arse fhey erosld bralainst priccim te those who
at: fit fr. .ta ikes diBtreeniag coaiplauii: but ra.-ta-aately
their f ueOkess dor not eud acre, see lLoe
wheear try leca wiil s4 Umm little patf vala
sbi in ae aieer ways thai they will not ke wUilag
M ftd without ihtm. feat ana all sirk kcad
Isthahau of o sraitT llrr that her it saaiswo
suake eur grass wusat. Our iis uirs kt waua
oUmw oe act.
Carter's Little Lrear Pills are very ssaall as4
vary ay te uk. Oo or two jitlis MUt ause.
Tkry sr euxtiy nsiuMt as os ih r ur t
eat my tot'u y.'1-- wvwm whw
uae taa. la vial at W cenis; for tL
ty ariia evarywfcm. et eaat ky aaai.
CAICTEU MEDICINE CCX,
Yrk Cltjjg
I hsd msde the original draft of my tne
snpe to the cuiigrras with a view to lis
ex in truce.
PaassBa t wts Kwwt.
It the opinion of eminent Interna
tional Jurlt that In view of the fact that
the great design of eur guaranue under the
tretiy of 14k was to delicate the irttimus
to the purpose of liiteroc-a rile fansit, eud
shove all to secure the construction of en
I'.tetcK rar:io canal. ctljuih:a could nut
ii:idr existing conditions tefuse to enir-r
line a proper arrangemi.t With the Cnt-d
Elates to thst end, without violating the
Hlr:t and substantially repudiating the
it .lirati nut of a treaty the iuil beiiei.ts .f
which she bad enjoyed for over fitly yesr.
My intention wss to consult the congress
as to whether under such circuinMam ec It
wuld not le projr to annour'-e luat the
nal was to be dug forthwith: that we
would give the terms that we had offerer
and no other; and tt.at If u h trrni- were
not agreed to we w uld enter Into an ar
rangement with Panama direct, or take
what other step mere needful In order to
begin the enterprise.
A third possibility was that the people of
the iFthmua. who had formerly constituted
an 1ri(ieieiii)erii state, and who until re
cently were united to Colombia only
ly a loose tie of federal relationship
might tak the protection of their
own vital interests Into their own hands,
reassert Iheir former rights, declare their
Indepi-ndcnce upon Just grounds, and es
tahl sh a government competent and willing
to do Its Fhare In this great work for civil
listlon. This third possibility is what actu
ally occurred. Everyone knew that It was
a possibility, but It wss not until towsrds
the end of October that It appec-ed to be
an Imminent probability. Allhouih the ad
ministration, vf course, had Kpecial means
of knowledge, no such tnnn were neces
stry In order to appreciate (e possibility,
and toward the end the likelihood, of such
a revolutionary outbreak and of Its suc
cess, it wss a matter of common notoriety.
Quotation from the dally papers could be
Indefinitely multiplied to show this state
of affairs.
Hevolwtlea Was Drewlas;.
Quotation of this k..- . ould be multi
plied luaennitely. Buno It to say that
it waa notorious that revolutionary vrouuie
ol a seiiuua natural was linpeuaiug upon
the isiiimus. iiut it was noi iiecesaary to
reiy exclusively upon such general means
of Information. On October ik Coiiimaiiuer
iiubbara, ot the navy, noilbed Uie Navy
department that, though thing were quiet
ou the Istiimua, a revolution had bioaeu
out iu tbe sLaiu of Cauca. on October 16,
at tne request of Lieutenant Oenerai
iouug, 1 saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and
LdeuL Orsjaoti jdaljrt Prevoat lurphy,
who had just returned from a lour months
tour Ui rough tbe iiojiue.ru portious of
oiieiue.a and Colombia, ibey stopped in
Panama un their leiuin in the la-llvr part
of bepiember. At the lime tuey were em
uou u.eie hsd kta no thought of tuair
going to Panama, and their visit to ths
isthiuus was but an unpremediatea Incident
of their return Journey, nor had they Peru
spoken to Ly anoiie at anhlngton regard
ing tbe possibility of a revolt. l mil they
lauded ai coion they had no kiiowleasu
that a revolution was Impending, save
what they had gained from tne uewapapers.
What they saw In Panama so Impressed
them that they reported tnereou to Lieu
tenant Oenerai luuiig, according to ius
meniorandum
"That while on the isthmus they became
aalistied beyond quesuon tbal, owing
lalteiy to the Oissatialacllon because ot tbe
faaiure of Colombia to rauiy the Hay-Jier-ran
treaty, a revolutionary party was In
course ul organisation liaving for its ob
ject the sepaiauon of the state ot Panama
rrotn I oiomuia, tbe leader being L'r. Klch
ard Arango, a former governor of i'anama;
that when they were on the Isthmus arms
and ammunition were being smuggled Into
the city of Colon In piano ooxes, merchan
dise crates, etc.. the small arms received
being principally Uie Oras Frencn rifle, the
Keniing-ton and the Mauser; that nearly
every citiren of Panama had some sort of
rifle or gun In his possession, with ammu
nition therefor; that la the city of Panama
there had been organised a fire brigade
which was really intended for a revolu
tionary military organization; that there
were representatives of Uie revolutionary
organisation at all important polnta on the
Isthmus; that in Panama, Colon and the
other principal places of the lstiimus polio
forces had been organized which were In
reality revolutionary forces; that the peo
ple on the Isthmus seemed to be. unanimous
In their sentiment against the Bogota gov
ernment, and their disgust over the failure
of that government to ratify the treftty pro
viding fur the construction of the canal and
that a revolution might be expected imme
diately upon the adjournment of the Colom
bian congress without ratification of the
treaty."
Lieutenant General Toung regarded their
report of such Importance as to make it
advisable that I should personally see
these officers. They told me they had al
ready reported to the lieutenant general,
adding that on the isthmus th excitement
waa seething, and that the Colombian
troops were reported to be disaffected. In
response to a question of mine they In
formed ma that it was the general belief
that the revolution might Drew out at any
moment, and If It did not happen before,
would doubtless tske place Immediately
after the closing of the Colombian con-
fress (at the end of October) If the canal
reatv were not ratified. Thev were cer
tain that the revolution would occur, and
1-efore leaving the Isthmus hsd msde their
own reckoning ss to time, which they hsd
set down as being probably from three to
four weeks after their leaving. The reason
they set this as the probable Inside limit
of time wsa that they reckoned that It
would be at lesst three or four weeks
say not until October 10 before a sufficient
quantity of arms and munitions would
have been landed.
Takes Seeeerary Prveawtloas.
In view of these factg I directed the
Navy department to Issue instructions such
as wouid Insure our having ships wlinin
easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of
reed arising. Orders were given on Octo
ber it to the Boston to proceed to Ban Juan
del Bur, Nicaragua ; to the pixie to prepare
to Bale from Lague Island; and to the
Atlanta to proceed to Guantanamo. On
October 10 the Nashville was ordered to
rrocred t.- Colon. On November X when,
he Colombian congress having adjourned,
it waa evident that the outbreak waa immi
nent, and when It was announced that
both sides were making ready forces whose
mevtlna" would mean bloodshed and disor
der, the Colombian troops having been em
barked on vessels, the following Instruc
tions were sent to the commanders of the
Boston. Nashville and Dixie:
"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit.
If interruption Is threatened by armed
force, occupy the line of railroad. Pre
vent landing of any armed force with hos
tile intent, either government or Insurgent
at any point within fifty miles of Panama.
Government force reported approaching the
Isthmus In vessels. Prevent their land tig
If, In your Judgment, the landing mould
precipitate a conflict."'
Ttieae orders were delivered In pursuance
cf the policy on which our government had
repeatedly acted. Tbe policy was exhibited
In ths following orders, given under some
what similar circumstances last year and
tha fear before and the year before that.
The first two telegrams are from the De
partment of Btaje to the consul at Pan
ama: .
"July R1900.
"Tou are directed to protest against any
act of hostility which may involve or Im
peril the safe and peaceful transit of per
sons or property across the Isthmus of
Panama. The bombardment f Panama
would have this effect, and the United
Stales must Insist upon the neutrality of
th Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty."
"November fcj. Idol
"Notify all parties molesting or inter
fering with free transit across the Isthmus
that such interference must cease and that
the United aUatea will prevent tbe Inter
ruption of traffic upon the railroad. Con
sult with captain ot ths Iowa, who will be
Instructed to land marines. If necessary,
for the protection cf the railroad. In ac-c-ordanoa
with the treaty right end obli
gations cf the United Ft h ten. L'eslrab.a
it avoid bloodshed, if possible."
Isistraetiwas to Kavy.
The next three telegrams ars from and to
the secretary of the navy:
"September 12, Jlf Hanger; Panama:
United biatca guarantees peiivct neutrality
of isthmus and that a tree transit Iroiu
sea to sea be not Interrupted or embar
rassed. e Any trsnaporiation of
Uooiw which might contravene these pro
visions of treaty should not be sanctioned
ly you nor should ue ot road be permu
ted which might convert the line ot tran
sit Into theater ut hostility. kiooDY."
COLON, bepi. au, 1. Secretary Navy,
Washington: K very thing la conceded. The
United titates guards nnd guarantee traf
fic and lite line ot transit. Today I per
mitted tbe exchange of Colombian troops
from Panama tu colon, about l.tMU mm
each way the troops without arms in train
guarded by American naval force in the
same manner as ottier pussengera. Arm
and ammunition In separate train, guarded
also by naval force in the same manner aa
OUier freight. M LEAN."
PANAMA, Oct. I Secretary Navy,
Washington, L) C. : Have sent this com
mJtike'.ioti te the American consul at Pan
ama: 'inform governor while trains run
Motf under V'nlted la lea protection I muat
evline transportation any combatant,
ammunition. ; rma, which might cause in
terruption traffic or convert line of transit
Into theater buetlbtles ' CASEY."
Oa November I Commander Hubbard re
stHinded to the above quoted telegram of
November t, 113. saying that before the
telegram had been received o0 Colombian
troupe from Cartagena had landed at Co
lon; that there had been no revo.utlua oa
the Isthmus, but that the situsttoa was
moot critical it the revolutionary ieadr
abould art. (la this same date the Asso
ciated Press In Waahiiigtua received a bul
let! a slating that a rvvolutiuitarv outbreak
bag ovowriwJ, Whea thla waa brwugnt to
the attention of tbe esslstsnt secretsrr cf
siste, Linomls, he prepared the follow
ing cs blegram to the consul general at
Psnsms snd the consul at Colon:
'Uprising on Isthmu reported. Keep de
partment promptly snd fully Informed."
Before this telegram wss sent, however,
one was received from Consul alalmoras at
Colon, running as follows:
"Revolution Imminent, (lovernment foree
on the Isthmus about t men. Their offi
cial promised support revolution. Fire de
partment. Panama 441, are well organised
and favor revolution. (Jnvernment vessel.
'artasena. with about i0 men. arrived
enrly today with new commander In chief,
Tobsr. Was not expected until November
in T "bar's arrival is not probable to atop
revolution."
Reports the trlslag. ,
This cablerram was received at t:3 p.
m.. and at p. m. Mr. Loom Is sent the
telegram which he had already prepared tu
both Panama and Colon. Apparently, how
ever, the cnsul-genrrl at Panama had not
received the Information embodied 1n the
Associated Press bulletin. uxn which the
assistant secretary of state based his dis
patch; for his snswer was that there wa
no uprising, although tbe situation wss
critical, tills answer being received at k.li
p. m. Immediately afterwards he sent en
other dispaich, which was received at
M p. m.. saying that the uprising hsd
occurred, and had been successful, with no
bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat Bogots
next day bessn to she ! the city of Panama,
with the result of killing one Chinaman.
The consul-generaj was directed to notiry
her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on Novem
ber 4. Commander Hubbard notified the de
partment that he had landed a force on
protect the live ind ptoperty of Ameri
can cltixms against the threata of the
Colombian soldiery.
Before any step whatever had been taken
bv the I'nlted Ftjtes troops to restore
order, the commander of the newly landed
Colombian troops had Indulged In wantou
end vloiPnt threats against American cltl
sens which created serious apprehension.
As Commander Hubbard reported In his
letter of November &, this officer and his
troops practically beg?n war against the
United 8ttes, and only the forbearance
snd coolness of our cfflcers snd men pre
vented bloodshed. The letter of Commsnder
Hubbard Is of such Interest that It deserves
quotation In full, and runs as follows:
ColosBblaa Act of War.
"U. 8. S. Nashville, Third Kate, Colon,
V. B. Colombia, xsoveniber e, UJl. bir:
Penning a complete report of the occur
rences of tne laal three days in Colon,
Colombia, 1 mot.l repectluiiy invite the
depal tmeiit s autnlwn lo Ihoeo of Uie oale
of Weakiesuay, November 4, which
amounleu to practically the making of war
against the Lulled b tales by the uthoer In
command of tha Colombian troops In coion.
At l o ciock p. m. on thai date 1 was Mim
muned on shore by a preconcerted signal,
and on iajiuitig met the L nited Stales con
sul, ice-conaul, and Colonel bhaler, the
general supei mlenuent of the Panama rail
road. The consul Iniormed me Uiat ha had
received notice lrotn Uie ofheer oununaiui
lng the Colombian troops, Colonel iorres,
through the prelect of Colon, to the effect
that if Uie Colombian officers, General
Tobai and Amaya, who had been seised in
Panama on inu evening ol the 'id of No
v ember by the Independents arid held as
prisoners, were not released by 2 o'clock
p. m., he, Torres, would open fire on the
town of Colon and kill every United Slates
citizen in the piace, and my advic and
action were requested. I advised that all
the United Stales citizens t-houid take ref
uge in the abed of the I'anama Kajlroad
company, a stone building susceptible of
being put Into good state lor aetense, and
that 1 would immediately land such body
of men, with extra arms lor arming the
citizens, as Uie complement of the ship
would permit- This waa agreed to and I
Immediately returned on board, arriving at
l:li p. ni. The order for landing was im
mediately given, and at 1:3 p. m. the boats
left the ship with a party of forty-two men
under the command of Lieutenant Com
mander H. M. vVitzel with Midshipman J.
P. Jackson aa second In command. Time
being pressing 1 gave verbal orders to Mr.
Witzel to take the building above referred
to, to put it Into the beat Ftate of defense
possible, and protect the Uvea of the citi
zens aaaembled there not firing cnlees fired
upon. The women and children took refuge
on the German sLoamer Marcom&nia and
Panama railroad kleaxner City of Wash
ington, both teady to haul out from dock
if necessary. The Nashville 1 got under
way and patrolled with her along tha water
front clowi In and ready to use either small
arm or shrapnel fire. The C- lombians sur
rounded the building of the rhiiroad com
pany almost Immediately after we had
taken possession, and for sbout one and
a half hours their attitude was most threat
ening, it being seemingly their purpose to
provoke an attack. Hannllv our men were
coot and steady, and while the tension waa
very great no shot waa fired. At about
1:15 p. m. Colonel Torres cama into the
uunuiiig tor an interview ana expressed
himself aa most friendly to Americana.
Claiming that the whole affair waa a mis
apprehension and that he would like to send
tne mcaiae or colon to Panama to see rien-
erai Tobal and have him direct Uie discon
tinuance of the show of farce. A aoemai
train was furnished and safe conduct guar
anteed. At about i:3o p. m. Colonel Torres
maa me proposition or withdrawing hia
troops to Monkey HilL If I would withdrew
the Nashville's force and leave the town
in poeaession of the police until the return
of the alcalde on the morning of th 6th.
After an Interview with Uie United States
consul and Colonel Bhaler as to the prob
ability of good faith In the matter, I de
cided to accept the proposition and brought
my men on board, the disparity in numbers
between my force and that of the Colom
bians, nearly ten to one, making mo de
sirous of avoiding a conflict so long as the
object In view, tne protecUon of American
citizens, was not Imperiled.
"I am positive that the determined atti
tude of our men. theft coolness and evident
intention of standing their ground, had a
most salutary and decisive effect on the
immediate situation and was the Initial
step In the ultimate abandoning of Colon
by these troops snd their return to Carta
gena the following day. Lieutenant-Commander
Witsel Is entitled to much praise
for hia admirable work In command on th
soot.
"I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly
represent to the department the groesnesg
of this outrage and tbe Insult to our dlg
ritT' ren Prt from the savagery of the
threat.
"Very reanectfullv.
"JOHN HUBBATID,
"Commander, U. S. Navy,
. "Commanding."
tt1!. November 8 Commander
Hubbard eels forth tha factg more in de
tail. "re-cawttoai Koae Too Boow.
His plain official account of the occur-
v. i.tffoiuw snows mat. Instead
?i .i'"r? nvlng been too much provision
by tha American government for the main
tenance of order aud the protection of life
,...tr, itminius, tne orders
. . . 1 ? "luswineiii m me American war-
f.W,V.eh.ad.J?0.l00 lonB dell: long,
hi fact, that there were but forty-two
marines and sailors available to land and
protect the Uvea of American men and
women. It was only the coolness and gal
lantry with which this little band of men
wearing th American uniform faced ten
times their number of armau wn
fVy'?f out Ul trocious threat of the
v uiumuiui commander, tnat prevented a
murderous rataarmtiha at ... . w
the revolution broke out, Uiere waa no
American man-of-war and no American
troops or ssilors. At Colon, Commander
Huhliard acted with entire Impartiality
towanla both sides, preventing anv move
ment, whether by Colombians or the Pan
amanian, which would tend to proKuoe
bloodshed. On November be p.evenied a
body of the revolutionists from landing at
Colon. Throughout he lnaved In the most
creditsble manner. In the New York Eve
ning Poet, under date of Panama- IJecem
her 8. Uiere is an article from s xilI ene.
respondent, which sets forth In detail the
uiiuearaoie oppression of the Colombian
government lu Panama. In thla article is
an niieresung interview with a native Pan
manian. which runa in fiart urn fntinva-
'Wa IooWmA iir.im tv VmliHiK .
Ktha canal aa a matter of life or death to
u vi waniea mat because it meant,
with the United States In control of it
peace and prosperity for us. President
Marroquln i pointed an Isthmian to be
governor or ranama: ana we looked upon
that as of hannv sua-urv. Kaon wa v.. rA
that the canal treaty was not likelv to be
approved at Bogota; next we heard that
our Isthmian governor. Obaldla, who had
scarcely assumed power, was to be soper
seoed by a soldier from Roe-ota.
"Notwithstanding all that Columbia h-s
orainea us or in tne wsy of revenues, she
did not brl.lee for us a single river, nor
make a single roadwav. nor erect a alncle
college whore our children could be edu
cated, nor do snythinr at all to advanoe
our Industrw-s. Well, when the new
general cam we seised them, arrested
'ncro. ana tne town or fanama was In lov.
ot a protest was made, exoeot th shots
ncen rm- Tne t oimrunan run bo at Bogota,
which killed on Chlileee lying In bi bed.
we were willlrr to encounter the Colnro-
nian irooo at -oion r fleht If out: hot
the commander of the United dtatea cruiser
Nashville forade Superintendent Ehaler to
a"ow the rai'-oad to transport troops for
ruiirr I'an.T. insi IS our Siory.
Pre-vewta m ("wallet.
I call eepeclal attention to th concluding
portion of this Interview which states the
willingness of Uie Panama twople to tight
the Colombian troops and tbe refusal of
Commander HJbbard to permit them to
use the railroad and therefore to get Into
a i Hon where the fight cou d take pla"e
It thus clearly appai a that the fact that
ther wa no bloodt-hed on the isthmus wua
directly due and only due to the prompt
and Drn enf.M cement by the (.'tilled eUatv
of ita traditional polnj. Iurmg the paat
fnrty years revolu-ion and attempts at
let uluuoa hats succeeded one rw-ihvr wiia
rrtonotonoiis regularity on the Isthmus, and
SFhin and again United Htale sailors snd
marines have been landed as they were
landed In this Instance and un1er plnnlsr
Instructions to protect the transit. One of
these revolutions resulted In three years
cf warfare; and the arrregate of blood
shed and misery caused by them hss been
Incalculable. The fact that In this last
revolution pot a life was lost, save that
of the man killed by the shells of th Co
lombian gunboat, and no jropert.v de
stroyed, was due to the sctlon which I
have described. We, In effect, policed tbe
Isthmus In the Interest of t inhabitant
and of our own national nceda, and for the
good of the entire ctviliied world. Failure
to act as th administration acted would
hare meant great waste of life, great
suffering, great destruction of property;
all of which was avoided by the firmness
snd prud nee wiUi which Commander Hub
bard carried out his orders and prevented
either party from marking the other. Our
action was for the peace both of Colombia
and of Panama It is earnestly to tie
hoped that there will be no unwise con
duct on our part which msj- encourage
Colombia to embark on a war which can
not result In her regaining control of the
Isthmus, but which may cause much blood
shed and suffering.
Denies Collwslve Knowledge.
I hesitate to refer to the Injurious In
Slnuationa which have been made of com
plicity by this government in the revolu
Uonary movement in Panama. They are
as destitute of foundation as of propriety.
The only excuse for my mentioning them
Is the fear lest unthinking parsons might
mistake for aouuiescenoe the alienee of
mere self respect. 1 think proper to say,
therefore, that no one connected with this
government hsd sny part In preparing,
inciting, or encouraging the late revolution
on tbe Isthmus of Panama, and that save
from the reports of our military and naval
officers, given above, no one connected with
this government had any previous know
ledge of the revolution except such ss was
accfvtsible to any person of ordinary Intelli
gence who reads the newspapers and kept
up a current acquaintance with public
affairs.
By the unanimous action of lta people,
without the firing of a rhot with a unan
imity hardly before recorded In any similar
case the people of Panama declared them
selves an independent republic. Their
recognition by this government wss based
upon a state of facta In no way dependent
for its justification upon our action in
ordinary canes. I have riot denied, nor do
I wish to deny, either Uie validity or the
propriety of the general rule that a new
state should not be recogmzod ss Inde
pendent till It has shown Its ability to
maintain Its Independence. This rule Is
derived from the principle of noninterven
tion, snd as a corollary of that principle
has generally been observed by the United
sttntes. But. like the principle from which
It Is deduced, the rule Is subject to excep
tions; and there are In my opinion clear
and imperative reasons why a departure
from It was Justified and even required In
the present Instance. These reasons em
brace 1. cur treaty rights; (2), our ra
tional Interests and safety: and (3), the
Interests of collective civilization.
Desists of ths Treaty.
I hsve already adverted to the treaty
of 1846, by the thirty-fifth article of which
the United States secured the right to a
free and open transit across the Isthmus
of Panama, and to that end agreed to
guarantee to New Granada her rights of
sovereignty and properly over that terri
tory. This article Is sometimes discussed
as If th latter guarantee constituted its
sole object and bound the i'nlted Slates
to protect the sovereignty of New Granada
against domestic revolution. Nothing, how
ever, could be more erroneous than this
supposition. That our wise and patriotic
ancestors, with all their dread of entang
ling alliances, would have entered Into a
treaty with New Granada solely or even
primarily for the purpoae of enabling that
remnant of the original Republic of Co
lombia, then resolved Into the states of
New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador, to
conUnue from Bogota to rule over the
Isthmus of Panama, Is a conception that
would In Itself be Incredible, even If the
contrary did not clearly appear. It Is true
that since the treaty was made the United
States has again and again been obliged
forcibly to Intervene for the preservation
of order and the maintenance of an open
transit, and that this Intervention has
usually operated to the advantage of the
titular government of Colombia, but It Is
equally true that the I'nlted States In in
tervening, with or without Colombia's con
sent, for the protection of the transit, has
disclaimed any duty to defend the Colom
bian government against domestic Insurrec
tion or apainst the erection of an Inde
pendent poveeeiment on the isthmus of
Panama. The attacks against which the
I'nlted States engaged to protect New
Granadlsn sovereignty were those of for
eign powers; but this enwugement waa only
mesns to the aocommabment of a yet
more Important end. The great design of
the article was to assure the dedication of
the isthmus to the purposes of free and
unobstructed lnteroceanie transit, the con
summstlon of which would be found In an
lnteroceHnlc canal. To the accomplishment
of this object the government of the United
States had for years directed its diplomacy.
It occupied a place in the instruction to
our delegates to the Panama congress dur
ing the administration of John Quincy
Adams, it lormea tne suroect or a resolu
tion of the senate In 18. and of the houss
of representatives In 1(9. In 1S4S lta im-
n
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rrrtance had become still more apparent
y reason of the Mexioan war. If the
treaty of 1M( did not In terms bind New
Gransda to grant reasonable concession
for ths construction of means of inter
oceanic commanloaUon. It waa only be
cause It was not Imagined that such con
cessions would ever be withheld. A It
wss expressly srreed that the United
Hi stew. In consideration of Its onerous
guarantee of New Granauiaa sovereignty,
should possess the right of free and open
transit on any modes of communication
that might be constructed, the obvious In
tent of the treaty rendered It onnecesssry,
If not superfluous. In terms to stipulate
thst permission for the eonstnictlon of
such modes of communication should not
bo denied.
Tee Bis for Private LCaterprlee.
Long before Uie conclusion of the Hay
herran trea.y ths oour of event bad
rliuwn that a canal to connect Uie Atianiiu
and Pacinc ocean must be kunl by the
I nited Slates or not at alL Experience
had demonstrated that private eiurrpiie
was utterly inadequate fur Uie purpose;
snd a tixea policy, uecisred by the Liu.eu
Mates on many memorable occasions, and
supported by the practically unanimous
vu.ee ut American opinion, had rendered it
morally Impossible that the work should
be uuaeriaaen by Curopvan powers, either
singly or in combination. Such were tne
universally recognized conditions on which
the legislation oi the cougrrae wss bastd,
and on which the late nogutiauons wltn
Colombia were begun and concluded.
Nevertneiess, when th well-considei ed
agreement was rejected by Colombia and
tne revolution on tbe isthmus enstiea. on
of Colomb.as first art was lo Invoke tne
Intervention of the Lulled States; nor does
her Invitation appear tu have been con
fined to tnls government alone. By a tel
exrr&m from Mr. Heaupre, our minister at
Bogota, of the 7th of November last, w
were Informed that General Keyea would
soon leave Panama Invested with full pow
ers; thst he hsd telegraphed tha president
ot Mexico to ask the government of the
United States and all countries repre
sented at the Pan-American conference "to
aid Colombia to preserve her Integrity;"
and that he had requested that the govern
ment of the Lnited Slates should mean
while "preserve the neutrality and Uanslt
of the Isthmus" snd should "not recognize
the new government." In another telegram
from Mr. Bauprc, which was sent later in
the day, this government was asked
whether it would take ettion "to maintain
Colombian right and sovereignty en th
isthmus in accordance with article Ss (of;
the treaty of lS4ti" In case the Colombian
government should be 'entirely unable to
suppress the secession' movement there."
Here was a direct solicitation to the United
Slates to Intervene for the purpose of sup
pressing, contrary to the treaty of JM6 as
this government has uniformly construed
It, a new revolt against Colombia's author
ity brought about by her own refussl to
permit the fulfillment of the great design
lor which that treaty was made. It wes
under these tircumstsnoes that the United
States, Instead cf using Its forces to des
troy those who sought to make the engsge
menta of the treaty a reality, recognhed
them as the proper custodians of the sov
ereignty of the isthmus.
Recounitlen is JusilfleiL
This recognition was, in the second place,
further Justified by Uie highest considera
tions of our national interacts and safety.
In all the range of our internaUonal rela
Uona, I do not hesitate to affirm that there
is nothing or greater or more pressing Im
portance than the construction of an inier
oeesnic canal. Long acknowledged to be
essential to our cuinmerical development
it has become, ss the result of a recent ex
tension of our territorial dominion, more
than ever essential to our national tself
delense. In transmitting to the senate the
treaty of U4t President Polk pointed cut
aa the principal reason for Its rstihcatlon
that the pnsaagy of the Isthmus, which
it was designed to secure, "would relieve
us from a long and dangerous navigation
of more than k.oCw miles around Cape Horn,
and render our communication with our
own possessions on the northwest coast of
America comparatively easy and speedy."
The evenU of the past five yeara have
given to this consideration an importance
Immeasurably greater than It puaaeased In
1M6. In the light of our present Situation,
the estaHishment of easy and speedy com
munication by sea between the Atlantic
and the Pacific prcsent Itself not simply
as something -to be desired, but as an ob
ject to be positively and promptly attained
Keaeons of convenience have been super
seded by ressons of vital necessity, which
do not admit of Indefinite deias.
To such delays the rejection by Colombia
of Uie Hay-Herran treaty directly exposed
us. As proof of this fact I need only refer
to the program outlined in the report of
the majority of the Panama canal com
mittee, read in the Colombian Senate on
October 14 last. In I his renort. which
ommended Uiat tbe discussion ot a law
to authorize the government to enter upon
new negotiations should be Indefinitely
postponed, it Is proposed that the consider
ation of the subject should be deferred Ull
October 81, l&ut, when the next Colombian
Congress should have met in ordinary ses
sion. By that time, as the report goes on
to ssy. the extension of time granted to
the N w Panama Canal company by treaty
In 1W3 would have expired, snd the new
Corigresa would be in a position to tak
up the question whether tiie company had
not. in spite of further extensions ths't hsd
been granted by legislative acts, forfeited
all Its property and rights. "When that
Uma arrives," the report significantly de
TO
Pl((MM A
002-L i' 4
OOI!
TICKET OFFICE, 1502 FARM STREET.
J.
City
clares, "th republic, without any impedi
ment, will be able to rwt tract, and will tie
In more clear, more definite and more ad
vantageous possession, both legahv and
materially." The naked meerlng of this
report is that Colombia proposed to wsit
until, by the enf-ireement of a forfeiture
repugnant to the Ideas of lutlre which on
tain In every civilised ration, the property
and rights of the New I'anama Canal com
pany could bs confiscated.
t-rak for Mwaey.
Etieh Is tbe scheme to which It was fro
pod that the United States should be In
vited to become a party. The construction
of th canal was to be relegnttd to the
Indefinite future, while Colombia . by
reason of her own delay, to be placed In
the "more advantageous1 position of claim
ing not merely the compensation to be paid
;y the United Slates for the privilege of
completers the canal, but also the lej.OW.
(Km suthorised by the act of 1HU2 to be paid
for the roperty of the New Panama Canal
company. That the attempt to csrrv out
this scheme would hsve brought Colombia
Into conflict with th government of France
cannot be doubted: nor could the United
State have counted upon Immunity from
th consciences of the a; tempt, even
apart from the IndcP.r.lie delnia to which
the construction or the canal was to be
subjected. On the first appearance of dan
ger lo Colombia, this government would
have been summoned to Interpose In order
to rive effect to the rtiarantee of the
treaty cf IMS: snd all this in support of a
plan whlrh. while characterized In Its first
Stage by the wanton disregard of cur own
Interests, wss fHlv to end In further In
jury to the dtlsens cf a friendly nation,
whose enormous losses In their generous
efforts to pierce the Isthmus hsve become
a "is"er cf history.
In the third place, I. confidently maintain
(Continued on Seventh Page,)
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