THE HE STEXA Ar.
.The overland campaign of 1864 opens with an army of
130,000 pitted against an army of 50,000; and yet, almost
immediately, at the Wilderness, defeat, like the sword of
Damocles, was seen hanging by a hair. When Lee struck
Grant's column of march on the flank, Grant found his hands
too full; he could not manipulate his great host. It was size,
and size, only, that saved his army; for Lee at first with but
two thirds pf his force present (General Hill not yet having
nrrived), found it a physical impossibility to strike more than
half of the army of the Potomac at one blow; and before he
.had time, taking it thus in detail, to strike at all, Grant with
drew. At the North Anna we find Grant ridiculously check
mated; and as wc sec the bloody, futile, senseless charges on
the works at Spottsylvania Court House and Cold Harbor,
all ideas that wc have of Grant's genius vanish, and we arc
almost compelled to doubt that he possessed common sense.
As wc pass over the field ot Cold Harbor and sec thr dead
lying in long windrows, bruised and mutilated, and all caused
by the exasperation of one man, who "hammered continu
ously," and whose boast it was that he never maneuvered,
wc cannot keep thinking how -well it would have been for
himself, his country, humanity, and posterity if be had ma
neuvered. The last few months of the siege of Petersburg and Rich
mond were a lamentable farce. The mine fiasco dispels any
remaining traces of belief in Grant's ability; and as wc sec
him impotcntly besieging a line of works, held by men stand
ing fifteen feet apart, wc arc confirmed in our belief of his
total. Inck of ability. Lee was nearly circumvallated; the
"Wcldon and Southsidc railroads were in Grant's hands; Sher
idan had almost independently Avon his great success at Five
Forks; and yet Lee, like the consummate strategist that he
was, slipped out, and led Grant a lengthy chase along the
.Appomattox. When, at length, on April 9, 1865, Grant was
successful, he captured a force of 8,000 ragged, hungry, dis
satisfied men, and the greatest general North America has
seen.
It may be said that Grant's plan of hammering continu
ously was the only feasible plan; that maneuvering had too
often been unsuccessfully tried; and that his project of end
ing the war, at whatever cost, was the best. True, he would
undoubtedly have been honored if he had thus crushed Lee
at one blow; but when we see him at first egotistically ignore
Lee's recognized ability, then reject with contempt every
thing approaching strategy, and finally fail ignonimously
and at what a cost in his substitute for strategy, wc arc
compelled to sec that the first part of the overland campaign
was nothing but a great, bloody, unsuccessful experiment.
General McClellan was too cautious, too systematic, and
lacked sufficient of that subtile instinct, which, more than
rules, makes success; but it is true that these faults were on
the side of merit rather than that of demerit. It is true that
placed, as he was, in command of the first campaign of any
magnitude, he was outrageously hampered, and compelled to
oppose the bigotry of the administration; and equally true is
it that the removal of McDowell's powerful corps of 45,000
men at the critical point in the Peninsula campaign, contribu
ted more than anything else to his defeat. Still, had he
possessed those qualities with which he was accredited, it is
not unreasonable to suppose that he would have gained more
decisive victories than he did. Had he made a sudden and
immediate assault upon the works at Yorktown, preferably
at Dam number 1, midway between Lee's and Wynn's
mills, where the water was but waist deep, and where a re
connaisance did cross, he could easily have driven Magrud
er's small force and -captured Richmond before an efficient
opposition could have been brought against him. He failed
to appreciate the value of time; and, while he dug impotent
ditches, and with infinite toil forwarded huge siege guns, the
golden opportunity passed. His only chance for fame he let
slip; and when, at length, he reached the vicinity of Rich
mond, and got astride the Chickahominy an exceedingly haz
ardous movement under all circumstances he found a most
efficient opponent. In the the battle of Fair Oaks, McClel
lan's personality is overshadowed by the ability of Sumner;
and, after the battle, he allowed another long interval to
elapse in impotency. Jackson appeared almost upon the
Union communications at Hanover Court House; and another
opportunity was lost. In ths retreat from within sight'of the
steeples of Richmond to Harrison's Landing, McClellan ap
pears to have been frightened into a display of brilliancy; but
the general who, under the influence of fear, makes brilliant
retreats from positions of which his lethargy deprived him, is
certainly not above mediocrity. The detention of Jackson in
the White Oak swamp and the delay of Lee's forces in mov
ing out upon the Charles City and Newmarket roads must,
however, be considered lucky accidents.
In the Antietam campaign, McClellan was, from the first,
aided by finding Lee's order of march; but even this immense
advantage was more than counterbalanced by his old fault
lack of dispatch. Had he pushed forward quiclcly, he could
easily have passed Crampton's Gap, held only by McLaws,
and relieved Harper's Ferry. This would have placed him
almost upon Lee's communications, strangled Lee's plan in
its infancy, and prevented the battle of Antietam. As it is,
history shows here, if nowhere else, the viciousness of in
decision. In the battle itself the interest centres at Durikcr's
Chapel; and as we see the fragmentary, spasmodic assaults,
first Hooker, then Mansfield, and lastly Sumner, all thrown
back in confusion and disorder; as we sec the wave of -battle
sweeping back and forth over the same open clearing; and as
wc think of what anight have been accomplished by one imme
diate, united, decisive effort, our anger and contempt involuu
tarily rise. McClellan attempts to shift the responsibility
upon Burnside by accusing him of deliberate disobedience of
orders to attack Lee's centre and right. This Burnside de
nies and in his report states that he carried Antietam bridge
with the bayonet at one o'clock. His recognized courage to
gether Avith his previous as Avell as subsequent high reputa
tion as a corps commander are too well established for -us to
suspect him of cowardice. McClellan Avas essentially an
organizer. He was a methodieal general; but his methods
showed strange lack of judgment. He was bound down by
theory, and lacked individuality. His successes were few;
but his failures, brought about by indecision, Averc many.
General Pope heralded his accession to power Avith the
blare of trumpets. He made his first lamentable error when
he published his order, urging the army of the Potomac tto
do like their western brethren "See' only the backs 'of their,
enemies." In his campaign from the Rapidan to Bull -Run
culminating in the second battle of Manassas, his efforts
availed but little against the mighty genius of Lee; and the
only Union general that we see is General Warren, thq.cn
gineer. General Pope fought one campaign, lost one battle;
and then stepped out, not as he stepped in, but amidst silence
dark, deep, and desolate.
General Burnside, who, upon accession to command, oc
cupied the painful position of a man with greatness thrust
upon him, is deserving of pity. The position of command
ing general was unsought by him, and was accepted in trepi
dation. He mistrusted his power to succeed; and the sequel,
bloody and horrible, showsithatin.his honesty and simplicity