140
MIND AND MAN.
VOL. VIII,
the essence of the soul, wo may rejoin by
saying, neither do we of mutter. Matter
is extended, it occupies spuce, but us to
ils essence we are totally ignorant. I
have no sympathy with that philosophy
which makes simply a rellector out of a
man's brain, and the nervous fibres of the
body so many paths over which influen
ces arc conducted and reflected to distant
pttt ts.
Let us fling aside the idea of matter
when we talk of the soul. Let us not be
deceived by the terms of matter which
are often misleading in discoursing of
immaterial existences. A. sudden blow
upon tlie outside of the brain sometimes
causes instant death a paroxysm of fear
or anger has been known to result quite
as fatally without leaving a trace of any
injury of the brain. In the former case
the cause was physical and external, in
the latter mental and Internal. True (lie
object insphing fear or anger may be ex
ternal, but the destructive agency must be
internal. The cause certainly is as dis.
ti net from the brain in one case as the
other.
Perhaps, wo do not understand the ma
terialist. If he still clings to simple mat
ter, as the sole condition of the universe
then we have done him no injustice.
What says Buchncr: "As to how life orig
inated, nothing but premises and liypoth
escs can be offered, but these hypotheses
all agree that this origin proceeded from
uaturul laws, and forces inherent in the
things themselves and determined by ex
ternal nature." How artfully he uses the
terms natural laws, inherent in things
themselves, and external nature. But to
the same import another speaks: "Matter
I define as that mysterious thing by
which all this is accomplished." Yes
the premises contain the universe from
mere matter and motion to consciousness
and volition. Can a man be met who
changes his piemises to suit the occasion?
Whenever the premises are enlarged, it is
done at the expense of the quasitu. And
when Hie materialist in trying to ac
count for all that lias been accomplished
transplants the whole conclusion into the
premises he simply comes to our ground,
and gives up the discussion.
But enough witli the materialist. Let
us inquiro more specifically into the men
tal man. I think, I feel, I will, the' Intel
lect the sensibilities and the will, these
are the three grand divisions of tho mind.
Are we machines or men ? Have we the
power office choice, and if so where does
it lie? We find that the acts of the Intel
led are llxed, that is, from certain condi
tions certain results follow. Two and
two are four. The same result is readied
by all. We arc not at liberty to change it
if we would. This then Is not the depart
ment of freedom. With tho sensibilities
wo reach the same result. When the rays
of light from an external object fall upon
the eye, the retina recoives the image and
tho mind sees through the eye. When
sound vibrations strike the drum of the
ear, wo are bound to hear. When the
scusorium is uflccted in any part, tho
mind immediately becomes conscious
through the medium of communication.
In this department therefore, if we have
certain antecedents given certain results
must follow.
Let us turn now to tho consideration of
the will. The choice may be preceded by
a certain set of antecedents, such as a
perception, an emotion, a desire, a motive.
It is a delicate question as to how far
these antecedents may influenco the re
sult; but wo all feel and know that we
have the power of doing this or that set
ting aside the natural sequence of tho
antecedents. All odds may bo against us,
tho sensibilities may urge strongly for in.
diligence in bodily pleasure, foreshadow-
lugs of wordly success may enter in to
influence our motives; but the will, that
power which alone makes man u free
agent, sole dictator of the inner world
may by an not of its own sovereign power
set aside all these in ils governmental
functions. When John Calvin was
warned not to enter the council at Geneva
