

the essence of the soul, we may rejoin by saying, neither do we of matter. Matter is extended, it occupies space, but as to its essence we are totally ignorant. I have no sympathy with that philosophy which makes simply a reflector out of a man's brain, and the nervous fibres of the body so many paths over which influences are conducted and reflected to distant parts.

Let us fling aside the idea of matter when we talk of the soul. Let us not be deceived by the terms of matter which are often misleading in discoursing of immaterial existences. A sudden blow upon the outside of the brain sometimes causes instant death—a paroxysm of fear or anger has been known to result quite as fatally without leaving a trace of any injury of the brain. In the former case the cause was physical and external, in the latter mental and internal. True the object inspiring fear or anger may be external, but the destructive agency must be internal. The cause certainly is as distinct from the brain in one case as the other.

Perhaps, we do not understand the materialist. If he still clings to simple matter, as the sole condition of the universe, then we have done him no injustice. What says Buchner: "As to how life originated, nothing but premises and hypotheses can be offered, but these hypotheses all agree that this origin proceeded from natural laws, and forces inherent in the things themselves and determined by external nature." How artfully he uses the terms—natural laws, inherent in things themselves, and external nature. But to the same import another speaks: "Matter I define as that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished." Yes the premises contain the universe from mere matter and motion to consciousness and volition. Can a man be met who changes his premises to suit the occasion? Whenever the premises are enlarged, it is done at the expense of the *quasita*. And when the materialist in trying to ac-

count for all that has been accomplished transplants the whole conclusion into the premises he simply comes to our ground, and gives up the discussion.

But enough with the materialist. Let us inquire more specifically into the mental man. I think, I feel, I will, the intellect the sensibilities and the will, these are the three grand divisions of the mind. Are we machines or men? Have we the power of free choice, and if so where does it lie? We find that the acts of the intellect are fixed, that is, from certain conditions certain results follow. Two and two are four. The same result is reached by all. We are not at liberty to change it if we would. This then is not the department of freedom. With the sensibilities we reach the same result. When the rays of light from an external object fall upon the eye, the retina receives the image and the mind sees through the eye. When sound vibrations strike the drum of the ear, we are bound to hear. When the sensorium is affected in any part, the mind immediately becomes conscious through the medium of communication. In this department therefore, if we have certain antecedents given certain results must follow.

Let us turn now to the consideration of the will. The choice may be preceded by a certain set of antecedents, such as a perception, an emotion, a desire, a motive. It is a delicate question as to how far these antecedents may influence the result; but we all feel and know that we have the power of doing this or that setting aside the natural sequence of the antecedents. All odds may be against us, the sensibilities may urge strongly for indulgence in bodily pleasure, foreshadowings of worldly success may enter in to influence our motives; but the will, that power which alone makes man a free agent, sole dictator of the inner world, may by an act of its own sovereign power set aside all these in its governmental functions. When John Calvin was warned not to enter the council at Geneva