

provided they are more of an evil than a good. Let us consider. Dr Robinson charges upon them that they are *expensive*. Now what is the test here? Is not the criterion of an article's expensiveness to be found either in its intrinsic value or in the length of the purse of the purchaser or possessor?

If to be a member of a secret college Society be really worth to me all that it costs me, then, no matter what it costs, it cannot be called expensive. Whether I could possibly spend the money so as to reap a yet greater relative advantage is not now the question in issue. The question here—and it is one which in this discussion the opponents of secret Societies cannot afford to beg—is whether or not these Societies are worth their cost. If, on the other hand, the Dr. means by *expensive* that these Societies entail up in the undergraduate a really intolerable burden of expense, we may properly take exception *in limine* to the generic character of the assumption. With an income of but a thousand dollars, a five hundred dollar carriage is no doubt too expensive for me, though it may not be for my neighbor whose income approximates a hundred thousand. So, for the student whose allowance barely meets his living expenses to join a secret Society may be not only unjustifiable but practically impossible; but should this exclude his classmate whose allowance happens to be more liberal? It will hardly do to think of establishing such a despotism as will prevent any student from doing or purchasing what is beyond the reach of all. Outward uniformity is no more desirable than inward. It is the province of a college to develop character, or at least afford it an opportunity for self-development. Incidentally, it must aim also to fit the student for the part he is subsequently to play as a citizen. It will not effect this by breaking down the distinctions and making void the conditions which subsist everywhere throughout society. The student may in this, as in other things, safely be

left perfectly free to choose in accordance with his circumstance and condition, and be instructed by the natural consequence of his own choice.

Not much more forcible would seem the second objection—the spirit of *clannishness* fostered by these societies. The same charge might be brought against any limited society whatever, and with like justice. The cosmopolitan Goethe objected even to patriotism (*amor patriæ*) as unworthy, narrowing in its influence. As “one idea,” as a single pursuit, makes a monomania of the man whose entire energies it engrosses, so, in its way, does any limited society, secret or open, narrow and degrade, if it secures exclusive attention. The essence of clannishness is limitation. So in a sense are we all members of some clan. With all it is a question of more or less.

Each is bounded by his nature,  
—And remains the same in stature,  
In the valley, on the mountain;  
Scoop from ocean or from fountain,  
With a poor hand or a richer,  
You can only fill your pitcher.

Of course culture broadens, emancipates, elevates. Through that magic door we pass from the narrower into the larger limitations, but never without them, never beyond them. First the family, then the neighborhood, then the state, then the nation, then, for God's anointed, the cosmopolitans, comes the world. To these, though limited still, we may lift our hats and bow with reverence. Goethe was first a German, Jesus a Jew, Shakspeare an Englishman; afterward, nothing human was foreign to them. Yet the stars and their attendant worlds, with their probable countless inhabitants, were beyond their ken.

Not necessarily therefore are these secret College Societies to be objected to because in them the spirit of clannishness finds a place for manifestation. To the college itself the same objection may be made. We must look further to find sufficient reason for condemning these Societies. Do we find it in the third charge that in