as it is in a monarchy, to know who is the prince and after what manner he ought to govern. Generally the people are well qualified for choosing those whom they are to entrust with part of their authority; this we discover by referring to the Romans and Athenians; yet, as well as monarchs, they need to be directed by a council.

The suffrage by *lot* is as natural to democracy, as that by *choice* is to aristocracy. Suffrage by *lot* is a method of electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen with the pleasing hope of serving his country.

In an aristocracy the power is lodged in the hands of a certain number of persons, being invested with legislative and executive power; the rest of the people hold the same relation to those, as that of the subjects of a monarchy to their sovereign. But in this form of government the senators ought by no means to have the right of naming their own successors because in this manner they can perpetuate abuses. Montesquieu seems to think that "the more an aristocracy borders on a democracy, the nearer it approaches perfection, and, in proportion as it draws towards monarchy, the more it is imperfect," and the most imperfect of all is, that in which the part of the people that obeys is in a state of civil servitude to those who command, as was the case in Poland where the peasants were slaves to the nobility.

A Monarchical form of government "is that form of government in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws," and "the prince is the source of all powers, civil and political." The maxim of all monarchical governments is, "no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch. And in studying the relation of church and state, we find that "though the ecclesiastical power be so dangerous in a republic, yet it is extremely proper in a monarchy, especially of the absolute kind." Political virtue is almost unknown in a moanrchy, and policy effects great things with as little virtue as possible.

In describing the character of courtiers of the courts of monarchs, Montesquieu uses the following language, they have "ambition in idleness; meanness mixed with pride; a desire for riches without industry; aversion to the truth; flattery; perfidy; violation of engagements; contempt of civil duties; fear of the virtue of the prince; hope from his weakness, and above all a perpetual ridicule is cast on virtue."

It is exceeding difficult for the leading men of the nation to be knaves and the inferior to be honest. It is not virtue but honor that is the main spring of the form of government and coupled with ambition it thrives.

The despotic form of government "is that form of government in which a single person directs every thing by his own will and caprice." And as a natural consequence "a man whom his senses continually inform that he himself is everything, and his subjects nothing, is naturally lazy, voluptuous and ignorant." The management of public affairs he neglects and resigns to the care of a vicar. The larger the empire, the larger the seraglio. The more nations he has to rule, the less he attends to the cares of government; the more important his affairs, the less he makes them the subject of his deliberations. The people are judged by the laws, and the great men by the caprice of the prince. The church and state are generally combined and the church is usually higher than the prince.

This kind of government requires passive obedience, and *fear* is the principle that controls the subjects in their actions.

Virtue is much more essential to a democracy than it is to either a monarchy or despotism; and when virtue is banished ambition invades the minds of those who are disposed to receive it and avarice possesses the whole community. Moderation that proceeds from virtue is most necessary to an aristocracy. As the most of the quotations in this article are from memory, if any should desire to test them, they will find the most of them in that admirable work entitled "Spirit of Law."

A. E. G.

Professional Education.

A long time ago, "Many an hundred year," a stern old Spartan ruler condensed the whole science of education into one of those aphorisms in which the Greek delighted. Said he "Teach the boys that which they will practice when they are men." Philosophy, as well as History, repeats itself, and to-day the wisdom of the old King is recognized anew.

There is a large class of people who consider an education as an end in itself. There is another class, constantly increasing, who look upon it as only a means to an end. But this latter division is a house divided against itself. Since many are content with regarding it as a preparation for some general end to be hereafter determined upon, while, on the other hand, there are some who strenuously urge that an education, to be a true one, should be a means for the attainment of a specific end, which the student should have in view, at least, from the beginning of his college course. By the term "education" is meant at present simply the acquisition of knowledge during what is known as collegiate life.

The first class it is not worth the while to dwell upon. They are rapidly decreasing as it is being recognized that the quantity of knowledge is not so important as its quality—that indeed real knowledge consists not in an acquaintance with many facts, but in the right use of a few. Those who look upon an education as a means toward a general end, lay great stress upon the point, that it should aim at a complete training of all the faculties, and furnish the ground-work for a future development of specific ones, by a subsequent course of professional study. This general end they express by the phrase "mental discipline", claiming that such and such studies give such and such discipline to different faculties of the mind, so that the final result is a full and harmonious development of the parts into a symmetrical whole. By this means, they further claim, the mind has been so cultivated and strengthened that it is ready to take up any vocation; that in fact, the foundation has been deeply laid upon which to rear an imposing structure of whatever design the future may determine. But what would you say of that builder who spent the best days of his life in laying a foundation, firm and solid though it might be, before he had decided what sort of a structure he should build—before he had drawn the plan and knew its dimensions? And who might find when it was too late to remedy his mistake, that he had wasted his strength in making it needlessly wide in some directions, while, in others it was irremediably narrow and inadequate.

That mental discipline is the real object of a higher education and of the utmost importance, no one denies. Just as important then are the means by which it is to be gained.

What is mental discipline? No words of mine can tell you better than these—"By mental discipline is meant that systematic and protracted exercise of the mental powers which is suited to raise them to their highest degree of healthful capability, and impart a permanent direction to their activity." Notice particularly, I pray you, the last clause—"*and impart a permanent direction to their activity*."

There are then two objects to be gained by this discipline. *First*—to raise the faculties to their highest power and *second*—to give them a permanent direction. This is the ideal of the higher education which the present age is demanding at our hands.

Since but a few years can be devoted to acquiring an education, in a technical sense, the strictest economy is absolutely necessary. Both an economy of time—and what is far more important—an economy of mental force. A thing which is priceless, and which it is one of the highest offices of education to teach us, is how to economize and when to wisely spend. That we do not know how always to do this is self-evident.

It is a fact which every one of us has made his own by experience, that there must be a concentration of the mind upon one point, or all study is in vain. The mind must have a central idea around which to group the knowledge obtained, to which to fit each truth observed, adopting every thing which has connection, near or remote, with the end in view, and rejecting that which is useless.

The student must be, for the time, a sort of cuttle fish, with long arms radiating in all directions, lying in wait for unsuspecting prey, ready to convey it to its voracious mouth, yet nicely discriminating between what is, and what is not to the purpose.

This central idea, this pivot upon which every thing should turn, is possessed when the student enters college with his profession already selected. It is the magnet which attracts the correlative and repels the antagonistic. Henceforth he has an aim. He takes up this branch and gains from it what there is in it of use to him; then turns to another to repeat the process, collecting what is to him its gold, and leaving the dross—dross, which in its turn, may be gold to him who has a different aim. For there is no study in the whole curriculum which will not contribute to his store. Let me repeat it—there is not a single study in all the college course which will not contribute its quota, no matter what the profession or industry for which he is preparing.

Not, as was intimated by a late writer would be the case, that our embryo chief justice should only study enough Latin to teach him the meaning of *ex post facto*, *habeas corpus* and *quo warranto*; or that the aspiring itinerant should be content with a correct rendition of *baptizo* or *Gehenna*; any more than that a knowledge of the *thorax*, the *hæmal* and *neural* arches, should warrant young sawbones in flinging out his sign to every western breeze. Such superficiality can not be too harshly condemned. It is like all other veneering—apt to strip off at an inopportune moment.

It is not asserted that there should be any shortening of the college course, or any hastening into the professional. On the contrary both should rather be lengthened. No man can *really* succeed in a profession or industry who has not a broad and liberal culture, whose basis is a thoroughly completed classical and scientific course of study. It is not that the student should neglect certain studies but, having his future work in view, pass by certain things in them as foreign to his purpose. Thus his mind is not burdened and weakened by a mass of accumulated facts, stowed away without reference to any centre of radiation, from whose conglomeration he is some day to bring forth those which may be of use to him in his profession. "Burdened" and "weakened"—for it is a fallacy to suppose that by any series of aimless exercises of the mind in various directions; it may be strengthened, or mental force gained for universal application.

Against all this there may be urged two seemingly valid objections. First—that when the average boy enters college he is too young to intelligently choose his profession. But this "average boy" is the cause of a great deal more perplexity of soul than he is worth, or than is at all necessary. He is full of possibilities. His malleability is only equalled by that of the average girl. He is as clay in the hands of the potter, or, more poetically, as marble under the sculptor's chisel. Put him down to real, solid work and he will eventually turn out as good a lawyer, or doctor as he would a preacher, or professor, had he directed the same amount of effort in either of those channels. "Genius is well enough but it is work that pays." If Genius, the heaven-born, has come down to dwell with him, she will make her presence known and there will be no need of "choosing a profession." God has done it for him.

But, in truth, it is one of the evils of our hot-bed systems of education that our average boy is, by the forcing process, carried into college too early. But once *there* among the most important things he has to learn, is the relative value of his studies. The human faculties are best developed and disciplined by the act of choosing. But how is he to judge of their comparative worth if he has no standard by which to gauge their use to him? He is then debarred from one of the most efficient means of discipline, if through his four years of college life, he is prevented from exercising his power of choice. Again, would not the increased importance which *this* would give to both courses, tend to remedy a growing evil—the rush of young men into professional practice before they have sufficient general and professional knowledge?

The second objection is that this method will do much to make what are called "men of one idea." And this, I answer, is what we want and what we hope to gain. The American jack-at-all-trades is the worst impediment in the way of our educational and scientific progress. He is a parasite whose all-embracing tendrils smother our growth.

We want men who devote their lives to one thing. Men who develop their talent exclusively in one direction, to its highest "healthful capability." Not a preacher who is now a politician and now a teacher—not a mechanic who can turn his hand to doctoring—not a lawyer who can cut and slash with the editorial scissors—not a statesman whose chief recommendation is that he has been a soldier—not a teacher who occasionally preaches—nor one who flourishes the rod until she can get married—but men, (and women too when the time comes)—who choose their profession in early life and adhere to it undeviatingly until they reach deserved prominence in its ranks—men who are emphatically of one idea. And in passing let me