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NU alum remembers Cuban missile crisis SORENSEN from page 1 Soviet deployment. Because Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev gave sever al explanations for the action'in later years, no one will ever know for sure why the Soviets placed missiles in Cuba, Sorensen said. One reason might have been a desire by Khrushchev to demonstrate the Soviet Union’s political might, Sorensen said. “He thought, ‘We can show them we could match them. We’ll see how they like it. We’ll put missiles in Cuba.’” In 1962, the crisis over the divided city of Berlin provided an ongoing test of will for both superpowers. By plac ing nuclear missiles in the back yard of the United States, some speculated, the Soviets were trying to flex their mus cles and weaken US. resolve to defend West Berlin, the free sector of the East German city miles behind the Iron Curtain. Along with a show of political strength, the Soviet action may have been a desperate attempt to achieve nuclear parity with the Unitec} States, Sorensen said. “The Soviets were behind; the mis sile gap was actually the other way around,” he said. “Putting intermediate range missiles into Cuba, which could reach any part of the United States - virtually any part - was a way of closing uioi gap. During the 1960 presidential cam paign, Kennedy had insisted the United States faced a “missile gap.” Supposedly the Soviet Union was achieving greater missile capability than the United States. As Sorensen acknowledged, this turned out to be bunk. But through its missile deployment in Cuba, the Soviet Union doubled the missile power it could use to strike the United States, expanded its missiles’ range and sharply decreased the warn ing time die United States would have in a nuclear strike. The reason for the Soviet deploy ment given most frequently by Khrushchev - that the Soviets were defending the new Cuban communist regime of Fidel Castro against an American invasion—was disingenuous, Sorensen said. “I think it was really more of an excuse that gave him an opportunity; it gave him a rationale, but I don’t think that was the primary reason,” he said. Regardless of the Soviet motiva tion, the missiles in Cuba were now a fait accompli. The Ex Comm had to decide upon a response. One adviser, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, argued during the opening meeting that the Cuban mis siles did not cause a significant change in the strategic balance between the superpowers. The Soviet Union already could strike the United States with missiles fired within Soviet borders. Given the destructive capacity of even one nuclear missile, McNamara argued, it did not matter that the Soviet Union suddenly had several more missiles to i uc ai me umieu aiaies. But Kennedy faced { political pressures, both foreign and domestic, that necessitated a response regardless of any argument that the missiles were strategi cally insignificant. As Sorensen said, Kennedy may have suf fered severe interna tional political damage had he not responded to the Soviet provocation. in me worm or mar ume, perceived power can be real power,” he said. “The whole balance of power was based upon the credibility of an American response to a Soviet attack on Europe. “If we wouldn’t respond to Soviet nuclear missiles iri Cuba, nobody believed we would respond to a Soviet action in Europe. That’s why we had to respond.” Kennedy also had to keep his promise to eject Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. He had to fight criticisms launched by congressmen who said Kennedy was being soft on Cuba. Initially, most of Kennedy’s advis ers favored airstrikes on Cuba to remove the missiles. The group soon split, however, between those who favored air strikes and those who want ed to start with a less aggressive response. ■ McNamara and Kennedy's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, began to favor a blockade to prevent Soviet ships from reaching Cuba. This course had the advantage of being a slow escalation of the crisis, unlikely to provoke nuclear war. Other advisers, including former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favored air strikes to remove the threat immediate ly. A blockade, they argued, did not address the central problem of Soviet nuclear missiles already in Cuba that were approaching readiness. The Joint Chiefs believed, however, that “surgical,” or limited, airstrikes could not guarantee removal of the mis sile installations. Any airstrike would have to be massive and probably fol lowed by a land invasion. Blockade proponents countered that the Soviets might respond to an air strike by launching intermediate range ballistic missiles at the United States. If ground troops landed in Cuba, the Soviets might fire battlefield nuclear weapons at the invading force. Sorensen sided with the blockade proponents, who prevailed. On Oct. 22, President Kennedy delivered a tele vised address announcing the discovery of the missiles and the retaliatory blockade. According to ‘“One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy 1958-1964,” a 1997 book by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, the Soviet Union had prepared orders to Hie tactical nuclear weapons at invading U.S. troops. Although the order was never delivered, it was ready in case events necessitated it “The chiefs wanted bombing, air strikes, an invasion of Cuba, which we now know - we didn’t know for certain at the time, but we now know - that the Soviets would have responded with tac tical nuclear weapons which they had on die island,” Sorensen said. “We would have been obligated, when our forces were devastated by nuclear weapons, to respond with nuclear weapons, and the ladder of escalation goes up very sharply after that” In the end, Kennedy and his advis ers had chosen a middle course they believed was both a firm and cautious response. As Sorensen made clear, the risk of nuclear escalation required care ful decision making. After several tense hours of antici pation on the morning of Oct. 24, Soviet ships turned back, deciding not to challenge the blockade. rour days later, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement end ing the crisis. Khrushchev stat ed publicly that he would remove die missiles from Cuba, while the United States would lift the blockade and pledge not to invade Cuba. Neither side mentioned one crucial private aspect of the deal. In a decision not made public until about 10 years after the crisis, Kennedy also had agreed to remove U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey. Sorensen said it was essential that the agreement on the Turkish missiles be kept secret to minimize international political fallout. The United States could not be perceived as selling out allies to protect its own security or mak ing concessions “with a gun to our heads,” as he put it Sorensen said Kennedy was deter mined to prevent nuclear war. This was a determination that would have been severely tested if Khrushchev had not agreed to remove the Cuban missiles. Had the Soviets held out longer, Sorensen said, Kennedy may have sought a peacefiil solution through the United Nations. He also may have tightened the blockade or employed other military actions short of an air strike or invasion, he said. “I think he felt nuclear war would have been a failure, a negation of every thing he stood for, everything he had tried to do, and he was determined to avoid it if at all possible,” he said. Sorensen acknowledged this posi tion might have become untenable in an extended qrisis. With the Soviet missile installations approaching readiness, patience among the public, the Congress and Kennedy’s Cabinet might have worn thin. Would Kennedy ever have agreed to order an air strike? “Never say never,” he said. “If the time came when the Soviets were clear ly determined to move ahead and build these missiles and military might to bring Kennedy and the United States of America and die Western Allies to look foolish and weak, and his administra tion as well as his military chiefs turned against him and said this is what you must do, it’s hard to see any president saying, ‘No matter what happens, we’re not going to take military action.’ “So I don’t want to say there are no circumstances under which (military action) was possible. All I’m saying is that I think (Kennedy) was going to do everything possible not to take that kind of action.” Lloyd Ambrosius, history professor at die University of Nebraska-Lincoln, said that although Kennedy pursued a course of action that avoided nuclear war in October 1962, die crisis must be understood in the coated of Kennedy’s earlier campaign statements and for eign pohcy decisions. ' in the 1966 presidential election, Keanaty faced VicePresidentlliciaKi Nixon, a cemmitted anti-communist. Nixon was sure to attack Kennedy for being soft on communism if at all pos sible. Kennedy wanted to show that he . too was a tough anti-communist, decry ing the supposed missile gap. In whatever way Kennedy’s state ments may have helped him win the election, they also helped “perpetuate the almost paranoid fears of the Cold War from the 1950s” and ensured the Cold War would continue, Ambrosius said. “Kennedy had campaigned alleg ing a missile gap,” he said. “He could and should have known that was not true. But having used that issue, Kennedy had helped escalate the rhetoric of the Cold War, which had both Cold War and domestic implica tions. “In a sense, Kennedy was caught exposed because of his earlier Cold War rhetoric. Given the tough talk, if he did nothing, it would have raised doubts. It was kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy: If you said something was an important issue, it was important because you said it was.” Kennedy’s previous Cuban policies also must be considered, Ambrosius said. In particular, the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 had further soured U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and Castro’s Cuba. After orga nizing an invasion of Cuba by anti Castro Cuban exiles, Kennedy had failed to authorize sufficient air cover to ensure the invasion’s success. After the Bay of Pigs, the CIA insti tuted a covert plan called Operation Mongoose to attempt the overthrow and assassination of Castro. As Sorensen mentioned, the defense of Cuba may not have been Khrushchev’s primary motivation for deploying the missiles. After all, the deployment was much larger than was needed to defend against a U.S. inva sion. Sorensen said the failure at the Bay of Pigs taught Kennedy “not to be heady, cocky, confident, certain that the United States and its interests would always prevail.” But given the Kennedy administra- . tion’s clear disdain for the Castro regime, legitimate Soviet and Cuban fears of an invasion may have con tributed to the Cuban missile crisis, Ambrosius said. “Looked at from the Soviet or Cuban point of view, there was no rea son to assume (Kennedy) wouldn’t invade if he had half a chance,” Ambrosius said. Ambrosius said Kennedy wanted history to record that Ire had stood firm against nuclear blackmail and pre vailed. Given the secrecy of the U.S. withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Jlnkey, and the toppling ofKhrushchev by the Soviet Presidium in 1964, this view was accepted for a while. ‘Tie wanted to create an impression that he had been a strong leader who had stood tough and tall and made Khrushchev back down, when in fact he had made real concessions from a Soviet point of view,” Ambrosius said. The Cuban missile crisis was the closest the United States and the Soviet Union came to a direct nuclear con frontation. After that, tire Cold War was waged mostly through wars on the periphery- as was the case in Vietnam - and covert operations around the world. Ambrosius said the close call of October 1962 led to these develop ments because thereafter, leaders of both superpowers were reluctant to risk direct Soviet-American confrontations. The strategic doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction - designed to deter either side from a nuclear strike by ensuring tire other side could mount an unacceptably destructive response - and later arms control agreements were pvt of this legacy, he said. *T thinkthe Cuban missile crisis left a legacy in terms of some real restraint which all subsequent presides** showed,” he said. “They ware far more 71=3.14159265 Double Slice Pizza=$1.99 f I The ratio of the circumference of a Fazoil’s pizza to its diameter is delicious. And getting one is as easy as pie. Just dine in, carry out or drive through for Double Slice or a whole pie. ... V . i .. ' • V' -----‘-. it If we wouldn’t respond to Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, nobody believed we would respond to the Soviet action in Europe. That’s why we had to respond.” Thodore Sorensen former special council to John Kennedy