The daily Nebraskan. ([Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-current, September 03, 1980, Page page 4, Image 4

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    page 4
Wednesday, September 3, 1980
daily nebraskan
Nuclear holocaust possible
Mark Rupert is a graduate student in the
UNL political science department. His
columns on international relations and
foreign policy will appear every other
Wednesday in this semester's Daily
Nebraskan.
We live in the Ubiquitous shadow of nu
clear holocaust. The United States and the
Soviet Union maintain immense arsenals of
thermonuclear weapons-capable of un
imaginable destruction-counterpoised in a
state of constant readiness.
A diplomatic blunder could, in the
space of 30 minutes, result in our mutual
annihilation and the radioactive contamina
tion of much of the earth. It is of para
mount importance that our government
manage its strategic power wisely, but the
official strategic policy of the government,
as it has been defined for nearly a decade,
imperils the lives of all Americans, as well
as hundreds of millions of others world
wide. President Carter has decided to inten
sify this dangerous policy.
This policy, known as "flexible strate
gic options." undermines the condition of
mutual deterrence that has maintained nu
clear peace since 1945.
Deterrence exists when neither super
power can be confident of its ability to dis
arm its rival with a nuclear first strike.
When the strategic forces of each nation
can survive a first strike in sufficient num
bers to inflict devastating retaliation upon
the attacker -when each possesses a "second
strike capability "-neither can hope to gain
advantage through nuclear attack and both
arc thereby deterred.
A full-scale nuclear exchange would
mean the end of each as a functioning 20th
century society. This reciprocal hostage re
lationship is called mutual assured destruc
tion (MAD), and serves as the basis of
deterrence. The sheer horror of this nuclear
specter makes its actualization less likely.
Assured destruction and the "balance of
terror" were accepted as U.S. strategic
policy until the early 1970s when critics
arose in the Nixon administration. Should
deterrence fail, they argued, MAD would
result in the complete devastation of both
societies due to its emphasis on the target
ing of the industrial and population centers
(countervalue targeting).
Moreover, its critics alleged that MAD
was not a credible deterrent against limited
stikes on military targets (counterforce
strikes). Such limited strikes, they feared,
would leave American leaders a choice be
tween massive retaliation and consequent
annihilation, and asking no response at all.
For these reasons, Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger began in 1973 to implement a
shift in U.S. strategy toward a policy of
44 flrt V iKlrt nntinnc
'Flexible options' dangerous
The conversion of American doctrine
and force structures to complement the
policy of "flexible strategic actions" has
been an evolutionary process. Originating
during the Nixon years, the process was
continued by President Ford. Carter has
chosen to follow in the strategic footsteps
of his predecessors and so, on July 25, he
issued Presidential Directive 59. The direct
ive and its accompanying documents call
for the emphasis of counterforce targeting
in U.S. doctrine, and the modification of
our strategic forces in order to increase our
counterforce capabilities.
These changes are designed to allow us
to respond in kind to say limited strike
against military targets in the United States.
Advocates of "flexible options" allege that
this policy enhances deterrence by increas
ing the credibility of the American retalia
tory threat. Unfortunately, for all of us,
this simply is not the case.
"Flexible options" is inherently and
immediately dangerous because it makes
nuclear was appear to be a rational policy
choice. It creates in the minds of govern
ment decision-makers the illusion that nu
clear exchange can be limited and con
trolled to serve the ends of policy.
Limited warfare unrealistic
. In the words of Paul Wamke, former
head of the U.S: Arms Control and Dis
armament Agency, such thinking is "apoca
lyptic nonsense" that serves only to ask nu
clear war appear less awful. "Deterrence is
always weakened by any strategy that
seems to contemplate a limited nuclear
war," says Warnke.
Even the Soviets recognize limited nu
clear as a dangerous mirage. Robert Leg
void, director of soviet studies for the
Council on Foreign Relations, has asserted
"the Soviets believe that nuclear war is gen
uinely difficult to control. They seem to
recognize that there is no such thing as a
neat attack against military targets." In any
counterforce strike, collateral damage will
occur and civilians will die.
This gray area between counterforce
and countervalue attack opens, the door to
holocaust. Moreover, the kind of cool,
rational, and well-informed decision
making that is absolutely necessary to
prevent a holocaust is hot likely to occur in
the context of nuclear exchange. Limited
nuclear war is an illusion.
Arms race
Our attempts to acquire the ability to
destroy Soviet missiles in tlieir silos art
perceived in Moscow as a threat to the
Soviet deterrent. This perception of threat
is made even more acute because more
Poles won victory for
rights, not U.S. ideals
Nothing could have been more
appropriate this Labor Day week
end than the agreement won by
striking Polish workers with their
government.
The Polish government agreed
to allow the workers to establish
independent trade unions which,
have the power to represent work
ers and express opinions to the
communist regime.
Of course the government will
not dissolve the state-controlled
unions, which offer vacations,
health care and job transition
assistance. And the workers did
not win the guarantee that the
new unions will be allowed to
negotiate wages and benefits, or
even be listened to.
All news reports now say the
initial victory must be followed up
by the workers if it is to be lasting
and meaningful, and if even
further progress is to be made.
That, of course, is obvious.
Progress was made, and a
victory was won, even if that
victory was small.
The victory was strictly for the
Polish people, but the American
people seem to view it as their win
too.
Perhaps the example of the
American people and our power
ful labor unions inspired the form
of the Polish strikes, but not the
reason. An oppressed people will
rebel, whether there is an America
to model itself after or not.
Yes, the agreement and the
show of labor's power does point
up the oppression and weaknesses
in the Soviet bloc. And, in our
continuing struggle for ideological
supremacy and human compassion
against the Soviets, the victory
represents a great propoganda tool
for America.
The people of the United States
can be heartened by the rebellion
against communism in its Soviet
form, and they can be happy for
the Polish workers.
But none of us will be living in
Poland, working to make the
agreement meaningful, fearing
possible communist reprisal and
struggling to feed our families.
We cannot consider this a
victory for the American or the
capitalist way of life. The ideals
the Polish people fought for were
not American ideological frag
ments, rather, they were human
rights and human needs in their
rawest form.
They are something people in
this country do not fully under
stand because they have been
-taken for granted for so long.
Labor won a victory on Labor
Day. The Polish workers also won
a victory. The American people
did not, even though our spirits
generally were lifted.
than 70 percent of the Soviet nuclear force
consists of vulnerable land-based missiles
(as compared to 19 percent of U.S. forces).
Thus the USSR feels compelled to
improve its forces in quality and quantity
in order to preserve the credibility of
their deterrent.
It is apparent that "flexible options"
will lead to arms racing in the future. Such
competition involves not only huge expedi
tures, but also increases suspicion and ten
sion between the superpowers, making
conflict still more likely.
"Flexible options" is dangerous because
it will create a condition of crisis instabil
ity. As arms racing results in both sides ob
taining counterforce weapons, neither will
feel its deterrent secure. The strategic
forces of each will have glaring vulnerabili
ties and the second strike capability of
both will come increasingly into question.
In a crisis situation leaders will view their
options as "shoot them or loose them." To
launch first will be to seize the greatest
chance for survival by eliminating as much
of the opponents's force as possible. Wait
ing to respond to an opponent's first strike
will appear suicidal. The incentive will
clearly favor nuclear attack, and the
chances of holocaust will be infinitely
greater. This is the long-term consequence
of "flexible options." It is hardly a desir
able future.
Let us abandon our folly and reverse the
tread toward counterforce strategy and nu
clear instability. The longer we delay the
more difficult it will be to return to sanity.
The stakes we are gambling are much too
high.
u
YRstaaExsai' Vessels says involvement need is great
UPSP 144-080
Editor in chief: Randy Essex; Managing
editor: Bob Lannin; News editor: Barb Richard
son; Associate news editor: Kathy Chenault;
Assistant news editor: Gordon Johnson, Tom
Prentiss; Assistant night news editor: Okonkwo
Ifejika; Entertainment editor: Casey McCabe;
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manager: Kitty Policky; Advertising manager:
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Pike.
Publications Board chairman: Mark Bowen,
475-1081. Professional adviser: Don Walton, 473
7301. The Daily Nebraskan is published by the UNL
Publications Board Monday through Friday dur
ing the 'fall and. spring semesters, except during
vacations.
Address: Daily Nebraskan, 34 Nebraska
Union, 14th and R streets, Lincoln, Neb., 68588.
Telephone: 472-2588.
Material may be reprinted without permission
if attributed to the Daily Nebraskan, except
material covered by a copyright.
Second class postage paid at Lincoln, Neb.,
63510.
Guest opinions are selected on the basis
of their importance to the student body
regarding current issues. Generally the sub
missions are too long to run as letters to
the editor. The Daily Nebraskan reserves
the right to select all guest opinion
material, which does not necessarily repre
sent the opinions of the paper.
This letter serves several purposes. First
of all, I would like to welcome you back to
campus, or for new students, to campus. I
"would also like to briefly explain my role
as ASUN president and student regent.
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the need
for increased student involvement and
point out the opportunities ASUN has for
improving student representation on cam
pus. The Association of Students of the
University of Nebraska (ASUN) is the
student government at UNL. The ASUN
Senate is comprised of 35 senators, each
elected by their respective colleges in the
spring of the year. The executives of ASUN
are the first and second vice-presidents and
the president. In addition to these elected
offices there are numerous commissions,
committees and agencies that ASUN
administers as the recnpnieH
tive of the student body.
My position as ASUN president and stu
dent regent on the NU Board of Regents
(the governing body for the university
system) is a very diverse one. However, one
responsibility that accompanies every
projects obligation is communication to
the student body and for the student body.
It is a primary responsibility to solicit stu
dent sentiment and relay it to the admini
stration, the regents, and the Nebraska
Legislature.
It is crucial that those who govern us
by making rules that affect our college lives
understand students and our opinions on
issues. On the same hand, it is just as
important that we students are aware of
the resulting consequences of decisions
that various administrations are making.
During the summer months, I have tried
to stress student concerns to these indivi
duals through various mediums: one-on-one
personal contact, presentations at
regents meetings, debates with UNL ad
ministration members, discussions with
state senators and press conferences with
the state-wide media. Concurrently, I have
relayed back information and decisions to
the student body, primarily through the
Summer Nebraskan.
Student concerns
Another major responsibility of my
position is helping suggest to others involv
ed in ASUN issues that require the
attention of students. Often times my
participation as a member of the regents or
in dealings with administration will point
out these concerns. Issues range from stu
dent involvement with the university
budget to advocating improved library ser
vices and hours to the need for more
effectively organized students on campus.
Developing plans for how these concerns
can best be met is a subsequent responsi-
The need for student representation at
UNL has never been so great. The admini
stration, in dealing with the regents Five
Year Plan, is making significant recom
mendations at this time. Over the summer,
the administration supported the regents
accepted-to much student opposition
the elimination of the Centennial Educa-
Continued on Page 5