The daily Nebraskan. ([Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-current, April 08, 1964, Page Page 2, Image 2

Below is the OCR text representation for this newspapers page. It is also available as plain text as well as XML.

    iitt! m
mmiM i vfaww- - ...
V
I
i
i
:i
Page 2
insight Slsewhere
by Kenneth Tabor
To Win,
And Winning, Gain
Each country within the
Southeast Asian community
of nations has at one time
or another been tagged "the
key to Asia" in so far as
our military and diplomatic
personnel have centered
their efforts at stopping
Red agression first in one
and then in another. Right
now the label is on Viet
Nam. Not so very long ago
it was on Laos. Before that,
Cambodia.
Right after the overthrow
of the Diem government in
South Viet Nam, Prince
Sihanouk, Cambodia's chief
of state, rejected the thirty
million dollars-a-year for
eign aid which the United
States was giving Cambod
ia. Cries went out all over
the U.S. and labelled the in
cident a failure of Ameri
can diplomacy, foreign aid,
and every other endeavour
in which our government
w as engaged. Loudest of the
cries was that certainly
Southeast Asia was now
lost.
Such evidently was not
the case. If it were, there
are no doubt many military
leaders, fighters, and on
lookers who wonder what
In the world we are doing
in Viet Nam. Bat we are
there, and the reason is that
Asia is not yet lost; and we
are trying to save it.
In order to understand
what really happened in
Cambodia, it is necessary
to look at it in retrospect;
and to do that one must
look at South Viet Nam.
We are undoubtedly doing
much better there than we
were earlier. First of all,
Nguyen Khanh's govern
ment has become much
more firmly entrenched.
Secondly, our government
has committee itself to di
rect action against the Viet
Cong should that become
necessary.
Our interest in Viet Nam
Is out of proportion to the
size and importance of the
country taken by itself.
What has developed this
interest to such a high rank
is that Viet Nam can not
possibly be taken out of its
context as a nation within
a community of nations.
Where before we labelled a
country "the key" because
that happened to be where
our efforts were being put
forth at the time, we now
label Viet Nam the key be
cause there is nowhere else
within the Southeast Asian
community for us to con
centrate a defense.
We don't know yet quite
how we are going to win
there. All we know is that if
we lose Viet Nam, all is
lost. Not that all the other
countries have already
gone over to the Commu
nist bloc. On the contrary,
they1 have not. But t h e y
would stand little chance of
resisting that block if Viet
Nam succumbed. Not only
would they have trouble re
sisting, some would not
even put out the effort to do
so.
It takes little speculation
to see the progression. Aft
ter South Viet Nam, then
Laos followed closely by
Cambodia. This would leave
Thailand open from all
quarters. The fall of Thai
land would expose Burma
which is turn would leave
the Malaysian Federation
unprotected. Next stop: the
Philippine Islands,
Now we are not dealing
with a tiny, insignificant
Asian nation such as Viet
Nam. Now we are dealing
with 240 million people- in
a land area of 7 million
square miles. The various
segments into which this
overall population have di
vided don't even get along
Wednesday, April 8, 1964
with the West or the Com
munist bloc. Yet they are
candidates for either camp.
If we look at Cambodia
with this in mind and as a
representative part of a
huge community maybe we
can see why our aid was
refused.
Prince Sihanouk and his
nation stand between the
Red Chinese and the United
States. His desire, and
there is little doubt that he
speaks not only for Cam
bodians, but for most of
Southeast Asia, is that his
country maintain a neutral
ist position. In steering his
country toward that goal he
first had to throw off
French rule. After this
was accomplished he re
jected the protection of
SEATO in 1956. In 1957 he
denounced the Red Chinese
and told his countrymen
that U.S. aid was a neces
sity if Cambodia was to be
saved from the Red Men
ace. In 1958 he recognized
Red China. In 1959 he as
signed the blame for his in
ternal problems to the CIA.
After refusing American,
dollars from the U.S. he
vowed that rather than go
go the Communist block, he
would get American dollars
from some other European
government. Two ""months
ago he announced' his de
sire for friendship with the
U.S. One month ago anti
American mob riot forced
the evacuation of many dip
lomatic people and their
families
Prince Sihanouk explains
these manouvers as stem
ming from his conviction
that the U.S. will be de
feated in Asia. Thus, with
neither the countries within
the Asian community or the
Western powers putting up
an international guarantee
of Cambodian neturality, he
feels left with no alterna
tive than to replace that
missing guarantee with rec
ognition. Evidently his fence strad
dling has little to do with
trying to garner more aid
dollars, and it apparently
has little to do with idiolog
ies. The main purpose of
his back-and-forth policy ix
security after the East-West
conflict in Asia is over.
The question with Cam
bodia is not whether diplo
matic efforts in that coun
try have failed, nor is ft
whether the Reds are sell
ing Asia on Communism.
The issue is security, and
Just as we here in the
states decide many domes
tic issues with that criter
ion, so the countries of
Southeast Asia decide for
eign Issues in that manner.
These countries, in viewing
the past stalemate in Viet
Nam and the compromise
in Laos, feel not so much
that we can't offer them
security because we have
lost, but that we won't of
fer them secuirty because
we haven't really put forth
a fight.
It would seem that to keep
this community of nations
out of the Communist bloc,
we must take a 'stand in
Viet Nam; not only to win,
but also that in winning
we may offer them their
security as neutral nations
and their independence to
make their own way as a
community.
Viet Nam then it not so
much a pitched battle in
which we may either win
or lose, but an opportunity
to demonstrate to this com
munity that we too can as
sure this guarantee which
they need and desire.
Far tMcktrs wl wtnt aMiMy, mr CMgt-nict
rata-rion w spia assistant in sstfig a
oartlcarar titoctiM, Mntoctt
THE DAVIS SCHOOL SERVICE
501 Stuart funding Lincoln, Nsbratks Fhons: 432-4954
Na fsat ar cnarax awtll ya fcsva raraivaa' ecaatoala aarvlca
ERIC SEVAREID
Viet Nam 'Policy' Implications
Many, Varied, But Clear-Cut
Our "policy" in South
Viet Nam is more than an
attitude but less than a de
liberate plan. It is policy in
the least of the mean
ings of the
word: a
course
of conduct
imposed up
on us by
Perhap
"p o sture"
wo u 1 d be
the more
a c c u r- Sevareid
ate term. The American
posture in Viet Nam is to
continue as counsellor and
supplier, and to hope. In
spite of the various h i g h
level missions to that ag
onized place there is no
ready evidence that any
thing has changed, save the
local government.
The first hope of the John
son administration must be
that nothing will happen in
Viet Nam to upset this pos
ture between now and the
November election. The con
tinued drain of American
money and individual Amer
ican lives is beginning to
chafe Congressional nerves,
but any decision for mas
sive intervention in the
north by American power,
or for withdrawal, would
produce political trauma in
this country. In spite of his
popularity as reflected in
the polls, I do not believe
President Johnson's hold on
the mind and affections of
the country as distinct
from his hold on its good
will is firm enough to
withstand such a trauma
without danger to his re
election prospects. I suspect
that he holds the same view.
As long as absolutely vi
tal military positions are
not being lost to the Viet .
Cong, the President can
continue h i s present .ap
proach. And it can be ar- '
gued that this approach is
not only the politically ex-
pedient course but the wise j
one. What this course is .
costing us Is not, for a great
power dealing with a vio
lent world, unendurable.
Time is life and in time
many things not now fore
seeable may happen in that
embroiled country. Of
course this attitude is mere
ly ostrichism to the minds
of various senators, steeped
as they are in the tradi
tional American psychology
of action and the instinc
tive belief that right actions
can always bring satisfying
solutions. One of the post
Subscription rata ft Mr aaniaatar
ar M per Mr.
EnltrwJ aaooad Um mUrr at
ttw PMt oflic in UnaAa, Nabraaka,
warn Um vu of Autuat 4, 112.
Tha Daily Nabraakaa to auMIahcd
at room M. fltudani Union, on Mon
day, Wednesday, Thursday, mdar
br UDtvarMtr of Noraka atodenui
ante tha tarladlctloi of tha Faculty
SubeomirtlUat an ttodant Publication.
Puntloatkoaa ahafl ba free from cn
aoraht br tha taboammiUca or any
Parana autatda Um Univaratty. Mem
ban of tha Nabraakaa ara raaaotwIM
tat what Oaay oauaa to ba priaUd.
Vnl
i "sy
war lessons we have had
the hardest time accepting
is the truth that situations
really do exist for which no
satisfying solution exists. To
us, this is a new fact, to be
resented. To European gov
ernments, this is the part
of the permanent and an
cient condition of life, to be
accepted.
In the interim, this de
lemma seems to be one of
those familiar situations in
which the negative proba
bilities appear more certain
than the positive possibili
ties. A voluntary withdrawal of
the American presence
would mean a great polici
cal defeat of America. It
would also mean the end of
all our hopes for that part
of the world. This was not
the case when the French
withdrew, because Ameri
can power was hovering in
the background, ready to
move in, as it did. It was
not the case in March of
1947 when the British with
drew from Greece, opening
up a dominant salient on the
Mediterranean for the So
viets, because America was
again ready to occupy the
salient. The difference be
tween the United States and
any one of our allies is not
only a difference of degree
but of kind. "The buck
stops here."
Neutralization of South
Viet Nam could not even
be negotiated for, so long
as the Viet Cong are ad
vancing. The outcome at a
conference table would de
pend directly and complete
ly on the course of events
on the fighting terrain. Ev
ven if arranged, a neutral
status could not be guaran
teed without the continuing
presence of outside power
which would almost surely
for STUDENTS
New S'64 directory lists 20,000 summer job openings
in 50 states. MALE or FEMALE. Unprecedented re
search for students includes exact pay rates and job
details. Names employers and their addresses for hir
ing in industry, summer camps, national parks, resorts,
etc., etc., etc. Hurry!! jobs filled early. Send two dol
lars. Satisfaction guaranteed. Send to: Summer Jobs
Directory P. O. Box 13593 Phoenix, Arizona.
SPECIAL STUDENT DISCOUNTS
YOUR EXCLUSIVE KEEPSAKE
DEALER III U(ICOU)
Credit
1332 "O" St.
' 1 1
Til.
m
have to be American power.
The alternative course, of
which some senators are
now enamored, whould be
American bombing of bases,
roadways and junctions in
North Viet Nam. Aside from
the question of what Red
China might do, it seems
to me that our Asiatic mili
tary experience in the big
war and in the Korean War
argues against the proposal
on very practical grounds.
Guerrilla warfare, as de
veloped by Mao Tze-t u n g
and as waged in Viet Nam,
is expressly designed to
elude disruption by heavy,
modern weapons. Guerrilla
fighters, can be dealt with
only by other fighting men,
on the ground.
Furthermore, Korea has
to be remembered. When
the Chinese massed forces
attacked southward, thev
had only a couple of roads
to use, as I recall it. And
we had absolute air su
premacy. Yet bombing
alone could not stop them.
In the big war, in the fall
of 1943, I went to see Gen
eral Stilwell in Chungking
and asked him what could
stop the Japanese if t h e y
decided to invade south
China by roadway, from In-do-China.
"Only troops," he
said, "if we can get them."
Two days later I put this
to General Chennault, that
remarkable air warrior, in
Kunming. He went to h i s
wall maps and said, "We
will bomb and strafe them,
here and here and here, and
they will be stopped."
The Japanese did move
into China by those road
ways. Stilwell was proved
right and Chennault was
proved wrong. South China
went under, Chennault's
Kunming headquarters
along with it.
J
eweiers
HE2-5126
!. HI
Cigarette
i
Dear Editor:
- I read with interest the
article on page three of the
March 19 edition of tne
DAILY NEBRASKAN con
cerning the loss of cigarette
advertising in college news
papers. That this problem
would arise an anticipated
by the authors of the recent
Consumers Union Report
on Smoking and the Public
Interest. To quote from
page 165 of that report, the
National Advertising Serv
ice, which represents some
850 college newspapers in
the United States, has
started in its promotional
literature, "Never again
will you reach them (col
lege seniors) in a period
where brand-changing is so
tampant as it is in college
years, where they are so
eager to shake off family
ties, so anxious to fill new
needs and wants
MAIN EVENTS, the New
York City College evening
weekly paper dropped cig
arette advertising in 1962
and had to appeal to the
school administration for
assistance before the year
was out. The editors ex
pressed their regret that,
". . . the financial integrity
of this paper and apparent
ly many other school pap
ers across the country
must, to such a large ex
tent, rely upon a product,
which, accordng to the evi
dence, contributes so great
ly to the death of thousands
every year."
It now seems evident that
the tobacco industry will
continue to ii .dly abrogate
is responsibility In this im
portant area. Let us hope
that the advertising indus
try will not be so callous.
That college newspapers
need to rely upon cigarette
advertising in part is un
fortunate. That the editors
and business managers of
these papers should regret
the loss of income is un
derstandable. However, uni
versity newspapers have
traditionally maintained a
high degree of social re
sponsibility. This is not the
first, nor, one hopes, the
last time that this respon
sibility has been in con
flict with fiscal policy.
All too often we look at
the tobacco industry, the ad
vertising industry and t h e
Iii.iii,i.iI.,i,ii..liiiiiiiiiiiIii.iiiii, .hi i . v. k yM,-mnm.my'V '. n
. , BMHtA
' ' ' '" ' ' s
THE ENGAGEMENT RING WITH
THE PERFECT CENTER DIAMOND
True artistry is expressed in the brilliant
Tashion styling of every Keepsake diamond
engagement ring. Each setting is a master
piece of design, reflecting the full brillianca.
and beauty of the center diamond ... a,
perfect gem of flawless clarity, fine color
and meticulous modern cut.
The name, Keepsake, in the ring and ow,
the tag i8 your assurance of fine quality,
and lasting satisfaction. Your very per-i
onal Keepsake diamond ring is awaiting?
your selection at your Keepsake Jeweler'
store. Find him in the yellow pages. Prices
from $100 to $2500. Ring8 enlarged to show
beauty of detail Trade-mark registered.
, MCW J PUiN YM ENGAGEMENT ACT VZZXVA
bat fw nlv 2V l?
' ,
Ad Problem
tax revenue trom tobacco
and feel that we must not
disturb this ponderous en
terprise. Although I have
not completed the estimates
yet, a preliminary estimate
of the loss to Nebraska as
a result vof death due to
cigarette smoking, reveals
a minimal figure of $124
million per year. The true
figure will no doubt be a
multiple of this but it will be
more difficult to estimate
the maximal than it has
been to calculate the min
imal loss.
Theoretically, rational
control of his environment
is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of man visa-vis
the lower animals. Of
course no one likes to give
up a bad habit.
George E. Pickett, M.D.
Director, Chronic
Disease Control
EDITOR'S NOTE:
It is reassuring to note
that commercial newspap
ers today have enough
large-volume, national ad
vertising, would not serious
ly affect their financial op
eration. On the other hand,
school papers usually op
erate at a loss no matter
the policy on certain types
of advertising, e.g., liquor
and cigarette. College news
papers, however, will be
able to continue functioning
to whatever degree o! so
cial responsibility they wish
because ultimate responsi
bility for the paper to not
their's, but the school's.
But, it is distrubing that
television and radio have
many more and different
problems with their adver
tisers and many times bow
to the wishes of the sponsor.
It is hoped that both of the
electronic media will grow
out of this phase. At least,
it is hoped they will soon
teach the degree of financi
al solvency that will allow
them to operate editorially
independent of their busi
ness staff.
Consider this, however,
as a problem that faces the
rp'ss media: you are doing
a good (socially responsi
ble) job; you are a busi
ness, however, and in or
der to print or to air you
must make some sort of
money; you do this by ad
vertising; in some, often
many cases, your advertis
ers object to the job you're
doing, whether it is socially
responsible or not.
'"fl Vow p,cmond R
' " .'- iff "
;r-r .-