Thursday, April 8, 1943
DAILY NEBRASKAN
Background Digest
US European Policy
Causes Pacivoc War
. . . Hitler
RV PROP J. L. SELLERS
(American History Department.)
Hitler has attributed this war to
the settlement drafted 24 years
ago at Versailles. With the fall
of France he dramatically staged
on the scene of the former armis
tice a Germaji version of the Eu
ropean order.
The comparison of the two pro
cedures indicates that the victors
in the first war were mild and
gentle men. No one can doubt
that Hitler and a large part of the
German people have devoted their
entire being to the destruction and
utter obliteration of the treaty of
Versailles.
Was the treaty of Versailles
a bad treaty? It applied the
democratic principle of self de
termination of peoples, it libera
ated conquered peoples, it made
some effort to make Germany
pay reparations to millions of
homeless refugees whose home
steads were rendered a no man's
land by ruthless bosche invaders.
Knew Freedom.
The treaty turned colonies into
mandates and set up a League of
Nations. The peoples of Central
Europe knew freedom that they
had only read of in the promised
land of America.
Why did settlement fail? First
it was rejected by the United
States through the action of our
senate. The United States govern
ment through its secretary of state
in the 1920's went out of its way
to express its complete disassocia
tion with the affairs of Europe,
and to make it disagreeably obvi
ous that no European probiem
could possibly interest us. We
treated the requests for guaran
tees of the settlement and the se
curity of France against German
invasion with the greatest disdain.
In the face ot his disdain of
Europe and the League of Nations
we invited first British and Japan
and (after feelings were ruffled)
we were forced to include all told
nine powers at Washington con
ference on limitation of arms and
the settlement of Asiatic and Pa
cific problems.
Three important treaties were
Voluntary Censorship Controls
Press, Radio News Releases
BY HAROLD HAMIL.
(Director School of Journalism.)
The real censors in this war are
the men and women who write and
edit the news for local newspapers
and radio stations. In my opin-
1
-4,'uurtriy Lincoln Joun.l.
HAROLD HAMIL.
Ion, they assume a greater day-today
responsibility than does the
staff of the office of censorship at
Washington.
Press censorship in America
Is a voluntary matter. True,
certain facts are withheld from
the public by orders of the
army, navy, state department
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Blames Treaty
signed, but despite the high praise
heaped upon this conference it is
doubtful if it was conducive to the
peace and goodwill of nations.
The conference defied the League
of Nations principles of collective
security and incensed the nations
that were relying upon it.
The conference provided no
means of causing Japan to per
form her promises, too many of
which stood unperformed and
mocked the very words that
statesmen were pronouncing.
The United States and Britain
denied' themselves .naval bases
by which they might expect to
exert any naval and military
power to even defend their own
possession in the Orient, to say
nothing of enforcing their guar
antees to China.
No Definite Policy.
The fatal weakness of the
United States Oriental policy was
their lack of an effective European
policy. Our Oriental policy was
undermined by the guarantees of
the leading European crisis. But
since we took no measures to
provide against European crisis
and refused to support any ma
chinery for settling them, it was
finally evident that European
powers would never dare to divert
their power to the Orient to assist
Set Stage for Recent Events . .
War Result of Treaties of 1919
BY PROF. NORMAN HILL.
(Political Science department.)
The invasion of Poland in 1939
was the culmination of a series of
events dating back to the peace
settlement of 1919. This is not to
say that the shortcoming of that
settlement were the sole or even
the main cause of the present
war. Indeed the iniquities of that
settlement are often given too
much stress and its constructive
features overlooked.
In two ways the treaties of 1919
set the stage .for the 20 years
and other service and govern
mental branches, but these are
held up at the sources and their
control is relatively simple.
Not Easy to Censor.
A lot of vital information, how
ever, is not controllable at the
source and there is where volun
tary censorship comes in. Vital in
formation as such is not easily
tagged or classified. New situa
tions arise daily. Some of them
are mishandled, no doubt, but by
and large, the editors and news
casters have a good record for
keeping out of public news chan
nels the kind of information that
might be helpful to the enemy.
The office of censorship in
Washington is primarily an ad
vistory organization. It has set
up broad general rules by which
the press is asked not ordered
-to keep certain information
out of general circulation. The
office will rule on specific cases
for any newspaper or radio sta
tion which does not wish to rely
on its own interpretation.
Few Violations.
Wishes of the censorship office
have been violated on occasions
and journalists naturally resent
some of the regulations, but there
have been few reported instances
of out-and-out violation of the vol
untary code.
A local newspaper is given con
siderable leeway in the handling
of news about a nearby military
establishment or defense plant.
But the censorship office is very
critical of a newspaper of nationay
circulation which takes the same
liberty. The theory is that if the
if
V
--,iSf
Courtesy Lincoln Journal.
PROF. J. L. SELLERS.
in settling a Pacific crisis.
Many people could forsee that
our one direction diplomacy of the
1920's was bound to net us dis
aster. The reliance upon our
former allies to sustain us in Asia,
but our refusal to co-operate with
them in Europe left them too weak
to inforce the peace settlement
When war came in Europe our
guarantors were occupied and
helpless.
Our new definition of neutral
ity, contained in several neutral
ity acts from 1936 to 1939, was
a heavy yoke upon the necks of
(See U. S. Policy, page 6.)
which followed. In the covenant
of the League of Nations there
was a proclamation of a new inter
national morality which would
substitute reason in the place of
power.
Other Causes.
But in the economic and political
clauses of the treaties were pro
visions which, however justifiable
some of them may have been, cre
ated an order unacceptable to Ger
many, Italy and some of the
smaller states of Europe. The in
ternational relations of the 1920's
big papers of national circulation
published any and all news about
military establishments through
out the country, enemy agents
would have a ready-made hand
book for sabotage plans, compu
tations of military strength and
so forth.
Certain Facts Omitted.
Movements of troops, ammu
nition and supplies are not dis
cussed specifically. Sizes of
training detachments are not
made public. Men wounded or
evacuated from battle zones are
not identified by the units to
which they are attached. The
idea is that such information
can aid an enemy agent in fol
loawing the movements of indi
vidual units and in computing
the strength of American forces
in specified areas.
The local editor-censor Is con
fronted daily with questions raised
by letters from men in the serv
ices, by unwitting remarks made
by soldiers and sailors on furlough
or by troop train and convoy
movements he sees with his own
eyes. Real news crops up contin
ually in these areas completely
out of the control of army and
navy public relations officers or
representatives of the office of
censorship. The decision to re
port or not to report must be made
locally by reporters, editors and
newscasters.
And in my opinion American
Journalists have done a good job
of giving the public a -fair re
port of the war without giving
our enemies much that could be
termed "aid and comfort."
Decline of Power
Leads Ceich to War
. . . According to 'Mein Kampf
BY PROF. H. C. VEDELER.
European History Department.
Origins of the European part of
the Second World War stem very
largely from the inability of the
highly nationalistic element in
Germany to accept the fact that
Germany is becoming a decadent
power.
This is not to say that the in
dividual Germans are losing their
vigor; it does mean that Germany
since the end of the First World
War is declining in terms of
power relative to the super-states
of the world, namely, the British
Empire, the Soviet Union, the
United States, and China. Just
as Spain and Sweden have had
their day as first-class powers, so
Germany is ceasing to enjoy the
position it had from 1870 to 1918.
Influence in the world at large
has been passing from Germany
to the United States and the Soviet
Union, and even China with its
great area and man power is po
tentially stronger than Germany.
Population Stationary.
An index to Germany's retro
gression is its virtually station
ary population as compared with
the irresistible fecundity of the
and the 1930's were the manifesta
tions of the two conflicting tend
encies which were thus set at
work.
During the first post-war dec
ade the League of Nations made
promising strides, in spite of the
absence of this country from its
meetings: the relations of France
and Germany became more friend
ly; disarmament conferences be
came the order of the day; and
there was signed the Pact of
Paris renouncing war. These evi
dences that reason had come to
prevail over power would have
been more convincing were it not
for the alliances that came to in
elude much of Europe, the fascist
revolution in Italy, and the grow
ing prominence of Hitler in Ger
man politics.
Confusing Events.
Such events were confusing to
laymen and to statesmen as well
They required positive policies and
decisive action on the part of the
nations which had written the
peace and assumed responsibility
for world order. Instead of re
sponding to this challenge, the
democracies entered the 1930's dis
trought, quibbling among them
selves, and too busy with internal
politics to give heed to the pre
vention of war.
Failed Twice.
They failed, on the one hand, to
develop the possibilities of the
League of Nations and on the
other, to make use of the power
which was theirs. There was vacil
lation everywhere. The Japanese
invaded Manchuria in 1931, Italy
seized Ethiopia in 1935, while
Germany armed herself and set
out on her program of conquest
all over the feeble protests of the
democracies.
Most of the lessons to be learned
from the events of the past 20
years are sufficiently obvious
There are a few, however, which
may need special emphasis.
Peace Settlement Not All.
To state them briefly, enduring
peace cannot be guaranteed by
any settlement, however wise it
may be. Alert statesmanship in
the years to come will be even
more important than the pro
visions of the next treaty of peace,
Aggression can be prevented more
effectively than it can be ar
rested.
The existence of machinery to
prevent aggression has little sig
nificance without the will to ukc
it, and it is the will of the people
that matters, for their opinions
are the necessary basis for all ef
fective political action.
Russians, who incease in . normal
times at the rate of three millions
each year. The los3 of the First
World War produced a terrific
impact on the Geman mind, which
was due in part at least to the
realization during the post-war
period that Germany was sinking
down into the second rank of pow
ers. The pages of Mein Kampf
the mouthpiece of the extreme na
tionalist Germany clearly express
this dawning anxiety.
In the face of this growing
inferiority, several choices lay
before the Germans.
They could accept it grace
fully and live as a first-class
secondary state in good, neigh
borly relations among the circle
of nations, winning esteem for
themselves by their contribu
tions to the scientific, artistic,
literary, economic', and social
sides of civilization.
Or they could hope to escape
the destiny that threatened them
by assuming the leadership in
the voluntary unification of
continental Europe west of the
Soviet Union.
Units An Anachronism.
The states of Europe have been
reluctant to surrender any bit of
their sovereignty, yet it was a
common observation that Euro
peans west of Russia on the eve
of the Second World War were
more inclined than at any previous
time to recognize that the division
of Europe into small political units
was an anachronism.
The progress in creating such
a union under German leadership
would have been slow; Germany
would have had to work patiently
with the methods of negotiation
and mutual consent; and Germany
could never have subordinated the
interests of the separate parts to
those of the Teutonic center. But
such a union might have been the
most durable way in the long run
for Germany to retain its political
importance.
The third course was to make
a desperate effort to build a vast
military machine with which to
conquer the continent.
Provide Base.
A subdued Europe under Ger
man domination would provide a
base for gaining the Eurasian
heartland, then the world island
of Europe, Asia, and Africa, and
finally the world. So the geo
politcal dream went, and as we
know this course was chosen by
the Nazis. The long tradition of
Prussian militarism and the Ger
man cult of the state as power
dictated the selection
The Nazis accordingly set to
work to create what they consid
ered the most favorable conditions
possible for achieving their end.
With methodical zeal they endeav
ored to prevent the mistakes which
they considered Germany had
made in the First World War. A
new, streamlined version of the
army-state was evolved with elec
trifying swiftness. And any op
position at home to this state and
its policies was ruthlessly crushed.
Launch Program.
Having laid the foundations of
the Nazi new order in Germany,
Hitler launched his program of
aggression. He proceeded with a
masterly tactic of gradualism, of
the limited objective for the time
being, in order not to arouse gen
eral apprehension nd the formation
of a coalition opposing Germany.
He could confidently expect that
his diplomacy of aggression based
on Germany's big battalions would
encounter for some time nothing
more than resistance short of war.
Such was the lesson the Japanf.se
had taught him when they invaded
Manchuria to defy the League of
Nations with impunity. The Ital
ian conquest of Ethiopia re-enforced
the point.
Astute enough to guage ac
curately the non-resisting temper
of the powers, Hitler tore up
Versailles and Locarno. He sent
a German army marching into the
Rhineland, and the building of the
West Wall commenced at once.
(See Decline, page 6.)