

# Background Digest

## 'UN War and Postwar Program'

### ... According to 'Mein Kampf'

BY PROF. GLEN GRAY,  
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A calendar of the German war shows that since March, 1938, when Hitler first led Germany outside her boundaries, he has engaged in five complete annual campaigns and the preliminary portions of the sixth.

These can be divided into 27 distinct military operations of major importance. Of these two have never passed beyond the planning and preliminary moves (IVCI and VCI). In four the threat alone of force was enough to procure victory (IA and B, IIA, IIC3). The last of these was in 1940.

In six the use of force has procured a satisfactory victory (IIB: IIA, BI, B2; IVA; VAI). Only two of these, however, have been since July 1940 and but one since June 1941. These were both preliminary offensives. In other words the last time that Hitler attained a primary objective reasonably completely, by either the threat or use of force, was in the Battle of France.

#### Campaigns Futile.

In five great victories none of the objectives have been gained (IIC2, IVA2, VA2, IVB, VBI). All these are African or Russian and none of the African was a primary campaign of its year. The two partial successes in Russia prevented planned terminal campaigns.

In two cases no success whatever was gained (IIC1, VB2). Both of these were against the British; the first from its importance would rank as primary in other years while the second engaged a few men that only its timing and objective justify a primary rank. One is unfinished (VIA1) and the remaining seven have been defensive battles.

In no unquestionable primary campaign has Hitler failed to win great success, in none has he been on the defensive. Yet the calendar shows such decreasing German success and increasing allied power that either complete failure or the defensive in a primary campaign seem probable when this calendar is next extended.

#### LESSONS OF THE GERMAN WAR.

The real lessons are secrets of general staffs and state departments; these are conclusions of an amateur. Military weakness, even when accompanied by scrupulously correct conduct is fatal (Denmark, Holland, Greece). At least nine countries were attacked some hours before any formal announcement of hostilities (Poland, Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Greece, Russia, United States). Only two of these (Denmark, Norway) had not been foreseen by press and radio.

In six cases military precautions had been taken against attack but in only one instance (Italy vs. Greece) did the attacker fail to win an important victory by the surprise. Panic stricken civilians contribute to defeat (Flanders, France), while civilians willing to give even their

lives render invaluable aid (Britain, Russia).

Equality in men, and equipment, is not enough; quality of men and leadership (IVAI) or skill (VA3) can defeat superior numbers and equipment.

#### Superior Air Power.

There has been only one victory by inferior air power (VA3) and there air power prevented complete victory. The skill required in air defense or air attack upon territory is elementary when compared with the skill necessary for cooperation with ground forces.

Tank superiority alone is not enough (IVA2 a possible exception). No victory has been gained with inferiority in tanks. Tanks have a unique value in the exploitation of victory.

The most heavily fortified lines are not enough (The Mannerheim, K-W, Maginot, Metaxas, and Stalin lines all failed). Rivers, mountains and even the sea (Crete, North Africa) have failed.

The most effective defense works have been land mines and towns. Both in Africa and Russia artillery has gained steadily in importance.

Defeat no longer means a slice of territory and an indemnity. Defeat at the hands of Hitler means that the very life blood in property and person alike is sucked away (Poland, France, etc.). Given out a single further German victory yet the balance of peoples in Europe has already been changed in Germany's favor for generations.

The only conclusion I can see is that in a world of power politics and totalitarian states the only way to be safe is to be big, have a tough civilian population, possess at least equality in men, in tanks, in planes, in artillery, and in skill in the use of them. It is better to be superior in some of these.

### Most Homemakers In College Come From Small Towns

STATE COLLEGE, Pa. (ACP). More co-ed "homemakers" come from small towns than from big cities, according to a three-year survey of home economics freshmen of Pennsylvania State college.

Nearly 57 percent of the women students taking home economics courses came from communities ranging in population from 2,500 to 10,000, while less than 8 percent hailed from rural towns that numbered under 2,500 persons.

### CALENDAR OF THE WAR

#### THE GERMAN WAR

- I Campaign of 1938
  - A. Preliminary—Occupation of Austria (March)
  - B. Primary—Occupation of Sudetenland (Sept.-Oct.)—Munich
- II Campaign of 1939
  - A. Preliminary—Occupation of Czechoslovakia (March)
  - B. Primary—Battle of Poland (Sept. 1-27)
- III Campaign of 1940
  - A. Preliminary—Battle of Norway (April 9-May 2)
  - B. Primary—
    1. Battle of Flanders (May 10-June 4)
    2. Battle of France (June 5-22)
  - C. Terminal—
    1. Battle of Britain (Aug. 8-Oct. 5)
    2. 1st African Campaign (Aug. 4-Sept. 18) Graziana
    3. Occupation of S. E. Europe (Oct.-Feb.) Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria
- IV Campaign of 1941
  - A. Preliminary—
    1. 2nd African Campaign (Dec. 9-Feb. 3) Wavell
    2. 3rd African Campaign (Mar. 24-April 18), 1st Rommel
    3. Battle of the Balkans (April 6-June 1)
  - B. Primary—1st Battle of Russia
  - C. Terminal—
    1. Spain and North Africa (planned but not attempted)
    2. 1st Russian Winter Offensive (Nov. 20-Mar. 5)
    3. 4th African Campaign (Nov. 18-Jan. 16) Auchinleck
- V Campaign of 1942
  - A. Preliminary—
    1. Clearing of the Crimea (May 8-July 1) Sevastopol
    2. 5th African Campaign (Jan. 22-July 7) 3rd and 4th Rommel
    3. Russian Counter Offensive (May 12-30)
  - B. Primary—
    1. 2nd Battle of Russia (June 10-Nov. 19) Stalingrad, Caucasus
    2. 6th African Campaign (Aug. 30-Sept. 6) 3rd Battle of El Alamein
  - C. Terminal—
    1. Siege of Moscow (planned but not attempted)
    2. 2nd Russian Winter Campaign (Nov. 19-Apr. 2)
    3. 7th African Campaign
      - A. Libya (Oct. 23-Jan. 23) 2nd Montgomery
      - B. North Africa (Nov. 7-Dec. 6)
- VI Campaign of 1943
  - A. Preliminary—
    1. Donets Counter Offensive (March 5—?)
    2. Battle of Tunis (March 20—?)

#### THE PACIFIC WAR

- I Campaign of 1932-2 Conquest of Manchuria (Sept.-Mar.)
- II Campaign of 1933 Jehol and North China (Feb.-May)
- III Campaign of 1935-6 Inner Mongolia and North China (Jan. '35-Aug. '36)
- IV Campaign of 1937 Peking and Nanking (July-Dec.)
- V Campaign of 1938 Hankow and Canton (July-Oct.)
- VI Campaign of 1939 Mongolia and Hainan (Feb.-July)
- VII Campaign of 1941-2 Southwestern Pacific—
  - A. Preliminary—
    1. Occupation of South Indo China (July)
    2. Neutralization of U. S. Pacific fleet and Philippine air force (Dec. 7-8)
  - B. Primary—
    1. Continental Campaign (Dec. 7-May 15) Malaya and Burma
    2. Island Campaign (Dec. 8-May 10) Philippines, East India
    3. Northern Pacific Campaign (June 3-7) Battle of Midway
  - C. Terminal—
    1. Papuan Offensive (July 21-Sept. 20) Buna
    2. Allied Counter-offensive
      1. Papua (Sept. 26-Jan. 22)
      2. Solomons (Aug. 7-Feb. 9) Guadalcanal

### Pacific War . . .

## Jap Attack Shows Sea, Air Power

Analysis of the Pacific war, as well as comparison of it with the German war, already shows several interesting things. Pearl Harbor was the ninth time since 1939 a country had been attacked without formal warning. A sudden Japanese attack upon the United States was a surprise to no one, but the authorities at Pearl Harbor did not expect it there.

While the German war has been primarily land power plus air power the Pacific war has been sea power plus air power. Both Europe and the Pacific show that Mahan's analysis of sea power is still sound, but that sea power must incorporate the carrier-based plane as earlier it did the torpedo and that the land based plane is a new form of coastal artillery of vastly greater range. That range may soon interlock the continental masses but it hasn't yet.

#### Sea Power Bows to Air.

Both Europe and the Pacific show (battles of Britain, Coral sea and Midway) that sea borne invasion against hostile air power fails. If so the island campaign could have been stopped in the Philippines as well as East Indies by effectively used air power.

While Germany prefers to begin a campaign in the spring Japan prefers the fall, yet the two Japanese attacks upon Russia began in the summer. Japan thus far has taken advantage of opportunities created by Germany rather than cooperated with her. Cooperation seems indispensable now, but there is no evidence of an axis Casablanca conference.

### Small Business Man Is Forgotten Man Says Prof

LOS ANGELES, Calif. (ACP). The Forgotten Man was different kind of hero than is commonly supposed, has less glamour, but should rate with the immortals, maintains Dr. Frederic P. Woellner, professor of education at the University of California.

"The first allusion to 'the forgotten man' is conceded to have been made by Prof. Charles Sumner of Yale in 1871. He applied the term to the quiet, unobtrusive householder, who worked hard, sent his children to school and managed to save a little money for emergencies.

acres more of peanuts, an additional 800,000 acres of sorghum, another 400,000 acres of Irish potatoes.

#### Need Increase.

For lend-lease we will need an increased production of 9 percent in beef, 15 percent in pork, 28 percent more poultry for meat, and 8 percent more eggs.

The farmers are asked to produce this extra food with reduced labor and machinery. It is not impossible of attainment if all of us, including the weatherman, will co-operate wholeheartedly. It is not a problem for the farmers alone, it is the problem of all of us. Surely there will be some way in which all of us can take a part.

The government is asking for a vast increase in the number and production of home gardens. Individually these may not seem important but collectively they will produce tremendous amounts of food. Efforts are now being made to organize all available labor in the rural districts. This will include those of school age.

If this help can be available to help harvest the crop the farmers will be able to increase their production greatly.

## Farm Labor Dearth Threat American Food Production . . . For Hungry World

BY DEAN W. W. BURR,  
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Whether in peace or in war, agriculture's biggest job is to furnish food for the people, but in this war that job has become enormous because so much food is needed. It is much more difficult to attain because of the shortage of labor on the farms and the lack of satisfactory machinery and equipment.

This tremendous increase in food requirements is made necessary by several factors. Certain foods that in peace time are imported in large quantities now must be replaced with homegrown substitutes. We must furnish our allies with vast supplies of food or they cannot continue in the war.

Russia has lost in the Ukraine, Cremita and Caucasus, lands which formerly produced two-thirds of her national food supply. Secretary Wickard is quoted as saying that the defense of Stalingrad was a victory for the Amer-

ican farmer.

#### Men Scattered.

Men of our armed forces are scattered around the world. People of many countries look to our agriculture for food. In attempting to reach these places there is some loss thru submarine sinkings, and this must be replaced. I saw an estimate recently that 1.4 billion people believed themselves eligible to a part of our food supply. Now on top of all the food needs, American agriculture is asked to produce additional crops for non-food purposes such as fiber, drugs, rubber and plastics.

The amount of food that was used in lend-lease this year was set forth in an interesting article in the April issue of the American magazine by Mr. Stettinius. He showed that 18 million pounds of beef were sent, mainly to England, but this was more than offset by the 25 million pounds New Zealand and Australia furnished our soldiers.

For its own use the army

bought last year about 11 percent of our national supply of beef. Lend-lease took approximately 10 percent of the pork production, or about 1.1 billion pounds, enough to fill 55 ships if each carried 10,000 tons. Of lamb and mutton about 0.4 percent was used by lend-lease.

Some four billion pounds of milk products were sent abroad mainly as cheese and evaporated milk. About 17 million pounds of butter, or 1 percent of our supply went to Russia. Lend-lease used about 450 million dozen eggs shipped mainly as dried eggs. Lend-lease took about 6 percent of our 1942 food supply.

For 1943 the government estimates that lend-lease will require about twice as much food as last year. Last year's agricultural production was the highest in history, thanks to the industry of the American farmer and good weather. Yet 1943 goals call for 4 million acres more of corn, 1.3 million



—Courtesy Lincoln Journal.  
DEAN W. W. BURR.