The Conservative *
THE NEW PANAMA CANAL.
The delays and risks experienced in
bringing the "Oregon" eastward from
the Pacific Coast , at the outbreak of the
war with Spain , have drawn the atten
tion of the whole country to the im
portance of an early construction of a
ship-canal across the isthmus now ob
structing free communication between
our Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The
route by Capo Horn is entirely too long
to meet present demands , either com
mercial or military.
But , while canal is so urgently de
manded , it is equally true that it should
bo , in respect to facilities of transit ,
security of operation , and cost and time
of construction , the best canal possible.
The work will be a gigantic engineering
feat ; and'no mistake in selecting the
route should be made at the outset.
Unfortunately , the American public
lias been led to believe , by the collapse
of the old sea-level project at Panama ,
that there is only one really practicable
route for a canal ; viz. , that by Nicara
gua. The elaborate investigations
which have been in progress at Panama
during the past eight years are little
Known or appreciated in America ; nav-
iug been conducted quietly ( especially
during the last four years ) by the new
company , with a view to determine the
best and most economical solution of
the problem before making public the
information obtained.
The writer , being a member of the
ComitS Technique , invited to assist the
now Panama Canal Company in direct
ing its investigations and forming its
conclusions , has had exceptional ad
vantages for understanding the subject
in its present aspects. The Comite" is
international in composition , and in
cludes French , English , German , Rus
sian , and American engineers among
them the chief engineers of the Man
chester and Kiel maritime canals. It
may bo added that , in this respect , it
reflects the view of the Company that
the work should be broadly interna
tional in character , a benefit to the
whole world , and not simply a French
construction. Last spring the writer
visited the Isthmus of Panama with
other engineers , and personally exam
ined the route in detail. He has had
for many months free access to the
elaborate records of surveys , borings ,
experimental excavations , river gaug-
ings , and researches of every Jdnd con
ducted by the Company , and is there
fore qualified to present the subject in
its true aspects , which may be found to
differ widely from the popular impres
sions now existing in America.
When the idea of constructing a sea-
level canal at Panama was definitely
abandoned , there remained three im
portant difficulties to consider : (1) ( ) The
regulation of the water-supply , and
control of the floods of the Chagres
River ; (2) ( ) the serious caving which had
occurred at the Cnlebra ; and (8) ) the ill
effects of the climate upon the health of
the employees. The present conclu
sions as to each will be given in turn.
(1) ( ) The studies of the region of the
Chagres have been most elaborate ; in
cluding wator-levels , automatically re
corded since 1888 ; frequent measure
ments of the discharge at crucial points ;
the collection and discussion of data
respecting all the historical floods ( five
in number , of which one was carefully
measured ) ; rain records at points well
distributed along the route of the Canal ,
aggregating fifteen years on the Atlantic
Coast , thirteen years on the Pacific
Coast , and thirty-two years in the inter
ior ; and , finally , a collation of all this
"
.
material , and the elaboration of pro
jects perfectly providing for controlling
the floods , for the supply of the summit-
level with water during the dry season
( January , February , March , and April ) ,
and for ample hydraulic power at the
dams , transmitted by electricity , for
operating the locks and lighting the
Canal at night. It may safely be
affirmed that the Chagres River is no
longer an element of danger , but is
rather a useful friend whose assistance
will be of great value to the Canal iu its
operation.
(2) ( ) The question of caving in the deep
central out has been studied in the most
thorough manner ; involving not only
many borings and pits to determine the
material to be encountered , but also a
tunnel excavated throughout the
troublesome region along the axis of the
Canal , having a projected width at bottom
tom of 82 % feet , with slopes of about
45 degrees , and a projected elevation
above sea-level varying from 128 feet to
157 > feet. This work , together with a
tunnel 689"feet long and 9 % feet wide ,
pierced , at an elevation of 184 feet
above sea-level , at the spot which had
triven the most ! trouble on the whole
route , combined with the evidence
afforded by the borings and pits at
greater depth , leads to the ooi/viotion
that , at Cnlebra , where the deepest
cutting is required , the excavation has
already passed through the strata sub
ject to caving , and that the remainder
traverses an indurated argillaceous
schist , changing to compact rock , where
no fears of yielding to pressure need be
entertained. At Emperador , where the
cutting required for the Canal is much
less , the indications are similar , except
that the material at present reached is
less resisting ; but with proper precau
tions in the way of drainage , which
were wholly neglected by the contract
ors of the old company , little or no
difficulty from serious caving need be
apprehended. This work of experi
mental excavation has been continued
for more than three years ; involving
the removal of about 8,924,000 cubic
yards. It was projected , partly to de
termine the proper inclination for the
side slopes , and partly to estimate the
unit cost. The results are highly satis
factory ; and the old bugbear of a slid
ing mountain divide has been proved to
be imaginary.
(8) ( ) The health of the personnel
formerly caused trouble ; coolies and
other races not well suited to hard labor
under a tropical sun being employed.
With negroes from the British Antilles ,
little difficulty is now experienced.
This matter was carefully investigated
during the investigation last spring ;
American engineers and employees on
the Canal and on the Panama Railroad
being questioned , the fine hospital near
Panama where the Company provides
for its sick being visited , and the views
of the medical officers and of the Sisters
of Charity , acting as nurses , being ob
tained. All agieed that the dangers
resulting from the climate have been
much exaggerated. The surgeon in
charge of the hospital , Dr. Laoroisade ,
who has resided on the Isthmus since
1887 , after presenting full statistics
covering the sick-reports for the past
year of a force of about 8,800 agents and
laborers under employment , said :
"Among the diseases attributable to
the climate the most numerous are
simple marsh fevers , which have not
occasioned a single death. Two dis
eases only belonging to the epidemic
type have appeared the beriberi , of
which there is no longer any question
( it was imported with negro laborers
brought from Africa as an experiment ,
and disappeared when they were sent
back ) , and yellow fever. The latter ,
after having been absent from the
Isthmus for at least six years , was im
ported in 1897 , and continued about six
months , from March to August , when it
again disappeared after very light rav
ages ( only six deaths ) . Thus it cannot
be considered that this pest is really \
epidemic on the Isthmus. From the
other infectious epidemics , such as
variola , typhoid fever , diphtheria , etc. ,
the Isthmus appears to be almost en
tirely exempt. From the foregoing we
may conclude that life on the Isthmus
.scarcely incurs more dangers than elsewhere -
whore , even for Europeans , who , after
the blacks of the British Autillesappear I
to resist the climate best. Residence
here , then , offers nothing alarming ,
were it not for a constant feeling of
fatigue and uneasiness , due to a tem
perature always high , and an atmos
phere saturated with moisture. "
There appears , therefore , to bo no
danger of serious mortality in the con
struction of the Canal , if due care be
f-n.lrnn fn linnfifit1w nnaf. nvnnrirmr n in
selecting the laborers.
The three old spectres barring the
route being thiis laid at rest , it remains
to consider the present project for the
Canal. This has been most carefully
elaborated. No less than sixteen pro
jects ( not including the older proposals )
have been worked out in detail , includ
ing estimates of cost and of the time
needed for construction.
The entire length of the Canal is 4(5 (
miles , of which about 15 miles on the
Atlantic side and 7 } miles on the
Pacific side , or about'one-half of the
whole distance , will be at sea-level. ft
Of this distance 18 miles , or about two-
fifths of the entire route , is today es
sentially completed , so that at a mod- i ) j
erate outlay for dredging it will bo
made at once serviceable. We have ,
therefore , only to consider the 28J
miles between Bohio , on the Atlantic
side , and Miraflores , on that of the
Pacific. Two excellent harbors , which \
will demand no outlay for protection , J
are available ; and the Panama Rail
road skirts the Canal throughout its
entire route to be availed of in con
struction. Ample quarters , in fair con
dition , for the increased force of labor
ers are already prepared at many sites.
These advantages are immense whore
time is of so much importance.
There is another advantage , iu my
judgment scarcely less valuable. By
careful technical studies , the Company
has succeeded in provisionally adjust
ing the project so that a choice between
the best three different summit-levels
may be reserved , to be decided by actual
experience in conducting the work upon
a grand scale. These projects are
designated as "Level 96 % feet , " "Level
69 feet , " "Level 82 % feet" ; the figures
indicating the elevation in feet of the
bottom of the Canal at its highest level ,
above mean tide , which is found at "Vjj
practically the same absolute level in '
both oceans , although the tidal range at '
Colon is only a few inches , while at
Naos it may at times reach 20 feet. A
comparison of the estimated cost of con- j :
struction , properly so-called , has established - ?
lished that , as between larger excava- j
tion , on the one hand , and more locks '
and higher dams , etc. , on the other , rd
there will be nearly a balance of ex- \fi
penditure. The cost of either of the
plans is estimated at about $100,000,000.
It is not the same , however , when the
element of time is considered. This
time will vary with the amount of ex-
