* ' * * * * - jft 44 * * . * * * * " 'jptf * * , -JfiMV 't jj * " tt * * 1 3 | |
< v fe * , ' 's iT'- | S'-iTw3
Conservative * 11 ' "v " ' " " " 1
centralization of authority : And in
the majority of instances those persons
who are afraid of a' . government by a
strong man have avoided the difficulty
by making a great "inany elective
offices , thereby [ in effect putting the
people themselves in a position to pass
upon the various details of govern-
meut. Fortunately our states have no
foreign policies and can have no policies -
cies with each other save those provided -
vided in the federal constitution.
Tlierefore , a weak and temporizing
form of state government does not do as
much harm as it might legitimately
be expected to do , and , as , it certainly
would do if applied to any state hav
ing international re
lations. The result
is to punish only the
people of each state
for the sins of gov
ernment permitted
by that state.
The practical ex
perience of the
w o r 1 d has shown
tliat that govern-
lf ! * m e n t is soundest
Is , ' which chooses its
rulers most carefully
' and then expects
*
I' ' ' them to rule.
l Under the present
, i disjointed system in
V the several states ,
i there is a general
, V rule that officers arc
{ > ' r elected wherein an
' , excuse can be found
) > for an election , and
' , ' that the appointive
\t \ office is rare andcom-
' ; paratively unimport-
J ant. This is cs-
' " pecially true of offices -
? ' . fices created by a
' _ constitutional ct ) n -
, - vention. Legislatures -
( | ures in creating of-
< % ,1- , fices quite frequently
t | * > / create appointive ot'-
F"- ' " fices. But a cons -
s . ' stitutional convention -
§ "
tion seems to bo con-
f * ; , stitutioually opposed
j ? x to , p u 11 i n g a n y
power into the hands of a governor or
other chief official which may , by
any ingenuity , be vested elsewhere.
As a result , in most of the states of
the union , frequent elections are held
at which are chosen a governor , a sec
retary of state , an auditor of public
accounts , a state treasurer and state
superintendent'of schools , a sheriff for
each of the several counties , a coroner
for each of the several counties , a
superintendent 'of schools and a raft
of county officials for each county in
the state- with a perfect swarm of
elected officers for each city or town
in the state. In addition to these
officers the public , charitable and
penal institutions , and institutions of
learning , are administered by various
boards , some elected and some ap
pointed. The result is a system of
government which for complexity is
the most baffling device the human
mind can conceive. Let us assume
that such a state is governed under a
constitution based upon the lines of
the federal constitution. There would
then be elected a governor and a legis
lature , and in the several towns and
cities a mayor and a city council. The
desire of the people of the several
counties of the state for local self-
government , by which is meant , not
the choice of a local man for office ,
but the choice of a man who will
respond to local influences , is simply a
method for holding within the hands
of the people of each county the power
of saying whether they shall be ob
servers of the law in its entirety or
not.
Federal Division of Labor.
s
Under the federal -constitution the
several functions of government are
exercised each under a cabinet official ;
thus all the vast machinery of the
courts , marshal and district attorneys
of the federal government is managed
and controlledlbythe ] [ dcpartmentjof
justice , at the head of which is the
attorney general. If we had a like
system in the state , an attorney gener
al , instead of being elected , would be
appointed by the governor , and there
would bo appointed subordinate to
him a state's attorney or county pros
ecutor for each county in the state.
The prosecution of criminals and the
administration of justice would there
by bu entirely removed from local in
fluence , and the administration of
the office depend entirely upon the
law and not upon local sentiment. So ,
also , the various sheriffs throughout
the counties would'be appointed , and
Ui.- : ' ! i
1
EDWIN A. MUNGEK.
would be subject to
the same authority ,
thus making the
preservation of the
pxiblic peace a matter -
tor not to be affected
by the question of
whether the next
election would be
a close one or not ,
or by the question
of whether an avoid
ance of Anty would
bring more votes
than its perform
ance. So also in the
matter of auditing
public accoitnts , the
examination of cor
porations , the school
system and charita
ble and penal insti
tutions , all would be
administered a t a
comparatively slight
expense and with a
certainty of i m -
proved results if
managed in proper
departments , under
responsible , experi-
e n c e d heads ap
pointed by an d
responsible to the
governor , who , i n
turn would be re
sponsible to the pee
ple.
Americans are no
ticeably conservative
in the mater of changes in the
basic forms of local government and
for this reason , among others , the er
rors of the first state governments
which wore made for country com
munities , live with us though their
faults are increasingly more prominent
in all our 20th century activity than
ever before. The present systems of
state and local governments are a bur 1
den to the people who sustain them.
It admits of no doubt that this burden S !
will bo greatly lessened if not made imperceptible - .
perceptible by following not some newer
or original scheme of government , but
by applying those principles of poli-