&
I
Cbe Conservative * &
DESIRED CHANGES IN MUNICIPAL
GOVERNMENT.
It is not the province of this article to
deal with every change that might be
beneficial in the government of cities ,
but only with those desirable changes
which are susceptible of ready and prac
tical application without attempting any
startling revolution either in methods or
ideals.
Municipal Government Defective.
All students of the subject are agreed
that the government of our great cities
is the defective point in American
national life and that the evils of the
present and dangers of the future , alike ,
will find their opportunity for growth in
the of citizenship
large masses ill-governed
ship , congregated in our large cities.
The fact that a general system of
government , for all other communities ,
the most nearly perfect of human govern
ments , should fail of success when ap
plied to the conditions of city life , urges
an examination of social and political
conditions making such apparently con
tradictory results possible.
In making this examination the ob
server will be immediately struck by the
fact , that there is in city life a lack of
personal acquaintance among neighbors
and a want of that sense of mutual inter
dependence , which , in a small com
munity , exercises such a salutary re
straining influence upon the passions
and greed of men , and by which the
weight of public opinion is given im
mediate effect.
It is also a feature , constantly to be
reckoned with , that the vicious and
criminal naturally hive together in our
great cities , where every condition tends
toward the indulgence of their propen
sities and where detection is difficult
and concealment or flight extremely
easy. Their vote is compact , always
ready , and always deliverable against
good government.
The country official knows the men
with whom he deals. The city official
necessarily comes into actual contact
with very few of the citizens. It is
only the citizen with private interests to
serve , who makes it his business to keep
in touch with the official after election.
Caucus Nomination.
Perhaps the most striking features of
city politics is in the methods of nomi
nation. In theory , these methods may
be exactly like those of a country con
vention , in practice they are widely dif
ferent from it.
In a city convention the actual nomi
nations are invariably made in the cau
cus of party leaders , before the conven
tion is called to order. These nomina
tions are then ratified by what is known
as a working majority of the delegates ,
few of whom could tell , thirty min
utes after adjournment , for whom they
had voted.
"
The caucus is made up of the leaders
from the various wards who are able to
"deliver , " i. o. : to cast , without
question , the entire vote represented by
his delegation.
Should the delegation represented by
uoh leader contain one or more men
who insist upon thinking and voting for
hemselves , the ward leader is disgraced
jecause he has failed to have a "solid"
delegation. The several ward leaders ,
with their delegations , are held together
by the understanding that each of them
will be given some desired nomination
or appointment. This _ nomination is
> aid to belong to such delegation , and
; he remainder of the caucus or conven-
ion never consider the fitness of the in
dividual , but only that the delegation is
entitled to such nomination and have
signified their choice and that the nomi
nee will probably prove a vote getter.
The choice is , of course , the choice of
; he ward leader or ward boss.
The choice of the voter is in practice
confined to one of two men , each nomi
nated by one of the two great parties
under the above conditions. Such an
official , when elected , owes nothing to
those who elected him and all to those
who nominated him , and he discharges
his obligations along these lines.
Municipal Partisanship.
We have in our cities , as in the state
and nation , government by parties , but
these parties , being exclusively aligned
along national and international issues ,
their principles have nothing in common
with the problems of municipal govern
ment.
The struggle between the parties for
the control of municipal office is the
means whereby party organization is
preserved , in yenrs when national issues
are not in question. This will not be
changed under a convention system ,
since neither party can afford to ignore
local offices as a means of maintaining
its party organization.
The great majority of voters will ,
doubtless , continue to follow one of the
two dominant parties. The independent
vote can never hope to do more , than
hold the balance of power , and this
balance of power can not be wielded in
the cause of good city government , un
less one candidate chances to be much
superior to the other , and even in this
event the successful candidate will
always owe more to the powers that
nominate , than to the powers that elect.
Too Many Elective Positions.
One of the most serious obstacles to
good nominations , and even with good
nominations , to a successful administra
tion , is the choice of too great a number
of officials by the ballot.
It has already been shown that the
solidarity of a convention majority is
assured through the process of trading
delegations and swapping nominations.
Every additional candidate to be nomi
nated increases the trading power of the
elegation malinger. This , in itself , is
serious menace to good government.
There is , however , another and more
iorions result flowing from the election
f ninny officials.
In theory , our government , national ,
tate and municipal , is divided into the
: hreo co-ordinate branches , usually
designated as the legislative , the execu-
ivo and the judicial. These three co
ordinate branches , acting each within
; ho scope of its constitutional power ,
lave made the system of national
government in America the wonder and
admiration of the world. Evoiy servant
or officer of the United States , except
the executive and the congress , is ap
pointed , and is a subordinate of one or
the other of these three branches. The
slection of sucli servants and officers
would work unending confusion and
inefficiency , and this , because each man
tlected to minor office is himself a petty
sxecutive , owing no duty to nny superior
officer and bringing neither credit nor
discredit upon the head of the govern
ment by the manner of discharging his
duty. The people rarely examine care
fully the doings of a minor , elected
official during his term of office , and he
does , in the main , practically as ho
pleases. The true theory of government
in city life is , as before stated , precisely
the same as that of our national govern
ment , and the result of violations of
this theory , by choosing numerous elect
ive officers , i8 quite that to be expected.
A city attorney , nominated by the trad
ing system , owing many political , and ,
frequently , financial debts , proceeds to
run his office in such manner ns to
bring the best results to himself. He
has no superior officer and is constantly
tempted to subvert the interest of his
client , the municipality , to his own.
This is equally time of a city clerk and
city treasurer , or any other official
chosen in the same manner. Even if it
be conceded that the mayor will bo as
bad ns his fellow officials , it is better to
have one man's dishonesty or weakness
to deal with , than that of three or six.
There can be no better reason for elect
ing these officials , than there would be
for electing a fire marshal or chief of
police , or even the rank and file of the
fire and police departments. Where
large masses of citizens are to put their
health , their property and their lives
into the hands of men whom they can
not know personally , the number to be
held responsible should be as limited
as possible and the responsibility clearly
fixed upon one individual , who can be
made to give a good administration or to
get out.
A Practical Civil Service Law.
Given then a mayor with the fullest
possible powers over the entire executive
department , subject to impeachment in
the first instance before the supreme
court of the state , for failure to perform
his duty , and to immediate removal if
vm.