. ? * % , < " /
10 The Conservative.
TYPICAL PROTECTION VICTORY.
A Letter from One of the Largest Manu
facturers and Exporters of Agri
cultural Machinery.
Of nil the "triumphs"over realized by
the great "American principle of pro
tection to homo industries , " none was
over more thoroughly characteristic ,
moro aptly illustrative of the natural
working of the principle itself , than the
splendid triumph just scored in calling
out the Russian retaliatory edict. It
will not bo claimed as such , by the Pro
tectionists , themselves. Arrogautevery-
whcro else , these partisans are modest
enough , where the really typical results
of their system are concerned. The pub
lic blessing , in which they glory , is
almost , always , something that they
.have striven to prevent , and not quite
succeeded ; while the result that flows
directly from their labors that con
tains in itself , as any genuine effect
does , the true essence of the cause
they prefer to pass over in silence.
Hence , the need of proving a proposition ,
that ought to be known intuitively ;
that this edict of the Russian govern
ment , is an altogether natural outcome
of the protective policy in America.
Russia.
It appears that commerce between
this country and Russia has been regu
lated by a treaty , now nearly seventy
years old , binding each power to give
the other all the rights allowed "the
most .favored nation ; " that that empire
has tinder that treaty admitted goods
from the United States at the same re
duced rates granted to Germany , and
other powers , through reciprocity trea
ties ; that , in so doing , it exceeded the
requirements of the "most favored na
tion "provision .which has been again and
again declared to be no bar to special
tariffs iii reciprocity arrangements with
other countries ; that Russia has fallen
in with the prevailing European custom
of encouraging exportations of beet-
sugar , by collecting a lower internal
revenue tax on the exported article ,
than on that sold at home ; that this
lower'tax is denounced by the sugar in
terest in this country , as an indirect
bounty on export , and , therefore , punish
able under the Dingley law , by an equal
countervailing import tax , when such
sugar enters our territory ; that Secre
tary Gage has , after considerable hesita
tion , sustained this view , and ordered a
levy of the countervailing tax on im
ported Russian sugar ; that the Tsar's
government , viewing this as a harsh
construction of law , declined any longer
to extend to this country the excep
tionally lenient application of their own
tariff , some of whose benefits , wo had
enjoyed since 1882 ; that , in consequence ,
our exports will have to pay some 80
per cent more to enter Russia , than they
have been paying , or than those from
Germany now pay ; that since the ex
ports , chiefly affected by this change ,
are machinery and other manufactures ,
the consequent loss of trade with Rus
sia , weighs especially on the producers
of such wares here ; and that the whole
sequence , from the countervailing duty ,
prescribed in the Diugley law , to the
general cancelling of Russian orders
from American manufacturers , today ,
shows as regular and unmistakable a
relation of cause and effect , as is often
seen in human transactions.
There is no reason , probably , for
blaming the instrumentalities through
which each effect flowed from its
cause , as though any other course could
have been expected of them. It could
hardly have been supposed that our
Russian customers would continue to
treat our products with special favor ,
after we had shown a special disfavor to
an important product of theirs , even if
the distinct warning that retaliation
would follow , had never come to us.
Nor , do I find the slightest fault with
Secretary Gage , for deciding as he did.
Though I was one of those who hoped ,
till the last , that he would see his way
clear to decide otherwise , and though I
am , even now , interested in the endea
vor to reverse his decision in the courts ,
I do not doubt , for an instant , that he
has given us his candid interpretation of
the law , and decrees the countervailing
duty , only because he believes that the
Dingley tariff imperatively requires it.
Cheap Sugar.
On its own merits , apart from any
construction of the law , the question
whether the industries of this country
were encouraged or discouraged , by the
freer trade we haveuntil now , had with
Russia , is so one-sided that it is super
fluous to argue it. Until the fiscal year
1896 97,1 find no record of any impor
tation , whatever , of sugar from Russia.
The four years that have since elapsed ,
show , in thousands of dollars' worth ,
the figures , 15 , 0 , 841 , and 22. As our
sugar import from all countries reached ,
last year , a total of $100,000,000 , it will
easily be seen , how insignificant the
part taken by that empire , since the
largest proportion for one year , that in
1898 99 , was but 86 hundredths of 1
per cent of the total. Our exports to Rus
sia , during the same fiscal year , amount
ed to $10,000,000 worth , more than one-
third of which were iron and steel , and
their manufactures , which thus alone ,
had a value ten times exceeding that of
the sugar imports of that exceptional
year. It is quite unnecessary to discuss
the advisability or iuadvisability of leg
islation , whose object is to punish other
countries for furnishing us sugar
cheaply , and to prevent our citizens
from profiting by such endeavors on
their part. Let us grant that cheap
foreign sugar is a calamity to us ; yet ,
still , it may be asked , "Is it so impor
tant to make a few thousand' dollars'
worth at most $841,000 a year cost
our citizen a little 'more , that wo are
justified in sacrificing a rapid growing
trade of $8,500,000 in iron and steel
manufactures , and risking twice as
much more trade in other articles ? "
Practically , I must confess , it seems
to be regarded as a mistake to discuss a
question involving protective duties ,
from the point of view of the average
citizen , directly interested , only as a
consumer , and almost as great a mistake ,
even , to take the point of view of the
manufacturer , when his interests lie in
the direction of open markets for export
trade. Such interests are regarded as
the natural prey of the producer , who
depends for his profits , not on a foreign
market , but on having the home market
exploited for his benefit ; and , appar
ently , he alone , is entitled to a hearing ,
for the "system" governing the allow
ance of protective duties is to give to
those who may make trouble , if not
supplied. The richer and more power
ful they are , therefore , and the closer
their combination , the stronger is their
claim to protection. It might be
thought , to be sure , from the connection
found or invented , between this system
and the employment of labor , that the
production of exportable manufactures
could make out as strong a case for an
open market abroad , as can the sugar
refining business for legislation , inevit
ably provoking a closing of that market ;
but that , it appears , is not the true
view. .The sugar trust has again and
again shown its power to come out on
top , when a tariff adjustment is under
taken. The whole character of the
Wilson bill was changed because it had
to be conciliated ; its claims were care
fully conceded on every point in the
Dingley bill , the .reciprocity arrange
ments , by which the rigors of that bill
were to have been softened , have been
defeated by the same agency , and all
possibilities , in future tariffs , have to
be judged , it seems , by discovering
whether , or not , the interests of this
trust are advanced. The sacrifice
of millions of dollars' worth of trade in
machinery must be accepted philosophi
cally , as one of the necessities of the
situation , if it comes in the way of a
few thousand dollars' worth of the
trust's monopoly.
Evils of "Protection. "
It has been the custom , among super
ficial or partial writers and speakers , to
treat the favor shown to the sugar
refining monopoly , by our tariff laws , as
if it were some sort of surprising excep
tion to their normal workings , an abuse
of a system generally beneficent. In
truth , however , nothing is more normal ,
more altogether characteristic of pro
tection , than this very favoritism. With
whatever object a protective policy is
first adopted , its application inevitably
falls sooner or later into the hands of
