The Conservative (Nebraska City, Neb.) 1898-1902, November 01, 1900, Page 9, Image 9

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    I
'Cbe Conservative. 9
started au evolution in competition and
cooperation which is still in progress.
The manufacturer saw the change in
conditions ; saw he could no longer
monopolize the territory which he had
considered his own ; saw he could pro
duce more cheaply on a large scale
with improved machinery , and that the
cheaper transportation would enable
him to invade territory from which he
had hitherto been barred , as well as per
mit the invasion of his own. The field
appeared unlimited , and , with little
knowledge of the consuming capacity
of the people and the productive capa
city of his rivals he rttsheddnto it. He
knew but few of his customers person
ally , and expected no mercy from stran
gers and gave as little as he expected to
receive. He feared attack , therefore
he hastened to attack himself.
What one did others did , and thus
the human feeling in business was
steadily weakened. The merchant , af
fected by much the same conditions ,
followed the example of the manufac
turer.
The consumer who had hitkerto
bought his supplies from his friend
around the corner found he could buy
cheaper at some big store many corners
distant. Rapid transit enabled him to
do so with but little inconvenience and
expense. Thus he began to buy of
strangers for wkose welfare he had no
regard.
Excessive Competition.
Under these changed conditions com
petition became excessive. An increas
ed cooperation only intensified its sharp
ness. The advantages of doing busi
ness on a large scale were now under
stood. Accordingly , to get these ad
vantages , there was more and more
co-operation of men with small means
( whose capital separated would not
have enabled them to do business ) ;
hence the formation of great corpora
tions. Hence , because of them , a fur
ther weakening of the human feeling.
The householder who left the corner
shop to buy of John Smith's great es
tablishment did not perhaps know
Smith , but there was the chance that
he might know him and even become
his personal friend , whom he might
favor and who might favor him. But
when John Smith co-operated with a
dozen , or a score , or a hundred other
men , and became the Smith Mercantile
company , there was on end to any pos
sible sentiment. Friendship with a
corporation was ridiculous. The com
mon adjective used with corporations
expresses the popular feeling ; they are
"soulless" when they are not "heart
less" or "greedy. " The stockholders
composing the corporation , with souls
and hearts and not always greedy ,
were overlooked by him ; and in turn ,
overlooked him. He was the same ab
straction to them , that they were to
him. The officers and managers em
ployed by these companies felt no duty
except to their own stockholders , and
made as much money as they could for
them. Having no discretion ( such as
the individual proprietor had ) in mat
ters of humanity , they were not in
fluenced or restrained , as he had been ,
by any consideration for the welfare of
their customers.
Loss of Human Fooling.
In the same way the greater distance
between the employer and the workingman -
man led to the loss of the friendly , hu
man feeling between them , also. When
a man employed a dozen men in a shop ,
often working with them himself , call
ing them by their "little names" and
very likely being "Bill" or "Jack" to
them , knowing all about one man's sick
wife , and another man's bright boy ,
whom he was educating by working
over hours in short being their friend
and comrade as well as their employer
there were few strikes , although wages
were smaller and prices were higher.
But when the employer worked a hun
dred or a thousand instead of a dozen
men , they ware too many for him to
know. He "ran the business through
the office , " and did not know his men
by sight , much less by name. The
human feeling was crowded out of the
shop. Although the wages were better
the relations were worse.
Under these changed conditions com
petition between the various groups of
co-operators became extreme and meroi
less. Prices were out below what was
warranted by the cheaper cost of pro
duction , causing not only lack of profit
but in many cases absolute bankruptcy.
To escape these disastrous consequences
the competitors tried an unreal co
operation. They met together and
agreed upon prices , and paid a corps of
spies to watch each other. Going yet
further , to prevent violations of their
agreements , they placed a controlling
interest in the stock of their companies
in the hands of trustees who were to
control them and see that they played
fair. Thus arose the trusts.
These combinations were economically
wrong , because they increased the ex
pense of production instead of decreasing
it , as could have been done by genuine
co-operation. The separate organiza
tions of the old companies were retained
and a new lot of agents added , with
their new salaries. The absence of the
human feeling also led these combina
tions and trusts not only to charge prices
high enough-to pay these additional ex
penses and a fair profit , but as much
more as they could get. To escape the
results of abused competition , they
abused co-operation.
Legislation.
An indignant public ( with equally
little human feeling toward them , and
goaded on by reckless newspapers and
reckless demagogues ) , ran amuck
against the trusts. The statute books
were filled with legislation so compre
hensive and so radical ( as well as so
ignorant ) that , were it carried into
effect , it would prevent not only the
abuse of co-operation , but all use of it
in business.
Naturally such legislation failed. In
fact , it did nothing beyond giving work
to the printers and making trusts and
corporations more hated and less understood -
stood than before.
The trusts and combinations failed
from natural causes from dissension
and treachery within , and from compe
tition without. The competition , in
cited by the abnormally high prices hud
to be bought off constantly ; and finally
it cost more to do this than could be
wrung from the public. Competition ,
even more merciless , again ruled and
prices were again ruinous.
New Form of Combination.
Once more co-operation was tried as a
remedy , and immense corporations were
formed to buy up and consolidate under
a single management the plants of the
former competitors. It was a genuine
co-operation thii time , and increased
production while decreasing expenses.
It enabled the new companies to pay
good wages and make fair profits at
moderate prices. Unfortunately , many
of these corposatiom were overcapitalized
ized , and the desire to pay dividends on
"watered stock" has tempted some of
them to abuse their temporary power by
exacting unreasonable prices. It has
brought its punishment in fresh compe
tition and falling prices.
So far as we have gone the great cor
poration is an economic success. It
renders human labor more efficient , and
is therefore a factor of progress , and of
great benefit to humanity if its powers
be not abused. Its powers may be
abused , but under the operation of
natural laws the abuse will bring its own
punishment and its own cure. Some of
the great companies have already been
punished by bankruptcy and dissolution
for their abuses , while the moderate
have succeeded.
Unfortunately the just bitterness felt
by the people toward the old combina
tions and trusts has been transferred to
these new companies indiscriminately ,
although they are very different , from a
legal as well as an economic standpoint.
The odious name of "trust" is applied
to them , and the hue and cry is raised
by demagogues for their persecution and
extermination , regardless of their con
duct. Bryan , who is preeminently the
apostle of popular ignorance and
prejudice , denounces the big corpora
tions as "trusts , " and all "trusts" as
evil.
Big Corporations.
The work of manufacturing and trans
portation is carried on by big companies
because , in the course of industrial
evolution , they have proven better for