

BRYAN ACCEPTS. It required 8,000 words for Mr. Bryan to say "yes" to the amalgamated proposal of populism, Bryanarchy, and free-silver-republicanism. Those who have watched the career of this poly-partied nominee are no doubt greatly surprised upon reading the lengthy document given out at Indianapolis, to find no "cross of gold" or "crown of thorns" which so effectively appealed to emotional delegates at the Chicago convention. He failed to utter one word of warning against the gold standard which, in 1896, he declared was devastating this country of ours, "destroying happy homes," and bringing desolation and despair to cheerful "firesides."

Instead of denouncing this gold behemoth, he now rebukes those who would dare "press economic questions on the country to the exclusion of those which involve the very structure of our government," and accuses them of "subserviency to pecuniary considerations." How insignificant has become the "economic question" about which Mr. Bryan used these words in 1896:

"The great struggle now on cannot cease until all the industrial interests of the country are fully and finally emancipated from the heartless domination of syndicates, stock exchanges and other great combinations of money grabbers in this country and Europe.

"My friends, all the trusts together fall into insignificance when compared to the money trust.

"They (the republicans) have declared against the right of the people of the United States to govern themselves.

"In this campaign for the first time in the history of this government a great party proposes to surrender the right of self-government and invest in foreign legislative bodies the power to legislate for the people of the United States.

"If they ask us 'what about other questions?' We tell them that so long as the right of self-government is endangered, there is no other question. Why discuss things if we be not powerful enough when we should have the power?"

If Bryan then spoke the truth; if, in the fight for bimetallism, was involved the right of self-government, is it not more than a mere "economic question?" If to yield in this fight was to relinquish the right of self government can we better afford to yield now than we could in 1896? Is not the question whether we shall legislate for ourselves or permit Europe to legislate for us of greater importance than our legislating for the Filipinos. Is not the question of industrial emancipation from the "heartless combinations of syndicates, stock exchanges, and other great combinations of money grabbers in this country and Europe," more important than our making laws to govern another people? The privilege of making laws for somebody else is dependent upon the

right to make laws for ourselves. Hence the denial of the right to make laws for ourselves of necessity denies the right to make laws for somebody else. If Mr. Bryan was truthful, honest and sincere in 1896, how can the question of imperialism be paramount to the "economic question" of bimetallism? How can the question of self-government for the American people be of lesser importance than the question of establishing a government for the Filipinos? If, on the other hand, Mr. Bryan was not honest and sincere in 1896 what must be our opinion of his expressions upon the subject of imperialism?

If, as Mr. Bryan says, there are other questions which overshadow this economic question, why did he, on the Fourth of July,

notify the convention at Kansas City that unless there was a specific reaffirmation of this "economic question" he would not accept the nomination for the presidency? If THE CONSERVATIVE remembers rightly the perils of the republic were the same upon the fourth as on the fifth of July? These "questions which now threaten the structure of our government" confronted us on the former as well as the latter date. This being true, is it not a sad commentary upon the intelligence and patriotism of the peerless one that he should make the triumph of these questions secondary to the reiteration of an "economic question?" Was he not "subservient to pecuniary considerations?" Many people will be at a loss to know when to agree with this matchless leader. On the Fourth of July he was firmly standing out for the free and unlimited coinage of silver as tantamount to everything else. On the fifth day of July we find him apparently making something else paramount. Verily "we know not what a day may bring forth," especially is this true when applied to Mr. Bryan's definition of tantamountcy or paramountcy. Mr. Bryan's facility in the convertibility of paramounts forces THE CONSERVATIVE to the conclusion that this sage economist believes the life of the republic is dependent not so much upon the triumph of certain principles as it is upon his election to the presidency. If we are to be positively assured of the safety of the structure of our government the peerless proclaimer must be put in the white house.

The question which Mr. Bryan believes endangers the structure of our government is the

government of remote territory. This question is a logical sequence of the treaty with Spain. A majority of the senate of the United States opposed the ratification of that treaty because they did not believe it compatible with our form of government to assume this responsibility. They did not believe we ought to acquire remote territory and become responsible for the

government of distant people. But unfortunately the efforts of these patriotic senators were defeated. Senator Hoar, the leader of the anti-imperialists thus explains the defeat:

"I myself, in my humble way, did everything in my power to prevent the ratification of the treaty. I do not understand that any opponent of Imperialism charges me with failing to do my full duty as a senator, both by vote and speech. I did it at the cost of what was as dear to me as my life—the approval and sympathy of men who had been my friends and political companions for more than thirty years. Everything I tried to do was brought to naught by the action taken by Mr. Bryan, an action taken against the remonstrance of the wisest leaders in his own party."

The one who "against the remonstrance of the wisest leaders of his party favored the acquisition of the treaty," and defeated the efforts of opponents of Imperialism now asks the suffrages of those who opposed the Imperialistic policy embodied in the treaty!

Referring to his part in ratification Mr. Bryan says:

"When the war was over and the republican leaders began to suggest the propriety of a colonial policy, opposition at once manifested itself. When the president finally laid before the senate a treaty which recognized the independence of Cuba but provided for the cession of the Philippine islands to the United States, the menace of Imperialism became so apparent that many preferred to reject the treaty and risk the ills that might follow rather than take the chance of correcting the errors of the treaty by the independent action of this country.

"I was among the number of those who believed it better to ratify the treaty and end the war, release the volunteers, remove the excuse for war expenditures, and then give to the Filipinos the independence which might be forced from Spain by a new treaty."

From this it is clear that Mr. Bryan was fully aware of the menace of Imperialism contained in the cession of the Philippines. He admits that this menace was "so apparent" that "many preferred to reject the treaty." In making this admission he also admits that he preferred to endorse a danger which was "so apparent." The ills that might have followed the defeat of the treaty were nothing as compared to those which have followed ratification. Senator Money thus stated the effect of ratifying the treaty:

"Does any man say we are going to have peace by ratifying this treaty? Yes; we will have peace with Spain, but we will begin war with the Filipinos. We had a war with Spain that lasted three months. I stood right here and predicted on the 28th of March that we were about to engage in a war that would last sixty days, which would be a