Conservative.
THE CONSERVATIVE
TWO YEARS.
TIVE closes its second
end year with this issue. During two
years it lias been ns often prniseclby
substantial and thoughtful men who
pay taxes , and cursed by feather-brained
men who orate in favor of fallacies and
do not , as a rule , pay taxes , as any
journal in the West.
THE CONSERVATIVE has never flinched
before that unreasoning zealotry which
assaults corporate capital and calls all of
its owners and its defenders enemies of
the public good. THE CONSERVATIVE ,
on the other hand , has cordially called
millionaires and other men with money ,
brains and energy to come into Nebraska
to help develop the unnumbered possi
bilities of its agriculture , horticulture ,
arboriculture , manufacture and com
merce. THE CONSERVATIVE will con
tinue to tell the truth about real
demagogues and unreal democrats , and
to defend , always , the honor and in
tegrity of the government from the
assaults of those who would pay off its
obligations , with currency of less value
than that circulating when they were
incurred.
Interest in the
THE CHINESE
oriental boxer re-
QUESTION.
rnaius unabated.
Our government is placed in a very del
icate situation. Our action in the pres
ent crisis is apt to have a permanent and
far-reaching effect upon our national
life. There is an opportunity for the
display of genuine statesmanship in the
solution of this question. THE CON
SERVATIVE believes that the Chinese
problem can be best attended to by the
ft department of state rather than that of
war. Diplomacy will be more effective
than force. Firmness coupled with
kindness will best promote our interests.
Nothing should be left undone to secure
a right understanding between the two
nations. We should seek , if possible , to
locate the cause of the outbreak of the
boxers. If it should develop that our
missionaries are not wanted in China ,
and that the uprising is a protest against
their presence , we should notify them to
withdraw and at the same time com
municate our intentions to the Chinese
government , with the assurance that we
have no desire to force any kind of reli
gious creed upon them.
If on the other hand the outbreak is
due to a too aggressive policy upon the
part of foreign
Diplomacy , not Force.
capitalists , if the
latter have not shown a proper regard
for the rights of the natives , if they are
using the attack of irresponsible boxers
as a pretext for seizing Chinese territory ,
we should emphatically express our dis
approval of their conduct , and deny any
such intention on our part , and declare
our soul interest to be the desire to pro
tect our own citizens. Such a course
would secure for us the confidence of
sf
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' I'
* t
.
u i JL
the Chinese government in our sincerity
and disinterestedness , and thus obtain
its cooperation in the protection of
American interests. We believe that ,
after such a declaration , the government
of China would bo amply able to main
tain order and suppress insurrection.
But , if in spite of protest , wo
hould land a large military force upon
Chinese territory ,
it would mean that
wo would not only have the boxers to
contend against , but we would find our
selves at war with the whole power of
the empire. War with China would
only augment the dangers of the Amer
icans located there. Instead of pro
tecting their lives it would make them
still more insecure. Armed intervention
would not only defeat our purpose in
this particular , but it would be attended
with an even greater danger , viz. , its
possible effect upon our form of govern
ment. Perhaps no one would now ad
mit the possibility of war terminating in
the extension of our government to the
oriental empire. But it is only a year
since we did that which was not
loss improbable a few months before the
act was consummated. When a war is
once started it is difficult to foretell the
outcome. When we declared war
against Spain to free Cuba no one fore
saw the complications that would result
from it. No one anticipated that it
would leave us the possessors of islands
across the Pacific , 10,000 miles from our
western shore.
But when the war ended wo did find
ourselves in the Philippines and we are
still there. It is
The Philippines. snid thafc we must
remain. Having destroyed the govern
ment the Pilpinos had , the obligation
rests upon us to replace that which we
have destroyed and establish a stable
government for the Filipinos. If we
would not do so we would be shirking a
sacred duty. The withdrawal of Amer
ican troops would leave the Filipinos
without any government at all. It
would leave them exposed to all the
dangers of anarchy , which would be
even worse than Spanish tyranny. The
islands would then become a bone of
contention for the civilized nations of
the world and would eventually become
the property of some grasping foreign
power. Thus is our occupation of the
Philippines defended.
Would not the landing of a large mil
itary force in China be liable to be
tended with
same. Result , in china ,
like results , and
leave us with the same responsibilities ,
wo are now forced to meet in the Philip
pines ? If the insurrection in China is
due to the aggrandizement of foreign
powers , who have been artfully schem
ing to secure more territory in China ,
the lauding of an army by the United
States over the protest of the Chinese
government , would be construed by that
.X.
government as an act of sympathy for
European laud grabbers and would be
ground for suspicion of sinister motives
on our part. Our intervention would
thus constitute an act of war. China
would bo forced , to fight for the preser
vation of her territory. We would be
come involved in war with 400,000,000
people , with great resources back of
them and able to prolong a conflict for
many years. We could slaughter them
by the thousands without making any
apparent diminution in the population
or without materially affecting their
resources. It would be difficult to fore
see the end of such a conflict. It could
bo terminated only by the dissolution of
the empire and the downfall of the gov
ernment. This could be accomplished
only after a terrible loss of life and the
expenditure of millions of money. It
would mean the piling up of an appalling
national debt and the sacrifice of thou
sands of our best lives. This is only part
of the cost of forcible intervention in
the affairs of the orient.
We would have the more difficult
problems to meet after the war was end
ed. There would
Pence. ,
be the terms of
peace to quibble over. A native govern
ment would be out of the question.
Governmental control would pass to the
civilized powers of the world , to be di
vided among them. Would we relin
quish our claim ? Would wo consent
either to native control or to the parti
tion of the empire among European
powers to the exclusion of ourselves ?
Since we were unwilling to let the Filipinos
pines , with whom we had no quarrel ,
govern themselves , is it reasonable to
suppose that we would grant this privi
lege to a people with whom we had been
at war ? Since we were opposed to for
eign powers parceling out among them
selves the islands of the Philippines
would we not even more stoutly resist
their securing territory in China , incom
parably greater in area and infinitely
richer in natural resources , unless we
were permitted to share in the partition ?
Nations do not yield the prizes of war.
If the fortunes of war should place Chi
nese territory within our reach , re
cent history bears out the presumption
that our grasping nature would triumph
over our sense of justice and we would
vie with European nations in the land
grabbing business.
Then our troubles would begin. Our
power and influence would be extended
over millions of
Empire. , , . _ .
people , differing
from us in hist'ory , religion , racial char
acteristics , industrial life , in fact , in all
essential points. Our power over them
could only bo maintained by the con
stant display and perhaps frequent ap
plication of force. A despotic form of
government would be required , firmly
supported by a large standing army.
This would mean an enormous expense ,
the greater portion of which would , no