

Our borax tariff is, therefore, the real mother of this great world trust.

#### Trust Prices Here and in England.

But observe now the difference between trust prices in protected America and in unprotected England. On October 28, 1899, the Chemist and Druggist, of England, quoted refined borax at 16 shillings per hundred weight. This is less than  $3\frac{1}{2}$  cents per pound as against  $7\frac{1}{4}$  cents in New York. And yet the same company supplies borax, from the same mines and mills, to both markets. Could there be a better illustration than this of the oppressive effects of tariff-protected trusts?

It may be asked why, if it owns all of the profitable mines of the world, does not the trust put its prices as high in Europe as in America? It is partly because it has not got, and it is not easy to get, as complete control of the world's borax mines as those in California and Nevada, and partly because the trust has not, as yet, had full opportunity to test its world monopoly. Some of the companies which it took over were under contract to supply raw material at certain prices for one, two or three years. Until these contracts expire, refined borax will be likely to remain low in England.

#### Germany's Protected Borax Trust.

Germany, because of her tariff duties, has had a similar experience to ours. Thus in May, 1894, the Chemist and Druggist, an English publication, said: "At present the position of the three German manufacturers is quite secure. Aided by a rather heavy duty, they have gradually been able to reconquer their home market almost entirely from the Britishers, and even to develop a considerable foreign trade, the German exports of refined borax and boric acid having risen since 1880 from 222 tons to about 1,700 tons yearly."

Undoubtedly France has enjoyed, in higher prices, some of the blessings of high duties and protected combinations. The trusts that have existed in this industry in England have been comparatively short-lived and have been unable to put up prices to anything like the American level.

#### Borax in the Senate.

When the Dingley bill was being discussed in the senate in 1897, a great calamity howl went up from the California and Nevada senators about the depressed borax industry. Senator Perkins told the senate that "there can be no trust and no monopoly of the borax fields of Nevada and California." When attempting to answer Senator Gray's inquiry as to why it was that an industry which had been built up on lower duties should as time goes on and the infant industry is established, still want higher duties, Senator Perkins replied that "it is simply the old story of crushing an industry which has been estab-

lished. The mines are opened, the water is pumped out of them, roads have been built to the mines and if they are abandoned, then the trusts again come in and advance the price."

This absolute misrepresentation of facts passed as wisdom in the senate.

When faced by the fact that the borax industry had passed into the hands of a British corporation—the Pacific Borax and Redwood Chemical Works, Limited—which had been running six months and had, in spite of the low prices and depression, cleared 12 per cent on its capital—absolute fabrication was resorted to and the western senators denied the existence of the English corporation and Senator White, who had turned protectionist and beggar for the borax infant, read a telegram "from a gentleman in California \* \* \* for whom I am ready to vouch," saying that "borax mines are owned by individuals and companies, all American."

Senator Stewart helped to deceive the senate by saying that he "understood that there had been an attempt to make this sale in Europe in good faith, but I think the whole thing fell through. It was one of the bombastic prospectuses that the English put out. It must be an exaggeration." The "bombastic prospectus" had stated that the earnings of the two companies to be amalgamated (The Pacific Company being by far the larger) were \$446,000 in 1892-93, \$405,000 in 1893-94, and \$267,000 in 1894-95. The reduced profits in 1894-95 were said to be "owing to the reduction in the price of borax by the American Company."

Senator White played his part in the deception by stating that "it is an absurdity for anyone \* \* \* to assert that this article can be sent to and sold in England at 2 cents a pound at a profit, and it appears nobody was gullible enough to believe that statement." And this in face of the fact that 20,420 bags had been exported the previous year and sold for less than 2 cents, "at a substantial profit," as the "bombastic prospectus" stated. One of the conditions of these sales in London was said to be that this crude borax should not be re-sold to American refiners.

Of course the ordinary protective claims about "cheap foreign labor," "difference in wages in America and Turkey," "American citizens spending their money at home," "crippled home industries," "mills closed by low duties of 1894," etc., were placed before the delighted senators, although the facts were that practically all of the labor employed in the borax beds was Chinese and Indians, hundreds of whom were working for \$1 a day, and that we never before produced as much borax as we did under the low duties of 1894.

By such arguments and deceptions this trust beguiled the senators and got its partner, the protective tariff, to put more money into the business, and to greatly increase the profits of one of the

wealthiest men on the Pacific Coast. Is there anything here for the Industrial Commission to investigate?

BYRON W. HOLT.

New York, Nov. 23, 1899.

#### PASSING PIONEERS.

During the year 1899 three men noted in the annals of Nebraska among the most influential and illustrious of her citizens, have passed forever from homes and loved ones. They were among the pioneers. They had braved the hardships of the frontier and by their lives western men and western enterprise were made more and more admirable and respected in all parts of the republic.

Algernon Sidney Paddock died first. He had been territorial secretary, acting governor and United States senator. He was a sturdy, self-reliant, honest man, whose ambition led him to attempt great labors. His success was commensurate with his abilities.

Alvin Saunders came to Nebraska as territorial governor in 1861 to succeed Sam W. Black, who immediately became colonel of a Pennsylvania regiment and was killed at Gains' Mill while gallantly leading his men.

Governor Saunders organized the first Nebraska regiment and appointed John M. Thayer its colonel, H. P. Downs its lieutenant colonel and W. D. McCord its major. He also made his private secretary, Geo. F. Spencer, sutler, and he soon became United States senator from Alabama. Governor Saunders was well-known as the war governor of Nebraska Territory and was very influential in bringing about the change from territory to state. The returns for the first state election held in 1866, precedent to application for the admission of the state of Nebraska into the Union, were made to the governor of the territory who convened a board of canvassers consisting of the secretary of the territory, the United States district attorney and himself. Returns made from Cass county were peculiar. But the board would not go "behind the returns." Thus the republicans gained the governorship by a hundred and forty-five majority and the legislature by seven or eight on joint ballot.

Governor Saunders was a loyal partisan and although defeated for the senate by Thayer, when the state entered the Union, he was rewarded later on by the prize he then sought. He served six years and then retired from public life with the exception of holding a place on the Utah commission up to 1894. He was a man of fair ability but neither original nor courageous. In commercial life his success was great until he formed a banking copartnership with Mr. Hardenberg and opened a private banking house in New York City which ultimately failed and much impaired his health and fortune.