8 "Che Conservative.
TKUSTS ANI > KKMKDIES.
Early Monopolies Founded oil Ilestrlc-
lions.
[ Bv FHANICUN PIEHCK. ]
There is no novelty in our American
trusts. Their prototype is found in the
monopolies which existed everywhere
before the present century and in the
mediaeval guilds. Before the nineteenth
century , towns , districts and nations
everywhere surrounded themselves with
walls of legislative restrictions intended
to keep out the monster , trade.
Nor are the reasons given in our clay
for creating monopolies new. When a
delegation from the indignant Commons
begged Elizabeth to recall the patents
which she had granted creating trade
monopolies , the wily Queen replied :
"Since I was queen , yet never did I put
my pen to any grant but that upon pre
text and semblance made unto mo that
it was both good and beneficial to the
subjects in general , though a private
profit to Fome of my nncieut servants
who had deserved well. " Ever since
the time of Queen Elizabeth the rich
and powerful have maintained that high
protective tariffs , monopolies and trusts
were "good and beneficial" to the sub
jects , and have not been wanting in
finding pretexts and semblances of
reason to induce the ignorant to believe
in their contentions.
The movement toward commercial
freedom in the 19th century has set in
with a strong current , but it takes a
weary time to tench the world that no
body of men are wise enough to enact
restrictions upon trade which will be
beneficial.
I propose in the short space allotted
me , to show wherein our American
trusts are the direct result of our pro
tective tariff.
Genesis of tlio Trust.
The trust comes from our high pro
tective tariff as naturally as fruit from
blossom. If a single corporation were
manufacturing the entire product of
any protected article in the United
States , it is perfectly apparent that it
could sell its goods at a price just below
the cost of the foreign product , plus the
duty , and engross the whole trade of
our people. In experience , however ,
when an increase of duties is contem
plated , many new corporations for
manufacturing purposes are formed ,
and these rush into competition with
those already in existence. The result
of this , as we all know , is "overpro
duction , " and the selling price of manu
factured articles falls below the cost of
the foreign article , plus the duty , and
the manufacturer thereby loses a portion
of the benefit of his high duty. Now ,
the only way for the manufacturer to
avail himself of the full advantages of
the protective tariff , is by combining
the trade into a corporation , or asso
ciation , so as to fix the soiling price of
In's manufactured articles just below the
price of the foreign articles , plus the
duty. The promoter of the trust cannot
always unite the entire trade to this
end , but ho can unite a sufficient portion
tion of the trade with sufficient capital
to enable the trust to indiscriminately
slaughter the weaker manufacturers
who have not sought the shelter of the
combination.
Our protective tariff affords only an
artificial basis for trade. "Wo deliber
ately lay the foundation for the prices
of the necessaries of life in fluctuating
legislation , and then curse the combina-
imtion and visit it with penal legisla
tion because it seeks to protect itself
from the very conditions which the
high tariff legislation has brought
about.
Hut Few Trusts ill England.
Now , the remedy for trusts is to make
trade free , tear down the protective
walls , and bring the sale of the products
of our trusts into competition with the
rest of the world. The trusts would
quickly fall to pieces under such con
ditions.
"But , " our protectionist says , "this
is not so. Trusts exist in free trade
England , as well as in the United
States. " This statement is not true.
Monopolies and trusts have always
existed when fostered by high protective
tariffs , and they have never existed to
any considerable extent where free
trade prevailed. An international trust
would be difficult , as wo learned when
the International Copper Trust , under
the very best of circumstances , went to
pieces in the eighties. Trusts fixing the
price of the necessaries of life exist only
to a limited extent in England. Mr.
Wilhelui Ferdrow , an eminent German
writer on political economy , writing in
The Forum of May last , upon "European
Trusts , " says : "As far as England is
concerned it must be admitted that , not
withstanding her great industrial
activity and a competitive warfare not
less than that of other states , the trust
system has as yet found but tardy ac
ceptance in that country. This is
doubtless due , in some degree , to the
thorough application of the principle of
free trnde ; for it is well known that the
largest trusts are powerless unless their
interests are secured by a protective
tariff , excluding from the home market
the products of foreign countries. "
In France today , the conditions are
similar to those existing in England
prior to the beginning of free trade. An
army of French workmen are now pre
paring to move toward Paris ; and in
every country where protective tariffs
exist , many monopolies exist , markets
are unstable , strikes are common , and
iho whole basis of trade is upon unstable
foundations.
Remove Causes of Trusts.
The remedies for trusts are largely
forecasted in the above discussion as to
their causes.
The remedy by attempting to suppress
the trust through the penal law , applied
in many of our states in recent years ,
and advocated by many members of the
recent trust conference , will always be
found altogether impracticable. The
quack doctor proclaims that his nostrums
will cure anything from a wooden leg
up to unrequited affection , and the
quack politician prescribes , as a sovereign
eign specific for every ill , a penal statute.
I doubt whether , in the whole United
States and under the many state laws
enacted against trusts , five convictions
for violation of anti-trust penal laws
can be found. So difficult is it to prove
criminal intent , so loath will jurors be
to regard combinations of trade as
criminal in their nature , that convictions
under penal statutes are practically un
known.
The Court of General Quarter Sessions
of the Peace was the first court estab
lished in the Colony of New York.
This court opened August 7 , 1694 , with
Abraham De Peyster as presiding judge.
The first indictment found in this court
was against John Watson , who was
accused of forestalling the market.
Prosecutions for forestalling the market
continued for a hundred years , and dur
ing a portion of the same period not a
Jerseyman could bring a pound of but
ter , or a pound of cheese , or a dozen
hen's eggs , not a Connecticut farmer
could bring a load of firewood into New
York City without paying a duty there
on. It apparently did not occur to any
considerable number of our early legis
lators that the market could not well be
forestalled if competition was open.
Our recent legislators , like Mr. McKinley
and Mr. Dingley , seem to understand
the problem little better than the early
Dutch and English settlers of New York
City. Why continue to interfere with
the laws of trade which , when left un
obstructed , prevail with as much steadi
ness and certainty as the law of gravita
tion , and then attempt by penal
legislation to suppress the very artificial
creatures which your interference has
called into existence ? Wise statesman
ship prevents the existence of evils.
Cheap demagogues as legislators create
evils , and then attempt to make political
capital out of an attack upon them.
Does any intelligent , thinking man ,
who has observed the tendency of party
legislation in our day , seriously believe
that our politicians sincerely desire to
suppress trusts ? We all know that the
politicians fatten upon such sores on
our body politic. What would they dote
to win popularity if they did not have
trusts to inveigh against and to level
penal legislation at ? What would they
T ars