it- * , , 4 Conservative.
"Trusts arc combines
TKN YKAKS OF
TKUS T. bines , and that
Fettles the whole
question. " The public is inclined to
close the controversy about trusts in this
manner. It must certainly be admitted
that the trust is a combine ; and so is a
* . partnership or any other business asso
ciation. If all combinations are to be
suppressed , all associations in business
must cease. Some objectors , including
law writers and judges , not a whit more
logical than my friend , define trusts to
be combinations for certain illegal pur
poses. Such a definition also settles the
whole question. If trusts are combina
tions for illegal purposes , no more can
be said in their favor than in favor of a
partnership or any other association for
illegal purposes.
Whfit is the objection to trusts , com
biuations , or associations formed not for
illegal purposes ,
The Kciil Question. , , e. V ,
but for the purpose
feV
pose of carrying on business ? So long
as the business is small and the trust is
formed by a few persons and called a
partnership , there seems to be no serious
objection on the part of the public. If
the trust takes the form of a corporation
not too large or too successful , people
not too much tainted with socialism
seem willing to tolerate it. If it takes
the form of a large corporation , does a
large business , and makes much money ,
it is denounced by persons of com
munistic tendencies , and it is yet to be
determined whether it will bo allowed
peaceably to exist. If it takes the form
whic.h gavH rise to the name trust as
applied to business associations , namely.
a trust of corporate stocks by means of
which a body of men united in interest
are enabled to carry on business through
separate corporate agencies , it is not at
fev
Vv ' A all tolerated , is even denounced as a
crime ; and yet no objection on the
ground of antagonism to public interests
can be urged to such an association to
which any other business association is
not equally amenable.
Reasonable persons opposed to trusts ,
if they will analyze their reasons , will
find them based
upon the opinion
that eertain evils are incident to all
associations ; that these evils increase as
the association increases in wealth and
power ; and that by reason thereof asso
ciation itself may be carried to such an
extent as to become a public evil. The
real question concerning trusts , there
fore , is whether the evils incident to
largo associations for business purposes
are such as to render these associations
contrary to public policy. The present
controversy in relation to trunts is but
the continuation of a struggle that has
been in progress for five centuries. It
is the assertion , on one side , of the right
of freedom of association for business
purposes , and on the other side a denial
of that right because association tends
'to monopoly , tends to increase prices ,
tends to suppress competition , and tends
to crush out individual industry. The
advocates of liberty of association admit
that association confers power upon the
associates , that it gives them an advan
tage over unassociated individuals , and
that such power may be used for evil as
well as for good. On the other hand ,
they allege that association is a necessary
instrument of modern industry ; that it
cooperates with and is made nece.ssnry
by the steam engine , the railroad , and
the power loom ; and that , while these
instrumentalities of modern industry
may produce some evils , such evils are
more than counterbalanced by the ad
vantages conferred upon mankind.
During the five centuries of conflict
referred to , the theory has always been
that associations -tended to increase
prices and to oppress the public ; the
facts , however , have always been con
trary to the theory. Legislators and
justices in olden days feared high prices
more , if possible , than witchcraft , and
the former fear has not entirely passed
away with the latter visionary terror.
The attempt by law to fix , regulate and
protect prices , directly or indirectly , has
never ceased. Laws regulating the
prices of bread and beer are so old that
their date is uot known. From the
fourteenth to the nineteenth century
the statute.-books abound in regulations
of prices of meat , clothing , poultry and
wine. Not only were prices fixed by
law , but other laws were enacted to
prevent laws fixing prices from being
violated. Thus it was that it became
criminal to buy commodities on their
way to market , to buy in order to sell
again in the same pr a neighboring mar
ket , and to buy in large quantities.
Thus also originated the whole biood of
crimes known as offences or conspiracies
against trade. Thus also originated the
laws , both statute and common , against
associations or combinations of business
men.
Permit a brief reference in illustration
of this fact , to the laws against combi
nations of laborers. But one reason was
ever given for these laws , namely , that
high wages caused high prices for the
necessaries of life. The earliest statute
against combinations , in 1425 , made it a
felony for masons to confederate
together to raise their wages above the
amount fixed by law. From that date ,
for nearly five 'centuries , wages were
fixed by law and workmen were forced
by penalties to work at the fixed rates.
Not only were workmen punished for
taking greater wages than those fixed
by law , but employers were punished
for paying them. By some statutes
justices and mayors were permitted to
fix the rates of wages , they to be
governed in so doing by the cheapness
and dearness of the necessaries of life.
Against these infamous laws laborers
combined , labor guilds and secret societies -
Gullds. cieties inuuuier-
amo were organ
ized. It became necessary , therefore ,
for the law to attack combinations
which were intended to keep up rates of
wages. Thus it was that combination
itself became a crime in the eyes of the
law and in the estimation of lawmakers ,
who wore consumers , not producers ,
esteeming laborers as little better than
slaves , and shopkeepers and men of
business as scarcely worthy their atten
tion. The effect , as they supposed ,
of every combination of workmen ,
manufacturers , or traders was , by
increasing wages , to increase the
price of the necessaries of life. By
Statute 24th Edward III , "alliances
covinrs , congregations , chapters , ordi
nances and oaths made by masons and
carpenters shall be void and annulled. "
The object of the infamous ' 'statute of
laborers" of 5th Elizabeth , which fixed
hours of labor and empowered judges to
fix rates of wages , was to break , up
combinations of laborers. The Act of
40th George III made criminal any
combination between workmen for the
advancement of wages. Even after
these acts were repealed , laborers were
punished by the judges upon the ground
that combination was an offence at com
mon law. Lord Kenyon said that not
only was a combination of workmen to
obtain an increase of wages indictable ,
but it would be indictable in the master
to agree to raise wages. Now , I think
it will bo admitted that workmen have
the right to combine to obtain fair
wages , and it is true , whether admitted
or not , that good wages do uot increase
the price of products. These laws
against laborers are a fair sample of
enactments intended to prevent increase
of prices , and they show the origin as
well as the effects of the prevalent
opinion that the purpose and tendency
of all combinations was to increase
prices.
Laws as severe as those against com
binations of laborers were for like
reasons directed
Purtnorn. . . . .
against all manner
of business associations. So strong was
the feeling of the governing class against
such associations that judges frequently
pronounced combination a crime in
itself. Yet , as already said , business
combinations were common. Partner
ships existed , and all the potency and
tendency that inhere in any combina
tion , bo it joint-stock association , part
nership , or trust , to repress competition ,
to fix and influence prices , to restrain
production , and to monopolize business ,
exist in the partnership. We may won
der that men denounced as wholly evil ,
and the law punished with severity , f ;
combinations , aud yet this form of
combination went unchallenged. Sin- ,
