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About The Conservative (Nebraska City, Neb.) 1898-1902 | View Entire Issue (June 8, 1899)
. i * ii i i ITO I , . I "Che Conservative. fi Hinith , "look the whole world in the faco" coiiBcioiiH of no obligation greater than his powers of service. Ho should P08S088 full freedom in nil matters not legitimately connected with the conduct of his ofllce. Principle , and not subserviency to some person possessing nominating or appointing power , should control his political action and ho should bo as free to oppose as to support the policies of the chiefs of administration in all matters not directly ail'octing his conduct as an employee. Such action should of course bo characterixod by decorum and suit able regard for ollloial and personal dig nity. I'ValuroK ' of llu ; SjiollH How is it with the spoils system ? Does not continued allegiance to the patron who has secured appointment constitute the solo title of the appointee to permanence in office ? The latter would , purhaps , prefer to retain his of fice on account of the honesty , industry , and intelligence displayed by him in the performance of his duties but ho is not permitted to do so. The patron upon whoso recommendation ho was selected may die , ho may oven bo removed from public life by the better judgment of his constituents , though it is the busi ness of those whom , under the spoils system , ho has foisted upon the public pay-roll to prevent such an intelligent expression of the will of the voters. A new administration may , in spite of the same obstacles , bo selected. If it bo of his own party the employee maybe bo safe though experience has shown that this is doubtful and that ho will bo wise to cultivate friends among the faction newly become dominant. If it is of another party his doom is sealed unless , indeed , ho can maintain personal relations that are superior to partisan ship , or can stifle his convictions , sub ordinate his desire to enjoy a good opinion of himself , and masquerade as ti friend of the party newly successful. Even for the slender chances thus secured how numerous have been the self-stultifications , inexcusable indeed , but brought about by timorous fears and appalling possibilities to loved and help less dependents that lead us to pass them with but mild condemnation. Those who have committed these sins , led thereto by circumstances which to their weakness scorned inexorable , have been robbed of their self respect. The country has been robbed of manliness in a group of its citi/ens , the state has been weakened , the social edifice de prived of part of its foundation. The spoils system destroys also the in dependence of the legislative branch of government and enables the executive to control the law-making power by granting or withholding at will favors to individual legislators in the distribxi- tioii of patronage. The legislator , who , belonging to the party in power under the spoils system , ventures to act upon liis own judgment irrespective of the wishes of the executive not infrequently finds himself deprived of all influence in the distribution of ollices and the in fluence of place-hunters used to build up rivals for his political power and to prevent his continuance in the legisla tive body. UnlesM ho is a man of extra ordinary popularity ho has the alterna tive of a complete surrender of princi ple or retirement from public service ; ho either gives place to a more pliable successor or becomes a traitor to his convictions and a faithless servant of the people. Government JCiuployvoH ItliiHcmuih'il. "Thou shall not steal" the political power of individuals. The integrity of each voter is essential to that of democ racy itself and can bo subverted by any means which gives undue influence to other individuals as effectively as by measures which exclude qualified elec tors from the privileges and duties that are the attributes of the franchise. One way to accomplish this result is to introduce the use of money in elections and this is in part , at least , n result of the spoils system. Under no other sys tem would an employee of tha public feel compelled to act in accordance with such a notification as that which I am about to read. It was actually sent by an agent of a national campaign com mittee to an employee of the Federal government. It read : "Our books show that you have paid no heed to either of the requests of the committee for funds. The time for action is short. I need not say to you that an important canvass , like the one now being made , requires a great out lay of money and wo look to you as one of the Federal beneficiaries to help bear the burden. Two per cent of your salary is $ . At the close of the campaign wo shall place a list of those who have not paid in the hands of the head of the department you are in. " One need not comment on the brutal ity of such a system towards those who hold public ofllce. This system of levy ing blackmail upon employees of the Federal government for campaign pur poses was so recently in existence , that its more superficial evils are familiar to all. Possibly wo have not all considered its more remote , though not less inevit able results. Campaign funds obtained in this way were , so far us the Federal service was concerned , available to but one party at a time. Would the leaders of the other party stand idly by and see the victory of principles they regarded as essential to the public welfare turned to defeat by the superior finan cial resources of their opponents ? To fight fire with fire is a natural if not always an ethical impulse. Not being able to place public resources un der forced contributions , what sources are available ? Are not , ask the loaders of the party out of power , our princi ples just , is not our anticipated victory to eventuate in legislation ? Some must profit pecuniarily by that legislation ; lot them contribute. From this con clusion , so easily justified by the /eal- ous and enthusiastic partisan , how short the stop to the sale of legislation. Who will say that it has not boon frequently taken. And so both parties have ple thoric campaign funds. A now rivalry ensues. Each party fools that it must have the loudest , if not the most har monious music , at the head of its pro cessions , which must contain the most brilliant torches and the most splendid uniforms. Each candidate desires that the largest halls , and those most fre quently , shall resound in his honor with the ringing phrases of the most eloquent and highest paid speakers , and that the plaudits of the largest multitudes shall bo made to testify to his tremendous popularity. JIlHnosilion of C Fundis. Every one knows how largo a portion of every campaign fund is never applied to the objects for which it was raised. The demands of ward workers rise pro portionately with the total expenditures. Every one must have a share in the feafct. Vote purchasing begins , if it has not begun before , and the wages of the purchasers rise with the price of the purchased. The party that hopes to come into power meets the emergency by soiling more prospective legislation ; that in power is impelled to raise the per centago it demands of the salaries of the incumbents of public offices , and when the limit in that direction is reached , to multiply the offices and holders and increase their compensation in order that greater sums may thus bo diverted from the public treasury to the party coffers. If the assessments of candidates for office has not yet begun , it begins now. Prospective judges , leg islators , civil officers of all kinds are made to pay , first twenty-five , then fifty , then one hundred per cent , and finally , twice or thrice their prospective salaries as the price of nomination. If office- gaining is made so costly , office-holding must become correspondingly remuner ative. The history of nearly every largo municipality and of nearly every state , affords most ample evidence of the way in which this has been accom plished. If , however , we exclude the use of money , wo find many other elements of political corruption resulting from the partisan abuse of the power of appoint ment to office. Whenever this power is delegated to party leaders with tacit or express permission to exercise it as a means of strengthening party organiza tions , subordinating capacity and fitness for the public service to the require ments of partisan expediency , a force is put in operation that tends progressively