8 The Conservative *
TJIH SINOI.K TAX.
Mr. K < 1 wan I Atkinson's POMT for Henry
To one who has not tested the single
tax theory to find out how it would
work , it hns many attractions.
First , its simplicity putting all the
taxes on one subject which cannot run
away.
Second , the relief from a great many
petty exactions and annoyances ; taxes
on personal luggage under the tariff , and
the like.
Third , the assurance that all the taxes
that are paid , the government will re
ceive and that none will bo diverted to
private purposes.
"When one , however , tries to make out
a case in support of the better housing
of the great mass of the people , under
the application of this system , doubts
begin to appear. A single tax is , in
point of fact , a ground rent which it is
proposed to substitute for rents payable
to private owners. But all the advo
cates of the single tax who are not com
munists or socialists admit that the per
manent possession of land by private
persons or corporations is necessary to
its use or cultivation. It follows that a
single tax on land would be of the same
nature as a variable ground rent , unless
possession for a long period should be
given , a very objectionable form of laud
tenure on a fixed rental value. The ob
jection to the latter course on the part
of the advocates of the single tax is
that if the ground rout or single tax
were adjusted at a fixed sum on a
tenure of long date , the choice of that
lot might become worth more than the
fixed ground rent , in which event a high
price might bo paid to the original pos
sessor of the single tax leasehold by a
successor ; that would bring in a bugaboo
of the unearned increment to as full an
extent as that alleged bad feature comes
in on the purchase and sale of the laud at
an assessed valuation. On the other hand ,
if a lot subject to a ground rent or single
tax for a long term of years should cease
to be desirable , then the possessor might
i.ot bo able to pay the rent and would
then lose the buildings or improvements
he had put upon it.
Again , it may bo asked , who would
undertake to build an expensive build
ing on land subject to a variable single
tax ground rent ? Who would improve
land without a long contract or lease for
permanent possession ? How would the
system work after the first year of an
adjustment of the single tax or ground
rent to the valuations of that year ?
Take a lot in the suburbs worth in the
markets today , say , two thousand dollars
lars , on which a man of moderate means
can afford to put up a house costing
three thousand dollars , good for occu
pancy for twenty years , ho witnessing
that the tide of improvement is setting
that way. Now suppose the lot is
grunted to him subject to a variable and
probably increasing ground rent or siu-
glo tax. In ten years , under existing
conditions , that lot may become worth
ten thousand dollars , and has become
subject to a single tax or ground rent at
the rental value of $10,000 , but the
house on it cost only three thousand
dollars , and is half worn out. The pos
sessor must then give up his house be
cause he cannot afford to pay the ad
vanced ground rent 011 th land , and he
cannot afford to build a building more
consistent with the use of the land. Oil
the other hand , suppose ho has been
granted the land for a term of years at
a fixed single tax. Then at the end of
ten years the rental value of that lot
having risen , ho can sell out at a , large
premium , thus gaining what is called
an unearned increment.
How would a single tax work in Bos
ton ?
It is proposed by the single taxers to
substitute a bingle tax in the City of
Boston for all other city , county , state
and national taxes combined. The pop
ulation of Boston may be computed to
day at 550,000. It may be interesting to
find out how much the single tax on
Boston land would come to if the valua
tions of I898 made by the assessor were
adopted in order to determine what rate
of single tax should be paid this year or
for any given term of years. The fol
lowing figures from the assessors' books
will give a very close approximation to
the facts :
Aswssors'H Amount of
Valuation. Tuxes.
Land valuation . . . $ J82,747,000 $0,505.859.20
Buildings or improve-
month , not perbonal
property . . . 847,480,900 4,725,821.84
Per&onal property tax 205,8(55,518 ( 2,790,771.04
Corporation tax col
lected from the
state 53,111,000 833,821.00 ,
$1,089,211,018 $14,924,278.08
Aii estimate only can be made of the
proportion of the national taxes borne
by the people of Boston for the last
twenty years ending with the Spanish
war. The average per capita taxation
for that period was five dollars ( $5) ) per
head. The increased armament , pen
sion list and other permanent expendi
tures growing out of the Spanish war
have increased this rate to over seven
dollars ( $7) ) per head , and it is difficult
to see how that increase can be avoided
within any reasonable period. Having
committed "criminal aggression , " wo
have now to pay the bills. Seven dollars
lars ( $7) ) per head on 550,000 people
would come to thirty-eight hundred and
fifty thousand dollars ( $8,850,000) ) .
But it will bo manifest to everyone
that the per capita method , although
very useful in many applications , does
not meet this cose. The blacks of the
South do not pay proportionately on
their consumption with the inhabitants
of cities , neither do a large portion of
the farmers pay as much. A very mod
erate additional estimate of the
tax on the consumers of cities
as compared to the blacks and
the farmers would carry the annual
contribution to national taxes of the
people of Boston up to say five million
dollars ( $5,000,000) ) , making the total
contribution to be collected under a
single tax from the inhabitants of the
city of Boston a fraction less than
twenty million dollars ( $20,000,000) ) , in
place of all existing state , city and na
tional tax.
Now suppose that twenty million dollars
lars ( $20,000,000) ) were all assessed in a
single tax on the laud value of $482,747-
000. It conies to a little over four (4) ( )
per cent , or forty dollars per thousand.
In other words no one can question the
fact that if all the taxes national , state
and city that the people of Boston
now pay were put into a single tax on
land , the ground rent would be forty
dollars per thousand upon the assessor's
values of the year 1898.
It being granted by the single-taxers
that some kind of individual possession
is necessary to the improvement of that
laud by the construction of buildings
upon it , then whoever accepts possession
becomes subject to a ground rent of
forty dollars per thousand on the valua
tion. If that valuation may be changed ,
the risk of improving the land becomes
greater. It is in order to secure to the
alleged benefit of the mass of the people
the so-called unearned increment or in
crease in the rental value of the laud
that the single tax is advocated , hence
no advocate of that policy can consist
ently consent to a permanent ground
rent for any long term of years even at
$40 per $1000 on the present valuation.
Again , this ground rent or single tax
would be the prior lieu upon the laud.
It must be advanced year by year in
cash. It follows that a single tax title
could be no security for raising money
upon a mortgage ; that is to say , no se
curity that prudent trustees or managers
of savings banks could possibly lend
money upon.
Think of it a moment. A lot worth
two thousand dollars ( $2,000) ) today , on
which a man might now put a house
costing three thousand dollars ( $3,000) ) ,
borrowing half the money or twenty-
five hundred dollars ( $2,500) ) . Suppose
the single tax on that land advanced
five-fold in five or ten years. The house
then becomes unfit for the land. The
possessor cannot afford to build another ,
hence the mortgagee would be obliged to
take possession , remove the unfit house
and put up buildings consistent with the
advanced rate of the single tax. "What
would be the effect of these conditions ?
Who would lend or who would build on
such a title ?
According to my comprehension of
the facts , nobody but very rich men
could afford to take a single-tax title to
any lot of laud anywhere. Instead of
helping poor men to become the posses
sors of their homes , it would make it ex
cessively dangerous for a poor man to