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10 the Conservative *
second place , the islands which wo have
taken from Spain never can be the resi
dence of American families , removing
and settling to make their homes there.
The climatic conditions forbid it. Al
though Spaniards have established them
selves in Spanish America , even in the
tropics , the evils of Spanish rule have
largely risen from the fact that Span
iards have gone to the colonies as ad
venturers , eager to make fortunes as
quickly as possible that they might re
turn to Spain to enjoy them. That the
relation of our people to these posses
sions will have that character is already
apparent.
SOMK FACTS AllOUT COINS.
Since 1878 , the United States has pre
sented the spectacle of a nation acting in
defiance of all the sound principles of
finance , and regardless of the monetary
experience of the world. Following the
advice of theorists , and eschewing the
practical lessons of the past , we then
embarked on an experiment in the use
of silver at a ratio different from that of
the market , in au ignorant and fruitless
attempt to satisfy those who wished to
maintain the price of silver as well as
those who were carried away by the
fallacious desire for more money. Bit
ter experience has proved a hard teacher.
The wrecks of private firms , larger cor
porations , banks and manufacturing es
tablishments are sad reminders of
our errors. It is time to bring that
wasteful experiment with silver to a
close. Immediate and drastic action by
the legislative bodies of congress in the
interest of permanent commercial sta
bility is demanded. Uncertainty as to
the standard of payment must bo re
moved. In business , uncertainty is de
struction , stability is prosperity. When
this experiment with our standard was
begun in 1878 , disaster was pi ophesied.
Evil results were postponed by temporary
ary makeshifts , such as the creation of a
vacuum in our circulation of small
United States notes into which silver
money could bo introduced. But make
shifts are no longer in order. Common
sense and facts cry out against further
dalliance with theories which have been
disproved. To this end , men of all
parties and beliefs should patriotically
unite to remove from our statute books
every trace of pernicious legislation to
which evil can bo traced. "When all are
in danger , all should unite to remove
the peril. It will bo generally admitted
that our business conditions have been
in the main sound and healthy ; but the
uncertainty as to our standard , owing
to the unwise silver legislation , has cre
ated uncertainty and distrust. Through
this loss of confidence , and the ensuing
hoarding of gold , because the country
had discredited the silver by retaining
gold and paying only silver for customs ,
it became loss easy for banks to grant
loans , and liquidation was therefore
forced upon firms perfectly solvent , but
who could not meet immediate demands.
The country should at once bo relieved
from all dangers duo to evil legislation.
Silver Legislation Since 1878.
The passage of the act of Februaiy 28 ,
1878 required the coinage of not less
than $2,000,000 worth of bilver dollars
per month , at a ratio to gold of 15.98 to
1 , when the market ratio was 17.88 to 1.
This was not bimetallism ; for the con
current circulation of the two metals
side by side under these conditions was
an evident impossibility. It resulted
merely in the creation of a quasi-
subsidiary coinage of larger denomina
tions than formerly ; and it was kept at
par with gold by methods similar to
those by which all our subsidiary silver
was treated , namely , by limitation of
quantity , and by the silver certificates
being received for customs equally with
gold , thus forming a system of redemp
tion whereby the surplus of silver circu
lation could he returned to the treasury.
Subsequently , by withdrawing United
States notes of small denominations , and
lowering the denominations of silver
certificates , a field was opened for the
new and larger subsidiary money. Un
der this system , the country might pos
sibly have continued to absorb the
monthly coinage of silver for many
years , and maintain its equality with
gold. Only the government being per
mitted to coin this silver , the profit aris
ing from the difference between the bul
lion value and the face value of the
dollar , or seigniorage , was covered into
the treasury.
The act of 1878 was satisfactory to no
one , neither to inflationists , to owners of
silver mines , nor to sound financiers.
The intricacies of monetary action per
mit popular misunderstandings and hal
lucinations to abide for a time until ex
posed by experience ; and , as history
shows , in no other subject are popular
fallacies so tempting and captivating , al
though always fraught with great
danger to trade when adopted. By a
strange kind of mental and moral par
alysis the advocacy and explanation of
sound principles of money after 1878 al
most entirely ceased. The country lost
the gains of education by public discus
sion and official documents. Giving
way to the general hallucination which
swept the country , politicians sacrificed
their opinions for expediency. The
practical business men of the country
took no heed , so long as disaster did not
come. Consequently , the spirit of un
sound finance ruled supreme , carried
away men of high standing and experi
ence in finance , and brought about the
passage of the act of July 14 , 1890 ,
known as the "Sherman act. " This act
intensified the fatuous policy of the act
of 1878. It required the purchase of
4,600,000 ounces of silver per month , to
bo paid for in "treasury notes , " which
were made a general legal-tender , but
redeemable at demand in coin. The
market ratio of silver to gold was now
19.10 to 1. It was a mere question of
time how long before the circulation
would bo saturated with this currency
of a fluctuating value ; for between Sep
tember and February of this year , the
value of silver fluctuated fully 25 per
cent , equalling the sensational perturba
tions of 1870. The provision for redemp
tion "in coin , " inasmuch as government
payments had been regularly made in
gold funds , throw upon the § 100,000,000
gold reserve created solely for the re
demption of the $340,000,000 outstanding
"greenbacks , " the additional burden of
redemption of the silver money now
rapidly increasing by over $50,000,000 a
year. The result was inevitable. This
reckless and unparalleled tampering
with the standard of commercial trans
actions could neb go on long without
disaster. It was not until the winter of
1891 that men awoke out of the lethargy
existing since 1878.
The Full In the Value of Silver.
So far as the legislation of the United
States was regarded as a means of sup
porting the value of silver , it must be
admitted to be a failure. In February ,
1878 , the market ratio was 17.88 to 1 ; in
July , 1890 , it was 19.10 to 1 ; and since
then it has fallen to more than 80 to 1.
In face of these facts , further attempts
of this kind are unworthy the common
sense and dignity of a great nation.
These facts show better than words the
impotence of legislation by one state to
control the value of a metal affected by
the action of the rest of the world. But
this is low ground ; it is high time that
the principle should bo recognized that
it is not the province of the state to bol
ster up the price of any article. Even
if our legislation could keep up the value
of silver , and even if the interests of one
class of producers would bo thereby pro
tected , it should be denounced as con
trary to all sound principles of free gov
ernment. "When the price of iron or
copper rises or falls excessively , the con
sequences are left to the laws of trade ;
so it should bo with silver , under pres
ent circumstances. These circumstances ,
it should be remarked , are unparalleled
in the history of the precious metals. The
recent legislation of Austria-Hungary ,
looking to the establishment of a gold
standard , followed by the closing of the
Indians mints to silver , marks unmis
takably the end of all attempts by west
ern nations to rehabilitate silver as a
money of general legal-tender quality.
This is evidenced by the extraordinary
recent fall in the value of silver to half
its value in 1878.
Moreover , this fall in silver , without
any corresponding fall in the prices of
commodities and staple goods makes
clear , what may have been before doubt
ful , the departure of silver from a posi
tion where it can influence general
prices. Also neither in-1870 nor in 1890 ,
when silver fluctuated so greatly , did