m
\i\ \ \
Such is the Tenor of the Message on Cuban
Affairs Sent to the Two Houses of
Congress on Monday.
CANNOT RECOGNIZE ISLAND'S INDEPENDENCE
Executive Opposes Recognition of Beligerency as Inxpedientand Favors the
Granting of Authority to Use Such Armed Forces of the United
States as are Necessary to End Hostilities and
Establish a Stable Government.
WASHINGTON , April 12. The pres
ident sent the following message to
Iho congress of the United States :
Obedient to the precept of the con
stitution which commands the presi
dent to give congress from time to
time Information of the state'of the
union , and to recommend to their con
sideration such measures as he shall
Judge necessary and expedient , it be
comes my duty now to address your
body with regard io the grave crisis
that has arisen in the relations of
the United States to Spain , by reason
of the warfare that for more than
three years has raged in the neighbor
ing island of Cuba. I do so because
of the intimate connection of the Cu
ban question with the state of our
own union , and the grave relation the
course which is now incumbent upon
the nation to adopt must needs bear
to the traditional policy of our gov
ernment , if it is to accord whh the
precept laid down by the founders of
the republic and religiously observed
by succeeding administrations to the
present day. The present revolution
Is but the successor of other similar
insurrections which have occurred in
Cuba against the dominion of Spain ,
extending over a period of nearly
half a century , each of which , during
its progress , has subjected the Unite : !
States to great effort and expense in
enforcing its neutrality laws , caused
enormous losses to the American
trade and commerce , caused irritation ,
annoyance and disturbance among our
citizens , and , by the exercise cf cruel
and barbarous and uncivilized prac
tices of warfare , shocked the sensi
bilities and offended
the humane sym
pathies of our people.
Since the present revolution began
In February , 1895 , this country has
seen the fertile domain at our
threshold ravaged by fire and sword in
the course of a struggle unequaled in
the history of the island and rarely
paralleled as to the number of the
combatants and bitterness of the con
test by any revolution of modern
times where a dependent
people , striv
ing to be free , have been opposed by
the power of the sovereign state. Our
people have beheld a once prosper
ous community reduced to compara
tive want , its commerce virtually par
alyzed , its exceptional productiveness
diminished , its fields laid waste , its
mills in ruins and its people perish
ing by tens of thousands from hun
ger and starvation. We have found
1 ourselves constrained in the observ
ance of that strict neutrality which
our laws and which the law of na
tions enjoins , to police our own wat
ers and watch our own seaports in
prevention of any unlawful act in aid
of the Cubans. Our trade has suffer
ed so the capital invested
by our citi-
, * * * * * VrfA JCArl ) V 1 V JHJ.3 t
the forbearance of our people has
oeen so sorely tried to
as beget a
per-
Hous
unrest among our own citizens ,
which has inevitably found its expres
sion from time to time in the na
tional legislature so that issues whol
ly external to our own body politic )
earross attention and stand in the
way of that close devotion to Jomea- ii
iin
contented Cement that becomes a self- iio
commonwealth whose pri- o
. * * *
lZIu.1 D13 Y1TT1 M Q o lr
of all foreign entanglements. All'"this tlfi
must needs awaken and has indeed fia
aioused the utmost concern on the d
part of this dC
government , as well dur- C (
TnT F/edecessor's as my own. di
In April , 1896 , the evils from which dia :
our country suffered through th ° Cu VJ
ban war became so onerous that mv fe
predecessor made an effort to brine tl
about a peace through the mediation tlm
of this governbent in any way that vz
might tend to an honorable adjust ci
ment of the contest between Spain ciai
and Its coveted colony , ori the basis ai
of some effective scheme of self-gov aig
ernment for Cuba under the flag and fr
sovereignty of Spain. It failed , through le
the refusal of the Spanish government 01
then in power to consider
any form th
of mediation or indeed any plan of of f
settlement which did not begin with tit
the actual submission of the insur tei
gents to the mother country , and then
only on such terms as Spain Itself
might see fit to grant. The war con pr th
tinued unabated. The resistance of th
the Insurgents was In no wise dimin
Cli
ished.
l The efforts of Spain were increased. cemi
bJti by the dispatch of fresh levien mi
fei
to Cuba and by the addition to the
horrors of the strife of a new and in by
human phase happily unprecedented m <
in the modern history of civilized , su
Christian peoples. The policy of de Pr
vastation and concentration , inaugu hu
rated by General Weyler on October ofA
10 , 1S96 , in the province of Pinar del A
rio , was thence extended to embrace esOn <
all of the island to which the power of On
the Spanish arms was able to reach to
by occupation or by military opera tll (
tions. The peasantry , including all CO )
dwelling in the open agricultural in kii
terior , were driven into the garrison sui
towns or isolated places held by the the
troops. The raising and movement of lie :
provisions of all kinds were inter a (
dicted The fields were laid waste , he ;
dwellings unroofed and fired , mills d- . poi
stroyed and , in short , everything that thi
could desolate the land and render it th (
habitation or support
unfit for human of
was commanded to be destroyed , by
one or the other of the contending coi
parties , and executed by all the powers frc coi
at their disposal. . , , , .
By the time the present administra gn
tion took office , a year ago , reconcen- pr <
tration so-called had been mate * . - an
Jective over the better part of the four tri :
central and western provinces , Santa
Clara , Matanzas , Havana and Pinar del
Rio. The agricultural population , to
the estimated number of 300.000 or
more , was herded within the towns
and their immediate vicinage , deprived
of the means of support , rendered des
titute of shelter , left poorly clad and
exposed to the most unsanitary condi
tions.
As the scarcity of food Increased
with the devastation of the depopu
lated areas of production , destitution
and want became misery and starva
tion. Month by month the death rate
increased in an alarming ratio. By
March , 1897 , according to conservative
estimates , from official Spanish sources ,
the mortality among tlie reconcentra-
dos from starvation and the diseases
thereto incident exceeded 50 per
centum of their total nymber. Mo
practical relief was accorded to tin ?
d stitute. The overburdened towns ,
already suffering from the general
dearth , could give no aid. So-called
zones of cultivation established within
the immediate area of effective mili
tary control about the cities and forti
fied camps proved illusory as a remedy
for the suffering. The unfortunates ,
being for the most part women and
children , with aged and helpless men ,
enfeebled by disease and hunger , could
not have tilled the soil without tool. ? ,
seed or shelter for their own support ,
or for the supply of the cities. ll- -
concentration , adopted avowedly as a
war measure , in order to cut off the
resources of the insurgents , workad
its predestined results. As I said in
my message of last December , it was
not civilized warfare ; it was extermi
nation. The only peace it could beget
was that of the wilderness and ths
grave.
Meanwhile the mimary situation In
the island had undergone a noticeable
change. The extraordinary activity
that characterized the second year of
the war when the insurgents invaded
even the hitherto unharmed fields of
Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and
destitution up to the walls of the city
of Havana itself , had relapsed into a
dogged struggle in the central and
eastern provinces. The Spanish arms
regained a measure of control in Pinai
del Rio and parts of Havana , but.
under the existing conditions of thu
rural country , without immediate Im
provement of their productive situ
ation. Even thus partially restricted - f
stricted , the revolutionists had
their own territory and their
submission put forward by Spain as
the essential and sole basis of peace ,
seemed as far distant as at the outset.l
At this state of affairs my adminis
tration found itself confronted with
the grave problem of its duty. My
message of last December reviewed
the situation and detailed the steps
taken with a view of relieving its
some form of honorable settlement.
Fhe assassination of the prime min
ster , Canovas , led to a change of gov :
ernment in Spain. The former ad- ;
ninistration , pledged to subjugation i
vithout concession , gave place to that
f a more liberal party , committed ll
eng in advance to a policy of reform ,
nvolving the wider principle of home
ule for Cuba and Porto Rico. The
ivertures of this government , made
hrough its new envoy , General Wood-
ord , and looking to an immediate u
nd ; effective amelioration of the con-
lition of the island , although not ac- n
epted to the extent of admitted me- n
lation in any shape , were met by >
ssurances that home rule in .an ad- biv
anced phase would be forthwith of- bip <
ared to Cuba without awaiting for p :
he war to end , and that more hu-
lane methods should henceforth pre- fob
b
ail in the conduct of hostilities. In- :
ci
identally with these declarations the
ew government of Spain continued reHi
nd the Hi
completed policy already be- "
an by its predecessor of testifying
iendly regard for this nation by re- EC
sasing ; American citizens held under ai
ne charge or another connected with re
ie insurrection , so that , by the end .
November , not a single person en- . ?
tied in any way to our national pro-
iction remained In a Spanish prison. Wi
Wiile these negotiations were In CO
regress the Increasing destitution of CO
ie unfortunate reconcentradoes and TV"
alarming mortality among them
aimed earnest attention. The suc- ge
sss which had attended the limited
easure of relief extended to the suf- ° .r I
ring American citizens among them r
the judicious expenditure of the . '
oney appropriated expressly for their
iccor by the joint resolution ap- :
roved May 24 , 1897 , prompted the rei
imane extension of a similar scheme as
aid to the great body of sufferers ,
suggestion to this end was acqui- ;
ced in by the Spanish authorities.
f
the 24th of December last I caused
be issued an appeal to
e American people inviting
nd for the succor of the starving °
fferers in Cuba , following this one
tie
of by a similar pub-
e Sth January - of !
announcement of the formation of
in
central Cuban relief committee , with ou
sadquarters in New York city , com- ar <
ised of three members representing Ja <
e American National Red Cross and be ; ;
e religious and business elements ret
the community. The efforts of that Tet
mmittee have been untiring and ac- t
mplished much. Arrangements for ari
De transportation to Cuba have OUi
eatly aided the charitable work. The crc
esident of the American Red Cross the
id the representatives of other con- ses
ibutory organizations have senerous- ? 0'
ly visited oui > u and co-op < .r tea with
the consul general and the local au
thorities to make effective distiibution
of the relief collected through efforts
of the central committee. Nearly $200-
000 in money and supplies has already
reached the sufferers and more Is
forthcoming. The supplies are ad
mitted duty free and transportation
to .the interior has been arranged , FO
that the relief , at first necessarily
confined tolavana and the larger cit
ies , is now extended through most , if
not all , of the towns where suffering
exists. Thousands of lives have al
ready been saved. The necessity for a
change in the condition of the recon-
tradoes is recognized by the Spanish
government. Within a few days past
orders of General Weyler have been
revoked , the reconcentradoes are , it
is said , to be permitted to return to
their homes and aided to resume the
self-supporting pursuits of peace ; pub
lic works have been ordered to give
them employment and a sun of § 600-
000 has been apropriated for their
relief.
The war In Cuba is of cuch a nature
that short of subjugation or extermi-
ntion victory for either side seems
impracticable. The alternative lies in
the physical exhaustion of the one
or the other party , or perhaps of both
a condition which in efTc-ct ended
the ten years' war by the truce of
Zanjon. The prospect of such a pro
traction and conclusion of the pres
ent strife is a contingency hardly to
be contemplated with equanimity by
the civilized world , and least of all by
the United States , affected and in
jured as we are , deeply and intimately
by its very existence.
Realizing this , it appears to be my
duty , in a spirit of true friendliness ,
not less to Spain than to the Cubans
who have so much to lose by the
prolongation of the struggle , to seek
to bring about an immediate termina
tion of the war. To this end I sub
mitted on the 27th ultimo , as a re
sult of much representation and cor
respondence , through the United
States minister at Madrid , propositions
to the Spanish government looking
to an armistice until October 1 , for
the negotiations of peace with the
good offices of the president. In addi
tion I asked the immediate revocation
of the order of reconcentration , so as
to permit the people to return to their
farms and the needy to be relieved
with provisions and supplies from the
United States , co-operating with the
Spanish authorities so as to afford full
relief.
The reply of the Spanish cabinet
was received on the night of the 31st
ultimo. It offers , as the means to
bring about peace in Cuba , to confide
the preparation thereof to the insular
department , inasmuch as the concur
rence of that body would be necessary
to reach a final result , it being , how
ever , understood that the powers re
served by the constitution of the cen
tral government are not lessened or
diminished. As the Cuban parliament
does not meet until the 4th of May
next , the Spanish government would
not object , for its part , to accept at
once a suspension of hostilities , if
asked for by the insurgents from the
general-in-chief , to whom It would
pertain , in such case , to determine
the duration and conditions of the ar
mistice.
The proposition submitted by Gen
eral Woodford and the reply of the
Spanish government were both in the
form of brief memoranda , the texts
of which are before me , and are sub
stantially in the language above giv
en. The function of the Cuban par
liament in the matter of "preparing"
peace and the manner of its doing so
are not expressed in the Spanish mem
orandum ; but from General Wood-
ford's explanatory reports of prelim
inary discussions preceding the final
conference it is understood that the P
Spanish government stands ready to a
5ive the insular congress full pow- h
jrs to settle terms of peace with the tic ;
nsurgents whether by direct negotia- c :
ion or indirectly by means of legis- Pti
ation ! does not appear. tia
With this last overture in the direc- a
ion of immediate peace and its dis- "
ippointing reception by Spain , the bi
ixecutive was brought to the end of ci
lis effort. fcn
In iny annual message of December n
ast I said : "Of the untried meas- nivi
vi
ires there remain : Recognition of
he insurgents as belligerents ; recog- aj
lition : of the independence of Cuba ; S
leutral intervention to end the war
y imposing a rational compromise V
etween the contestants and inter-
cl
ention in favor of one or the other
iarty.
re
I speak not of
forcible annexation , th
or that cannot be thought of. That , fie
y our code of morality , would be su
riminal aggression. Thereupon , I er
eviewed these alternatives , in the
ght of President Grant's measured lai
rords , uttered in 1875 , when , after laiwl
sven years of sanguinary , destructive se
nd cruel barbarities in Cuba he Sti :
aached the conclusion that recogai- th
ion of the independence of Cuba was fa'I
npracticable and indefensible , and
lat the recognition of belligerence ta
as not warranted by the facts , ac- wl
srding to the tests of public law. I [
smmened especially upon the latter les
spect of the question , ointing out gr
ie inconveniences and positive dan- on
ers of a recognition , which , while CO
Jding to the already onerous burdens ini
neutrality within our own jurisdic- wl
on , could not in any way extend our th <
ifluence or effective offices in the ter- cei
tory of hostilities. Nothing has since illi
curred to change my view in this tie
igard , and I recognize as fully now '
then that the issuance of a procla- en'I
ation of neutrality , by which press -
em
ss the so-called recognition of bel-
' pri
Serence'is published , could not of its- niz
, and unattended by other action , dei
jcomplish nothing toward the one
id for which'we labor , the instant
icification of Cuba and the cessation
Turning to the question of interven-
on at this time , the independence
the present insurgent government
Cuba , we find safe precedents in
ir history from an early day.- They
e well summed up in President >
tckson's message to congress , Decem-
r 21 , 1826 , on the subject of the 5
cognition of the independence cf
sxas. He said :
"In all the contentions that have
isen out of the revolutions of .France
of the disputes relating to the
ews of Portugal and Spain , out of
e separation of the American pos-
sslons of both from the European 3
ivernment , and out of the numerous
consutiiviy occurring struggles for
domination In Spanish America , so
wisely consistent with our principles
has been the action of our government
that we have under the most critical
circumstances avoided all censure and
encountered no other evil than that
produced by a transient re-estrango-
ment of good will In those against
whom we have been by force of evi
dence compelled to decide. "
It has thus been made known to the
world that the uniform poliry and
practice of the United States is to
avoid all interference in disputes of
other nations , and eventually to recog
nize the authority of the prevailing
party without reference to the merits
of the original controversy. But on
this , as on every other occasion , safety
's to be found in a rigid adherence to
principle.
"In the contest between Spain anrt
the revolted colonies we stood aloof
and waited not only until the ability
of the new states to protect themselves
was fully established , but until the
danger of their being again subjugated
had entirely passed away. Then , and
not until then , were they recognized.
Such was our course In regard to
Mexico itself.
It Is true that with regard to Texas
the civil authority of Mexico has been
expelled , its invading army defeated ,
the chief of the republic himself cap
tured , and all present power to control
the newly organized government of
today annihilated within Its confines ,
but on the other hand there Is In ap
pearance , at least , an immense dis
parity of physical force on the side cf
Texas. The Mexican republic , under
another executive , is rallying its forces
under a new leader and menacing a
fresh invasion to recover its lost do
main.
"Upon the issue of this threatened
Invasion the Independence of Texas
may be considered as suspended , ana
were there nothing peculiar in the sit
uation of the United States and Texas ,
our acknowledgement of its indepen
dence at such a crisis should scarcely
be regarded as consistent with tha't
prudent reserve with which we have
hitherto held ourselves bound to treat
all similar questions. "
Thereupon Andrew Jackson pro
ceeded to consider the risk that there
might be imputed to the United States'
motives of selfish interests in view or
the former claim on our part to the
territory of Texas and of tne avowed
purpose of the Texans in seeking re
cognition of independence as an inci
dent to the incorporation of Texas 'n
the union , concluding thus :
"Prudence , therefore , seems to indi
cate that we should still stand aloof
and maintain our present attitude , if
not until Mexico itself , or one of the
great foreign powers shall recognize
the independence of the new govern
ment , at least until the lapse of time
or the course of events shall have
proved beyond cavil or dispute the
ability of the people of mat country
to maintain their separate sovereignty
and to uphold the government consti
tuted by them. Neither of the con
tending parties can justly complain of
this course. By pursuing it we are but
carrying out the long established pol
icy of our government , a policy which
has secured to us respect and influence
abroad and inspired confidence at
home. " These are the words of the
resolute and patriotic Jackson. They
are evidence that the United States , in
addition to the test imposed by public
law as to the condition of the recog
nition of independence by a neutral
state ( to-wit , that the revolted state
shall "constitute in fact a body politic n
having a government in substance as n
well as name , possessed of the ele tih
ments of stability and forming rte h
facto , if left to itself , a state among 01
the nations reasonable capable of dis- tin
jharging the duties of state ) : has im n
posed for its own goverance in dealing r
ivith cases like these the further con- rb >
lition that recognition of independent ol
statehood is not due to a revolted dependency fa
fahi
pendency until the danger of its being hire
igain subjugated by the parent state w
las entirely passed away. This ex- re
reme test was in fact applied in the
ase ; of Texas. The congress to whom itui
President Jackson referred the ques- ui
ion as "one probably leading to war" uim
md ; therefore a proper subject for a th
'previous ] understanding with that ca
locly , by whom war alone can be de- of
lared , and by whom all the provisions su
or sustaining its perils must be fur- re
lished : , " left the matter of the recog- reM
lition of Texas to the executive pro- M [
iding merely for sending a diplomatic a
ast
gent , when the president should be st :
atisfied that the republic of Texas or
ad become "an independent state. " tote
tom
It was so recognized by President m
ran ; Buren , who commissioned a to
harge ; cl' affaires March 17 , 1837 , after th
lexico had abandoned an attempt to pete
econquer the Texan territory and
lien there was at the time no bona to i
de contest going on between the in- dii :
urgent province and its former sov- ofm i
reiga. m
I said in my message of December foi
ist : "It is to be seriously considered ths
hether the Cuban insurrection pos- ho
3sses ; beyond dispute the attributes of tei
atehood , which alone can demand rel
ie recognition of belligerency in its tai
ivor. " of
The I same requirement must cer- all
ilnly : be no less seriously considered thi
hen the graver issue of recognizing Pli
dependence is in question , for ness mi
ss positive test can be applied to the isE
eater < act than to the lesser , while
the other hand the influences and spi
msequences ! of the struggle upon the fro
.ternal policy of a recognizing state , Spi
hich form Important factors when the
ie recognition of belligerency is con-
irned , are secondary if not rightly cisi
iminable factors when the real ques- 1
an is whether the community claim1
g recognition is or is not independobj
it beyond peradventure. wa
Nor from the standpoint of expedi- ins
ice do I think it would be wise or der
udent for this government to recog- not
ze at the" present time the indepen- can
ace of the so-called Cuban republicme
ich recognition is not necessary in rep
der to enable the United States to Ion
tervene and pacify the island. To pac
mmit this country to the recognition hui
any particular government in Cuba in 1
ight subject us to embarrassing conint ; <
tions of international obligation todut
ird the organization so recognized. Cul
case of intervention our conduct P
uld be subjected to the approval or CUH
sapproval of such government and the :
would be required to submit to its app
rection and assume to it the mere " :
lation of a friendly ally. When it tha
all appear hereafter that there is to t
thin the island a government capvol1
le of performing the duties and dis- con
arging the functions of a separate pos ;
tion , and having as a matter of fact Owi
proper forms and attributes of of
tlonality , such government can be the
promptly and readily recognized , and
the relatious and Interests of the
United States with such nation ad
justed.
There remain the alternative forms
of intervention to end the war , either
as an impartial neutral , by imposing
a rational compromise between the
contestants or as an active ally of the
one party or the other.
As to the first , it is not to be forgot
ten that during the last few months
the relation of the United States has
virtually been one of friendly Inter
vention in many ways , not so conclu
sive , but all lending to tne exertion of
a potential Influence toward an ulti
mate pacific result , just and honorable
to all Interests concerned. The spirit
of au our acts hitherto has been an
earnest , unselflsn desire for peace and
prosperity in Cuba , untarnished by
differences between us an * . cpaln , and
unstained by the blood of American
citizens.
The forcible Intervention of the
Uniced ucates as a neutrnl to stop the
war , according to the dictates of hu
manity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring states
have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifice of life by internecine conflicts
beyond their borders. Is justifiable
on national grouuds. It involves ,
however , hostile constraint upon both
the parties to the contest , as well to
enforce a truce as to guide the event-
tual settlement.
The grounds for such intervention
may be briefly summarized as follows :
1. In the cause of humanity and to
put an end to the barbarities , blood
shed , starvation and horrible miseries
now existing there , and which the
parties to the conflict are either un
able or unwilling to stop or mitigate.
It is no answer to say this is all in
another country , belonging to another
nation and is therefore none of our
business. It is specially our duty for
It is right at our door.
2. We ewe it to our citizens in Cuba
to afford them that protection and in
demnity for lifo and property which
no government there can or will afford
and to that end to terminate the con
ditions which deprive them of legal 11
protection. 11r 11c
3. The right to intervene may be r
justified by the very serious Injury to i
the commerce. ' trade and business of a
our people and by the wanton destruc ii
tion of property and devastation of iia iit
the island. a
4. And which Is of the utmost im e
portance. The present condition of t
affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to y
our peace , and entails upon this gov yii
ernment an enormous expense. With ii
such a conflict waged for years In an iiP
island so near us and with wnich our
people have such trade and business d
relations when the lives and liberty ti
of our citizens are in constant danger tin
and their property destroyed and ti ;
themselves ruined where tiri
our trading ri
vessels are liable to seizure and are It
seized at our very door by war ships Ith
of a foreign nat.on , the expeditions of
it
filibustering that WP are powerless to
le
prevent altogether and the irritating leui
ui
luestions and entanglements thus aris
ing all these and others tiiat I need m
bi
not mention with the resulting
strained relations are a constant men
ace to our peace and como" ' us to keep siw
on a semi-war footing with a nation w
tvith which we are at peace. 02
These elements of danger and dis- 02D
srder already pointed out have been D
strikingly illustrated by a tragic event ti !
which has deeply and justly moved the tiw
American people. I have already trans- w
nitted to congress the report of the ofCi
laval court of inquiry on the destruc- Ci
ion of the battlesliip Maine in the eqm
larbor of Havana during the night m
if the loth of February. The destruc- ba
ion of that noble vessel has filled the th
lational ; heart with inexpressible sor- th
thmi
ow. 'iwo hundred and fifty-eight mice
rave ; sailors and marines and two co
ifficers of our navy , reposing in the in 1
ancied security of a friendly harbor , du
iave been hurled to death grief and
rant brought to their homes and sor-
ow to the nation. . its
The naval court of inquiry , which , to
needless to commands the
is say , an
nqualified confidence of the govern-
icnt , was unanimous in its conclusion 1
tiat the destruction of the Maine was )
aused by an exterior explosion , that me
a submarine mine. It did not as-
ne
ume to place the responsibility. That
wa
smains to be lixed.
pr (
In any event , the destruction of the ab
aine. ; by whatever exterior force. J5
by
patent and Impressive proof of a
ate : of things in Cuba that is intol-
it
able. That condition Is thus shown
be such that the Spanish govern-
ient < cannot assure safety and security sel
a vessel of the American navy in int
ie harbor of Havana on a mission of out
jace and rightfully there. these
Further referring in this connection seam
recent diplomatic correspondence , a am
spatch from our minister to Spain
the 2Gth ult. contained the state- offer
ent < that the Spanish minister for for
ireign affairs assured him positively the
lat Spain will do all that the highest of
mor and Justice requires in the mat- ord
r of the Maine. The reply above to ]
iferred to of the 31st ult. also con- the
ined an expression of the readiness hav
Spain to submit to an arbitration me.
the differences which can arise in nen
is mazier , which is subsequently ex- hav
lained by the note of the Spanish in
inister at Washington of the 10th inwhi
st. follows
as : me ;
"As to the question of fact which thei
rings from the diversity of views pea
sm the report of the American and If i
lanish boards Spain proposes that tific
fact be ascertained by an impartial
vestigation by experts , which de-
iion Spain accepts in advance. "
To this I have made no reply. '
The long trial has proved that the COB
ject for which Spain has waged the oth <
ir cannot be attained , 'ine fire of
surrection may flame or may smoul- ; ? ,
with varying seasons , but it has , .
t been , and it is not plain that it ao"
be , extinguished by present .
thods. The only hope of relief an l scje
pose from a condition -which cannot v
iper be endured is the enforced has ;
cification of Cuba. In the name of Dry
manitv , in the name of civilization , race
behalf of the endangered American side
erests , which gives us the right anil sideW
ty to speak and to act , the war in W
ba must stop. turi
Resident Grant. In 1873 , after dip evei
ping ; the nhases uf the contest as it was
n apeared and its hopelessness and "On
aarent indefinite prolongation , said : youi
'In such event I am of the opinion youi
it other nations will be compelled tion
assume the responsibility which de said i
lves upon them and to seriously Yan !
isider the only remaining measures mon
ssible , mediation and intervention , of 01
ing. perhaps , to the large expanse 01W
water senaratinp the Island from W
peninsula , the contending parties tune
appear to have within themselves uo
depository of common confidence to
suggest wisdom when passion and ex
citement have their sway , and to as
sume the part of peacemakers. In this J
case , In the earlier days cf the contest ,
the good omces of the United States as
a mediator were tendered In good faith
without any selfish purpose. In the
interest of humanity and In sincere
friendship for both parties , but were
at the time declined by Spain with the
declaration nevertheless that at a fu
ture time they would be Indispensable.
No intimation has been received that
in Its opinion that time has been
reached , and yet the strife continues
with all Its dread horrors and injuries
to the interests of the United States
and of other nations. Each party
seems quite capable of working great
injury and damage to the other as
well as to all tba relations and inter
ests dependent upon the existence of
peace In the island , but they seem In
capable of reaching any adjustment ,
and both have thus far failed of
achieving any success whereby one
party shall possess and control the
island to the exclusion of the other.
Under Ihe circumstances the agency
of others , either by mediation or by
Intervention , seems to bo the only al
ternative which must sooner or later
be invoked for the termination of the
strife. "
In view of these facts and these con
siderations. I ask the congress to au
thorize and empower the president to
take measures to secure a full settlp-
ment and termination of hostilities
between 1 the government of Spain and
the 1 people of Cuba , and to secure In
the 1I I island the establishment of a stable
government 1 capable of maintaining
order 1c and observing Its International
obligations , ensuring peace and trarf-
quillty and the security of its citizens ,
as well as our own , and to use the
jT military ji and naval forces of the
United States as may be necessary for
these purposes , and in the interest of
humanity and to aid in preserving the
lives of the starving people of the
i island , I recommend that the distrib
ution of food and supplies be contin
ued and that an appropriation be mada
out of the public treasury to supple
ment the charity of our citizens. The
issue Is now with the congress. It is
a solemn responsibility. I have ex
hausted every effort to relieve the in
tolerable condition of affairs which is
at our doors. Prepared to execute
svery obligation imposed upon me by
Lhe : constitution and the laws , I await
your action.
In the last annual message of my
mmediate predecessor , during the
lending struggle , it was said :
"When the inability of Spain to
leal successfully with the insurrec-
ion has become manifest and it Is de-
nonstrated that its sovereignty Is ex-
inct in Cuba for all purposes of its
ightfuT existence , and when a hone-
ess struggle for its re-establishment
las degenerated into a strife which
neans nothing more than the use-
ess sacrifice of human life and the
itter destruction of the very subject
natter of the conflict , a situation will
IB presented in which our obligations
0 the sovereignty of Spain will bo
uperseded by higher obligations ,
fhich we can hardly hesitate to rec-
gnize and discharge.
In my annual message to congress ,
ecember last , speaking of this ques-
on , I said :
"The near future will demonstrate
rhether the Indispensable condition
f a righteous peace , just alike to the
lubans and to Spain , as well aa
suitable to all our Interests so intl-
lately involved in the welfare of Cu-
a , is likely to be attained. If not ,
ie exigency of further and other ae
on by the United States will re-
lain to be taken. When the time
jmes that action will be determined
f
the line of indisputable right and
ity. It will be faced without mis-
ving or hesitancy in the light of the
oligation this government owes to
self , to the people who have confided
it the protection of their interests
id honor , and to humanity.
"Sure of the right , keeping free from
offense ourselves , actuated only by
right and patriotic considerations ,
oved neither by passion nor selfish-
jss : , the government will continue its
atchful care over the rights and
operty of American citizens and will
iate ; none of its efforts to bring about
peaceful agencies a peace which
all be honorable and enduring. If
shall i hereafter appear to be a duty
iposed by our obligations to our-
tves , to civilization and humanity to
tervene with force , it shall be with-
t fault on our part and only because
necessity for such action will be
clear as to command the support
d approval of the civilized world. "
i'esterday and since the praparation
the foregoing message , official in-
mation was received by me that
latest decree of the queen regent
Spain directs General Blanco , in
ler to prepare and facilitate peace ,
proclaim a suspension of hostilities
duration and details of which
ve not yet been communicated to X ,
This fact , with every other pertl-
at consideration , will , I am sure ,
ve your just and careful attention
the solemn deliberations upon
ich you are about to enter. If this
iasure attains a successful result ,
in our aspirations as a Chritian
ice loving people will be realized ,
it fails it will be only another jus-
cation for our contemplated p.ctlon
WILLIAM M'KINLET.
Executive Mansion , April 11.
'Don't you see. " said the Atlanta
nstitution's colored veteran , the
er day , "what dey doin' wid de nig-
s in dis heah war time ; en ein't
les ez I tol' you ? " "W'y whut dey
n' ? " "Well , suh , ef dey ain't gone
sent a whole regiment er cullud
ers ter de Dry Tortures ! Min' you
tuk 'urn all fum a Ian' vrhar dey
local option en sent 'um ter de
Tortures ! I tells you , de cullud
ain't get no show 'tall on de ton
er deworl' ! "
Fhen Gen. John B. Gordon was lee-
ing in Owasso , Mich. , the other
ning , a telegram from the south
handed to him. which he read-
ie hundred and fifty thousand of
ir comrades stand ready to follow
r lead in the protection of
our na-
lal honor. " After reading It he
: "I think I hear rebel yells'and
ikee hurrahs
mingled
as our com-
country unites in the protection
iur flag.
Thy Isn't a girl's figure her for-
instead o her face ?
