

Former 92nd Officer Indicts Army Policy

"Report on the Negro Soldier" by Warman Welliver, one of the white officers with the 92nd Division, reprinted in the May Headlines and Pictures from Harper's Magazine states that this country's policy for colored troops had been a most complete military failure. Mr. Welliver contends that colored infantry units were ineffective and gives the Negro's inferior position in American society as the chief reason. "The fact that the colored man, by and large, has never been privileged to feel this stimulus to action," Mr. Well-

iver writes, "or perhaps the fact that when he has felt it, after a too early, too believing study of the Declaration of Independence or the Constitution, he has been subsequently rudely awakened to reality—has formed a tremendous barrier to his ability, let alone desire, to be a competent soldier." The author of "Report on the Negro Soldier" served for two years with Negro troops—the 92nd Division. He points out that the Army failed to choose either white officers who wished to serve with colored troops or white

officers of superior ability.... In fact, it often seemed in the 92nd that the War Department had chosen exactly the officers who would guarantee the division the least possible chance for success. Mr. Welliver believes that mixed fighting units are the answer to the problems the War Department face in using Negroes effectively. However he adds that "the goal of effective mixed combat units will not be reached without understanding, leadership, and planning of a high order."

THE RIGHT TO DISSENT



by Ruth Taylor

My favorite war story was the one about the Cockney soldier who, when one of those annoying people who ask question queried him as to his reasons for fighting, replied, "We're fighting the war to keep the most important right an Englishman has—the right to be against the government." The right to dissent is the most important freedom guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, for upon it hang all our other freedoms. All of our rights are rights to disagree. Freedom of religion, freedom from unwarranted search and seizure, of trial by jury—what are they but freedoms to dissent from the majority opinion?

Some of the decisions of the Supreme Court which are most remembered are those dissenting opinions of the Great Dissenter, Justice Holmes, who in his non-assenting opinions represented the liberal vein of thought of his day.

However, only as we fulfill our responsibilities do we entitle ourselves to the right to dissent. Only free men can afford to disagree because only free men can be trusted to observe the rights of others and the formalities of orderly intercourse.

Where there is danger in dissent is when it becomes dictatorial. Hitler's Brown Shirts parading the streets of Munich, degrading everything and everyone, were unimportant and rather ridiculous until they began to turn their dissent into demands and to try to stifle that very freedom which had been their own safeguard. Dictatorial dissent is a peril to any government. Such is the dissent of a highly organized minority, of a pressure group which holds out for special privilege.

Let us not forget that we fought for the right to disagree. We fought for the right of free men to be against the person or thing in which they do not believe—and to express that difference in speech and orderly action. We must remember the words of Wilson "The seed of revolution is repression."

In planning for the future let us keep this right to dissent well in mind, realizing all that it implies and remembering always that the Bill of Rights is but the Amendment to the constitution of Responsibilities.

INDUSTRIAL LABOR RELATIONS

by George E. DeMar for CNS

There is considerable planning now for the young people who will finish school and become part of the labor market. Most thinking is generally related to the employer—the wages, the hours, the leave, the vacation and general working conditions. It seems to me that we had better do a little more thinking about the employees' responsibility, particularly on jobs where they are appearing for the first time.

Recently a Negro employee of one of the public utilities talked with me about how the Negro employees were acting. Said she, the first girls who entered the employ of the company mixed easily and well with the white employees, but the more recent ones are not staying on the job. They quit after about six months. They do not show up for work on Mondays and after holidays. They bunch together in the dining room even to the extent of taking chairs from other tables. They argue in the cafeteria line and do not seem to realize that they, through their actions, are effecting the attitude of management toward all Negroes. One girl, who knows that the company allows ten days for marriage, has been off the job now for two weeks. She has not phoned the supervisor as to when she will return, nor has she sent a thank-you note for the wedding gift to which all the girls contributed. All of this in a firm that changed its policy two years ago. To me this activity points up the need for Negroes in industrial relations personnel.

However, it seems only logical that after individuals and organizations pave the way for better job opportunities, the workers should learn good race relations and job habits. Many of us can lay plans for the new-comers to the labor market and interest employers in their skills, but skill doing the technical job is not enough. Once on the job, it is up to the individual to assume job responsibility and behave as befits a reliable, efficient, courteous and friendly worker. Young workers are welcomed to the labor market. I hope they use mother-wit, their home and church training to make secure their status in the world of work.

American Legion Presents Flags to J. E. Davidson, Recognizing Service



J. E. DAVIDSON shows his new flags, presented to him by the American Legion, to Roy Page, Vice-President and General Manager of Nebraska Power Company.

In recognition of his service to the American Legion, American Legion Post No. 1 presented a set of silk desk flags to J. E. Davidson, president of the Nebraska Power Company, National Commander Warren Atherton was the principal speaker at the April meeting, at which time the presentation was made. The flag stand holds Old Glory and the American Legion flag, and it also carries the national emblem of the Legion. The back of this emblem has the following engraved inscription: "Presented to J. E. Davidson in recognition of his services to the American Legion."

In thanking Commander Vincent C. Hasall of Omaha Post No. 1 for this honor, Mr. Davidson said: "From the time Omaha Post No. 1 was organized, as an American citizen I have had a very high regard for its Legionnaires. I have cherished the opportunity to do what I could for the American Legion, in my endeavors to indicate in a small way my respect and admiration for you all."

In 1929, Mr. Davidson was selected by the Legion as Omaha's outstanding citizen of that year and was presented the American Legion Civic Service Citation.

The suit against Colliers following an editorial criticizing him in connection with the lynchings of a Negro of Florida. He termed the statement as libelous, damaging and detrimental to his character.

PHONOGRAPH RECORD COMPANY ORGANIZED

Hamp-Tone Records, Inc., a new phonograph record company, organized for the purpose of providing an outlet for promising Negro talent, has been formed, it was announced today. The Jefferson-Travis Corporation with its extensive interests in the record field, through the recent acquisition of the Musicraft and Gull labels, will have a substantial financial interest in the Hamp-Tone label, and will also provide the necessary pressing and distribution facilities. Gladys Hampton, wife of Lionel Hampton, well-known Negro band leader, will function as president of the new corporation.

Veterans Promised Aid by National Housing Agency

Every effort will be made to assure Negro veterans and veterans of other minority groups equal consideration under the Veterans Emergency Housing program, Wilson W. Wyatt, Nat'l Housing Expediter and Administration of the National Housing Agency, declared today.

Start of construction of 2,700,000 low and medium cost homes and apartments for veterans and their families by the end of 1947 is aimed at under the emergency program.

"In a recent order channeling bldg. materials into low-cost homes and rental projects state and district directors of the Federal Housing Administration have been asked to encourage local builders to construct homes both for sale and for rent to veterans of minority groups and their economic ability to purchase or rent," Mr. Wyatt said.

"The Federal Public Housing Authority has adopted and is pursuing definite policies and procedures regarding emergency housing for other minority group veterans in temporary re-use housing under the Veterans Emergency Housing Program.

"All Mayor's Emergency Housing Committees have been urged to give special attention to the housing problems of veterans and their economic ability to purchase or rent," Mr. Wyatt said.

"The housing of minority group veterans in accordance with needs is beset with peculiar problems," Mr. Wyatt said. "A large proportion of them fall into the lower or lowest income groups and cannot afford to purchase homes at prevailing prices. Consequently, it is necessary to provide for them a high proportion of dwelling units at low rentals. The requirement, under the channeling order, that 25 percent of new residential construction shall be rental units is a step in that direction. Passage of the Wagner-Elender-Taft Bill is needed to provide large numbers of permanent homes to meet the needs of the large proportion of Negro veterans in the low income bracket who cannot afford economic rents."

"Because of neighborhood resistance upon the use of land, new home sites for Negroes are often difficult to acquire," Mr. Wyatt continued. "During the war these restrictions often delayed and sometimes completely blocked private and public efforts to produce housing for essential Negro war workers. An early solution of this problem is required if the Veterans' Emergency Housing Program is to succeed in providing needed homes for Negro veterans. Cities have been asked to make special efforts to provide sites for Negro housing."

Louis Jordan Fights Against Himself for Top Billing

NEW YORK. (Calvin's News Service).—Louis Jordan, now on a tour of one nighters through Ohio, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Missouri, will soon be fighting against himself for top billing at the Oriental Theatre in Chicago. When the famed bandmaster begins a

two weeks engagement there on May 2nd, he will be billed as Louis Jordan, the Man who sings the Blues and His Decca Recording Orchestra. That will be the stage attraction. But on the screen will be a little Nixie in Jordan's saxophone. For the film, Jordan himself, will be the midwestern premiere for his 28 minute short "Caldonia." Produced by himself and with himself as the star, it will be quite a task to distinguish which will get the best billing. After all, whichever way it goes Jordan will be sure to win out!

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WEEKLY NEWS ANALYSIS Congress to Probe Diplomacy of State Department; Maneuver to Modify Demands of CIO Unions

Released by Western Newspaper Union. (EDITOR'S NOTE: When opinions are expressed in these columns, they are those of Western Newspaper Union's news analysis and not necessarily of this newspaper.)



Although handicapped by an almost complete lack of tools, these German prisoners of war in PW camp at Fowey, England, still managed to turn out this varied collection of toys to help fill Santa's bag for little Britons. The amateur workmen included a former Berlin judge, a doctor from Hamburg and university students.

U. S. DIPLOMACY: Duplicity Charged

Long under fire for its implementation of American foreign policy in the wake of U. S. victories on the battlefield, the state department was scheduled for congressional investigation following ex-Amb. Patrick Hurley's charge that some of its personnel had worked counter to his efforts to promote the unification of China.

In losing his bombshell on Capitol Hill, Hurley declared that certain professional diplomats were inviting future conflict by siding with the Chinese communist party and the imperialistic bloc of nations in keeping China divided against itself and unable to resist encroachment.

While he worked for a democratic China which could act as stabilizing influence in the Orient, Hurley charged, some state department officials told the Chinese communists that his activities did not reflect the policy of the U. S. and they should not enter into a unified government unless retaining military control.

Agreement to investigate the state department followed the demand of Senator Wherry (Rep., Neb.) for an inquiry to determine whether there was any variance between U. S. foreign policy and the Potsdam declaration and whether the foreign service was interfering with domestic affairs in South America, influencing other countries toward communist government, or clashing with the army and navy over occupation policy.

Meanwhile, Gen. George C. Marshall, ex-chief of staff, prepared to embark upon his duties as special envoy to China in the midst of Chiang Kai-shek's redoubling of efforts to unify the country and open the way for vigorous postwar economic expansion. In announcing his program to modernize the country, Chiang declared the No. 1 goal would be the improvement of transportation to facilitate an exchange of materials between the various regions.

LABOR: On Defensive

Heretofore on the offensive with its demands for higher wages to maintain high wartime pay, the CIO was suddenly thrown back on the defensive with the Ford Motor company's proposal that the United Automobile workers pay a \$5 a day fine for workers involved in unauthorized strikes.

Ford asked for this protection against production losses as officials continued negotiations with the UAW, whose leaders have maintained that the industry can afford 30 per cent pay boosts without raising prices because of large reserves and promises of substantial profits from huge postwar output.

While UAW immediately challenged the effectiveness of a fine in curbing wildcat walkouts, Ford officials insisted that the union could exert sufficient pressure on its locals to prevent unauthorized strikes, slowdowns and controlled production.

Meanwhile, General Motors, reversing a previous stand, agreed to consult with government officials concerning resumption of negotiations with the UAW after the union gave ground in its demands for a 30 per cent wage increase. With the company holding out for a modification of terms, the UAW declared that it would seek no wage increase.

Gen. Yamashita

First major axis personality to be brought to trial for war crimes, Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita, erstwhile "Tiger of Malaya" and Jap commander in the Philippines, flatly denied charges of countenancing rape, pillage and murder and then rested his case.

As the Allied military tribunal pondered the case, Yamashita considered appeal to the U. S. Supreme court in case of conviction on grounds of illegality of the proceedings. Previously the Philippine Supreme court had refused a similar protest, with the demand that the defendant be freed for trial before civil authorities.

In taking the stand to deny charges against him, the squat, browned Jap general declared he ordered none of the atrocities related by scores of witnesses or contained in hearsay evidence admitted by the court. To the accusation that he had planned the extermination of the Filipinos, Yamashita declared that common sense indicated the impracticability of killing 18 million people.

The case against Yamashita was complicated by the apparent division of command in Japanese ground, naval and air forces in the Philippines. While as ground commander Yamashita said he had ordered the withdrawal of his troops from Manila for warfare in the mountains, Nipponese naval detachments remained within the capital for the fighting which heavily damaged the city and exposed civilians to danger.

PEARL HARBOR: Kept Top Secret

Because of a desire to keep secret the U. S. breaking of the Japanese code, the intercepted messages revealing Jap political and military moves were known only to nine top officials, Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, former head of army intelligence, told the congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor.

Along with President Roosevelt, others possessing knowledge of the decoded messages included Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of State Hull, Lt. Gen. L. T. Gerow, head of the war plans division, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Admiral Stark, chief of naval operations, Col. R. S. Bratton of the army intelligence staff, Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff, and Miles.

Though Maj. Gen. Walter Short and Rear Adm. Husband Kimmel were not apprized of the breaking of the code, Miles said, they were kept informed of the course of events. However, with officials anticipating an attack in the far east, Short and Kimmel were advised to take only such action as they deemed necessary at Pearl Harbor and guard against sabotage.

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THE COMMON DEFENSE EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

(by Dr. John J. Mahoney, Director Harvard-Boston University Extension Courses)

The unfinished work before us, the living, is that of perpetuating and improving the workings of that democracy which some thousands of Americans have died to defend in two world wars.

At long last the general public is becoming aware that our schools and colleges must address themselves to the task of EDUCATING FOR DEMOCRACY much more purposefully and realistically than has been the case hitherto. With a public awake to the need, we shall soon come to grips with this business of educating for democracy, for citizenship, for civic competency. But we have a long way to go.

The kind—or field—of education that aims to develop those understandings, attitudes and behaviors that make for better living together in the democratic way is our infant educational industry. To organize and put into operation a program of teachings and activities specifically designed to attain that end is the educator's unfinished work IMPOR-

TANT WORK. For—let it be said pointedly—despite all the education in our schools and colleges, how to live together well and in the democratic way is the one lesson that the American people have least learned.

We must attempt to make clear what education for democracy, or civic education, includes and involves. It outlines a program of school work that aims very definitely at the elimination of those shortages that mark and mar our attempt to make democracy function in every life relationship—political, social and economic. Reduced to specific terms, that means a program of teachings and activities that aim to produce an adequate understanding of and a whole-hearted allegiance to the democratic way of life; a keen interest in things political; the application of more intelligence in the conduct of political affairs; better political leadership; a citizenry that is more law-abiding; intergroup understanding, respect and goodwill; the ability and the disposition to manage our economic order for the benefit of all; and last and all important, a translation of the teachings of religion into civic behavior.

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
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R. C. PRICE Candidate Board of Education

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