

English Deal Fairly at Treaty Parley--Collins

Seventh installment of "Michael Collins' Own Story," is presented today to readers of The Omaha Sunday Bee.

Love of country, instilled while still a boy, was the outstanding characteristic of the young Irish leader who, through an American newspaper correspondent, has bared facts in regard to Erin's struggle for freedom never before revealed. Final chapters of the narrative were given the correspondent shortly before Collins' assassination.

How the Easter week uprising, instead of being an ignominious failure, became a spur to Irish loyalty because England treated the disturbance seriously has been explained in previous installments. Because of England's action, perpetrators of the uprising went to martyrs' deaths, declared Prof. Eoin MacNeill, to whom Collins sent the writer of his story to get this part of the tale "first hand."

By HAYDEN TALBOT.
Copyright, 1922, New York American.

CHAPTER XIV--Continued.

"I anticipated what subsequently turned out to be the fact, Britain must represent to us that the north-east would never acquiesce in more, while representing them that in such a settlement they would be preserving that which they professed to have at heart, the sentimental tie with the nation to which they were supposed to be attached.

"In those preliminary conferences, a few of us held that any settlement which did not include the possibility of an united Ireland--which was not predicated on the living truth, THAT EVERY IRISHMAN IS FIRST AN IRISHMAN WITH RIGHTS THE SAME AS THOSE OF EVERY OTHER IRISHMAN--would be unacceptable to us.

Coercion Is Frowned Upon

"For the most part De Valera--at first--seemed to be in accord with the views voiced by Griffith and me. As little by little Childrens' views were worked into our councils, however, De Valera's attitude gradually changed.

"From beginning to end, Stack and Brugha were unqualifiedly hostile to the whole idea of entering into negotiations with England. Yet for a long time we had all been agreed on the fundamental wisdom of no coercion for Ulster. Likewise we were one in our conviction that a divided Ireland could never be a free Ireland.

"It was--and, more's the pity, it still is--this serious internal problem which led some of us to argue for the attainment of the final steps of freedom by evolution rather than by force. If we could obtain substantial freedom by consenting to association with the British empire it would at least give us time to teach the northeast to evolve in the Irish orbit and to get out of the orbit of Great Britain.

"We held that in acquiescing in a peace which would admittedly involve some postponement of the fulfillment of our national sentiment--by agreeing to some association of our Irish nation with the British nation--we would be going a long way toward meeting the sentiment of the northeast in its supposed attachment to England.

"Against these counsels the uncompromising republicans raised up the objection that by consenting to bargain with England before she recognized the republic--we should be letting the republic down. But De Valera himself pointed to the fact that this was not an issue to be argued then.

"Mr. Lloyd George had already made it clear that no such recognition would be granted. Further, we had no right to expect that the Irish republic would be recognized if we should have to use our resources to coerce northeast Ulster into submission. None of the conferees was prepared to sponsor such a course of action.

Peace Offer Already Made

"We had long since concluded that coercion--even if it succeeded--could never have the lasting effects which conversation on our side, and acquiescence on theirs, would produce.

"Our position at this time, as it appeared to me, was one of greater strength than ever before in the history of Ireland under English rule.

"From the English viewpoint, peace with Ireland had become a necessity to the British cabinet. Alas, Mr. Lloyd George, in July 1921, had made a peace offer to De Valera. That offer had not been acceptable to the Irish people.

"Referring to Mr. Churchill, at London, in September of the same year, had said:

"... this offer is put forward, not as the offer of a party government conferred by a Parliament opposed to and anxious to bargain for the Irish vote, but with the united sanction of both the main parties in the state and, indeed, all parties. It is a national offer."

"I had long since concluded that coercion--even if it succeeded--could never have the lasting effects which conversation on our side, and acquiescence on theirs, would produce.

strength. But I fought the stupid notion that we were strong enough to rely on force alone.

No Real Change of Heart Seen

"England wanted peace with Ireland, true; but if Ireland made impossible demands we could be shown to be irreconcilable--and then England would again have a free hand for whatever further measures of force might be necessary to restore law and order in a country that would not accept the responsibility of doing so for itself.

"I was under no delusion that the offer indicated any real change of heart on the part of England towards Ireland.

"In this respect I was entirely at one with the uncompromising republicans. But I held that then, as always, England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity--and we should be fools to fail to seize it merely because behind the offer was no sincerity of good will.

"It seemed to me to make no difference that an awakening conscience had nothing to do with the English offer. It is true that there were stirrings of conscience felt by a minority of Englishmen--the minority that had opposed England's intervention in the European war.

"They were the peaceful group, averse to bloodshed on principle. They were opposed to the killing we had to do in order to get our rights. As such they were opposed to the aggressive killing of our people by the British agents sent to Ireland for that purpose.

"I urged that we waste no time in considering this phase of the situation. Pacifists the world over are almost without political power and have very little popular support. The point was that peace had become necessary to England.

"It was not because she had repented in the very middle of her black and tan terror. It was not because she could not subject us; it was because she had not succeeded in subjecting us before the world's conscience awakened and made itself felt.

"We had ample evidence of this. There was, for instance, the frank admission of Lord Birkenhead in the British House of Lords early in August:

"The progress of the coercive attempts made by the government has proved in a high degree disappointing.

"From every side came proofs that world sympathy was with us--positive sympathy for the most part. It was not done no more--and we had done much more--the winning of world sympathy was itself a great asset in the proposed negotiations with England.

"What it was never possible to make the more extreme of our conferees appreciate was that we had not beaten and never could hope to beat the British military forces. We had thus far prevented them from contravening our achievement. And in July, 1921, we had reached the high water mark of what we could do in the way of economic and military resistance.

"I suppose there are Irishmen who will go to their graves still cherishing the notion that continuation of the struggle would have ended in an overwhelming victory for Irish arms. It is a pity, but it is a fact. To such men figures mean nothing. They will not see.

"But even some of these uncompromising republicans had their moments of sanity. Some of them at least are on record as recognizing our inability to beat the British out of Ireland. See what Mr. Barton had to say in The Republic of Ireland in its issue of February 21, 1922:

"... it had become plain that it was physically impossible to secure Ireland's ideal of a completely isolated republic otherwise than by driving the ever-hungry, ever-jealous British forces out of the country.

"I had long since concluded that coercion--even if it succeeded--could never have the lasting effects which conversation on our side, and acquiescence on theirs, would produce.

Erskine Childers' asinine scheme to get England to consent to a "hands off" policy toward Ireland, deportations of Sinn Feiners, Boland's devotion for De Valera and the Sinn Fein convention in October, 1917, also have been detailed.

"Lloyd George was not to blame, except nominally, for the English policy during the period of 1917-21." This perhaps is one of the most startling statements made by Collins, who asserted that the British prime minister's attention was absorbed in the world war during that period and left other matters to those under him.

The smashing of the British spy system, the greatest secret service in the world, through hunting down of Irish traitors, robbing of mails and tapping of telephone lines, has been described in detail. In reply to charges against the Irish of unwarranted slayings, Collins declares the "murders" they committed were legitimate acts

would not yet acquiesce in any kind of isolation from Britain. Before we undertook the treaty negotiations we realized these facts among ourselves.

"Had we not realized them--had we not accepted them as facts--there would have been no negotiations. Let there be no doubt about that.

"It is true that before we accepted the invitation sent by Mr. Lloyd George we endeavored to get an unfettered basis for the conference. And after negotiations had begun--as I shall presently point out--we continued to try.

"Document No. 2 was an instance of this endeavor. But we did not succeed. Again and again we asserted our claim that the plenipotentiaries could enter such a conference only as the spokesmen of an independent sovereign state.

"I was a claim Britain tacitly admitted in inviting us to negotiate at all, but the fact remains that we finally went to London without recognition of our nation as an independent sovereign state.

"We went--and in going we admitted that there was a possibility of the Irish people realizing their national aspirations with 'association of Ireland with the group of nations known as the British Commonwealth.' Let us not fool ourselves about that!

"Collins Asserts Attitude Unfair

"Those who cannot, or who will not look these facts in the face, blame us now and more than blame us. They find fault with us because in agreeing to some kind of association of our nation with the British nations we were not able, by the touch of a magic wand, to get rid of all language of empire. That is not a fair attitude.

"We like that language no more, perhaps less, than do those who wish to make us responsible for its preservation. It is Britain's affair, not ours, that she cares to preserve the prerogatives of obsolete feudalism.

"The British empire is what it is. It is what it is with all its trappings, its symbols of monarchy, its feudal phraseology, its obsolete oaths of allegiance--its king, its lords, having no individual power, its inequality of status, its universal subservience translated into modern snobbery.

"But these are things that are not to be dissipated by the waving of a magic wand.

"Moreover, the result of our liberations speaks for itself--we entered into negotiations with that empire--and its language is the language we had to speak.

"It is not any verbiage about sovereignty which can assure our power to shape our destinies. The important thing is to grasp everything which is of benefit to us--to manage things for ourselves--to make such a constitution as suits ourselves--to make our government and restore our national life in the finest which suit our national character and our national requirements best.

"It is now only fratricidal strife which can prevent us from making the Gaelic Ireland which is our goal."

CHAPTER XV.
My going to London as one of the plenipotentiaries was in spite of my conviction that any other Irishman would serve the cause of Irish freedom better than I--at least so far as the treaty negotiations were concerned.

For three hours one night after the decision had been made to send a delegation to London I pleaded with De Valera to leave me at home and let some other man take my place as a negotiator. But it was no use. My arguments seemed to fall on deaf ears. I had no choice, I had to go.

"I had long since concluded that coercion--even if it succeeded--could never have the lasting effects which conversation on our side, and acquiescence on theirs, would produce.

Throngs View Collins Cortège



The photograph shows a general view of the funeral of Michael Collins in Dublin, with the funeral escort, the cortège and part of the immense throng that swarmed the streets to pay last respects to the slain leader of the Irish free state army.

Collins Denies Duress Charge

"It would be poor return for the treatment accorded us in London to overstep the bounds of strict ethics by divulging anything of the negotiations which in any way could prove offensive to the English participants. I have no intention of doing so.

"But with that said there are certain points which I may slip light upon without committing that unpardonable offense. And to begin with there is one matter that I can deal with without any breach of confidence, or without any departure from etiquette.

"It has been charged that we signed the treaty under duress. It has been said we signed the treaty under a threat of immediate and terrible war. That is not true. It was Barton who first made this charge, and by his own statement proved himself a man who could be successfully threatened.

"But Barton--challenged to quote the exact words used by any of the English plenipotentiaries in framing the alleged threat--admitted that it had never been voiced in words!

"Nevertheless, Barton, having signed the treaty, opposed it and gave as his justification his having acted under a threat which was never made! It is this kind of thing which receives the attention of the public.

"Surely I have made it plain enough that British armed forces could wipe the Irish nation out of existence. Is it necessary to labor a self-evident fact? No one but a madman would question it. And

"I have before stated, I objected to the presence of Childers in the secretariat because, as I have already pointed out, I considered him to be in a sense as a final sacrifice with which to win out to freedom--I had to walk into Whitehall and deal, face to face, with the heads of the British empire.

"At the very moment I was shaking hands with Mr. Lloyd George on the occasion of our first meeting there was still in existence the Dublin castle reward of 10,000 pounds for my capture, dead or alive! Subsequently I reminded the British prime minister of this incongruous state of affairs, but that did not happen until I had discovered that he knew how to laugh!

"English Agents Deal Candidly

"From beginning to end the English plenipotentiaries dealt candidly, fairly and sympathetically. Much criticism has been directed at Griffith and his associates frequently in the public conferences given by Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Churchill. It seems to me the point is not well taken.

"I have never heard of any one criticizing De Valera for leaving conferees quite alone with Mr. Lloyd George's few tentative suggestions. These are manifestly details in the course of negotiations of this character, which are best discussed by a few men rather than by dozens. It seems to me the criticism is not only unjust, but also unwarranted.

"The point that I tried to impress upon De Valera was that for several years--eight or twenty years--no difference in the English had held me to be the one man most necessary to capture the Irish mind who was not to be responsible for the smashing of

Collins Denies Duress Charge

of self-defense forced upon them by British oppression. The arrest and harsh treatment of Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Irish writer who was opposed to the use of military methods to achieve the republic; his execution with two other writers by the black and tans; the disheartening attempt to fix responsibility on the perpetrators of the alleged "murders"--all this has been told by the Widow Skeffington. Mrs. Skeffington later escaped from Ireland in disguise and toured America to arouse sympathy for the Irish cause.

The gun-running exploit at Howth, although featured by tragedy when British troops shot down two women, a man and a boy after the soldiers were stoned at Bachelor's Walk, was successful.

But the Irish attempt to import arms from Germany for the Easter week uprising ended in disaster. The ship was ready to leave a German port for Ire-

Collins Denies Duress Charge

land. The date of the uprising had been set for Good Friday. But unexpected difficulties necessitated postponement of the rebellion to the following week. Desperate efforts to notify Sir Roger Casement of the change in time failed and the ship sailed away. Surrounded by British patrol boats in Tralee bay, the captain had to scuttle the ship which went down with 20,000 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Casement, rushing to Ireland in a submarine to prevent his comrades from attempting what he thought was the impossible, paid for the trip with his life.

Included in last Sunday's installment were sworn statements from several Irish persons of alleged mistreatment by British troops. The installment closes with an account of the British proposal for peace and the Irish leaders' determination to seek the maximum limit of freedom.

land, and with an executive responsible to that parliament.

"This is the whole basis of the treaty, and it must be borne clearly in mind that the treaty (and a treaty, be it remembered, is between equals), is the bedrock from which our status springs, and that any later act of the British legislature derives its force from the treaty only.

"We have the constitutional status of Canada, and that status being one of freedom and equality, we are free to take advantage of that status. In fact, England has renounced all right to govern Ireland, and the withdrawal of her forces is the proof of this. With the evacuation secured by the treaty has come the end of British rule in Ireland.

"No foreigner will be able to intervene between our government and our people. Will Irishmen continue to intervene between our government and our people?

"The treaty we brought home gave us the freedom we fought to win--freedom from British interference and domination.

"And it seemed that the Irish people resident in London celebrated a triumph. For at the station those were thousands of them--men, women and children--waving the tricolor and cheering us and singing happy folk songs. It was a heartening sight.

"Was it only a forerunner of our greeting in Dublin? We all wondered."

CHAPTER XVI.
"Our arrival with the signed treaty in Dublin--on a gray, cold December morning--was in a sense prophetic of what was to follow the Irish session. Here were no signs of jubilation. There was no one at the station to greet us. And yet the newspapers had acclaimed the treaty as a triumph. Even the few people abroad at that early hour seemed to be apathetic. Had our four months of hard work meant just nothing at all to the people whom we had tried to serve? It appeared so."

Collins spoke with an unaccustomed note of sadness in his voice. Although at this time he did not make reference to it, I recalled an earlier confidence of his--the real ambition he hoped one day to realize. What he wanted above anything else--and I can say this because I have his word for it--was to see his country awakened to the meaning of freedom. He wanted to permit him to lay down the heavy burden of leadership. And when that day came Collins hoped he might be able to set himself up in business--a little business in which he could never have to be afraid of becoming rich.

England Objects to Submarines

"It happened during the conference between Mr. Churchill and Lord Bessy and Childrens and myself--on the colonial office--to which I have already referred.

"In my embarrassment over Childrens' failure to produce anything approaching a reasonable idea to back up his statement that he could prove that Ireland was of no concern to Britain--I searched my mind for something to say that would at least make my colleague's impracticability less glaring.

"It will be remembered that Childrens had insisted that Plymouth was a better base for submarine chasers than any Irish port! While Lord Bessy was pointing to the map and thus flouting disproving the truth of this assertion, I had an idea.

"Pointing to the French coast, I suggested that Havre, for instance, would have made an excellent base for the British forces engaged in hunting submarines.

"Quite so," replied Lord Bessy. Then he smiled and added, 'But we can't take a French port!'

"If that constitutes duress, I'll admit that we were under duress. But to my way of thinking it is plain talk, right talk, and the kind of talk I prefer my opponent to use. The other part of the Englishmen with whom we were dealing to say what they mean was forewarned by Mr. Lloyd George. I think he will have no objection to my quoting him. As I have already stated, I know he can laugh.

"Quite so," replied Lord Bessy. Then he smiled and added, 'But we can't take a French port!'

"If that constitutes duress, I'll admit that we were under duress. But to my way of thinking it is plain talk, right talk, and the kind of talk I prefer my opponent to use. The other part of the Englishmen with whom we were dealing to say what they mean was forewarned by Mr. Lloyd George. I think he will have no objection to my quoting him. As I have already stated, I know he can laugh.

"England did not mind if we built a dreadnaught or two, a battleship or two--although these concessions do not appear in the signed treaty. In fighting for vital concessions we were not weakening our position by claiming anything so obviously useless as the right to build and man a few capital ships.

"It must be apparent to everyone that to do such a ridiculous thing would be to pay England's game."

"We could indulge our vanity--if we were foolish enough to waste public funds in such a manner--by having an infant navy that could never mean anything at all to the British sea power--but we could not have one submarine! Submarines are cheap to build and require few men to operate them! Submarines are a menace to England!

"I fought my best to try to argue the point. After all, I said to the British prime minister, Ireland could never hope to wage aggressive war against England. Restricting our offensive armament seemed to me on a par with taming a shrew."

"Submarines," replied Mr. Lloyd George, "are the flying columns of the seas." He looked at me straight as he said this, and slowly a twinkle came into his eyes. Then he spoke again. "And I am sure," he said, "there is no use for me to tell you, Mr. Collins, how much damage can be inflicted by flying columns! We have had experience with your flying columns on land."

"There was nothing to be said then," he knew who he was talking about. "More than that--he knew that I knew!

"But De Valera and Childrens saw nothing disadvantageous to us in this prohibition of submarines. Perhaps it was my own vanity. As a result of my own vanity, I made it quite clear to the British representatives that my mind was different from that of the author of the three-pointed proposal.

"I stated that Ireland was a neutral country. With the duties and responsibilities and business and industry of a neutral country. This simple statement had more effect on the British delegates than all the arguments about our status, or all the arguments based on the claim of our historic basis on any one point of view.

England Objects to Submarines

land. The date of the uprising had been set for Good Friday. But unexpected difficulties necessitated postponement of the rebellion to the following week. Desperate efforts to notify Sir Roger Casement of the change in time failed and the ship sailed away. Surrounded by British patrol boats in Tralee bay, the captain had to scuttle the ship which went down with 20,000 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Casement, rushing to Ireland in a submarine to prevent his comrades from attempting what he thought was the impossible, paid for the trip with his life.

Included in last Sunday's installment were sworn statements from several Irish persons of alleged mistreatment by British troops. The installment closes with an account of the British proposal for peace and the Irish leaders' determination to seek the maximum limit of freedom.

land, and with an executive responsible to that parliament.

"This is the whole basis of the treaty, and it must be borne clearly in mind that the treaty (and a treaty, be it remembered, is between equals), is the bedrock from which our status springs, and that any later act of the British legislature derives its force from the treaty only.

"We have the constitutional status of Canada, and that status being one of freedom and equality, we are free to take advantage of that status. In fact, England has renounced all right to govern Ireland, and the withdrawal of her forces is the proof of this. With the evacuation secured by the treaty has come the end of British rule in Ireland.

"No foreigner will be able to intervene between our government and our people. Will Irishmen continue to intervene between our government and our people?

"The treaty we brought home gave us the freedom we fought to win--freedom from British interference and domination.

"And it seemed that the Irish people resident in London celebrated a triumph. For at the station those were thousands of them--men, women and children--waving the tricolor and cheering us and singing happy folk songs. It was a heartening sight.

"Was it only a forerunner of our greeting in Dublin? We all wondered."

CHAPTER XVI.
"Our arrival with the signed treaty in Dublin--on a gray, cold December morning--was in a sense prophetic of what was to follow the Irish session. Here were no signs of jubilation. There was no one at the station to greet us. And yet the newspapers had acclaimed the treaty as a triumph. Even the few people abroad at that early hour seemed to be apathetic. Had our four months of hard work meant just nothing at all to the people whom we had tried to serve? It appeared so."

Collins spoke with an unaccustomed note of sadness in his voice. Although at this time he did not make reference to it, I recalled an earlier confidence of his--the real ambition he hoped one day to realize. What he wanted above anything else--and I can say this because I have his word for it--was to see his country awakened to the meaning of freedom. He wanted to permit him to lay down the heavy burden of leadership. And when that day came Collins hoped he might be able to set himself up in business--a little business in which he could never have to be afraid of becoming rich.

"England did not mind if we built a dreadnaught or two, a battleship or two--although these concessions do not appear in the signed treaty. In fighting for vital concessions we were not weakening our position by claiming anything so obviously useless as the right to build and man a few capital ships.

"It must be apparent to everyone that to do such a ridiculous thing would be to pay England's game."

"We could indulge our vanity--if we were foolish enough to waste public funds in such a manner--by having an infant navy that could never mean anything at all to the British sea power--but we could not have one submarine! Submarines are cheap to build and require few men to operate them! Submarines are a menace to England!

"I fought my best to try to argue the point. After all, I said to the British prime minister, Ireland could never hope to wage aggressive war against England. Restricting our offensive armament seemed to me on a par with taming a shrew."

England Objects to Submarines

land. The date of the uprising had been set for Good Friday. But unexpected difficulties necessitated postponement of the rebellion to the following week. Desperate efforts to notify Sir Roger Casement of the change in time failed and the ship sailed away. Surrounded by British patrol boats in Tralee bay, the captain had to scuttle the ship which went down with 20,000 rifles and 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Casement, rushing to Ireland in a submarine to prevent his comrades from attempting what he thought was the impossible, paid for the trip with his life.

Included in last Sunday's installment were sworn statements from several Irish persons of alleged mistreatment by British troops. The installment closes with an account of the British proposal for peace and the Irish leaders' determination to seek the maximum limit of freedom.

land, and with an executive responsible to that parliament.

"This is the whole basis of the treaty, and it must be borne clearly in mind that the treaty (and a treaty, be it remembered, is between equals), is the bedrock from which our status springs, and that any later act of the British legislature derives its force from the treaty only.

"We have the constitutional status of Canada, and that status being one of freedom and equality, we are free to take advantage of that status. In fact, England has renounced all right to govern Ireland, and the withdrawal of her forces is the proof of this. With the evacuation secured by the treaty has come the end of British rule in Ireland.

"No foreigner will be able to intervene between our government and our people. Will Irishmen continue to intervene between our government and our people?

"The treaty we brought home gave us the freedom we fought to win--freedom from British interference and domination.

"And it seemed that the Irish people resident in London celebrated a triumph. For at the station those were thousands of them--men, women and children--waving the tricolor and cheering us and singing happy folk songs. It was a heartening sight.

"Was it only a forerunner of our greeting in Dublin? We all wondered."

CHAPTER XVI.
"Our arrival with the signed treaty in Dublin--on a gray, cold December morning--was in a sense prophetic of what was to follow the Irish session. Here were no signs of jubilation. There was no one at the station to greet us. And yet the newspapers had acclaimed the treaty as a triumph. Even the few people abroad at that early hour seemed to be apathetic. Had our four months of hard work meant just nothing at all to the people whom we had tried to serve? It appeared so."

Collins spoke with an unaccustomed note of sadness in his voice. Although at this time he did not make reference to it, I recalled an earlier confidence of his--the real ambition he hoped one day to realize. What he wanted above anything else--and I can say this because I have his word for it--was to see his country awakened to the meaning of freedom. He wanted to permit him to lay down the heavy burden of leadership. And when that day came Collins hoped he might be able to set himself up in business--a little business in which he could never have to be afraid of becoming rich.

"England did not mind if we built a dreadnaught or two, a battleship or two--although these concessions do not appear in the signed treaty. In fighting for vital concessions we were not weakening our position by claiming anything so obviously useless as the right to build and man a few capital ships.

"It must be apparent to everyone that to do such a ridiculous thing would be to pay England's game."

"We could indulge our vanity--if we were foolish enough to waste public funds in such a manner--by having an infant navy that could never mean anything at all to the British sea power--but we could not have one submarine! Submarines are cheap to build and require few men to operate them! Submarines are a menace to England!

"I fought my best to try to argue the point. After all, I said to the British prime minister, Ireland could never hope to wage aggressive war against England. Restricting our offensive armament seemed to me on a par with taming a shrew."

Sister of Casement in America for Tour



Mrs. Agnes Newman, sister of Sir Roger Casement and friend of Michael Collins, has arrived in America for tour.

in that sense, then, there was nothing in the negotiations as there had been in an Ireland and Ireland the amount of duress given only. Nobody doubts that had we been able to do it we should have beaten the English out of Ireland--our simple right.

"Our acceptance of the terms, our consenting to negotiate--yes, and in the same sense, our signing of the treaty--all these things that there would be the sign of duress.

"I had been able to do it--we should have whipped England's delegates--and then the treaty negotiations would have been conducted in Dublin, and we should have been a continued nation, a continuing nation of ourselves--with any other nation.

"I recall on this point because a lady, quarters this charge of duress, which are best discussed by a few men rather than by dozens. It seems to me the criticism is not only unjust, but also unwarranted.

People Seem Apathetic

"Our arrival with the signed treaty in Dublin--on a gray, cold December morning--was in a sense prophetic of what was to follow the Irish session. Here were no signs of jubilation. There was no one at the station to greet us. And yet the newspapers had acclaimed the treaty as a triumph. Even the few people abroad at that early hour seemed to be apathetic. Had our four months of hard work meant just nothing at all to the people whom we had tried to serve? It appeared so."

Collins spoke with an unaccustomed note of sadness in his voice. Although at this time he did not make reference to it, I recalled an earlier confidence of his--