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About The Red Cloud chief. (Red Cloud, Webster Co., Neb.) 1873-1923 | View Entire Issue (Jan. 8, 1904)
BflC f jV S PfT ) IVVV" 'T SPECIAL MESSAGE President Clearly Shows Committed Act of DEFINES UNITED STATES POLICY A State Paper Containing Historical Facts of Great Import to America--Treaty of i846 Com. plied With in Every Detail. WnnhtiiRtnn, Jiin. 4. -The president loilny Hcnt to cnngicnn the follow luff moaa.ige. I'd Hie Hennle and IIoimp of ltpptc HeiilntlvrK' I lay before congress for llx In formation u nlatotnont (r my net lou ti() to this (lino In OM'ititliiK tin- ml entitled "An net to ptovlde foi lli- roMHlnirtlmi of a onnnl connecting the waters or tho Atlantic mill Pacific oeo.ihs," approved June 28. IHO'-'. Uy llic wild net tin- pwrlilcui was authorized to Hoeurc for the t 'ill ted Hlntes (lie piopoity of I lie P.iuumn Cuiittl ciiiii tiauv and the perpetual contiol of u strip C mile wide iioiosn Hit Inlhniun of I'anuiuii. It wnn tUt til er DI'OVlllCll tllilt "Hlll)llll tin PlPlll- deul be tiunhlp to nblnln for the Unit 'd Stales n satisfactory title to the ptoppily of the Npw I'.hiiiiiiii Canal Company nnil tlu control of (In- ne iCMiniy tcrrltoiy of the Itcpublli' of Colombia within n ipunnunhle time nud upon reasonable let ins. then the I'irKltlPiit" hliould endeavor to piovldc for n ra lint ly Hip Ntcuinguu i onto. The language quoted tlr(lmu Willi exnclnesn and pinlnlnii what mi, lo he done, and what an a nintti'i of furl linn been doiip. Tlio pn-plilctit wm authorized to go lo Hip Nlmtng ti toute only If within n leanoiuible lime lip could not olitnlu "control of llio nccr'Hiry tnrrltorv of the Ropub llc of Colombia." Thin lonliol him now Iipph obtnhipd; tlio piovlplon of ho art linn Iippm compiled with' It In no longer possible under exMIng leglnlntlon to no to the Nicaragua toulp ok an nltcrinllvo. A Climax of American Effort. Tain act marked tlio e'lmtir nf Hip effott on Hip pa it of tlio l'nlto.1 States 1ft serine, an far an leghilntlnu wan concerned, an Intrroeennlo canal notonn Hip THttuuun. The prforl to no curp a treaty for thin purpose with oiip of tlio. Central American tcnubllon did not nlnnd on the same footing wllli the effort to secure a treaty un der titiv ordinary oonc'lilnnn. The prop, pr poltlon for tit United Slate to HfMunip In reference to thin ennnl. and llinrofor" to Ihe governments of he isthmus. Ind boon cl"ry set forth liy Soerotnrv Cass In 1RRt. American Control of the Canal. Under the Hny-Pauncefole tieaty It wna explicitly provided that the Unit ed Htntea should control, police, and Piotect the cnnnl which was to be built, keeping It open for the vencla nf nil nation!! on equal tonus. The United Htntea thun assumed the posl Hon of guarantor of the canal and of ltn peaceful line by all the wnild. The Kuaranty Included an a matter or course the hulldliiK of the canal. The enterprise wan recognized nn responding to an International need: uud It would be the veriest travesty on right and Justice to tieat Ihe gov vi omenta in possession of the Isthmus tin having the right. In the language of Mr. ('ami, "to closo tho gates or In-U-reouiTP on the Brent highways of the world, and JiiKtlfy the net hy the pre tension that these nvenup,H of trade and travel belong to them and thut Ihev choope to abut them." When thin government HUbmlttcd to Colombia the Uay-Iterran treaty three UiIiirh weie. thercrote, alioady Hfllled. One wan that the cannl should be built. Tho time for delay, tho time far permlttliiR the nttpmpt to bo made bv nrlvatc enterprise, the time for per mitting nnv Bovernment of nntl-pnclat aplrlt and of Imoerfect dove'op loent to bar the worlt. wn nant. The tlulled Htaten had assumed In con Tiet'tlnn with the canal certain ipi ixiunlbllllten not onlv to Ha own people. Inil to the elvlllpd world, which ln lipratlvelv demnoi'ed thnt thero nhonld ' tirt longer be delay In beginning the worlc. Our Qeneroslty to Colombia. Hecond. While it wan nellled that the canal n'aould be built without ttn iiOCCfiHary or Improper delay. It wan no lenn clearly nliowu to be our pur pose to deal not merely In a nplilt of Junllco but In a aplilt of Koneioslty with Ihe people through whose limit we might build It. The llay-Herran Iroaty. If It erred at all, pried In the illreetlon of nn over-geueroxlty lotvnrda tlio Colombian government. In our nnxlpty to bo fair we had gone to the very vergp In yielding to a weak nation' demandn what that nation wan helplessly unable to enforce fioin u1 ngalnnt our will. The only crltlclnmn made upon thp ndmlnlatratlon for the ternm of the llay-tlerran treaty were for having irmnled too much to Colombia, not Tor failure lo grant enough. Neither In Ihe cmiRicHH nor In the public prew, at the time that this treaty wnn form plnlcd, wan there complaint that It did not In the fullest and nmplent manner guarantee to Colombia oveiy tb'ng that nhe could by any color of tll'o flprniuid, Aot of Congress Strictly Followed. Nor is thn fact to be lost sight of that the i ejected treaty, while gen oioiiBly responding to the pecuniary deinando of Colombia. In other ih ikscIh merely provided for the con struct lou of a ennal In confotmlty with tho expiess rcuuhements of the net of tho cougieaa of .luno as, luou. It that act, na heretofore iiuntcd, tho piesltlcnt wiih authorized to neimlio lio.ni Colombia, for the purposra of the vaiinl, "perpetual control" of u cerlaln jtlrlp of land: and It wan expiessly ri'Miilrert that Ihe "contiol" thus to be obtained should Include "Jurisdiction" to maUopolIco and aanltruy reguln tlnun and to establish hiicIi judicial tribunals an might be ugreed on for their enforcement. These wore conditions precedent prescribed by the congress: and for their fulfillment suitable stipulation, in tho ground that they Involved n rellumilnhment of her 'sovereignty;" Ifiit in tho light of what baa taken ,lHce, alleged objection must be con VHdered ao an afterthought. In real ity, tlio troaty, Instead of joqulrlng a cesnlon of Colombia's sovereignty over 1h canal Ktrlp, expressly acknowl edged, confirmed, and preserved liar aovoielgnty over It. The treaty In tlila respoct nlmply proceeded on tho lines on whloli all the negotlutlonn leading up to the present altuatlon iiave been conducted. In these negotlu tlonn the oxeielsn by the United fttates, subject lo the paramount to"wt I WnrwI.M-S J . . -; '.'. 2. lr""',-m',"'"-,-,'r- hm.m-.- - v s .;... ,rv-uH oMSBSBmBmS&EJKimAmiAMhjtam, .Ksi-tEeiim'rai'srwmmmmmmfxismmmvwmmvm'''1'-. ' ftm.Ti-'unujia .-,.t - - r . t-anfm.t.ji t- - m - -- - t : ON PANAMA (ANAL Congress that Colombia War Against Us. rlglila of the loci I poveiclgn. of a sub stiintlnl coiiiuil over the nanal and the Immediately .idjacent tenltory, ban been treated an it fundamental part of any nirangement that might be made. It Iiiih formed an enentlal fea ture of all our plaiiM, and Its iiocen nll.v Is fully lecognled In the ltay I'.umcefotis treaty. No New Principle Was Laid Down. The congies'i, In providing that such contiol Mliould be secuied, adopted no new prlinlp.o, l only Incoipotuled In Ita leglnlatloi a condition the Importance and propriety of which weie. universally naogiilued. During all the yeaia of negotiations ami dis cussion that pieceded the conclusion of tho llay-Ilcrrau tieaty, Colomblu never liitlinufd that the leiiulremetit by the United Htatea of lontrol over tho fn riu I atilp would render unat tainable the c oii'li uctlou of canal by way of the Isthmus of I'.iuama; nor weie we inlvlsd, during tho months when legislation of laoa wua puuillug be,foie congress, that the teuns which It oinbodlPd would lender negotiation With Colombia Imptuutlcablc It In plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the (.anal with a lean degiee or control than was stipulated In the liay-Uer-ran treaty. A tefus.il to grant nuch a degree of control waa necessarily u refusul to make any piartleablo treaty at nil. Huch refusal theiefore squarely ralsen the question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the world's traffic across tin; Isthmus. Colombia's Selated Offers. That the canal Itself was eagerly demanded by the people of the local ity thiough which It was to pass, and that the people of thin locullly no leas eagerly longed for its construction un der American conttol, are ahown by the unanimity of uctlou In tho new Panama Uepuljllc. Kurthermore. Co lombia, after having tejeeted the treaty in spite of our protests and warnings when It was In her power to accept It. has since shown tho ut most eagerness to ncrept tho same treaty If only the Htatus quo could be restored. One of the men standing highest In the official cltclea of Co lombia, on November C. addressed tho American minister at Uogota. naylug that If tho government of the United .Stolen would laud t loops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the tran sit, the Colimbla government would "declare martial law: and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order Im disturbed, (would) approve by decree the rati fication of the canal treaty as signed: or. If the government or the United States piefers. (would) call extra ses sion of tho congress with new and friendly uiembera next Jluy to ap prove the treaty." No Poslbility of Nicaragua Route. Third, l'lnally the congicss defin itely Hettleil wheie the canal waa to be built. II was provided that a treaty bhould be mado for building the canal acioss the Isthmus of Panama; and If. after reasonable time, It ptoved Impossible to secure such tieaty. that then we should go to Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for It needs no argu ment to Hbow that the 'intent of the congreya waa to insuru a. canul ncross Panama, and that whether the repub lic granting the title wan culled New (lianaitii. Colombia, or Panama mat tered not one whit. An events turned out, the question of "reasonable time" i'd not enter Into the matter at all. Although, as the months went by, It became Increasingly improbable that tho Colombian congrenn would rather ratify the treaty or take ntepn which would be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such action on their part did not vanish until the congiess closed at the end of October: and within three days thereafter the re volution In Panama had broken nut. Panama became an Independent state, and the control of tho territory neces sary for building the canal then be came obtainable. The condition under which alone wo could have gone to ;icaiagua thereby became Impossible of futtlllmcut. If the pending treaty wltn Panama should not be lutllled by the seunte this would not niter the fact that we could not go to Nicaragua. The congress has decided the route, and thero Is no alternative under existing legislation. Americans Wore Threatened. lleforo any step whatever had been taken by tho United States tinopn to restore order, the commander of the newly landed Colombian troops had in dulged In wanton and violent threats against American cltlsceni, whlc'.i dent ed serious apptchcunlnn. As Com mander Hubbard icported in his let ter of November fi, tills officer and bis troops practically began war against the United States, and only the for bearance and coolness of our ofllters nnd men prevented bloodshed. Commander Hubbard's Lotter. The letter of Commander Hubbard is of such Intel est that It doaervca quotation lu full, and tuns as follows. U. H. o. Nashville. Third Kate. Colon, U, S. Coloinbln, Nov. 0. Ifin:!, "rilr: Pending a eompb'to lepoit of the occurancea of the last three days in colon, Colombia. I most lespestfulty Invito the department's attention to those of the date of Wednesday, Nov ember -I, which amounted to practic ally tho making of war ngalust the United States by the officer lu com mand of the Colombian troop In Colon, At 1 o'clock p. in. on that d-'.to I was Niunmoned on shore by a preconcerted algnul, and on lauding met the United Ktatcn consul, vice-consul, and Colonel Slialor. the general superintendent of the Panama railroad. The consul Informed mo that he had received no tice from the officer commanding the Colombian troops. Colonel Torres, thiough the prefect of Colon, to the eiTeut that if the Colombian officers. Generals Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized In Pannma on the evening of the 3rd of November by the Inde pendenta and held us prisoners, were not released by 2 o'clock p. in. he, Torres, would open Are on the town of Colon ami kill every United States citizen In the place, uud my advice and action weie requested. "1 adcvUed that all the United Staten citizens should take refuge in the shed of the Panama Kallroad company, a WEST" "gSSr Vs&jMB-SS stone building susceptible of bemg rvt Into good Ktnto for defense, ami that I would Immediately laud nuch body of men, with extra arms for arming the cltlicens, as the complement of the ship would permit. "This wan agreed to and I Immedi ately returned on board, arriving at lilfi p. m. Tho order for lauding wan Im mediately given, and at 1:30 p. in. the boata left the ship wlt'n a party of forty-two men under the command of Lieutenant Commander II. M. Wltxrl, with .Midshipman J. P. Jackron nn Hec ond lu command. Time being pressing I gave verbal aiders to Mr. Wltzel to take the building above referred to, to put It Into tho best state of defense possible, uud to protect the lives of the citlr.eus assembled there not tir ing unlcna fired upon. "The Colombians surrounded the building of the railroad company al most Immediately after we had taken possession, and for about one and a half hours their attitude waa most threatening, It being Keemlngly their purpose to provoke an attack. Hap pily our men were cool nnd steady, and while the tension was very great no shot wan filed. At about 3MC p. m. Colonel Torres come Into the building for nn Interview and expressed himself as most friendly to Aincrlcans.clHlmlng that the whole affair was a misappre hension and that he would like to send tne alcalde of Colon lo Panama to nee (ionoral Tubal and have him direct the discontinuance of the show of force. A special train was furnished and safe conduct gum antced. "At about fi:3U p. m. Colonel Torres mado the proposition of withdrawing his troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the Nashvlllc'n fotce nnd leave the town in the possession of the poller until the leturn of tho al calde on the morning of the r.th. After an Interview with tho United Stutes consul nnd Colonel Bhnler as to the probability of good faith In the matter. I declined to accept the proposition ami brought my men on board, the dis parity lu numbers between my force and that of the Colombians nearly ten to one, making me desirous of avoid ing n conflict mo long an tho object in view, the protection of American citizens, was not imperiled. "I nm positive that the determined attitude of our men, their coolness and evident Intention of standing their ground, had a most salutary nnd de cisive effect on the Immediate situation and was the Initial step lu the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these troops ami their return to Cartagena the fol lowing day. Uoutenant Commonder Wltzel in entitled to much prale for bin admirable woik In command on the spot. "1 fool that I can not sufficiently ntrongly represent to the department tho groBsnesa of thin outrage nnd the Insult to our dignity, even apart from the savagery of the threat. Very resnetfully, jtJiiN iiunnAnn. Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding. The Secretary of tho Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C." Full Report from Hubbard. In his lotter of November S Com mander Hubbard setB rorth the facta more In detail: U. K. H. Nashville. Third Hate, Potto Hello, U. S. Colombia, Nov. 8. "Sir: 1. I have tho honor to make tho following report of the occurrences which took place at Colon and Pann ma lu the Interval between the arrival of the Nashville at Colon on the even ing of November 2, 1903, and the even ing of November C, l'JOS, when by the arrival of the U. . S. Dixie at Colon I was relieved an senior officer by Commander V. II. Delano, IT. a. nny. ":'. At tho tltno of the arrival of the Nashville at Colon at 5:30 p. ni. on November 'J everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There was talk of pro claiming the independence of Pana ma, but no definite action hnd been taken and theie had been no disturb ance of peace nnd order. At day llgiw on tli morning: of November 3 It waa found that n vessel which hail come lu during the night v.ia the Colombian gunboat Cartngona carrying between 400 nnd COO troops. I had her boarded and learned that these troops were for the garrison at Pana ma. Inasmuch nn the Independent party hnd not acted and the government of Colombia wns at that time in un disputed contiol of the Province of Panama, I did not feel, In the absence of any instructions, that I was Justified In preventing the landing of these troops, ami at 8:30 o'clock they were disembarked. The commanding officers Generals Amaya nnd Tobal, with four others, Immediately went over to Pana ma to make arrangementa for receiv ing and quartering their troops, leav ing the command In charge of an of ficer whom I later learned to be Colonel Tories. "The department's message address ed to the chip of the United Slntes con sul I received at 10:30 a. in.: It wan de livered to one of the ship's boats while I was at the consul's and not to tho consul as addressed. The message was said to have been lecelvcd at the cable office nt 0:33 n. m. Immediately on deciphering the message I went ashore to see what arrangements the railroad company had made for the transporta tion of these troops to Panama, nnd learned that tho company would not transport them except on request of tho governor of Panama, nnd that the prefect of Colon and tho officer left In command of the troopa had been non lipid by the general superintendent of the Panama Uailioad company. "I remained at the company's office until It waa sure that no action on my part would be needed to prevent tho transput tntlon of the troops that after noon, when I returned on board nnd cabled tho department the situation of affairs. At about C:30 p. in. I again went on shore, nnd received notice from the general superintendent of the lallroad that he had received the re quest for the transportation of the troops and that thoy would leave on the S a. in. train on the following day. I Immediately went to see the general superintendent, and learned that It Ciad Just been announced that a provisional government hud been established at Panama that Oenerals Amnya nnd Tobal, the governor of Panama, and four officers, who had gone to Panama In the morning, had been seized nnd were heltt nn prosoners; that they had an organized force of 1.C00 troops and wished tho government troopn lu Colon to be scut over. This I declined to permit, and verbally prohibited tho gcnernl superintendent from giving transportation to the troops of either party. Prohibited Transportation of Troops. "tl being then lato in tho evening, I sent eurly In the morning of Novem ber 4 written notification to the gen eral huperlntendent of the Panama railroad, to the prefect of Colon, nnd to the officer left lu command of the Colombian trops, later ascertained to bo Colonel Torres, that I hod prohibited the transportation of troops in either direction, in order to preserve the free and uninterrupted trnnult of tho Isth mus. CopleB or these letters are here to appended; also copy of my notifi cation to the consul. "Kxcept to n few people, nothing was known In Colon of tho proep"dlng.i In Panama until the artlval of tho train at 10:4f on the morning of the 4th. Some propositions were, 1 was told mndo, to Colonel Torron by the repre nentntlven of tho new government nt Colon, with a view to inducing nlin to re-pinbaik In the Cnttageua nnd re turn to the port of Cartagena, and It wan lu answer to thin proposition that Colonel Torres jnade the threat and took the action repotted lu my let ter No. 08, of November i", 1902. Tho Cartanena left tho port Just after the thtoat wan made and I did not deem It expedient to attempt to detain her, un nuch action would certainly, In th then ntnte of affairs, have pieclpltated a conflict on shore which I wan not prepared to moot. It In my under standing thnt she returned to Carta gena. Violattd His Agreement. "After the withdrawal of the Colom bian troopn on the evening of Novem ber 4, and tht return of the Nash vlllo'fl force on board, nn reported In my letter No. 06. there wan no dis turbance on shoie, and the night pan ned quietly. On the morning of the Cth I discovered that the coinmunder of the Colomblnn troops had not with drawn no far from the town an he had agreed, but wan occupying buildings neur the outHklrts of the town. I Im mediately Inquired Into the matter and learned thnt he had nome trlvlnl ex cuse for not carrying out bin agree ment, nnd also that It was hi, Inten tion to occupy Colon ngaln on the ar rival of the alcalde duo at M:4!i a. in., nnlenn (ionoral Tob.tl sent woid by the alcnlde that he, Colonel Torre , should withdraw. "Thta C.enernl Torren had decllianl to give any Instructions I wns cognizant of, and the situation nt once became quite as serious un on the day previous. I Immediately landed nn nrmed force, re-occupled the same building; also landed two 1-poundora nnd mounted them on platform earn behind protec tion of cotton bales, and then In com pany with the United Staten consul had an Interview with Colonel Torres, In tho coume of which I informed liltn thnt I had rclanded my men because he had not kept his agreement; that I 'nud no interest In tho affalra of either par ty: that my attitude wan strictly neu tral; that the troopn of neither side should bo transported; that my sole purpose In landing wns to protect the lives and property of American citizens If threatened, nn they had been threat ened, nnd to maintain the free nnd un interrupted transit of the Isthmus, and that purpose I should maintain by force If necessary. I also ntrongly advised that In the Interests of peace, and to prevent tho possibility of a conflict that could not but be regrettable, ho should carry out his agreement of the previous evening and withdraw to Monkey Hill. "Colonel Torres only reply wan that It wan unhealthy at Monkey Hill, a re iteration of hln love of Americans, nnd persistence lu hln intention to occupy Colon, should General Tobal not give him directions to the contrary. Not Quite So Threatening. "On the return of the alcalde about II n. m. the Colombian troopn marched Into Colon, but did not assume tho threatening demeanor of the previous day. The American women and chil dren again went aboard the Narcom ania, nnd City of Washington, and through the British vice-consul I offer ed protection to British subjects as directed lu the department's cablegram. A copy of the British vice-consul's acknowledgement Is hereto appended. The Nashville I got under way an on the previous day nnd moved close lu to piotect the waler front. "During tho afternoon several piopo sltlous were made to Colonel Torres by the rcpresentatlvca of the new govern ment, and he wan flnnlly persuaded by them to embark on the royal mall steamer Orinoco with all his troopn and return to Cattageun. The Orinoco left her dock with the troopn 474 ull toldat 7:35 p. in. The Dixie ar rived and 'anchored nt 7:05 p. in., when I wont on board nud acquainted the commanding officer with the situation. A portion of the marine battalion was landed and the Nashville's force with drawn. "3. On the evening of November 4 Major William M. Blaok nnd Lieuten ant Mark Brooke, corps of cnglneera, United Staten army, came to Colon from Culebra and volunteered their services, which were accepted, anrf they rendered very efficient help on the following day. No Part in Negotiations. "4. I beg to assure the department thnt I had no part whatever In the negotiations thnt were cat vied on be tween Colonel Torren nnd the represen tative of the piovlslonnl government; that I lnnded an armed force only when the liven of American citizens were threatened, and withdrew this force an noon an there seemed to be no grounds for further nppreheuslon of Injury to American Hvoh or propeity; that I relanded nn armed force because of the failure of Colonel Torren o car ry out hln agreement to withdraw and announced Intention of ipturnlng-, and that my attitude throughout was strictly neutral an between the two parties, my only purpose being to pro tect the liven nnd property of American citizens nnd to preserve the free nnd uninterrupted transit of the isthmus. Very letipectfully. JOHN HUBB.VP.D. Commnnder, U. S. Navy, Commanding. Tho Sccretnry of the Navy, Btueau of Navigation. Navy Depait. ment, Washington, D. C." American Action Too Long Delayed. Thin plain official account of the oc currences of November 4. shown that, Instead of there having been too much prevision by tho American government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life nnd property on the Isthmus, tho orders for tho movement of the American warships had been too long delayed: ho long. In fact, that thero were but forty-two marines nnd sailors available to land and protect tho lives of American men and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with which this little band of men wearing the American uniform faced ten times their number of nrmed foes, bent on cnrrylng out tho atrocious threat of the Colombian commander, thnt prevented fi. murderous catast rophe. At Pannma, when the revolution broke out, there was no American man-of-war and no American troopn or sailors. At Colon, Commnnder Hubbard acted with entire Impartial ity towards both sides, preventing any movement, whether by the Colombians or the ranamann, which would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 ho prevented u body of the revolu tionists from landing at Colon. Throughout he behaved In the moat ct editable manner. Our Action Was for Peace. The fact that in this laBt revolution not a life wnn lost, nave that of tho man killed by tho shells of the Colom bian gunboat, nnd no property destroy ed, wnn due to the action which I have described. We. In effect, policed the isthmus In tho Interest of ltn Inhabi tants nnd of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire civilised worl I. Failure to act an the adminis tration acted would have mean great wato of life, groat suffering, gicat destruction of property; alt of which wan avoided by the firmness and prudence with which Commander Hub bard carried out his orders and pro vented either party from attacking the other. Our notion wan for the peace of both Colombia and of Pana ma, it I, earnestly to bo hoped thnt there will be no unwise conduct on our part which may encourage Colom bia to em bii ik on a war which can not result In her legalnlng control of tho Isthmus, but which may cause much bloodshed and suffering. No Part Taken By Us. I hesitate to refer to the Injurious Inntructlonn which have boon made of complicity by thin government lu the revolutionary movement In Pannma. They are nn destitute of foundation nn of propilety. The only excuse for my mentioning them Is the fear lest un thinking persons might mistake for ncqulescence tho silence of mere self respect, I think proper to say, there foie, that no one connected with this government had nny part lu preparing, Inciting, or encouraging the late revo lution on tho Intimitis of Panama, and that nave from tho rcporta of our mili tary nnd naval officers, given above, no ono connected with thin government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except nuch as wan accen nlble to any person of oidlnnry Intelli gence who read the nowspapem nnd kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs. The Recognition of Panama. By tho unanimous action of Its neo. pie, without the tiring of a nhot with a unanimity hardly before recorded lu any jilmllar case the people of Pana ma declared themselves nn Independent republic. Their iccognltlon by thin government was based upon n state of facta in no way dependent for ltn Justi fication upon our action in ordinary cases. I have not denied, nor do I wish to deny, either the validity or the pro priety of the genernl rule that a now state should not be recognized an In dependent till It ban nliowu Its ability to maintain Its Independence. Thin rule Is derived from tho principle of non-intervention, and un a corollary of that principle hnn gencrnlly been ob served by the United States. But. like the principle from which It In deduced, the rule In subject to ex ceptions; and there me In my opinion clear ami Imperative reasons why a de parture from It wan Justified and even required In tho present instance. These reasons embrace, first, our treaty rightn; second, our national Interests and safety; and, third, the interests of collective civilization. The First Object of the Treaty. The attneks agnlnnt which the United Stntcs engaged to protect Now Granadlan sovereignty were those of foreign powers; but this engagement wan only a means to the nccompllnli ment of a yet more Important end. The great design of tho nrtlcle wns to an num the dedication of the Isthmus to tho purposes of fiee and unobstructed luteroceanlc transit, tho consummation of which would be found in an Inter ocenulo cannl. To the uceompllshmcnt of this object the government of the United States bad for yearn directed ltn diplomacy. It occupied a place In the Instructions to our delegaten to the Panama con gress during the administration of John Qulncy Adams. It formed tho subject of a resolution of the senate In lSSJi, and of the house of representa tives In 1839. lu 1S46 its Importance hnd become r.tlll more nppurent by rea son of tho Mexican war. If the treaty of 1S4B did not In termn bind New Granada to grant reasonable concen nlonn for the construction of means of Interocennlo communication, It wan only because It waa not Imagined that such concessions would ever be with held. An It wnn expresaly agreed that the United States, In consideration of Its oneroun guarantee of New Grana dlan sovereignty, should possess the right of free nnd open transit on nny modes of communication that might be constructed, the obvloun Intent of the treaty rendered It unnecessary, If not nuperfiuous, In termn tfl stipulate thnt permission for the construction of nuch modes of communication should not be denied. Private) Enterprise Inadequate. Long before the conclusion of the Hny-Horran treaty tha course of events had shown that n canal to con nect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans must be built by the United Statos or not at ntl. Experience had demon strated thnt private enterprise was ut terly Inadequate for tha purpose: and a fixed policy, declared by the United Staten on many memorable occasions, and nupported by the practically unanlmoun voice of American opinion, hnd rendered It morally Impossible thnt the work should be undertaken by lhiropean power., either nlngly or In combination. Such were the universal ly recognized conditions on which the legislation of the congress wns based, nnd on which the late negotiations with Colombia wore begun and con cluded. Ncvehtheless. when the well-considered agreement was rejected by Col ombia and the revolution on the Isth mus ensued, one of Colombia's first acta wan to Invoke the Intervention of tho United States; nor does her invitation appear to have been confined to thin government alone. By a telegram from Mr. Beaupre, our minister at Bogota, of the 7th of November last, we are In formed that General Itoyes would soon leave Panama Invested with lull powers: that ho telegraphed tho presi dent of Mexico to ask the government of the United States and all countries represented nt tho Pan-American con ference "to nld Colombia to preserve her Integrity," and thnt he had re quested that tho government of tho United Staten should meanwhile "pre serve the neutrality and transit of tho isthmus" nnd should "not lecognlze the new government." In nnother telegrnm from Mr. Benu pre, which was sent later In the day, this government wns asked whether It would take uctlou "to maintain Colom bian right and sovereignty on the Isth mus In accordance with article 3." (of) tho treaty of 1S4C" In case the Colom blnn government should be "entirely unable to suppress xhe secession move ment there." Urged Us to Violate Treaty. Here was a direct solicitation to tho United States to Intervene for tho pur pose of suppressing, contrnry to tho treaty of 1846 as thin government has uniformly ronntrued It, a new revolt against Colombian authority brought about by her own reftmal to permit the fulfillment of the great design for which that treaty wan made. It wan under these circumstances that the United Staten, Instead of using Its forces to destroy those who nought to mako the engagements of the treaty a reality, recognized them ns the proper custodians of the sovereignty of the isthmus. Canal a National Necessity. This recognition was, In the second place, further Justified by tho highest considerations of our national Interests uud safety. In ull tli range of our tfc" QJlU-i4. !,Ji International relations, I do not hesl- title to nfllrm that there In nothing of greater or more pressing Importance than the construction of an Inter oceanlo cannl. Long acknowledged to bo essential to our commercial ; vetopmoiit, It ban become, an the result of the recent extension of our tril torlal dominion, mote than ever essen tial to our national aolf-ilefense. In trannniltllng to the nonute the treaty of 184G, Piesldcnt Polk pointed out un thp principal reason for ltn rati-. t flcatlon thnt tho passage of the Ist'.i-, inun, which It wan designed to secure, "would relieve us from a long uud dangerous navigation of more than 9. 000 miles mound Capo Horn, and ten der our communication with our own possessions on tha northwest coant o America comparatively cany and speedy." The events of the past live yearn have given to this consideration an Importance Immeasurably greater than It possessed lu 184C. In the light of our present situation, the estnb- J llahmont of easy and speedy communi cation by sea between tho Atlantic nnil the Pacific presents Itself not nlmply nn something to bo dunlred. but as un object to be positively and promptly nttulned. Reasons of convenience have been superceded by leasonn of vltnl necessity, which do not ndmlt of Inde finite delays. A Mandate from Civilization. In the third place. I confidently maintain that the recognition of the ltepubllo of Panama wan an act Justi fied by the Interests of collective civil ization. If ever a government could bo said to hnve tecelved a mandate fiom civilization to effect an object the no- , coinpllshment of which was demanded fc In the interest of mankind, the United States holds that position with reganl to the Intel oceanic canal. Since our purpose to build the canal wus def initely announced, there hnve come from all quarters assurances of np proval and encourngement, In which even Colombia hernelf at one time participated; nnd to general lumin ances were added specific acts and declarations. In order that no ob stacle might stand In our way, Great Britain renounced Important rights under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and agreed to Ita abrogation, receiving In return nothing but our honoruble pledge to build the cntml and protect It an an open highway. Treaty Sisould Be Ratified. f Instead of using our forces, as w were Invited by Colombia to do. for the twofold purpose of defeating our own rights and lutcrentn nnd tho In terestn of the civilized world, and of compelling the nubmlsnlon of the peo ple of the Isthmus to those whom they regarded an oppressors, wo shall, as In duty bound, keep the transit open and prevent Ha Invasion. Meanwhile, the only question now before un In that of tho ratification of the treaty. For It Is to bo remembered that a fatluro to ratify the tieaty will not undo what has been done, will not lentote Pan ama to Colombia, and will not alter our obligation to keep the transit open acrosn the Isthmus, uud to pie vent nny outside power from menac ing this transit. It seems to have been assumed In certain quartern that Hie proposition that tho obligations or nrtlcle :. of tho trenty of 184(5 are to bo cousldeied an adhering to and following the sov plgnty of the IntbmuH, no long an thnt sovereignty is not nbsorbed by the United States, restn upon some novel theory. No assumption could bo further from the fact. It Is by no moans true that a ntato In declining ltn Independence rids itself of all the troaty obligations entered into by tho patent government. It In a mere co Incidence thnt this question wan once rained In a cane Involving the obliga tions of Colombia as nn Independent ntato tinder a treaty which Spain had made with the United Statpa munv yearn beforo the Spanish-American Independence. - Principle Asserted by Adams. In thnt case Mr. John Qulncy Adnins. Secretary of State, In an Instruction to Mr. Anderson, our minister to Co Combln, of May 27. 11123, said: "By a treaty between the United Staten and Spain concluded ut the time when Colombia won a part of the Spanish dominions the principle that free nhlps mako free goodn wan expressly recognized nnd established. It la nsseited that by her declaration of Independence Colombia has been entirely released from all the obllga tlonn by which, nn n, pnrt of the Spun lsh nation, she wan bound to other nations. Thin principle Is not ten able. To all the engagomentn of Spain jfc with other natlonH, affecting their rightn nnd Interestn, Colombia, so far nn she wan affected by them, remains bound in honor and in Justice. The stipulation now referred to In of that character." Was Fully Sustained. TIip principle thus asserted by Mr. Adams wan' afterwards sustained by nn International commission in res pect to tho preclso stipulation to which he referred: and a similar position was taken by the United Staten with rognid to the binding obligation upon the independent ntnte of Texan of commercial stipulations embodied In prior treaties between the United States nnd Mexico when Texas forme'V a part of the bitter country. But ho the piesent case It Is unnecessary to go so far. nven If It be admitted that prior treaties of a political and commercial complexion generally do not bind a now Htnte formed by separation, It Is undeniable that ntipulntlonn having a locnl application to tho territory em braced in the now state continue In force and are binding upon the new sovereign. Thun It In on all handa conceded thnt treaties relating to boundaries and to lights of navigation continue In force without regard to changes In government or In sover eignty. This principle obvlouslv ap plies to tint pint nf tho treaty of 184(5 which i elates to the Isthmus of Pan ama, w In conclusion let mo repeat that tho question actually before this gov ernment in not thnt of tho recognition of Panama ns an Independent repub lic. That In already an accomplished fact. The question, and the onlv ques tion. Is whother or not wo shall build an Isthmian cnnnl. I transmit herewith coplen of tho latest notes from the minister of the Republic of Pannma to this govern ment, and of certain notes which linvw pinneil between the special envoy of the Republic of Colombia nnd this government. THKODORR ROORKVRLT. -Ut White House, January 4, 1904. TomrtU What a Gotir-Iooklng person that angular female la over there In tho corner. Bojax Yea, she's a spinster. Tomdlx And what a Eour looklnr woman that la talking to her. Hojax Yos; she's married. Wltlln Mimnm T I.I.I, ...- .. . shfl grew homelier every dav ....... u..u,nu iuu uiuui ten her I said so, did you? Willie I had to, or she would have whlpjwd me.
