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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (Nov. 1, 1915)
3iBtoK WNAWUMdHU,! f. " '. 1 NOVEMBER, 1915 ih Commoner McAdoo on Ship Purchase Bill 19 Tho following speech was delivered by Sec retary of tho Treasury McAdoo, before the busi ness men and commercial bodies of Indianapolis, Indiana, October 13, 1915. What is a naval auxiliary? It is a fleet of merchant vessels so constructed that they may render essential service and assistance to our battleships and cruisers in time of war and serve the needs of our commerce in time of peace. A navy, no matter how strong in battleships, cruis ers, torpedo boats and submarines, is only par tially equipped without a merchant marine aux iliary. It is a fact, and every naval expert will bo testify, that a merchant marine naval auxil iary is just as essential to the effectiveness of tho navy considered as a complete fighting machine, as the guns upon the decks of our battleships and tho seamen upon whose skill and valor the effectiveness of those guns depends. Why is this so? Because battleships and cruisers and tor pedo boats and submarines have to be furnished at sea with coal, provisions and supplies of all kinds. Fighting vessels can not carry sufficient supplies to remain long from their home bases, and they must have these essential auxiliaries in order to enable them to stay at sea and en gage in effective offensive and defensive opera tions away from their home ports. We can not, with safety, rely upon our ability to purchase or charter suitable naval auxiliaries when a crisis appears. The very essence of pre paredness for the navy is to have these vessels of suitable types and construction where we can put our hands on them quickly. To prove this I need only to tell you what happened when war with Spain broke out in 1898. We had no naval auxiliaries no army transports. We were ut terly unprepared. We had to go into the market and buy immediately any and every kind of boat that could be hastily adapted to our purposes, and, of course, we paid fabulous prices for them. When a man, or a government, has to have something tho other fellow has got, and that fel low knows that this something can't be gotten from anybody but himself, he exacts the highest possible price and gets it. This is human nature. The navy alone bought at that time 102 vessels as naval auxiliaries and pad, in round numbers, the fabulous sum of $18,000,000 for them. There is no officer of the navy who knows about these purchases who won't admit that most of these vessels were junk. But we had to take anything we could get and pay any price the ship owner or broker asked, in order to send our fleet just a little way from home to Cuba. This is the penalty we paid for our failure to create a real naval auxiliary. Unhappily we have learned nothing from that painful lesson and are in worse condition today than we were in 1898, so far as merchant marine naval auxiliaries are concerned, because our navy is much larger and its requirements more exacting. In addition to the $18,000,000 spent by the navy, the war department spent millions for vessels to transport troops. If we build a real and efficient naval auxiliary, we shall have the right kind of vessels to supply the army with transports when it needs them We have not today under the American flag sufficient vessels to give our navy, in case of war, the support and assistance which is indis pensable to its efficiency. .. I do not ask you to take my word for this statement. I will "give you the testimony of the secretary of "the navy himself. In June last I addressed the following inquiry to the navy department: "Considering our navy as it is today, and hav ing reference to its maximum usefulness and efficiency -in time of war, what number of mer chant vessels and of what tonnage would bo re quired?" Admiral Benson, who was at the time acting secretary of the navy in tho absence of Secre tary Daniels, replied as follows: "There would be required 400 merchant ves sels for auxiliaries with a total of 1,172,000 gross tonnage. In addition to the above, should our own coast be invested, or even occasionally visited, there would1 bo required a large number of small vessels fitted for mine sweeping, say at least 324 of such vessels, of about 150 gross tons each." Then follows a statement of the various types and characteristics of the vessels Tequired, but it is hardly necessary to givo these details be yond saying that they cover fleet scouts, colliers, turTflhnnnSilm;t,i.d0e8 n0t talt0 In0 aCCOUnt fU- year o?r ndii MV7 Ae U ,ncrea8CS each oal?.flrCliant marIU mU8t In" There is no doubt of our ability to sunnlv from our coastwise vessels the 324 Small vessels for mine sweeping, referred to in Admiral Ben" Til t1at'f?,ent; but we a "t so fortunately situated with respect to tho 400 merchant ves- rnJr auxniarie9' aggregating abou 1,172,000 gross tonnage, to which tho admiral refers Un- dr,Uwed,ly a ll? Part of th,s tonnage could be drawn from ships now under American registry flbhm?Ch JMpBf W,uld' In man bo mal el shifts and not suitable, either in type speed or construction, to render, in the highest degree, reui a WeU develoned uavy uld I am informed by the navy department that we could draw from our present merchant ma rino approximately 700,000 gross tonnage of vessels that could bo converted into naval aux- i ?b;aa 7lla leaves ua wltl a deficiency of about 500,000 gross tonnage to meet tho needs of our navy as it stands today and without al lowing for growth. It may bo claimed in this connection that our merchant marine has grown so rapidly in the past year that we are Justified in relying on it to keep pace with our naval re quirements, so that wo could draw from it what wo want in case of war. Tho increase in our merchant marine in the past year is due to tho liberal act passed by the congress after the Eu ropean war broke out, known as the Ship Regis try bill, which authorizes any one fo register a foreign-built ship under our flag by complying with the conditions of the act. While tho Ger man cruisers were in f Atlantic and Pacific, a considerable number ' Vessels of English and other registry, many 'of which were owned by American citizens, were transferred to the Amer ican flag. WeThave no assurance, however, that these ships will remain under American registry after peace I" restored in Europe. Even if they do, their crews are composed mostly of foreign ers who are under no obligation to fight for our flag and are not likely to volunteer to do so in an emergency. It is, of course, out of the ques tion to rely upon citizens of foreign powers to fight our battles upon the high seas. Wo must not rely upon foreign ships and foreign crews which may have taken the benefits of American registry merelv for safety and Insurance against attack while the war Is raging in Europe and which may desert us as soon as that danger is past. As a part of our naval program of prepared ness we should provide every element of a well equipped, highly efficient, and perfectly bal anced naval fleet and organization. Tho ships, both of the fighting line and of the auxiliary line, should bo the best that American skill and sci ence can produce, and tho men who are to fight the battleships and operate the auxiliaries must be trained American seamen, imbued with our national spirit and knowing no allegiance except to the United States. So vital is this that, whereas a few years ago we permitted foreigners to enlist in our navy, the law now compels tho enlistment of American citizens only. Every part of a highly developed navv and every unit of the human organization should work in thorough reciprocation like the parts of a perfect locomotive, enabling it to develop the highest power, tho greatest speed, and the max imum of efficiency In all circumstances and un der all conditions. Our neglect to provide in the past the neces sary naval auxiliary give us, however, one great advantage. By building them now we can develop a type that will be better than anything the world has yet produced. We can construct a more efficient arm of this character than any nation on earth possesses, and, while we are con serving the national safety by Increasing the nower of our national fighting machine, we can. Itthl same time, put into commerce a class of Alps wS wl give to our people in the ex snips wnitu . . fraflg advantages over ev- VtltZr We can do this because the ery w marines of our leading rivals arc, In merchant m?Jln8 " ot nW FbipS, with ob- SSXSXSkt. ducted with special ref- oronco to navy uses, commercial requirement, and economical operation that will bo nupcrlor to anything that naval and marlno architecture " havo yet turned out. As I said beforo, this Is tho ono advantage of our pas neglect, but that -advantage will bo lout If tho calamity of war should ovortakc un before wo can create our well-balanced navy, with Its complement of mer chant marino naval auxiliaries. Up to this point I think wo can all agree. I bellevo thcro Is no citizen, however partisan lie may be, or whatever his viows may bo about a merchant marine, who will not agrco that the government should provide tho necessary auxil iaries for tho navy Just as it should provide the battleships and other essential fighting units of tho navy. Certainly wo can not afford to rely on private capital to creato these naval auxil iaries. Wo can not sleep any longer wo must prepare. The government should proceed immediately with tho construction of thoao auxiliaries aa a part of tho program of proparedncas. Tho ves sels should bo designed by tho best marlno and naval architects in this country. They should bo passed upon and approved by tho navy de partment, and tho contracts for their construc tion should bo lot to American shlpyardH to the extent that such shipyards can build them, and our own navy yards should construct as many of these vessels no their capacity will permit. I wish to omphaBlzo tho importanco of building these ships in American shipyards and in our navy yards. It is Just as important a part of naval preparedness to havo adequate shlpyardo for tho purposo of constructing and repairing vessels as it is to havo tho Vessels thouiHClvcs and the men to man them. We must pursue an intelligent system of building up our shipyards and our navy yards as a part of tho vital prob lem of naval preparedness. When wo havo built the 500,000 gross ton nage of merchant vessels as naval auxiliaries, the question Is, what shall wo do with them. They will not bo required for actual service un less a war breaks out. Thero aro two methods of dealing with them. First, tie them up In our harbors and allow them to romain idle and rot; and, second, operate them under some Intelli gent plan for tho protection and expansion of our foreign commerce. Of course, no rational person would advocate that these vessels bo kept idle In our harbors, awaiting tho uncertain oventuality of war. The interest charge alone would bo a large and con tinuing expense. In a comparatively few years tho vessels would go to ruin and tho whole In vestment would bo lost. If, on the other hand, we operato these ships under somo sensible plan and expand our for eign trade, wo will do the most intelligent pos sible thing from every standpoint. Tho opera tion of the ships will keep them in fit condition to respond to the Immediate call of the navy In case of need, and wo shall, at tho same time, cre ate a large corps of trained American officers nnd seamen, and the direct earnings may show a handsome return on tho Investment. Even if a loss is incurred, It will be a small price to pay for preparedness and tho national safety. While thus preserving Die ships and creating a highly efficient naval reserve, we can enlarge our for eign trade and carry our Influence, both financial , . and commercial, into tho open markets of the world. Is not this the Intelligent thing to do? Can there bo any difference of opinion on this point? If not, then all of us, whether partisans or not, can travel the same road this far I Imagine also that there can be no difference of opinion as to the desirability of increasing our foreign trade. I bellevo that we shall all agree that the prosperity of this country depends upon the maintenance and expansion of our for eign commerce. What could more clearly prove this than the experience through which the na tion has recently passed and Is now passing? When the European war broke out; the first re sult wa3 a complete disorganization of exchange and international credits, a dislocation of all for eign commerce and Its almost complete stoppage for several months. The effect upon our Intern al situation was immediate and dangerous. In all of our leading ports thero was great conges tion of grain, cotton and supplies of all kinds, with corresponding injnrv and depression -throughout the country. This was followed by a period of gradual loosening up, of restoration of confidence and credits, until now the orders from foreign nations havo so stimulated nnr foreign trade that our industries arc running full time and there .is a demand for all of our sur plus products, particularly the products of the .' ia 't&9