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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (Nov. 1, 1915)
t The Commoner 10 YOL. 15, NO. 11 Kitchin's Letter on "Preparedness" Mr m , 1'it i:-s- Ufi. r i. Ti y t . &'. ft W V V. rv m ' War f '.it hi i s... . . Mll'v r ,i . ew.;. Scotland Neck, N. 0., Sept. 4th, 1915. Mr. H, E. C, Bryant, New York World Bureau, t Washington, D. C. ' ' ' Dear Mr. Bryant; - ' "'' ." . ' . ' I am in receipt of your letter. I didiilt intend my little hurried talk of three or. four minutes, Just as I was leaving Washington for North Car olina tho other day, with a personal friend, a newspaper man of my state, relative to the hig naval and military program, now heing agitated throughout the country, to be published, though I did not caution against it. Since, however, my position hUs been so frequently misrepresented by tho press, no doubt, unintentionally, it would seem not improper for mo to state my position, rather, my views, with more deafness, In com pliance with your request. I at once wish to Bay that I have never stated, as appears in tho clippings you kindly sent, that . I would oppose any appropriation -exceeding $10,000,000 to $20,000,000 for national defense. I have been voting for tho laBt several years for appropriations in the annual naval bill exceed- . ing $120,000,000 and for nearly $100,000,000 in tho military bill; nor did I say that congress would not vote for increased appropriations for naval a,nd military purposes and. that it would take the position which I do. i am confident that the next congress will vote for larger ap propriations and will not take the position as to tho naval and military appropriations which I will. In other words, I admit that I -will be a minority on the question. Nor have I said, as the press would have it, that the. ji.rgsent . Euro-, pean war has demonstrated the uselessness of the battleship or dreadnaught. I have said, though, and repeat it now, that it has demon atrated, boyond any doubt, that our navy was lacking In submarines, destroyers, scout-ships and other auxiliaries, including air craft, far more than in battleships, or dreadnaughts, a view which many members of congress, includ ing myself, held and expressed long before, tho European war. While I was a member of tho naval .committee I insisted that thejiavy depart ment was paying too much attention to and had . too much faith, in dreadnaughts and. paying too little attention to and had too little faith in sub marines, torpedo destroyers, etc. I, together with other members of tho committee, urged, in vain, an increase in such smaller craft, in order to have a better proportioned and more efficient navy. The war has certainly demonstrated the wisdom of this position. However, I, assert now that the lessons of the present war furnish many good reasons for the probability niiat the war will demonstrate that tho dreadnaught, nine of which wo have now under construction and au thorized, costing over $120,000,000 and which the big navy propagandists insist that the next congress should largely increase, will not here after be the prime weapon of offense or defense in naval warfare, and some reason to believe they 'Will become obsolete after tho termination of this war, if not before. A year ago Sir Percy Scott, one of England's ablest and wisest officers, declared that the submarine was the most effec tive ship for the navy of the future, and adviBed a cessation in the rapid construction of dread naughts and the utilization of the money thus spent in building a larger number of submarines. And this long before the two or three Gorman submarines had plwd such havoo With the British fleet. Has not the war demonstrated conclusively tho correctness of his opinion and. the wisdom of his advice? If reports from the British, German and other belligerent ship yards ar true, ate not England, Germany, .and other warring nations. now king his advice? So far, this war has proved that the most dangerous nayal weapon of offense, and certainly the surest 'and most efficacious weapon of defense, is the "..submarine. When tho real, sea-going submarine, one that can go through tho seas und attack an enmy flaat' thousands of miles from base, many of . wjiichtftro now being built by Germany, accord ing Xo reports, (the last congress authorized tho . MUitrction of three for our navy) is put Into JHVic in this war, it may, and probably will, revolutionize the war-ship construction policy the world. The dreadnaught advocate in our country repeatedly asserts mat tno war nas demonstrated tho absolute usefulness and neces sity of the big dreadnaught or battleship; that tho superior battleship fleet of Great Britain and her allies swept the German fleet and German commerce from the seas. If Great Britain and her allies had not had a battleship, German commerce and the German fleet would have been swept from the seas exactly like they were. Great Britain and her allies had enough torpedo boats and destroyers and enough submarines to have sent after each battleship, battle-cruiser, and armored cruiser of the entire German navy, ten torpedo boats and destroyers and threo sub marines; enough to have destroyed, or driven to harbor, under protection of submarines and mines, as the German fleet was, the combined battleship fleets of the world, If located where the German fleet was. Great Britain alone' had four destroyers and two submarines for each of the big warships of the German navy. Now, a more direct reply to your letter: I am opposed to tho big navy and army program now being agitated with so much energy throughout the country, especially by the jingoes and manu facturers of war equipment and their subtle, ramified, , organized and powerful influences. I shall not support in the next congress the eight, six, or four battleships or dreadnaught proposi tion, lior tho 500,000 or 250,000 army Increase proposition, nor the $500,000,000 (more than double' the annual appropriations heretofore) ap propriation proposition for the army and navy. Whether congress will vote for such an immense ly increased appropriation depends on the Pres idents attitude. If he insists on the increase, congress will vote for it. If he does not insist, in my opinion, congress will not vote for it. This answferft your specific questions. In further answer to. your general inquiries, I shall not vote for any increase in the naval, ap propriation bill. for an oxtrarbattleships program. If the government has any extra money to spend, and must spend it on. an extra increase of naval construction, then, in my judgment, it should be spent on the increased construction of sub marines, torpedo, destroyers, scout-ships and other auxiliaries, including air craft, and in en larging our. capacity toj, manufacture and, lay mines. mainly on submarines and mines (the laying of mines is a function of the army, and not pf thejnavy, however) andnot on additional dreadnaughts or battleships. If no increase in the naval appropriation bill over the last bill is made, I think it wiser that, every dollar author ized1 and appropriated for new construction should be for submarines (and other smaller craft above mentioned. For the cost of one or wo dnauSnts put into' such craft, including the auxiliaries, we would liave a better propor tioned and 'more efficient navy than if put into dreadnaughts, and moBt certainly more efflcieht for defense. If this war has not as yet demon strate the uselessness of tho modern dread naught, it has surely demonstrated the marvels ous usefulness and absolute necessity of the sub marine as a weapon of offense and defense. For the cost of one dreadnaught, with the submarines Zl Zi JV? thosrbuildirfe and authorize!! 7 C01d 5uild enoen to keep the combined battleship fleet of the world hundreds of m?les from our shores. We Would have' the largest BrtSe. iV11 thG rrld' lar tlmn Great S2K 2 ?d Germany's combined at the out break of the present war. Fo the coBt of n. dreadnaught we could build from twenty-five to KiB?arln?' a many n Germany had at the beginning of tho war. Who unwpiVirtinS ?E? ,?tai!? Wd ln or outside of tSS Savy in the light of the experience of the nreqpnfwo? does not .know that twenty-five or ev LWar' five, well equipped and weU' manned subma are more efficacious for offense ami ,wSJl !l p one, or even four dreadnaugiUs' The ? naught costs $14,000,000 S upwards-rf" a thousand men and officers t oSS 1 or- 2 mif Hon and. a half dollars or Trim- fZ Y ' milm up-keop including crew- whU a IT, annal of submarines, costing each less than half a mini dollars, and manned by not over twenty-fivn destroyed' nearly 10 per cent of the big wnS' fleet of Great Britain, costing over $75 oonnnS and over two thousand lives, and, in ad(litl destroyed many thousands of tonnage of BmilhS war craft and merchant vessels? To accoSi KJ?8 submarines, costing a little over a million dollars, with seventy-five men aw would take, in a naval engagement, more t ,' a dofcen battleships and cruisers, costing accord ing to what we pay, more than $100,000 00 0 ?inf frb?S? to10'000 officers and men w th the probability, even if successful, of 0si many of the Vessels and thousands of lives DM not one little submarine, costing-less than half a million dollars, with only twenty-five men worming itself through thousands of miles of sea, creep into the Dardanelles, send to the bot tom five warships of the Allies and disable the Sb5K T111?" straggling, crippled, remnan of tho Allies' fleet out, whilo it survived un harmed arid Untouched? To accomplish this it would have taken eight or ten warships, costing from $60,000,000 to $100,000,000, aid "from 7.000 to 10,000 men, with the risk of ma ships being destroyed and many lives lost Ger many has her big, magnificent fleet of battle ships, cruisers, etc., lying unmolested in her har bor. Great Britain and her allies have a battle ship fleet nearly four times as large and power ful and a torpedo fleet over foUr times as large Why don't the Allies go in and destroy the Ger man fleet? Your answer, submarines and mines. That answers largely the question of our "de fensive preparedness." If a few submarines and mines (and Germany hasn't as many submarines as we have) can protect, and keep unmolested, the German fleet and her harbor and hold at bay for hundreds of miles a fleet four times as big and as powerful, why couldn't submarines and mines protect with equal assurance our fleet and our shores? But why should we tfe in such a hurry to make big- appropriations for tlie army and the navy? Why should congress make such a wild rush to tax the people more? Where is the ne cessity or the wisdom? If there ever was a time in the history of our government when the ad ministration, congress, and the people, could consider with deliberation, and without excite ment and without haste, a military and naval construction policy, it is now. Just stop and give a moment's calm thought to the situation: 1st. Ou,r navy and army is stronger, better equipped, with more ammunition and in every respect more efficient today than ever before, we have now under construction and authorized ror the navy more vessels than ever before 50 Per !? more in money and in numbers than ever before; more dreadnaughts under construc tion than ever before nine in number. During the two years of the Wilson administration con gress authorized the building of dreadnaughts to cost over $70,000,000; the last two years of iol a frustration dreadnaughts costing about b,ooo,000 were authorized. This ought to satisfy the. dreadnaught jingo and traffiker, cer tainly till we construct other more useful and necessary .craft. The dreadnaughts authorized m the last congress will not be completed until fSG ?r 'W years and the dreadnaughts, if aS , Gd by the cowing congress, can not pos sibly be completed within four or five years ?in ?G arS9Wins could eat us up alive by tnat time, . Relatively, considering the require ments and demands of the present war upon all other navies, we have the strongest and most powerful navy on earth sufficient to defend our country .and protect our rights on the seas or elsewhere against any nation or any possible combination, pt nations during the continuance of the preseniT'European war. After tho war terminates, wlmt nation will have the design or thO POWer th ntfhnlr nc.9 2nd. We are in less danger, from a foreign foe than ever before in the history of, our coun try. Even if we were not, he .has less power to harm or.s.trlke us than ever before. We are now absolutely in no danger of attack or in vasion. In faqt, the invasion by a foreign coun try from across the sea $pd the landing of an army upon the soil of unptben equipped with mines and.submarinoB, is a thing of .the past and an impossibility, and no nation will ever at tempt it. Every nation capable in the least of coping with us has its hands "full to its elbows ( -,i i'lti