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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (Oct. 15, 1909)
-? fifTyc&i PfWBPPJJ? i "ww- w"' tt; CCTOBEH IS, lSl'f The Commoner. EDUCATIONAL SERIES TO WHAT EXTHNT SHOULD TUB UNITED STATES NAVY BE INCREASED? Russell E. Townsend, of Lebanon, III., won the Silas Lillard Bryan prize given annually to th students of McKondreo College, Lebanon, 111., by W. J. Bryan in memory of his father, who graduated at McKendroo in 1849. The subject of Mr. Townsend's essay was "To "What Extent Should tho United States Navy bo In crease!?" The essay follows; Introduction A larger fleet is not necessary, for: (a) War is Improbable on tho Pacific; (b) War is im probable on tho Atlantic; (c) Granted tho pos sibility of war what the United States wants is not a larger fleet but better coast defense; (d) Diplomatic contentions do not require it. Proof A larger fleet is not necessary, for 1. War is improbable on tho Pacific, for (a) ,Wo have no formidable foe in tho Orient, for (1) Japan, the only naval power in the Orient is very friendly; (2) Geographical isolation pre vents conflict. 2. War is improbable on the Atlantic, for (a) Tho United States stronger than either Franco or Germany; (b) The British fleet could not act as a unit, for (1) Her colonial policy will not permit it, (2) Her geographical situation-is , riot -suitable; (c) Tho bond uniting tho English speaking nations declares it so, for (1) Nearly one hundred years of continued peaco warrants peace, (2) Race, religion, and political institutions are similar. 3. Granted the possibility of war, what the United States wants is not a larger fleet but better coast defense, for ia) Proper coast de fense would doubly safeguard tho Pacific, for (1) It would protect against a hostile fleot, (2) In case of war it would- give strategic advantago to the' fleet; (h) Proper coast defense would doubly safeguard the Atlantic, for (1) It would sdcurely protect life and property along the coast, (2) It would release coast defense vessels for service with the fleet; (c) Tho Panama canal will increase naval efllciencyr for (1) It will strengthen our already unique geographical sit uation, (2) It will shorten the sea passage from ocean to ocean. 4. Diplomatic contentions do not require It, for (a) It is moral weight that wins diplomatic contests, for (1) The Monroe doctrine was peaceably established, (2) Tho open door was gained through confidence, (3) Cleveland fear lessly settled the Venezuela boundry, (4) Lin coln caused the withdrawal of Maxmillian. a' .Conclusion Therefofe1 through the foregoing arguments, tho following conclusion Is reached, that (1) Theija should f be no material increase in tho number" of units of our present navy, for (a) War is improbable on the Pacific; (b) War is improbable on the Atlantic; (c) Granted the possibility of war what the United States wants is not a larger fleet but better coast defense; (d) Diplomatic contentions do not require it. To what extent should the United States navy bo increased? However deplorable and unnatural tho vlclous ness of one nation's arming itself against an other may be there remains an undeniable fact that they support and maintain navies which can have but one legitimato purpose for an ex istence that of protection. Being a sea power the strength of our navy depends altogether upon the probability and possibility of war. If from the nature of our country its geographical situation, Its coast lino, its commerce, its in ternational policies thero is a strong proba bility of war in either the Pacific or Atlantic waters, and it can be shown that other means of defense together with our present fleet aro inefficient in case of possible war, then tho present number of units of our navy are in adequate and our policy should be that of ma terially increasing tho units. But if war can be shown to be improbable in either ocean, and it can be shown that we can be made sufficiently strong by other means, together with our pres ent number of units, in case of possible war, then a policy of increase becomes untenable and our policy should be a mere process of replac ing the old and inefficient vessels, thus main taining our present strength. Therefore, to provo tho latter theory correct and establish the fact that no larger fleet is necessary it should bo provon, first that war is improbablo on tho Pacific, second that war is improbablo on tho Atlantic, third that in caso of possible war a properly constructed coast dofonso to gether with tho present fleot would prove ade quate for lawful purposes, fourth that diplo matic contentions do not necessitate a largo fleet. The fact that war on tho Pacific is consid ered improbable by tho United States govern ment Is shown by tho significant fact that a fleet has novor beon hold thero permanently. Tho Orient has but ono naval power, that of Japan. We may trust tho traditional friendship of that country, and wtf can also trust that she is in no condition economically to wage war against a great power. Should war occur with that country and wo have no grounds for a suspicion her fleet would bo of no practical benefit. Japan has no coaling station nearer to our Pacific coast than hor own ports. When in a conflict with this country tho ports of neutral countries are closed against hor. It is unreasonable to think that Japan's fleot could steam to our western coast without replenish ing her coal supply. And woro it ovon posslblo for her fleet to reach our shores it could not possibly return. Any conservative mind must realize that a war between tho United States and Japan must of necessity tako place in tho waters around the Phillppino Islands. Hence our fleet must bo sent to that quarter of tho globe. This can bo dono boforo hostilities reach the point of rupture, for every conflict the world has ever, known has beon anticipat ed and prophesied for a surety months boforo hostilities began. To claim that wo have a prob able foo in the Orient and aro in imminent danger of an attack from that foo far surpasses tho wildest dreams of naval enthusiasts. Having determined that war Is Improbable on tho Atlantic an examination of th6 relative sea stre'ngth of tho powers logically follows be fore a discussion of tho Improbability of war on the Atlantic. According to tho annual re port of Secretary Metcalf to tho president mado on November "30, 1908, England ranks first in the amount of tonnage, number of first-class battleships, armed cruisers, cruisers' abovo six thousand tons displacement, and cruisers of from one thousand to six thousand tons dis placement. Tho total number or these now in commission in tho British navy being ono hun dred and seventy-three. England appears to have no coast defense vessels. Tho United States ranks second, Franco third, Germany fourth, Japan fifth, Russia sixth, Italy seventh, Austria eighth. From tho secretary's report these significant facts aro gathered. England has nearly ono million more tons displacement than the United States who ranks next to hor. Or to make it more explicit her tonnage is near ly aB large as tho combined tonnage of tho United States, France and Japan.. In tho num ber of units, excepting torpedo boat destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines England now lacks ono unit of having double that of tho United States. Woro tho vessels now building completed England would have two units over double those of this country. This country would still, however, remain second, but Franco and Germany would trade places. These facts and figures distinctly place the United States as tho second naval power in tho world. Be ing second then, every ship that wo add to our navy in the meantime which does not make us superior in number to England is useless as far as other nations aro concerned, and of no avail as far as England is concerned. So wo aro left the alternative of being satisfied to hold our present position, or enter Into a wild scramble for superiority with England. Since it has boon determined that our fleet, according to Mr. Metcalf's report, is tho second in the world tho probability of an Atlantic con flict appears further removed than war upon the Pacific. Those who entertain tho most dire ful thoughts of sudden war surely can have no fear of France or Germany, since our navy is greater than either of theirs. But suppose for a moment tho sea strength of either of these countries was equal to that of the United States the result of tho Spanish-American war will in evitably stand as a warning to thoso nations. At tho beginning of that conflict tho tacit opin ion of the power of Europe was that an equality of strength existed between tho belligerent countries. Tho result of that war Is well known to tho naval world. The United States, without tho loss of a slnglo ship and but ono man utterly destroyed tho Spanish nW whoso power was conceded to equal that of tho United States, If tho powers of Europo woro willing to grant to Spain an equality of power and tho rank of Frauce and Germany now actually falls below that of this country how much nioro superior then Is tho Unltod Suites thnn cither Franco or Germany, and too, by tho samo logic England loses much of hor strength. England has be come a strong naval power becauso hor oxton sivo colonial policies havo drivon hor to It. In tho Atlantic waters sho has forty-fivo battleships and thirty-three armored cruisers. Since Eng land thus concedes that hor actlvo naval oper ations must bo transacted in tho Atlantic ocean it Is of no concom to this country whero tho romalndor of her ships aro ultuatod slnco It must romnlu there to compol obedience to British power. In tho Atlantic waters It Is posslblo for tho United States to have twouty-flvo battle ships, cloven coast dofonso vessels, twolvo arm ored cruisers of from ono thousand tons dis placement to those classed as armored cruisers, making a total of elghty-sovon units. Tho power of such a fleet no ono doubts for a moment. They can all unlto for a common purpoao wlulo thoso of England must necessarily divide into two squadrons ono to guard tho British Isles from tho slumbering Joalousnmm of European powers, the other to protect tho eastern coast of Canada. All thoso facts, howover, dwindlo Into com parative inplgniflcanco when tho great bond of friendship which unites thoso two English spoaking nations is brought Into consideration. Tho evolution of perpetual peace has beon go ing on by slow (logrcos, and although It does not exist among other nations, It certainly re moves all probability of a conflict betweon Eng land and tho United States. For nearly ono hundred years events have drawn and aro draw ing theso two countries closer and closor to gether, and tho moro they know of each other tho clearer is their perception of tho fact that race, religion, and political institutions form between, them a bond such as exists between no other two countries of tho earth. Their essen tial interests aro not divergont. Such unsottled questlous as arJso to vox their mutual good will aro capable of adjustment without sorious re striction. Tho trend of humau events oxerts n subtlo influence which must enter into tho final settlement of all disputes betweon them. It has been pointed out clearly that war is not probable but still thero is always a possi bility of it. In caso of a posslblo war It Is not a larger fleet but bettor coast defense which this country needs. Too little attention has beon paid to this matter. Tho necessity for a complete and adequate systom of coast dofonso Is greater today than over boforo. Tho fact that wo have a fleet makes It all tho moro neces sary. Tho groat strategic advantago a fleet has is its possibility to bo on tho offenslvo rather than tho defensive. A good coast defense gives tho fleet this advantago and permits it to seok out and watch its objective This was illustrat ed In tho late Russia-Japaneso war. Japan had a good system of coast protection, consequently could strike moro effective blows without fear of a recall to defend the coast lino. By build ing up the coast defense on our Pacific shore it is at onco evident that should our fleet ever bo called to a conflict in Pacific waters oufves sels could take tho Initiative In every maneuver, and at the same time our coast would bo safo from that phantom possibility of attack, the airly dream of navy-mad Americans. Then so far as a separate and distinct fleet In tho Pacific is concerned wo need none at all but should rather build up our neglected and in ferior coast defense. As upon the Pacific so upon tho Atlantic our coast and harbor defense is very Inferior. On the Atlantic coast there is a population of six teen millions of peoplo within gun shot of a ship; there are approximately eighteen billions of dollars of property within striking dlstanco of a hostile fleet; and only five out of tho twenty-seven fortified harbors havo complete equipment of fire control. Furthermore, many of our navy yards havo become inadequate for receiving tho largo Dreadnaughts proposed and advocated by our naval enthusiasts. Tho draft of battleships has been increasing so rapidly during recent years that there aro many porta throughout tho United States that can not be entered with safety. With proper coast de fense these requirements will be met and, In time of war, there will bd no demand for a