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About The commoner. (Lincoln, Neb.) 1901-1923 | View Entire Issue (Sept. 24, 1909)
flTiV Kfw. w il) SEPTEMBER 24, 1909 WT VftVimWWm tQWVimmaWWWvw:mqpy 7Tr-TvvrjmrFvn'-rr- crats hesitate to striko the blow? If tho re moval of the tax on raw materials did Injustice to any particular class, an objection might be raised to tho removal, but when a tax upon raw materials simply taxes all of tho peoplo for tho benefit of a few of tho people, it can not bo contended that tho removal of the tax does In justice, for no one has a natural right to tax others for his benefit. If a man is being taxed for tbo benefit of others, his remedy is In removing or reducing the tax that burdens him rather than in imposing a tax upon some ono else for his own benefit. The argument that is now being mado by some, that whilo protection is wrong, their con stituents must have their share of tho wrong as long as the wrong exists, would bo amusing if it were not proposed in all seriousness. The prin ciple of protection is either right or wrong. If It Is right it ought to bo advocated, not a3 an incident, but as tho direct part of the law. If the protcctlvo principle Is wrong, wo can hardly claim that our friends should have tho benefit of it. It would bo like saying that while we opposo horse stealing, still If horses were to bo stolen we must have our share In the dis tribution. Would it not bo better to say that as horso stealing is wrong, wo shall do our best to prevent it? If the protective principle is wrong wo should do. our best, to eradicate It; to attempt to extend the benefits of protection is inconsistent with tho declaration that tho system itself is wrong. And this brings us to tho discussion of tho principle of protection: I began tho study of public questions with tho tariff question, and years ..go roached the con clusion that tho protective principle is inde fensible from every standpoint. It is wrong in principle, wrong in policy, and its influence must always and everywhere be harmful. As unre stricted trade is tho natural condition, tho ad vocate of protection must bo prepared to estab lish threo propositions before ho can maintain his position. 1. He must prove that the principle of pro tection is right. 2. That tho policy is wise, and , 3. That tho protection asked for Is necessary. "What protectionist has ever attempted to es tablish any one' of these propositions? We con tend that tlxo jprincllilo Ja wiuug. A piulUutiYo tariff is an indirect bounty. In the case of a bounty the government collects tho money and turns it over to the favored individual or cor poration. In the case of a protectivo tariff tho government imposes a duty upon tho Imported article, and the theory is that this duty, being addcd"to the price of the imported article, so Increases the cost of the imported article that .tho manufacturer can collect from the consumer an amount equal to tho tariff in excess of tho amount that he could collect if there were no tariff. The protective tariff and the bounty 'do not differ II. principle, but merely in form. We contend that the government has no right to collect money from all the people for the bene fit of a few of the peoplo. ' In what is known as the Topeka (Kan.) case, tho Unit d States supreme court held that tho city of Topeka could not "tax the peoplo of that city to aid a manufacturing plant, located in, or near, that city, and the court in rendering tho opinion, said: (I quote from memory.) "To lay with one hand the power of tho govern ment upon the property of the citizen and with the other to give it to private individuals to .aid private enterprises and build up private for tunes, is none tho less robbery because dono under forms of law, and .is called taxation." If the city of Topeka, i.cting for a majority of its citizens, could not tax tho people to aid an industry located in tho city, upon what prin ciple can the people of one part of a stato be tatfed to aid an industry located in another part of the state? Upon what principle can the people of ono state be taxed to aid an industry located in another state? Upon what principle can the peoplo of one section of tho country bo 'taxed tp aid tho people who live in another . section? , If tho doctrine laid down in the Topeka '(Kan.) case is sound, then tho Bheep owners of western Texas have no right to tax the cotton growers of the rest of the state. If the doctrine laid down in the Topeka '(Kan.) case is sound, upon what principle can the owners of timber lands and sawmills col lect a tax upon tho builders of homes through out' the land? If wo concede tho right of the government to tax 'all of the people, for the benefit of thoso who may secure the favor of tho government, there is no ground upon which we can plant The Commoner. oursolves in our fight for a tariff for revenue only; and I may add. If the protective principlo is wrong, then how can wo logically domand that it shall bo invoked in behalf of certain aoctlon or certain classes, merely bocauso it has been wrongfully Invoked in behalf of othor sections or other classes? But even if wo could defend tho right of tho government to tax tho many for tho benefit of tho few wo would find difficulty in defending tho policy, because of tho evils to which it leads in practice. Tho moment wo concedo tho right of a man to uso tho government as an assot In his business, wo must expect him to becomo active in tho control of tho government. Tho protectivo system has been productive of moro corruption in government than any othor agency. Tho manufacturers hcivo supplied tho sinews of war for thoso candidates who aro willing to agree in advance to reimburse tho manufacturers out of the pockets of tho people. An alarming fact Is that advocacy of protec tion as a principlo and toleration toward its ap plied doctrine tends not only to a corruption of politics, and acts injuriously to tho peoplo who permit It, but is also a menaco to public morals, in that it teaches that a man's voto should bo determined by tho amount of money hq is likely to receive from legislation, rathor than by his deslro to contribute to the common good. Years ago a prominent republican coined a phrase that has since been in common us?, viz: "Frying tho fat out of tho manufacturers." If tho manufacturers have fat which may bo fried for campaign purposes, apd largo lumber men and sheep owners aro to bo dealt with upon tho same basiB, whero is tho system to end? How can wo denounce tho bribe-taker, who soils his vote for 00 cents or $5, if wo condono tho conduct of the rich, .whoso personal profits run into tho hundreds, the thousands or oven Into tho millions? Men havo been sent to congress and kept In congress by tho campaign funds furnished by tho protected interests. In tho last presidential campaign our national committee collected about $600,000, and moro peoplo contributed to it than over contributed to ,a campaign fund before, and 'yet probably not moro than. 5. per cent of tho democratic voters sent in contributions to tho national fund. A single corporation like tho steel trust could afford to contribute moro than $600,000 to any party that would promise to protect its products. Its net earnings havo amounted to over $150, 000,000 in a single year. It could give ten times as much to a campaign fund as wo col lected from tho entire democratic party last year, and yet make the money back over and over in a single year out of the favoritism which protection bestows; and it will-not help matters any to add tho producers of raw material to tho manufacturers as a corrupting influence. Tho .benefits of tho tariff on lumber do not go to any largo percentago of tho people, but mainly to tho owners of timber lands and saw mills. Tho Weyerhaeuser company, for in stance, owns immense tracts of timber lands and many sawmills. Whilo I can not speak in detail of tho lumber interests of Texas, I am sure I am within tho truth when I say that there aro twenty-five voters in Texas who are injured by tho tax on lumber for every voter who derives a pecuniary benefit from the.lumber tariff. Tho profits which tho large lu'iber owners and lumber compc-nies derive from the tariff on lumber is so great that they could easily finance a national cam paign, if by so doing they could retain a tariff rf on lumber. In my tariff speech at Des Moines last year I quoted from a speech mado by Senator Pettl grew and reported in the Congressional Record, in which he commented on a statement mado in the Northwest Lumberman, giving tho prtffit that would bo derived on lumber by a group of men who assembled in ono of the commltteo rooms of congress to protest against free lumber. Ono of the group declared that a tariff of $1 per thousand feet on lumber would amount to six million dollars to the men in tho room. As long aB men and corporations find It profitable to go into partnership with tho gov ernment in the use of tho taxing power wo shall havo corruption in politics. Another objection to protection as a govern mental policy Is that the moro protection you give tho more tho protected interests demand. When tho protective principle was first applied It was upon tho theory that a little protection, extend ed for a short time, would put the infant In dustry upon its feet and that thereafter no pro tection would bo needed. But we have found that tho infants havo becomo adults, and that thoy demand moro protection now than thoy did in the beginning; the Industrie! that supr plicatod for a littlo protection during the dayg of weakness now domand a continuation of the protection, and ovon an Increase, in the day of tholr strongth. They oven th ronton congress men with defeat if thoy rofuso to oboy thorn. If tho peoplo, who pay tho taxes, took as deop an Interest in tho tariff question an tho people who got tho boneflt of tho tariff tax wo would havo no difficulty, but a fow shcop owners, or tho ownors of a fow lumbor mills, can oomctlmoi torrlfy a congressman if tho rest of tho people nro Indifferent. Tho democratic romody in not to conclllato thoso who sook special privileges, but to awaken tho people to what is going on. When tho masses understand tho iniquity of protection it will no longer havo dofendors In tho south and west, and tho demand for protection on rnw materials will bo as quickly rejected as tho de mand for a protective tariff on manufactured products. Tho third objection to a protective tariff Is that its advocates do not attempt to show that It is necessary, oven from their own standpoint: Tho republican platform asked for a protective tariff equal to tho dlfforenco In tho coat of pro duction plus a reasonnblo profit to tho manu facturers, and if a protcctlvo tariff In to be de fended at all, thn,t is tho logical basis upon which to defend it. What democrat can defend a pro tective tariff, oven on raw matorial, on any othor ground, or to any greater extent? And yet what protectionist hnn attempted co show that wo need a tariff? Tho testimony taken beforo tho committees at Washington last win ter did not covor this point, although tld was tho very question presented by tho republican platform. Tho republicans who asked protec tion for tho manufacturing interests did not attempt to show that thoso Interests noedod the protection asked for, and thoso who demandod tho tariff on raw material did not attempt to show that tho producers of raw material needed a tariff. When a man starts out to defend a protective tariff ho abandons, logic and argument, and con- tents himself with demands and threats; he as sumes that tho principle of protection is right; ho presumes that the policy Is wise, and he takes It for granted that, tho mto , which--h nnics ror Is necessary. Tho man who contends for incidental protection soon becomes as un reasonable as tho man who asks for direct pro tection. Incidental protection is protection that was not Intended a protection that came without planning; tho moment you begin to plan for protection it ceases to bo Incidental and becomes direct and Intended protection, aud to defend it ono must resort to tho samo argu ments that are used to defend tho protective system in general. While it is true that tho Immediate effect of an existing tariff Is tho samo, whether It was intended for protection or intended for revenue, yet in tho construction of a tariff law It makes a great deal of dlfforenco whether thoso who make the law aro looking for revenue or look ing for protection. In making a revenue tariff you so adjust tho tariff as to collect a revenue, and you stop when-you get enough; In construct ing a protectivo tariff .you may so adjust the rates as to impose a heavy burden upon the people and yet collect but little revenue, and you never know when to stop. Take tbo tariff on iron oro as an illustration; tho steel trust wanted a tariff on Iron oro. We havo this upon tho authority of Senator Smith of Maryland, who said on tho floor of tho senate that he had It from a representative of the steel trust. Some of our democrats voted for a tariff on Iron ore, on tho theory that It was a revenue tariff, and they estimated that a duty of 25 cent per ton would bring In a revenue of $250,000, but if the steel trust adds tho tariff to the price of tho oro which it sells or to the price of tho finished product which it makes from tho ore which it converts into steel it will collect a tax of some $10,000,000 from the people, because of the duty on iron orb. If this bo true will any ono defend tho tariff on Iron oro as a revenue tariff? And the same mfght be said of a tariff on oil. The amount of oil Imported would be very small, but a tariff on oil would permit an enormous tax to bo levied upon tho American people. Other illustrations might bo used, but these will show how important It is that a tariff law should be made by those who oppose tho prin ciple of protection, rather than by those who favor tho principle of protection. When a tariff law is mado by thoso who oppose tho principle of protection, the interests of tho whole people IB , .. wrtA. T- &U ft