

When Senator Foraker Was "an Honorable Man"

Under the headline, "Some Curious Circumstances," the Washington (D. C.) Herald of September 30, prints the following:

When one comes to unravel the recent Hearst-Foraker-Taft-Roosevelt matter, if it may be so called, some curious things come to light—things which, arranged in sequence and considered calmly, are not without significance.

To begin at the beginning: On July 30, 1907, writing from Canada to Mr. A. I. Vorys, we find Mr. Taft saying, with respect to a joint indorsement suggested by some Ohio friends of himself and Senator Foraker, the following:

"In respect to one inquiry of yours I wish to express myself with as much emphasis as possible, that is, whether I would object to a compromise resolution which shall include an indorsement of myself for the presidency and Senator Foraker for the senatorship. In my judgment it would be not only a great mistake—something more. It would be accepted necessarily as a compromise on my behalf, and therefore, with my acquiescence, or at least with the acquiescence of my friends, for whose action I am more or less responsible. It would totally misrepresent my position."

On Monday, September 21, 1908, we find the president of the United States saying:

"Senator Foraker has been a leader among those members of Congress of both parties who have resolutely opposed the great policies of internal reform for which the administration has made itself responsible."

From these two statements, it can not be doubted that Mr. Taft repudiated Mr. Foraker privately over a year before the president made that repudiation public and coupled with it his own personal statement indicating that he, too,

had drawn strongly adverse conclusions concerning Senator Foraker, at least as far back as the last meeting of congress.

On September 3, 1908, we find Messrs. Taft and Foraker publicly meeting, somewhat ostentatiously and with a great flourishing of trumpets and beating of drums, at Toledo, Ohio, the occasion being a pre-arranged "reconciliation" affair. At this meeting the republican presidential nominee is quoted as saying of Senator Foraker:

"It is a pleasure to be here with Senator Foraker, because, when governor, he gave me what was really my first chance, and took a good deal of risk in putting a man of twenty-nine years on the superior court of Cincinnati. We are in a great electoral campaign, and it is a pleasure to think that we are going to stand in the campaign, shoulder to shoulder, with the full strength of the republican party."

On Friday, September 11, 1908, Senator Foraker called on Mr. Taft in Cincinnati. After they met, Mr. Taft is reported by a prominent news agency as saying, in response to an inquiry: "Certainly I shall call on Senator Foraker for assistance in the campaign, should occasion require."

Reference to the files of any newspaper carrying the political news of the day will disclose the fact that a further Taft-Foraker joint appearance was planned for Tuesday, September 22, by the National League of Republican clubs. This was to have been a "love feast;" Senator Foraker to preside, and Mr. Taft to make a speech.

A few days before this "love feast" was to occur, however, Mr. Hearst threw his bomb into the republican camp disclosed Mr. Foraker's connection with the Standard Oil company, and cre-

ated the greatest political excitement of the campaign thus far. Thereupon, Mr. Foraker wrote to Mr. John Hays Hammond, president of the National League of Republican clubs, and to Mr. Taft himself, withdrawing from the proposed program. Mr. Taft accepted the embarrassing situation in silence; the president issued a blistering statement denouncing Foraker, and published the year-old Vorys letter, heretofore referred to.

This sequence of events is highly interesting and presents food for thought. Incidentally, it suggests a few questions—

First—Does anybody believe that the National League of Republican club's program would have been altered had not Mr. Hearst stepped into the game at the time he did?

Second—Was it not rather queer that Mr. Taft, directly, and the president, inferentially, would have agreed to either the Toledo meeting or the National League "love feast" if both gentlemen had meant two statements herein quoted? If both knew, one at least a year ago and the other at least since the last meeting of congress, the unworthiness of any sort of compromise or apparent compromise with Foraker, why was the Toledo meeting, or the National League meeting, ever tolerated, in thought or in deed? And in view of the private Vorys letter of 1907, were not Mr. Taft's Toledo remarks noted herein rather peculiar?

Third—Doesn't it look as if Mr. Hearst's startling revelations alone actually precipitated the repudiation of Foraker, and headed off a great sacrifice of principle—or further sacrifice—upon the part of Mr. Taft and the president? Was not the public damnation of Foraker really forced, rather than willingly megaphoned to the world?

Gage and Fowler on Guaranteed Deposits

Lyman J. Gage, former secretary of the treasury, may be regarded as sufficiently "conservative" to obviate fears that he would be "unsafe" in his banking views. Before the house committee on banking and currency in Washington Mr. Gage discussed national finances and particularly the national bank. He sought an illustration of the idea he was expressing, which in general was in support of the guarantee plan, and like many others found it in the Walsh failure in Chicago.

After explaining how the clearing house banks took over the assets of the failed institution, guaranteed all depositors, and prevented runs on other banks, Mr. Gage said:

"Well, they learned another lesson and they adopted another principle, a principle provided for in this (the Fowler) bill. By the vote and voluntary compliance of all the members of the Clearing House association, they authorized the clearing house at any time and at stated periods to act upon its own volition and on its own account, and for the information of the clearing house committee itself to have full, complete and comprehensive investigation of each member of the association, and not only of each member, but of every institution that carries the name of bank over it that is cleared

or represented in the clearing house by any clearing house bank; and I can tell you as a safe prophecy that we are at the end of disastrous failure in the city of Chicago by clearing house banks, since this regime has come in. I am told that Kansas City has the same thing, and other cities will eventually adopt it."

Charles N. Fowler, republican, of New Jersey, chairman of the house committee on banking and currency, appears in the Congressional Record with a house speech in support of his bill which provided for guarantee of bank deposits. He specially answered the assertion that such a guarantee would induce reckless banking, saying:

"Mr. Chairman, we are occasionally met with the statement that guarantee of deposits would lead to unsound banking. * * * Can you think of a banker, because he had insured his deposits, going into the directors' room and saying: 'Gentlemen, we have insured our deposits today. Now let us proceed to make some rotten loans?'"

"Is it not possible that it will occur to those directors that their losses must come out of their profits, out of their reserves out of their capital, and out of their reputations? Will they not realize that they can get nothing out of the guarantee until the last dollar of their cap-

ital, surplus and profits has been wiped out, and stockholders have been assessed double the amount of their stock?"

"Until their reputations have been injured, if not ruined, and possibly some of them have been started on the road to state prison? Can anybody think that any board of directors of any bank would be less solicitous, anxious and honest and wise after they had guaranteed deposits than they were before?"

"I assert again, after the most mature deliberation, that if there is one reason for insuring life and home, there are more than a thousand good reasons—more than ten thousand good reasons—why the depositors of the banking institutions of the United States should be insured."

These two men have offered valuable contributions to the discussion of the proposed guarantee of bank deposits. Mr. Gage has set forth the present trend of bankers towards a closer watchfulness over all institutions which accept the people's money in trust, and has indicated the exact means whereby, under a guarantee law, bankers would do as now they do—maintain an association empowered to look sharply into financial concerns which seem to be departing from sound methods.—John E. Lathrop in Des Moines (Ia.) Daily Tribune.

TRUST AFFILIATIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN TREASURER

At New York City, October 2, Norman E. Mack, chairman of the democratic national committee, issued the following statement:

"The trust and corporation affiliations of George R. Sheldon, treasurer of the republican national committee for the past ten years, make interesting reading, in view of the recent developments in the campaign.

"I wish to recall in this connection that because of these very affiliations of his Governor Odell in 1902 refused to permit the party leaders to put Mr. Sheldon in nomination for lieutenant governor. Governor Odell at that time declared that he would not accept the renomination for head of the state ticket if Sheldon were named as his running mate. But while the republican party has refused to put Mr. Sheldon's name on the ballot for a public office it has for

the identical reasons for this refusal selected him for its campaign fund collector.

"This can not be denied. Most of the corporations with which Mr. Sheldon is identified are capitalized for millions. How much of their stocks is of the liquid variety can be easily ascertained. Yet Mr. Roosevelt has defended him and his resignation was not demanded when Mr. Dupont was invited to step down and out. Mr. Dupont was only identified with one trust, while Mr. Sheldon is at the present time intimately identified with no less than seventeen prominent financial concerns. One of them, the Bethlehem Steel company, does not employ union labor and has opposed the organization of its employes for the past sixteen years. Mr. Sheldon is a director of that company. He is also treasurer and director of the North American company, capitalized for \$50,000,000, the concern known as the 'mystery of Wall Street.'

"It is but a few years back since he was prominently identified with the whisky trust.

A glance at his connections with the various companies for the past ten years will explain tersely the reason of his present position. No further comment of mine is necessary."

The corporations named by Mr. Mack include railway, industrial and financial concerns here and elsewhere.

Chairman Hitchcock of the republican national committee was shown Chairman Mack's attack on Treasurer Sheldon, but declined to make any statement.

A COMPLIMENT

The courteous poise of Mr. Bryan's reply to Mr. Roosevelt is indicative of many things in the Nebraskan's make-up that account for his popularity and high standing throughout this country.—Washington Herald (Ind.)

In the meanwhile Uncle Henry Watterson is proudly flaunting a vindication as to that alleged Cleveland letter.